Bid Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

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Bid Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

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Titel: Bid Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction
Forfatter: Boom, Anette
Resume: This paper examines the effect of bid regulations on the range of potential equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with heterogenous bidders. General bid caps destroy equilibria with prices above the bid cap and create new equilibria with prices way below the cap. A cap only for larger rms does not guarantee market prices below that cap. A suffciently high bid floor only for smaller firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria despite their prices being above the bid floor. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably higher bid floors.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/9409
Dato: 2016-12-08

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