Intentional Power in the Organization

By

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Résumé

The paper critically reviews the intentional model of power in organizational management from seven different perspectives. It summarizes some of the most debated issues within political science over the recent decades in relation to an intentional understanding of the concept of power. We claim that these issues are also relevant within organizational management and strategy studies, and we point, in particular, to two contemporary research areas, in which the intentional concept of power seems inadequate to further push the research agenda.
Introduction

In this paper we will discuss a prevalent, if today rarely acknowledged, belief in organizational management. Put in simple terms the belief says that organizational control or, more generally, the notion of control itself, results from empowered management. By introducing into the academic management research a number of insights developed within political science on the problems of understanding the concept of power, we particularly wish to address aspects of understanding management power as an intentional, monolithical capacity to exert control.

The ability to produce a desired outcome, whether in terms of an external or internal organizational function, is itself a function of deliberate management, so the belief goes. Hence, any manipulation of an environment will ultimately require a knowing, willful, and powerful Subject. We will claim that this belief is also widely held in academic management and strategy research, although not explicitly acknowledged. On the contrary, the belief seems to be so deeply rooted in the conceptual management thinking that questioning its’ foundations can be dismissed as simply nonsensical. We will not claim that the belief should – or even could – be abandoned. Obviously, it shapes organizational behavior and as such it is an important practical belief. However, the idea that organizational control necessarily results from empowered management is a problematic starting point for scientific observation. By simply assuming that the managerial function consists of a simple causal relationship between the exercise of power and organizational performance, it is turned into a reality which for the organization can be made an object of analysis and upon which it can act. At the same time it becomes a reality whose status is unquestionable. Accepting this assumption will at best make it possible for us as scientific observers to provide alternative
conceptualizations and criteria in which the practice of organizational management might reorient itself. It will not, however, make it possible for us to observe and conceptualize practices of management, which emerge as counter-intuitive to the dominating, naturalized discourse. This is precisely what we would like to discuss by asking the following question: What does it mean for our understanding of organizational management that management control performance is conceptualized in terms of intentional power?

Turning the cognitive structure of this conceptual consensus into an object of investigation, we hence wish to draw out some of the implicit notions of management power, demonstrating the boundaries, and consequently some of the problems, of conceiving organizational management as necessarily or “naturally” related to intentional control and power. We will claim that there is a close analogy between the way management power is typically conceived within organizational studies and the way Max Weber and, particularly, Robert A. Dahl has defined and understood the concept of power: as a simple and personal capacity for intentional and instrumental action.

The structure of our general argument goes as follows. First we present some methodological considerations directing our discussion, which focus on the distinction between “concept” and “construct”; secondly, we re-state some well-known conceptual ties between management, control and efficiency; thirdly, we show how the intentional conception of power has an action-theoretical foundation in a more general concept of intentional action; fourthly, we critically address the intentional model of power from seven different perspectives, primarily drawn from insights developed within political science, thereby demonstrating how power is a construct rather than a clear-cut concept; finally, we draw the analogy between management understood in terms of managing efficiently and the
intentional model of power. Even though leaving the criticism of management self-understanding implicit and open in this paper we point out some possible consequences of basing the management self-understanding on an intentional understanding of the management process in terms of efficiency.

*Studying the construct of management power*

Laying out methodological criteria for the observation of organizational performance is a notorious scientific problem. This paper is inspired by a previous study of criteria for evaluating organizational effectiveness. Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) suggested approaching the notion of effectiveness, not as a clear-cut concept representing directly observable or easily measurable phenomena, but as a high-level *construct* composed of a number of lower-level concepts. The problem was – and arguably continues to be – that among organization theorists there was a general lack of consensus as to which concepts were to be included in the construct of effectiveness and what their relationships should be. They claimed that this problem in particular was reflected in factor analytic studies of organizational effectiveness. In such studies a set of evaluation criteria initially have to be selected, however, they claimed, “…the selected criteria usually reflect an unarticulated but fundamental set of underlying personal values about the appropriate emphases in the domain of effectiveness. These personal values that motivate the choice of particular criteria ultimately underlie the resulting effectiveness dimensions “uncovered” by (but actually antecedent to) factor analytic studies” (ibid. p. 365). Instead of simply assuming the construct of organizational effectiveness as an object of investigation, the focus of Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s analysis was on the cognitive structure of the organizational theorists, because this provided a method for “making the implicit and abstract notions of multiple theorists and researchers explicit and precise” (ibid.). Therefore, rather than adding yet another level of complexity to the existing
confusion of how to properly define the construct of organizational effectiveness, their analysis demonstrated that academic conceptualizations of organizational effectiveness could be placed within a spatial model consisting of the three value dimensions of “control-flexibility”, “internal-external”, and “means-ends”.

To address the question of this paper we will take a modified version of the Quinn and Rohrbach approach. We will take as our point of departure that the notion of management power is a construct somewhat similar to the construct of effectiveness in the sense that it is a high-level abstraction inferred by multifarious articulations of lower-level concepts. As an individual concept power is essentially contested, which is consistent with the general consensus in the discipline of political science, of which it is one of the most constitutive elements. However, in the field of organizational analysis in general and management and strategy research in particular the multifarious, explicit articulations of management power seem to draw significantly on a single and specific but implicit conceptualization of power, which assumes a causal relationship between intentional action and organizational performance. Therefore, in contrast to the construct of effectiveness, where more or less idiosyncratic and personal criteria a priori direct the evaluation of organizational effectiveness, the construct of management power seems to be informed by a widespread – but no less a priori – conceptual consensus as to the implicit criteria for determining and evaluating the power of organizational management. By contrasting this consensus with a range of different political science approaches to the construct of power, we hence wish to present future avenues for the academic debate about power in organizational management.
The Marriage of Management and Efficiency

Management is often conceived as an instrumental practice consisting in finding the most efficient means of organizing the organization and the people it consists of. This belief’s prevalence of course dates back to the Enlightenment, where knowledge was vested in the new invention of the rational individual or “Man,” rather than the metaphysical being of God. That power can be understood instrumentally as a means to an end was stated clearly by Thomas Hobbes who in 1651 wrote: “The Power of a man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good” (Hobbes 1985 p. 150).

