Browsing Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics (INO) by Title
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how much do they really differ? And how does it matter?Foss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai J. (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Some descriptive results from DenmarkBille, Trine (, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the labor market for artists and in the creative industries more broadly: How important is a formal education for jobs in the creative industries? How are the careers of people with a creative education? Do they work in the creative industries or outside the creative industries? How is the profile of the jobs within the creative industries? Alper and Wassall (2006) present an overview of the economic, mainly empirical research concerning the labor market of artists. Different types of studies can be distinguished: theoretical models of artistic career processes, qualitative interviews and data, retrospective surveys and panel data based on surveys (either true panel studies or quasi panel studies). Some of the most extended studies on artists’ earnings are done by Alper and Wassall on American census data, where data comes from peoples selfreporting in surveys, and peoples’ occupation is based on time spent at work during a single reference week. This do obvious have some drawbacks. Register data from Statistics Denmark representing true panel data, makes it possible to overcome some of these problems and gain new knowledge on the career patterns of artists, their income, the importance of education, multiple jobholding etc. The register data used in this paper includes a lot of variables on socio-economy, income, employment etc. for the Danish population in the period 1994-2003. The paper includes a discussion and delimitation of artist and the creative industries, and presents new empirical results on the labor market for artists and in the creative industries URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7750 Files in this item: 1
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Lando, Henrik (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: How should a court set the negligence standard in a given area of activity when future (potential) injurers or victims are unlikely to know the standard set by the court? In particular, how should the standard be set in the oft-occurring case where one of the future parties is a professional actor who is likely to know the legal standard of negligence, while the other is an amateur, who is unlikely to know it? In this case, it may be optimal for the court to set the standards at the first-best level despite the amateur's ignorance of the law. The amateur may be able to infer the standards, either from the situation itself (from his knowledge of the costs and benefits of precautions), or from the act performed by the professional party. Moreover, the amateur may take due care because he realizes that the professional party will have an incentive to live up to the standard, and that the risk of a loss will therefore be on the amateur. However, when the ignorance of the amateur is "large," involving not only the legal standards but also the risks inherent in the activity, it may well be optimal for the court to depart from first best standards. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7239 Files in this item: 1
ssrn-id906084.pdf (150.8Kb) -
the case of the Øresund medi-tech plastic industrySornn-Friese, Henrik; Simoni Sørensen, Janne (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper investigates barriers to the process of regional economic development from a linkage perspective. It develops the concepts of linkage lock-in and switching costs as fundamental factors explaining some of the social dynamics of the process. The overall claim of the paper is that different types of costs and their determinants may lock firms in to existing linkages, creating a probable barrier to successful regional economic development. The paper defines linkage lock-in as the difficulty in switching to alternative linkage partners, even if this is desirable. Switching costs are the costs involved in terminating and forming linkages. The extent of transaction costs, dynamic transaction costs and opportunity costs delineate switching costs in interfirm linkages. The paper further elaborates on the concept of opportunity costs; it states that in dynamically competitive environments a class of opportunity costs, namely learning opportunity costs might arise as a result of the relative importance of learning and innovation. Learning opportunity costs are defined as the costs of missing key possibilities to learn in dynamically competitive environments. They are furthermore seen as being constituted by cognitive costs, which in turn are influenced by the existence of information costs. The theoretical argument is illustrated by a case study of the medical part of the Øresund medi-tech plastic industry. Key words: Regional economic development; interfirm linkages and switching costs; lock-in and learning; cross-border business; medi-tech plastic industry. JEL classifications: D83, L14, L22, L68, R58 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7240 Files in this item: 1
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tentative findings from in-depth case studiesLorenzen, Mark (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
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why are inter-firm learning patterns institutionalised within particular localities?Lorenzen, Mark (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
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Lessons from the Entertainment IndustriesLorenzen, Mark; Frederiksen, Lars (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The paper analyses management of product innovation in project-based industries, offering a view on management not only of firms, but also of markets. It first argues that projects are prominent in industries where the nature of consumer demand means that product innovation takes place as experimentation. Then, the paper argues that if skills needed for projects are very diverse and projects are complex, there are few internal managerial economies of projects, and the scope for management then transcends the boundaries of firms. In these cases, markets become organized in combinations of people, contracts, and other institutions, in order to facilitate the coordination of market-based projects. While contracts play a role, a continuous, active role of knowledgeable managers (leaders and boundary spanners) is also often necessary. Such managers --- and thus (core parts of) whole industries --- are embedded in project ecologies at particular places, which is why we see geographical clusters in many project-based industries. The paper is mainly conceptual, but develops its argument by drawing examples from the Entertainment industries throughout. Keywords: Project organization, product innovation, portfolio management of projects, entertainment industries JEL Classification: L22, O31, L82 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7264 Files in this item: 1
