Browsing Working Papers (SMG) by Author "Foss, Kirsten"
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Foss, Nicolai Juul; Foss, Kirsten (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper responds to Kim and Mahoney’s "How Property Rights Economics Furthers the Resource-Based View: Resources, Transaction Costs and Entrepreneurial Discovery" (a comment on Foss and Foss, 2005). While we agree with many of their arguments, we argue that they fail to recognize how exactly transaction costs and property rights shape the process of entrepreneurial discovery. We provide a sketch of the mechanisms that link entrepreneurship, property rights, and transaction costs in a resource-based setting, contributing further to the attempt to take the RBV in a more dynamic direction. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7476 Files in this item: 1
cbs forskningsindberetning smg 47.pdf (357.2Kb) -
How Organizational Design Can Make Delegation CredibleFoss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai J. (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Credible delegation of discretion obtains when it is a rational strategy for managers not to overrule employee decisions that are based on delegated decision rights or renege on the level of delegated discretion (and this is common knowledge). Making delegation of discretion credible becomes a crucial issue when organizations want to sustain the advantages that may flow from delegation: Such advantages are dependent on motivated employees, and managerial overruling or reneging is harmful to motivation. However, little work has been done on how organizations can make delegation credible. We argue that key elements of organizations (i.e., organizational structure, coordination mechanisms, reward structures, and interdependencies between activities) and how these fit influence the credibility of delegation. Fit configurations of organizational elements reduce the probability of managerial intervention that may harm employee motivation. This introduces a neglected incentive dimension to the organizational design literature. Moreover, it is argued that harmful intervention may be reduced by increasing managers’ costs of intervening. Refutable propositions are derived. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7427 Files in this item: 1
cbs forskningsindberetning smg 25.pdf (688.5Kb) -
Foss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai J. (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In his seminal 1945 essay Hayek argued that the dispersed nature of much commercially relevant knowledge places strong constraints on the feasibility of centralized allocation and coordination mechanisms, but that there remains a problem of making efficient use of such knowledge (the first Hayekian knowledge problem). He realized that firms, because they make use of authority, are also challenged by dispersed knowledge, and his emphasis on delegation as a response to dispersed knowledge may lead to the prediction that (large) firms shouldn’t exist. Yet (large) firms obviously do exist (the second Hayekian knowledge problem). Recently, many management and organizational scholars have echoed Hayek’s argument that centralized coordination mechanisms, such as authority, may fail in the presence of dispersed knowledge. We examine these modern arguments and argue that they rest on shaky foundations: dispersed knowledge is a less strong constraint on authority than is often thought. We examine the wider implications of this for knowledge-based arguments in management and organizational theory, and call for more research into the micro-foundations of such arguments. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7462 Files in this item: 1
smg wp 2008-14.pdf (393.3Kb) -
A knowledge governance perspectiveFoss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai J. (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: A critical knowledge governance problem concerns the consequences for the use of the authority if the knowledge that is essential in a work setting is partially unknown to the person who is to exercise authority. Is it possible to rationally direct work and activities and efficiently utilize knowledge under such conditions? Recently, many scholars have given negative answers to this question, arguing that authority relations are becoming strained by the increasingly distributed nature of knowledge in and between firms. We analyze this argument on the basis of definitions of "authority” and "distributed knowledge.” This allows us to show that --- while intuitively appealing --- the argument that authority cannot be an efficient coordination mechanism in the presence of distributed knowledge is at best problematic. The argument is based on the flawed inference that because the holder of authority is ignorant about some of the knowledge held by employees, he cannot rationally direct them. However, it is correct that the quality of centralized direction (planning, authority) may be compromised by distributed knowledge, leading to choices of other governance mechanisms and structures. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7425 Files in this item: 1
smg wp 2008-01.pdf (447.9Kb) -