We will argue that to managers today the future apparent good always already seems to be understood in terms of organizational efficiency, i.e. the relative ability to control the time spent, other material and symbolic resources, and the wished for output. It is worth noting that the power of management is thus vested in the authority to apply subjective economic preferences (in the broadest sense of the term), since the function of management is to make authoritative decisions on the (efficient) allocation of scarce organizational resources. Whether vested authority is personal, in the individual manager, or collective, in a team of managers, is of minor importance in this context. The important point we wish to make here is therefore not that the individual managers’ authority can be subjected to a collective, or aggregate, management authority (because this would simply displace the problem), but that the rationality of management is to make “hard economic” decisions on behalf of an organization, and to hold responsibility for them.

In this sense, organizational efficiency is a simple derivative of management, and thus becomes a dependent variable from which an organization’s uniqueness can be measured – and compared. Conversely, the management function itself is turned into an independent
variable, namely *that* organizational resource which can explain the comparative efficiency, success, and identity of the organization. This is due to the fact that although an organization can obtain some control of its’ internal and external environment, and hence to a certain degree manipulate endogenous and exogenous influences, such control would indeed be attributed to the particular management practice of the organization, regardless of whether the practice was highly hierarchical or highly heterarchical, successful or unsuccessful. If it were not, what, then, would be the meaningful function of having a management? The management of an organization thus plays the important symbolic role of representing the personalized will to control. It is the particular choice of management form that can explain the level – in both positive and negative terms – of control an organization exercises over its’ constituting parts as well as its’ environment.

There seems to be nothing new in this observation, at least seen from a stakeholder perspective on organizational sociology (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). To Russell Ackoff the *raison d’être* of any organization is exactly its’ stakeholders.

“This involves recognition of the fact that an enterprise or government agency is an instrument of the system that contains it and of those it contains. Serving all its stakeholders is the only justification for its existence” (Ackoff 1986 p. 11).

Fulfilling stakeholder expectations thus seems to be the implicit rationale for the manager, whose interest, in the words of Nitin Nohria and Robert G. Eccles, lies in “…*being able to use the word to mobilize action to get things done*” (1998 p. 290). A manager openly admitting not to be in control would not last long. Critics have claimed that managers are just taking credit when things are going well, and try to avoid responsibility when not (Jackall
1988). As a specific, instrumental, and opportunistic management strategy, this might be true, but it does not change the fundamental belief that managers are expected to be in control, and this constitutes a conceptual framework managers cannot easily escape. The conceptual framework involves evaluating the explicit task of achieving organizational efficiency – which in private firms is ultimately measured in terms of profits – from a perspective in which good management leads to more efficiency and bad management leads to less efficiency. Management is framed within a teleological means-end structure, where the means can vary from organization to organization, but where the end is given and the abstract formula of goal-attainment is efficiency. In this framework the practice of management is conceptualized in voluntaristic terms: the acting subject of management (individually or collectively) not only has a will, but is also able to realize this will, and by doing so exerts control over its’ environment.

The points made so far show that efficiency constitutes a socially valid justification regarding the role of management, the power of managers, and the framework wherein people are submitted to management. Our conclusion is that management power is structured in a framework where the managers are expected to influence the managed in such a way that things get done more efficiently than otherwise. In the next section we will discuss in more depth how this understanding of management relies, firstly, on a generally voluntaristic or intentional approach to social action, and secondly, on a particular notion of intentional power.

**Intentional action and Power**

When we, in modern science, explain phenomena in nature, we often use causal explanations. If we can deductively assign a single cause or several well-known causes to the observed
effect, we consider it causally explained. The alternative explanations we have available are, for instance, explaining in terms of genesis, where the origin of something is explained, or by giving functional explanations, where some process sustaining feedback-mechanism producing unintended but useful effects is located (Elster 1979). However, in terms of relevance for the present discussion, we also have the intentional explanation. When we try to understand and explain people’s actions we often use intentional explanations, which explain the action in the light of the actor’s motives, beliefs, and will. We explain intentionality and will by ascribing to others propositional attitudes, which in the light of their perceived subjective beliefs could explain why they were motivated to act in a certain way. When we explain by ascribing intentions we hence ascribe propositional attitudes like intentions, will, desires, moral convictions, shame, and ideas about duties and obligations. In short, we use an intentional vocabulary in trying to reconstruct from the standpoint of a third party observer what reasons possibly motivated the person acting. The intentional explanation is the implicit core of any action-theoretical framework.

According to Donald Davidson intentional action is action, which can be explained in terms of beliefs and desires whose propositional contents rationalize the action, because actions become rational relative to the beliefs and values the acting person has (Davidson 2001 p. 99). The reasons attributed in order to explain an observed behavior might not be rational to the observer, but need to relate the intention or belief to the behavior as if it were a cause to an effect. The behavior of the four-year-old child, who at night ran out of his home and down the street, eventually falling asleep in a doorway, may be explained when we realize that he was dreaming of escaping monsters. However, this does not imply that we actually need to accept the existence of monsters. To have a reason, to act purposively, or with a view to an end, is to act intentionally. Rational people are generally thought to be able to justify their
actions by giving reasons for their actions (Brandom 1994; Scanlon 1998). To explain human behavior is to look for possible reasons by reconstructing from the outside the inner logic or reasons motivating the action.