wp_2005_01_maindoc.pdf (199.2Kb) -
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Foss, Nicolai Juul (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
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Sornn-Friese, Henrik (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
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Laursen, Keld; Foss, Nicolai Juul (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Does it make sense?Bille, Trine (Frederiksberg, 2010)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper discusses the concept of the experience economy in a Nordic context and shows how the Nordic version of the concept has come about from a mix of three different approaches and theories. Besides, the Nordic definition links the experience economy closely with cultural activities. In the Nordic countries the experience economy has been developed in a political context and it is apparently a popular development policy for local government authorities and regions. This paper discusses the Nordic definition of experience economy and questions if it makes any sense. The definition of experiences is not clear, and the definition of the word “economy” has different interpretations as well. In a narrow interpretation the term economy is related to market economic value, which is used in the political terminology. The paper shows that the experience economy can follow three different routes to market value creation, and how the growth opportunities for the different experience areas will depend on three different trends. Therefore, it can be shown that only some experience areas are growing, and the market value creation occurs in very different ways and to very different extents within, and in relation to, the different experience areas. The greatest growth potential resides probably in the broad value creation in association with the experience areas. But the experience economy does not lend itself to any consistent definition. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8012 Files in this item: 1
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Bilagsmateriale fra "ophavsret i den danske oplevelsesøkonomi: Tal og tendenser"Singal, Kunal; Lorenzen, Mark (Frederiksberg, 2009)[More information][Less information]
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8217 Files in this item: 1
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'Being Infringed' as a Normatively Induced Innovation Exploitation StrategyReitzig, Markus; Henkel, Joachim; Heath, Christopher (, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Patent trolls (or sharks) are small patent holding individuals or firms who trap R&D intense manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms within a game-theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably. Keywords: Patent, patent shark, patent troll, damage award, infringement JEL Classifications: M00, M11, M21, K00, K11, K33 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7249 Files in this item: 1
ssrn-id885914.pdf (277.4Kb) -
Drewsen, Merete; Lando, Henrik; Cummins, Tim (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This is not a theoretical paper but an application of existing law and economic contract theory to the issue of how to draft a specific kind of contract. It is addressed to practitioners and is intended for practical use. It will be part of a Wiki (as in Wikipedia) for contract drafting, which IACCM (International Association for Contract and Commercial Management) has initiated. The main theoretical aspect of the article concerns the application of the value maximization principle (the Coase theorem) to the drafting of confidentiality agreements. While the article is not theoretical, its prescriptions are open to theoretical dispute; this may especially be the case for the section on the size of damages. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7250 Files in this item: 1
ssrn-id917927.pdf (114.9Kb) -
Foss, Nicolai Juul (København, 1997)[More information][Less information]
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The Contingent Value of Networked CollaborationVaarst Andersen, Kristina (Frederiksberg, 2011)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Co-location of industry professionals often leads to development of collaboration networks, and multiple studies have emphasized the benefits of embedded collaboration. Due to higher levels of trust, embedded collaboration reduces transaction costs and facilitates ready knowledge exchanged. Other studies have pointed to dangers of over-embeddedness. The argument is that too high levels of embeddedness lead to habitual thinking, preferential treatment, and thereby mitigate performance. However, research on the conditions under which embeddedness in different types of collaboration networks primarily yields costs or benefits still leaves much to be investigated.... URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8352 Files in this item: 1
Kristina_Vaarst_Andersen.pdf (2.825Mb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: When a court sets standards of due care in a tort or contract case with a view to how the standards will affect future behavior of parties similar to the litigants, it should sometimes realize that only one of the two future parties is likely to become informed of the standards. The standards can then only have a direct effect on the behavior of the informed party, and it may be thought that the court should hold the informed party strictly liable, which maximizes this effect. However, this ignores that the informed party may, although strictly liable, lower her level of care in order to induce the uninformed party to take greater care. In this situation, the negligence rule may do better than strict liability, since the discontinuity of the negligence rule can prevent the informed party from strategically lowering her level of care. Under the negligence rule, optimal standards are sensitive to whether the informed party acts first and to whether she is the injurer or the victim. For both the informed and the uninformed, there are circumstances in which the standard should be higher than first best and other circumstances where it should be lower. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7221 Files in this item: 1
wp01-2008.pdf (121.8Kb)