Controlling Intervention Hazards in the Network MNCFoss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai J.; Nell, Phillip C. (Frederiksberg, 2011)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The MNC literature treats the (parent) HQ as entirely benevolent with respect to their perceived and actual intentions when they intervene at lower levels of the MNC. However, HQ may intervene in subsidiaries in ways that demotivate subsidiary employees and managers (and therefore harm value-creation). This may happen even if such intervention is benevolent in its intentions. We argue that the movement away from more traditional hierarchical forms of the MNC and towards network MNCs placed in more dynamic environments gives rise to more occasions for potentially harmful intervention by HQ. Network MNCs should therefore be particularly careful to anticipate and take precautions against “intervention hazards.” Following earlier research, we point to the role of normative integration and procedural justice, but argue that they also serve to control harmful HQ intervention (and not just subsidiary opportunism). URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8380 Files in this item: 1
Kirsten Foss_SMG WP13_2011.pdf (634.1Kb) -
An Entrepreneurial Theory of Economic OrganizationKlein, Peter G.; Foss, Nicolai J.; Foss, Kirsten (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Recent work links entrepreneurship to the economic theory of firm using the Knightian concept of entrepreneurship as judgment. When judgment is complementary to other as-sets, and these assets or their services are traded in well-functioning markets, it makes sense for entrepreneurs to hire labor and own assets. The entrepreneur’s role, then, is to arrange or organize the human and capital assets under his control. We extend this Knightian concept of the firm by developing a theory of delegation under Knightian uncertainty. What we call original judgment belongs exclusively to owners, but owners may delegate a wide range of decision rights to subordinates, who exercise derived judgment. We call these employees "proxy-entrepreneurs," and ask how the firm’s or-ganizational structure — its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, rules for settling disputes and renegotiating agreements, means of evaluating perform-ance, and so on — can be designed to encourage forms of proxy-entrepreneurship that increase firm value while discouraging actions that destroy value. Building on key ideas from the entrepreneurship literature, Austrian economics, and the economic theory of the firm we develop a framework for analyzing the tradeoff between productive and de-structive proxy-entrepreneurship. We link this analysis to the employment relation and ownership structure, providing new insights into these and related issues in the eco-nomic theory of the firm. Keywords: Judgment, entrepreneur, delegation, employment relation, ownership. JEL Codes: B53, D23, L2 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7452 Files in this item: 1
smg 2006-48.pdf (368.6Kb) -
Implications for New Organizational FormsFoss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai J. (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Two of Herbert Simon’s best-known papers are "The Architecture of Complexity" and "The Structure of Ill-Structured Problems." We discuss the neglected links between these two papers, highlighting the role of decomposition in the context of problems on which constraints have been imposed as a general approach to problem solving. We apply these Simonian ideas to organizational issues, specifically new organizational forms. Specifically, Simonian ideas allow us to develop a morphology of new organizational forms and to point to some design problems that characterize these forms. Keywords: Herbert Simon, problem-solving, new organizational forms. JEL Code: D23, D83 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7431 Files in this item: 1
cbs forskningsindberetning smg 28.pdf (508.4Kb) -
Foss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: On November 24, 1874, United States Patent No. 157,124 was granted to Joseph Glidden of DeKalb, Ill., for improved barbed wire fencing. Glidden’s patent was the culmination of a series of nine patents for improvements to wire fencing that were granted by the U.S. Patent Offi ce to American inventors, beginning with Michael Kelly in November 1868 and ending with Glidden’s patent (McCallum and McCallum, 1965), which quickly became dominant. To be sure, wire fencing had been used for a very long time. However, property rights over livestock were less secure, as wire fencing would often break under the impact of heavy livestock pressing against the fencing. This would not happen with barbed wire, so the costs at which property rights to livestock could be protected fell dramatically (Dennen, 1976; Anderson and Hill, 2004). URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7448 Files in this item: 1
smg wp 2008-26.pdf (294.3Kb) -
Foss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai J. (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: To add insight in new value creation, opportunity discovery should be integrated with strategic management theory. Based on the resource-based view and the economics of property rights we build a framework that accomplishes this. Our key argument is that property rights and transaction costs are important antecedents of opportunity discovery. We identify two mechanisms that establish this influence, and examine alternative ways in knowledge, transaction costs, and property rights influence opportunity discovery and sustainable advantage URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7482 Files in this item: 1
smg wp 2008-18.pdf (407.9Kb)
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