Hence, the intentional model of action is based on an assumption that the acting subject has internal reasons to act, and that others may rationally reconstruct these reasons taking the role of external interpreters. This leads to an important distinction between action and behavior. When internal reasons for acting are lacking we may speak of behavior, whereas when behavior is justified by reasons we may speak of action or intentional action. On the topic of intentional action Jürgen Habermas says:

“I call behavior intentional if it is governed by norms or oriented to rules. Rules or norms do not happen like events, but hold owing to an intersubjectively recognized meaning [Bedeutung]. Norms have semantic content: that is a meaning [Sinn] that becomes the reason or motive for behavior whenever they are obeyed by a subject to whom things are meaningful. In this case we speak of an action. The intention of an actor who orients his or her behavior to a rule corresponds to the meaning of that rule. Only this normatively guided behavior is what we call action. It is only actions we speak of as intentional” (Habermas 2001 p. 5).

Intentional action may, according to Habermas, take the form either of communicative action, strategic action, or instrumental action (Habermas 1984 p. 333). In short, the intentional model of action covers all meaningful action, and excludes only irrational actions where no meaning or meaningful plan of action can justify the behavior. In this sense, action is
sanctioned according to the meaning it invokes in terms of norms and rules. This implies that actions, which are meaningful, will place a responsibility on the acting subject. For example, robbing a bank by mistake cannot be classified as meaningful, and will either be sanctioned with imprisonment (intentional breaking of rules) or by stripping the perpetrator of his rationality (insane behavior).

Having introduced the concept of intentional action we can now turn to the discussion of power, specifically the problems associated with explaining the exercise of power as a function exclusively of intentional action. However, in order to keep a clear argument – which by no means is a simple task when addressing the essentially contested issue of power – we will take as our point of departure the definitions of power of the German sociologist Max Weber and the American political scientist Robert A. Dahl. Perhaps more than anyone they have served as reference points in academic discussions of power, because they seem to have put into words what is commonly understood as having and exercising power. Obviously, the definitions below form parts of wider arguments, the complexities of which we will not address here. The point of this paper is not just to critically discuss the power definitions of Weber and Dahl *per se*, but rather how they are indicative of prevailing – and in Dahl’s (1957) own words intuitive – notions of power understood as an individual’s capacity to intentionally exercise his or her own beliefs and will through other people’s action.

Hence, according to Weber

“Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will, despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” (Weber 1978 p. 53)
Along the same lines, Dahl’s definition, which will form the basis of discussion in this paper, goes as follows;

“A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” (Dahl 1961 p. 202-203).

We will call these conceptions intentional power, because power is bound to a concept of an actor having a will and intention to directly control or command the behavior of another actor. This is clear in several respects.

Firstly, the definitions of power given by Weber and Dahl are characterized by identifying the actual exercise of power, i.e. power as a definite action. This is often referred to as a behaviorist conception because it focuses on actual behavior, which is assumed to be overt and empirically observable, like the movement of a hand. Secondly, power is intended by actor A, and is seen as a direct result of actor A’s action toward actor B. The direction of the power exercised is going from A to B. Actor B’s behavior is assumed to be caused by A’s behavior in such a way that power is direct as well as directed. The ideal typical way of communicating this kind of power, especially relevant in a management context, is by issuing orders. It is notably on this point that the definitions have their intuitive appeal, since most people consider an order to be the most obvious example of the exercise of power. Thirdly, according to the definitions it is an actor – whether individually or collectively – exercising the power, which is therefore seen as something defined relative to and conditioned by the actor’s will. Power has its’ primary anchoring in the will of actor A, and secondary anchoring in possible conflicts of will between actors A and B. The extent to which actors’ wills are themselves constituted and hierarchically organized in terms of, e.g., vested authority,
competence, or might, is therefore taken for granted. Fourthly, the wills and intentions of A and B are implicitly locked in a given and static environment; they are situational. There is no history or path-dependency taken into consideration; only specific situations where an action is performed can be classified as the exercise of power according to the definition. Finally, it is also implicitly assumed that actor A individually has the capacity to sanction and coerce B despite possible resistance.

In sum, the general assumption in the definitions is that the issue of intentionality is unavoidable when the power of human agents is to be understood and explicitly defined. Below, we will critically review the intentional model of power from seven different perspectives. It should be noted that the list of perspectives is far from exhaustive, nor, for that matter, developed on the basis of a single structuring principle. Rather, it summarizes some of the most debated issues within political science over the recent decades in relation to an intentional understanding of the concept of power. We will claim that these issues are also relevant within organizational management and strategy studies, and in the conclusion we will point, in particular, to two contemporary research areas, in which the intentional concept of power seems inadequate to further push the research agenda.

*Power and Observation*

The concept of power applied by Dahl points to the observable exercise of power. The definition presupposes that a manifest conflict of interests between actors A and B can be assumed, and that A’s use of power affects B’s behavior. There is a behaviorist premise at the foundation of this notion of power, whereby only the palpable use of power (in terms of, e.g., physical force or formal competence) becomes visible in the definition’s field of observation.
When Dahl set out to empirically test who actually held power in New Haven, he chose to analyze decision-making on key issues only, and, furthermore, did not state objective criteria for the selection of such “key issues” (Dahl 1961). He held that he was able to identify subjective interests in the form of dominant policy preferences made visible by patterns of political participation in concrete key issue decision-making. Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz (1962; 1963; 1970) fervently criticized this one-dimensional approach, asking whether a sound concept of power could be predicated on the assumption that it was totally embodied and fully reflected in “concrete decisions”. To this question they answered:

“We think not. Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences” (1962 p. 948).

