Browsing Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics (INO) by Author "Lando, Henrik"
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Lando, Henrik (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This article derives key variables in the analysis of standards of proof in criminal law from basic conditional probabilities. The variables derived are the probability of correct and wrongful conviction, the expected sanction and society's incarceration costs, while the basic conditional probabilities are the probability of observing (any given) evidence against individual i given that individual j committed the crime (for any j including j equal to i). The variables are derived from the conditional probabilities as a function of the standard of the proof using simple Bayesian updating. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7225 Files in this item: 1
ssrn-id874907.pdf (143.3Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: How should a court set the negligence standard in a given area of activity when future (potential) injurers or victims are unlikely to know the standard set by the court? In particular, how should the standard be set in the oft-occurring case where one of the future parties is a professional actor who is likely to know the legal standard of negligence, while the other is an amateur, who is unlikely to know it? In this case, it may be optimal for the court to set the standards at the first-best level despite the amateur's ignorance of the law. The amateur may be able to infer the standards, either from the situation itself (from his knowledge of the costs and benefits of precautions), or from the act performed by the professional party. Moreover, the amateur may take due care because he realizes that the professional party will have an incentive to live up to the standard, and that the risk of a loss will therefore be on the amateur. However, when the ignorance of the amateur is "large," involving not only the legal standards but also the risks inherent in the activity, it may well be optimal for the court to depart from first best standards. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7239 Files in this item: 1
ssrn-id906084.pdf (150.8Kb) -
Drewsen, Merete; Lando, Henrik; Cummins, Tim (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This is not a theoretical paper but an application of existing law and economic contract theory to the issue of how to draft a specific kind of contract. It is addressed to practitioners and is intended for practical use. It will be part of a Wiki (as in Wikipedia) for contract drafting, which IACCM (International Association for Contract and Commercial Management) has initiated. The main theoretical aspect of the article concerns the application of the value maximization principle (the Coase theorem) to the drafting of confidentiality agreements. While the article is not theoretical, its prescriptions are open to theoretical dispute; this may especially be the case for the section on the size of damages. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7250 Files in this item: 1
ssrn-id917927.pdf (114.9Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: When a court sets standards of due care in a tort or contract case with a view to how the standards will affect future behavior of parties similar to the litigants, it should sometimes realize that only one of the two future parties is likely to become informed of the standards. The standards can then only have a direct effect on the behavior of the informed party, and it may be thought that the court should hold the informed party strictly liable, which maximizes this effect. However, this ignores that the informed party may, although strictly liable, lower her level of care in order to induce the uninformed party to take greater care. In this situation, the negligence rule may do better than strict liability, since the discontinuity of the negligence rule can prevent the informed party from strategically lowering her level of care. Under the negligence rule, optimal standards are sensitive to whether the informed party acts first and to whether she is the injurer or the victim. For both the informed and the uninformed, there are circumstances in which the standard should be higher than first best and other circumstances where it should be lower. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7221 Files in this item: 1
wp01-2008.pdf (121.8Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This article suggests a rationale for statutes of limitations in sales law, i.e. for the practice of cutting off buyers’ remedies after the expiration of a limitation period. The rationale is based on the notion of wear and tear, which carries two implications: First, a good that breaks down after several periods of use is likely to be of nearly optimal quality, and in this case little is gained by allowing a claim. Second, the number of dysfunctions is likely to increase over time, which implies that the pool of potential claims, and in particular the pool of unjustified claims, is likely to increase over time. It will be shown theoretically that these implications can provide a rationale for cutting off claims. The rationale will be supported with empirical evidence stemming from a recent extension of the limitation period from one to two years in Denmark. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7237 Files in this item: 1
wp06-2007.pdf (237.2Kb)
Now showing items 1-5 of 5