Along these lines, their argument was that prior to a concrete decision becoming an agenda issue in the first place, the game of “non-decision” had already been finished. Hence, with their concept of “non-decision” they claimed that power also has a “second face” or another dimension; namely in the form of agenda setting and the exclusion of specific interests, issues, and agenda items from the decision-making arena. The point they wanted to make was that simply observing conflicting behavior in formal decision-making contexts is analytically inadequate and does not reveal the indirect exercise of power, because the exclusion
mechanisms working in the process both prior to (agenda-setting) and following (implementing) actual decision-making are not observed, although such indirect mechanisms can indeed be observed (1963). Adopting a concept of power focusing exclusively on overt, intended action, limits the intentional power to controlling actual present behavior. Past and future actions and possibilities are not within the scope of control. Thus the focus on actual behavior excludes recognizing potential (understood but not enacted) and latent (not yet understood possibilities for) action from the scope of power.

Power as a Relational Social Phenomenon

By excluding potential and latent action, the will-conditioned notion of power becomes relative to the individual actors A and B and therefore lacks a deeper understanding of the specific relationship between the two actors. It is possible to claim that the relation is always already transcendentially constitutive for any actual use of power, since some relationship between the actors is a necessary condition for any use of power. Actor B thus often has the possibility of breaking the relation and hence also the possibility of the exercise of power. If a woman gets beaten up by her husband she can file for divorce; if the boss’s demands are unacceptable you can change jobs; and in the last resort we can break all social relations by committing suicide. A consistent analysis of the definition of power therefore seems to require an already established social relationship between actors A and B: a relation, which – in principle – can always be changed by both actors. Hence, there is a problem connected with ignoring the social relation between actors as constitutive for the actual exercise of power exactly because the definition ascribes power resources exclusively to actor A. By closer analysis, a relationship between A and B, conditioned on B’s transcendental consent or impotence, is assumed. Bachrach & Baratz analyzed the implicit relational presuppositions build into the intentional notion of power, dismissing claims that it was substantive or
material. According to their analysis the relational character of power concerned especially three factors: (a) there must be a conflict of interests between the actors A and B, (b) a power relationship presupposes that B actually complies with A’s wishes, and (c) a power relationship can exist only if one of the actors can threaten to invoke sanctions (1970 p. 21).

Summing up so far, the critique on Robert Dahl offered by Bachrach & Baratz – and later Steven Lukes (1974) although from a radically different perspective (see below) – suggests that power should not only be understood in behaviorist terms as the actual and observable exercise of power (the first face), but that it should also be viewed as operational when it is not directly observable and recognized, as in the case of non-decisions (the second face). With their critique, the notion of power is extended to include also the potential and latent exercise of power, directing attention to an underlying epistemological “blind spot” in Dahl’s approach; namely that the dualism between mind and body seems to be ignored.

Power & Consciousness

The epistemological “ignorance” towards the mind-body dualism inherent in the Dahl approach to power seems obvious to the extent that power can be seen as (psychologically) operative even if actor A has no explicit or stated intention of actually exercising his or her vested power. By simply having the position or status of actor A (i.e. holding the capacity to dominate), actor B can (re-)act as if A was indeed exercising power. The premise that “A gets B to...” is hence reversed since B can motivate his or her actions with reference to the power held by A. The fact that B may internalize his or her own expectations to A and thereby take over the role of A, will then re-arrange and re-direct the relationship between A and B, although this reversal is unobservable and consequently non-existent in the Dahl perspective.
One might ask; if it is so easy to reverse the direction of power, what – then – is the leverage gained from this definition?

The epistemic fallacy – that B is always able to (choose to) conceal his will and thus epistemologically lift or re-direct the exercise of power – becomes a real problem in a definition of power resting on observable will, as is also pointed out by Barach & Baratz (1970 p. 24). They offer the example of a man wanting to commit suicide but without the determination to carry it through. The man approaches a military guard, who according to a standing order shouts: “Stop, or I’ll shoot!” Observing this situation from the outside, the guard will be the one exercising power, but because of the approaching man’s particular interest in dying, he walks on, re-directs the relationship, and exercises power in the fact that he gets shot. The example makes it clear that power defined as conditioned on will is subjective and relative to the actors’ individual and unobservable consciousness (intentionality). They use the example primarily to delimit the concept of direct power to situations characterized by overt conflict, thus pointing to the problem with a will-conditioned and subject-centered definition of power; that it becomes relative to the individual subject and therefore invalidates itself as a general proposition on power. In spite of its’ general formulation, the exercise of direct power becomes dependent on the actors A and B. In the final analysis, however, B’s intentionality and will conditions whether power is indeed exercised or not.

Naturally, it is possible to dominate people in a purely physical sense, but the mind (consciousness) is not readily accessible, and requires complex, indirect, uncertain, and intangible instruments in order to be influenced, as, for instance, language, ideology and arguments. Especially within political science, the notion that the mind-body dualism has its’
own justification in culture and everyday life is often ignored. As Michel Foucault has shown in *Discipline and Punish* (1995) imprisonment is a modern invention based on the idea that while incarceration is an effective tool for physically controlling people, its’ effectiveness rests primarily in the way it disciplines people and their minds to act and think according to dominating social norms of acceptability/normality. Nelson Mandela fully understood this mind-body dualism, when he claimed that he would not leave prison until Apartheid was abolished. Hence, Mandela reversed the logic of imprisonment and was “voluntarily” in prison since he was offered “freedom” in return for not being politically active. He remained in prison and thereby re-directed the power relation, making himself a symbol of something, which could not be changed by the use of force. Gandhi also demonstrated an insight into the limitations of the intentional notion of power by saying “You cannot use violence against an ideology.” By playing on the mind-body dualism, Mandela and Gandhi with their statements seemed to corner those in power by redefining the relationship as well as the direction of the power. Actor A becomes powerless because actor B disappears from his role as actor B.

The mind-body dualism has as one of its consequences that it becomes a philosophical and epistemological problem how to access other people’s minds. Not even psychoanalysis has solved this problem, because the mind is ultimately a private and mental sphere only directly accessible to the acting subject, if at all. Without the epistemological means to solve the problem theoretically, Dahl simply deals with it on the analytical level by inferring by analogy from observable rational behavior to unobservable rational belief structure. In consequence, when he defines power relative to what is going on in the minds of A and B, he defines it relative to something that is not directly accessible. Thereby Dahl contradicts the idea of power being actual, overt, and observable. Most notably, the intentionality of B is at stake in the definition – in order for it to be meaningful in the first place – but no one could
know what B would have done otherwise. B’s alternative actions will never be observable. Counterfactually, any observer, including the actors A and B, have to know in advance actor B’s intentions and state of mind before being able to draw any conclusions as to whether and to what extent power is exercised. This not only presupposes access to B’s intentionality, but it also assumes knowledge of how B would have acted if not subjected to power. There is an implicit presupposition that one has to know how B would have acted in a world free of any domination or exercise of power. The intentional definition of power therefore implicitly (or *a priori*) assumes B’s freedom to act. It presupposes a possible world of non-power, which is a condition quite difficult to fulfill empirically. In short, the intentional definition of power presupposes an access to both A and B’s minds, intentions, and interests – presuppositions that can never be empirically fulfilled and, hence, potentially be falsified.

*Power as a Positive Resource*

It is not uncommon to distinguish between two senses of power: that which is exercised “over” someone or something, and the power “to” (do) something. The intentional definition of power focuses on power “over”. In specific contexts of decision-making, A has power over B. Power is thus primarily understood in negative terms: as a capacity to stop or directly determine B’s behavior as a consequence of A’s decision. Hence, the Dahl definition – and presumably also the Bachrach & Baratz approach – emphasizes how A’s power is exercised at the expense of B’s interests. It is, however, possible to understand power also in positive terms: as a capacity for collective decision-making and concerted action. The perspective on power as an operative resource in the service of the common good – power as a social integrator and power as the realization of the collective will-formation – is, if not excluded from, then apparently dismissed in the intentional definition of power. The tradition from Talcott Parsons via Hannah Arendt to Jürgen Habermas becomes a critique of the intentional
concept of power, because here power is seen as a positive resource and a legitimate capacity to apply political consensus to realize the collective will (Hindess 1996 p. 11). Again, it is the intentional premise, which excludes the possibility of conceptualizing power as a communicative power operative in the service of a collective or a democracy (Habermas 1996). In this tradition power is not personal but collective and democratic per se.

Non-intentional Constitutions of Power

By defining power as relative to (i.e. dependent on) the actors’ wills and intentions, Weber and Dahl’s concepts become systematically blind to the variety of other epistemological levels but for the monological perspective of the individual actor. There are, however, concepts of power in which it is located differently: as legality in law; as convention and tradition in culture; as authority and role positions in institutions; as competence in organizations; and as meaning, rationality, knowledge, and the good argument in discourse and communication. By identifying and localizing power as in these – certainly not exhaustive – examples, the concept of power is freed from the monological subject centering assumed by Weber and Dahl. If power is localized in legal, cultural, institutional, organizational, and discursive structures, processes, and products – existing and operating relatively independently from the individual actor’s intentionality and personal will – the plausibility of these alternative notions of power effectively constitute a critique of the somewhat reductionist and narrow scope of the intentional concepts of power.

What is lost, then, is how the formation of ideals, values, norms, traditions, habits, and internalized social expectations powerfully affect the individual’s will and behavior. The constructive possibility of – through communication – mutually affecting structures of expectation and interests, e.g., by way of a formation of norms, is ignored in the intentional
model of power. The definition is blind to the aspect of power in processes of socialization, and the “pressures of adaptation” to tradition and culture, which is often a social condition, also constitutive of the prior relation between A and B. For example, the management power inherent in value based management and other “soft” forms of management technology cannot be disclosed if the observation of power is limited to the focus provided by the Dahl definition.

In his book “Power – A Radical View” (1974) Steven Lukes already pointed out the fact that Dahl is blind to such latent processes of socialization. Lukes took the Bachrach & Baratz critique one – at that time radical! – step further by introducing the distinction between perceived and real interests into the theoretical struggle on how to define power. While Bachrach & Baratz effectively showed how the first, direct face of power offered by Dahl should be complimented with a second, indirect face, they still shared common grounds in the fact that both, according to Lukes, were set in the then on-going pluralist and positivist theoretical debate on decision-making focusing on observable actors, events, and objects of conflict. Consequently, both viewed manifest conflicts – either as with Dahl in concrete decision-making, or as with Bachrach & Baratz in the exclusion of conflictual agenda issues from the decision-making arena by mechanisms of non-decision – as the crucial element in identifying the exercise of power. For Lukes this was highly problematic:

“The trouble seems to be that both Bachrach and Baratz and the pluralists suppose that because power as they conceptualize it, only shows up in cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point, that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent conflicts from arising in the first place.” (1974 p. 23)
The main point Lukes wanted to make was to direct attention to the fact that somebody manages to get their interests fulfilled without manifest conflicts in spite of the existence of a latent conflict of interests. Hence, the exercise of power can take place through a “mental filter” between real and perceived interests: A exercises power over B by influencing B’s perception of his interests in a way which is consistent with A’s interests. In this way A effectively blocks B’s ability to perceive his own real interests.

“To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?” (1974 p. 23)

Importantly for the Lukes analysis, power is not just exercised by – and towards – individual actors, but is inscribed in the very process of socialization, hence, essentially being part of the societal fabric. Social institutions will exercise power in the form of, for example, authority, when individuals and groups accept certain conditions that are not favorable for them. Along similar lines, the absence of dissatisfaction does not necessarily entail a satisfaction with the current state of affairs. Such an “implied satisfaction” could simply be explained as an inability to realize alternatives; the condition is perceived as “natural” or “unchangeable”.

In this way, Lukes added a new (third) dimension to the discussion of power by introducing a distinction between manifest conflicts between individual actors and latent conflicts in the very fabric or structure of society, thus providing what we would call a non-intentional
constitution of power. His notion of power rested on the epistemic premise that objective interest, and thus conflicts between objective interests, lies at the foundation of every society, although such conflicts through processes of socialization will not necessarily surface as manifest conflicts. Lukes nevertheless imagined that actors could somehow realize their objective, real interests through processes of democratic participation and thus “emancipate” themselves from their perceived, subjective interests, but he failed to specify exactly how such an analysis should be conducted in practice, because it would require that actor B, either as an individual or a collective actor, found a “social vacuum” where he was free from A’s influence on and (with-)in himself (Bradshaw 1976 p. 121). For the same reason, he was criticized for suggesting a classical Marxist concept of objective interests understood as the elimination of “false consciousness”. Notwithstanding, he contributed in bringing the discussion on power to the question of how to establish a conceptual platform from which it is possible to reconstruct a perspective on the world, which is in itself freed from any external, individual, and non-intentional form of power.

The Dispositional Character of Power

It follows from the previous section that understanding power exclusively as an individual, personal resource makes one oblivious to the wide variety of ways in which power can in fact be exercised through social structure embeddedness (Granovetter 1985). This, however, does not mean that manifestations of power cannot be disclosed on the interpersonal level, but it does mean that such manifestations will always contain indications concerning the form, content, and distribution of power vested in an inter-personal relationship by latent or “naturalized” social norms. The lessons learned from the debate involving Talcott Parsons, Steven Lukes, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas and others clearly show that specific conflicts of interest (and their resolution by the exercise of power) will always be bound to a
social context and ultimately reflect (an essentially political) struggle over the constitution of social or societal relations. In principle, therefore, any interpersonal relationship can be socially vested with power in the Dahl sense as one individual’s capacity to decide at the expense of another. But this is certainly not the same as claiming that such vested powers will always be exercised, or – for that matter – will be exercised successfully. And it is not the same as claiming that every interpersonal relationship vested with power will be so strictly in the Dahl sense. The point we wish to make here is that perhaps power should be addressed as dispositional in a double sense. Firstly, on the societal or collective level, power can be understood as a disposition in terms of a fundamental capacity to constitute social relations (i.e. power “to”). Secondly, on the interpersonal level, power can be understood as a disposition in terms of a capacity for domination in relationships between individuals (i.e. power “over”). Since we are here especially interested in the intentional notion of power, it would be fruitful to develop this latter point a little further.

A classic theoretical insight across political philosophy, psychology, and sociology is that individuals have a fundamental disposition to act either in accordance with, or in opposition to, expectations. Within sociology this fundamental disposition has been specified in a theoretical distinction between “role-identity” and “role-distance” (Turner 1998 pp. 383-391), and the task has been to answer why and how individuals will normally (or rarely) do what they are expected to do. In terms of the intentional notion of power this question deals with the point that actor A will always have a choice of deciding whether to exercise power or not. The actual exercise of power is therefore modally contingent for actor A. Not only B’s interpretation will determine if the exercise of power is to be understood in terms of a potentiality, but also A’s choice. Exactly because the potential to exercise power exists both in terms of A’s choice and B’s understanding and interpretation of the situation, power could
be understood as dispositional. A potential or latent capacity is impossible to observe because it is not necessarily realized as an actual, overt exercise of power. The dispositional capacity is only visible to observation in terms of its manifestations (Morriss 1987 p. 16). This constitutes a collapse of the behaviorist assumption of Dahl that power is necessarily actual, overt, and observable. Accordingly, power understood as a dispositional concept cannot be an instrument, a resource or an actual event, but can only be understood as a potential or capacity (Morriss 1987 p. 19).

By consequence, the identification of the exercise of power by a third party observer relying on the intentional definition of power is just as problematic as ascribing intentionality to the acting subjects. The third party observer runs directly into the fundamental epistemological problem that we do not have direct access either to the future, or to other people’s minds. The subject’s own reasons for acting could always be different from the ones ascribed by a third party. It is a reconstruction created externally to the subject, and therefore not more valid than the reconstruction itself. Both rationality and power are properties that in the final analysis are externally ascribed in accordance with their (theoretical) determination, and are therefore relative to the interpreter’s attribution.

Taking an inside perspective, therefore, does not change the fact that power is dispositional. When A chooses whether to exercise power or not it becomes dispositional. When B anticipates A’s exercise of power and acts as if A had already exercised power it is dispositional. When B makes a cost-benefit analysis and judges that the benefit of complying is altogether bigger than the cost of not complying, power is dispositional.
Substituting Power

There are phenomena one can choose to observe and analyze as if they were a manifestation of power, but which nevertheless, especially within the intentional notion, are not commonly (and, again in Dahl’s own words, intuitively) understood as such. The intentional model of power seems to cover all possible intentional action; it is all-pervasive and universal, and therefore fails not only in discriminating power from non-power, but also in specifying its own criteria for relevance. This can be illustrated by substituting the general preposition “to do something” in Robert Dahl’s definition with a specific statement. If we hence were to compare Dahl’s classic will-conditioned definition with the paraphrase “A gets B to love someone, which B would not otherwise love”, it becomes clear that a relevant application of the intentional definition of power requires a substantial concretization of the object of analysis as well as a specification of the criteria by which intentionality – as opposed to other forms of explanatory, descriptive, or interpretive approaches – necessarily leads to an adequate understanding of power-relations in the object under investigation. That actor A can make actor B love actor C is perhaps not entirely impossible, but nor is it necessarily so. Whether a love relationship is constituted as a result of the intentional exercise of power (i.e., the explanation) depends entirely on the very question asked (i.e., the object of analysis). To ask, “Who made you love that person?” could very well be a relevant question in a context justifying an explanation with the exercise of intentional power, but it could also be highly irrelevant without abandoning the exercise of power as an explanation. For example, asking the question, “What made you love that person?” opens for a wide variety of alternative explanations.

What would happen to the meaning of the intentional definition of power if we presupposed a knowledge society in which actor A was more knowledgeable than B, and B was in need of
A’s knowledge? Would A exercise power when making B do something he would otherwise not have done (in this case increasing his knowledge)? What if B was so ignorant that he could not understand a simple order given by A? Would actor B’s ignorance and inability to be directed by commands reverse the direction of power? And conversely – as pointed out by Lukes (1974 p. 51) – is power indeed exercised if actor A cannot be expected to have any knowledge about the effects on actor B? If A’s knowledge about the consequences of the exercise of power on B is simply not available?

Finally, there are historically rooted trends running from the use of coercion to more refined or sophisticated ways of exercising legitimate power. The development from Machiavelli to modern management, where semantics of love, trust, friendship, team-spirit, ethics, and morality prevail as means to control the autonomous employee, can be seen as a reaction to the need for legitimacy in management and decision-making. Capitalism in a democratic state is submitted to a demand for legality and legitimacy. The demand for legitimacy in relationships of power brings forth the conflict or contradiction that the direction of power by the intentional definition goes from A to B, whereas the direction of legitimacy goes from B to A. A makes the decisions. B decides whether the decisions are legitimate. When an exercise of power depends on it being legitimate, the premise that power analytically depends on actor A’s intentions is clearly inadequate. This is a reason why coercion power does not fit a state of law and complex modern society.

In sum, the intentional model of power is, at the same time, too narrow, because of all the types of power it excludes, and too vague, because it potentially includes all forms of action defined as a form of power. That the intentional model of power is not a valid and exhaustive
(formal) definition of power is hence demonstrated by the fact that substitution cannot freely take place without changing the meaning of the concepts applied in the definition.

Conclusion

The conclusion to this analysis is that the intentional definition of power either defines every action as an exercise of power, or defines phenomena, which are not readily an exercise of power as power, and thereby fails the task of defining power by discriminating it from what it is not. Furthermore, our analysis shows how many implicit assumptions the intentional definition of power relies on.

The reason why the very definition of power is important is because it makes a difference in how we understand the management of collectives and the role of power in democracies. A considerable part of the debate among political scientists has focused on simply defining “the essentially contested” concept of power, primarily for two reasons. First, by defining concepts we draw theoretical distinctions; for example between what rightfully can and cannot be described, classified, and accepted as an exercise of power. The very act of giving (theoretical) definitions (e.g., of power) thus already constitutes the exercise of a second-order “definition-power” (Bordum 1998 p. 217), not to be confused with the first-order “defining power” originally suggested by Steven Lukes (1974). In the latter, the concept of power is related to its’ exercise by the tacit “coding” of its victims’ interests without them being consciously aware of the consent produced in the face of an “objective” conflict of interests. In the former, the concept of power is related to the semantic and discursive struggle to provide meaningful categories and classifications to first-order concepts of power. The first-order definition of any binary conceptual distinctions classifying the world in two (e.g., power and non-power) is therefore always also a second-order exclusion of the third,
i.e., alternative distinctions. The excluded third being the implicit pre-condition for the differentiated two. For example, feminists and post-Foucaultians have consciously addressed the issue of how gender bias, for example sexual harassment, would not be defined as the exercise of power within the scope of the classic male understanding of power. Only through a semantic struggle on how to define power in the first place, have feminists succeeded in including sexual harassment as an exercise of power and, hence, as an abuse of power. Thus the notion of power is circular in a pragmatic understanding. The conception of power affects what counts as power, and the exercise of second-order power may affect the notion of power. Our critical analysis of the intentional model of power showed that it does not succeed in defining power, or in delineating or discriminating power from non-power.

Political scientists widely agree that democracy deals with establishing legitimate institutional procedures, which neither randomly nor systematically privilege one group’s aspirations over another. However, the consensus stops when determining how far democracy and democratic procedures can and should be extended. Although the general consensus stipulates that democracy would formally involve the authoritative allocation of values for a society (Easton 1956) – often understood as the right to take collectively binding decisions – controversy arises on how appropriate democratic institutions and processes should be designed, and hence, about the legal and legitimate extend of democracy. To the extent that democracy is defined as a set of institutional procedures, which provide for a legitimate distribution of the formalized political power, the definition of power becomes crucial to the content and quality of such a democracy. What is really at stake in the second-order discourse on how to define power, is therefore a conflict concerning the constitution of the democratic institutions of society (Haugaard 1997 p. 139). The relationship between democracy and power is circular, because the two concepts are mutually constitutive. Consequently, the
debates about, or rather struggles for, definitions are not altogether trivial or practically unimportant.

The case of power should be clear by now, but what about organizational management? Is the conception of management and power also mutually constitutive? Following our discussion above, the answer to this question would be affirmative. If management is conceptualized strictly in terms of controlling efficiency within a teleological, intentional frame of understanding, then we may see analogue consequences within management.

What we have shown is that the intentional notion of power is conditioned on the model of intentional action and hence shares presuppositions with prevailing management conception that the ultimate management rationale is intentionally controlling efficiency. It is almost impossible within a management context to escape the demand for efficiency, when justifying managerial behavior. The demand for efficiency necessarily, so it would seem, frame managers in a role where they have to exercise intentional power in order to manage the managed more efficiently.

So, what is really the problem at stake here? Is it not perfectly rational that managerial behavior should be oriented on one hand by some sort of superior *Will* and on the other towards controlling, in whatever form, the behavior of others? Is the managerial function not in itself a perfectly legitimate expression of power? Going back to the introduction, we would like to stress that the notion of intentional management, while an important practical belief, is a problematic starting point for diagnosing contemporary problems of organizational management from an academic perspective, because it ignores some of the paradoxical “blind spots” of the traditional research agenda. Notably, there seems to be a paradox in the way
management is conceived on one hand as holding the ultimate responsibility for producing desired outcomes, but on the other hand as fundamentally deprived of the ability to do so. Managers are placed with the responsibility of performing, and failing to perform adequately will ultimately result in a change of management. At the same time, however, the means with which managers are both expected and equipped to perform will in themselves not guarantee that a desired outcome is produced. This leads to a fundamental asymmetry in the way managerial responsibility is related to managerial efficiency. Of course, rather than a fixed dichotomy, this asymmetry in effect turns the performance of the management function into a conceptual continuum, differentiating between degrees of good and bad management. To a large extent the academic management and strategy research is concerned with addressing this continuum by discussing criteria for determining appropriate and adequate management practices (e.g., new management technologies, necessary management qualifications, and new forms of management responsibility). But it is not concerned with addressing the question of the very appropriateness and adequacy of discussing management practices in terms of this particular continuum.

In our view, this “traditional” agenda is not well suited for diagnosing management problems in the new knowledge economy. Failing to acknowledge that, today, managers are deprived of the intentional power to produce an organizational efficiency, for which they hold individual or collective responsibility, will at best only help in reproducing the belief that organizational control can exhaustively be understood in terms of a continuum between good and bad management. It will not, however, make it possible to develop new notions on how organizational performance can be understood without reifying the management-efficiency relationship.
Below we give two examples from current research areas, where problems with identifying management as the exercise of intentional power become obvious in the context of a knowledge economy.

The first example deals with the issue of knowledge production and innovation. According to canonical management literature there are basically two ways of creating value in a firm. One is to rationalize what is already going on and thereby increase efficiency by *exploitation*, and the other is to expand activities and thereby create innovation by *exploration* (March 1991). Whether the path of rationalization or innovation is chosen, is commonly understood as a managerial task. The choice itself will ultimately rest in the managers’ ability and vested power to say “yes” or “no” and thus to decide and control the activity. The ones being managed seem to be absent from the picture, and left powerless regarding this question. At the same time focusing on efficiency alone leaves out the possibility of exploration and innovation. The early phases in the innovation process cannot be managed instrumentally. In the early phases of the innovation process there is no product to optimize or rationalize, there is only a failing market, a need, or a problem to be solved. Our rhetorical question is now: can management power, if understood according to the intentional model of power, logically support a decision for innovation? Can this decision itself be managed efficiently? The inherent instrumentality in the intentional model of power and efficient management seems to contradict the possibility. Any management with efficiency as self-understanding, and relying on an intentional conception of management power, is very likely to exclude managing according to the logic of innovation and exploration. The exclusion of innovation as a strategy is justified on the basis of systematic reasons, which from our point of view are not rational. Just as the intentional model of power focuses on power “over” and excludes power “to”, management power in this sense systematically blocks innovation.
The second example relates to the production and consumption of management knowledge in the context of consultancy. Today, we see an emerging institutional field in which private companies and other organizations make decisions to delegate management functions (e.g., on organizational change) to specialized service suppliers, whereby the companies and organizations create a distance to themselves. This not only implies that their reflection and knowledge of themselves is effectively negotiated in a market (in a contractually based interaction with the management consulting enterprise/agent), but also that the power to define the organizational unity and identity is dispersed. For instance, when contracts on projects of organizational change are negotiated between public organizations and private consultancies, power is dispersed from the public to the private sector in the sense that the private consultancy firm participates in formulating (future) images of public organization and management, which will (or can be expected to, or indeed are intended to) effect how, and by which processes, public organizations perform their functions. However, the interaction between the public organizations (as clients) and private consultancy firms (as suppliers) is regulated by market contracts and not by the exercise of public authority. Hence, the delegation or dispersion of power effectively takes on a character of de-authorization. This, then, raises important issues of, for example, democratic accountability. Here our rhetorical question would be: to what extent is the intentional model of management power able to grasp the consequences in terms of efficiency of delegating vital management functions to third-party service providers? If management in this fashion can be effectively turned into a commodity, how can it meaningfully hold responsibility for its’ performance? If public organizations are institutions working within a democratic framework and structure, how is it then possible to promote efficiency and to exercise intentional power as a consultant working within a framework and structure mainly determined by mechanisms of the market-economy?
In the light of our analysis, these interchanges between public authorities and private firms seem to contradict the underlying premises built into the concept of intentional power. Our two examples demonstrate that the conception of intentional power in organizations fails to produce efficiency in the case where management is trying to use force to create new knowledge in the early phases of managing innovation. Neither does it fit the conceptions of power in a democratic framework. Many other examples may support the general idea in this paper, that relying on a conception of efficiency, tied to an intentional model of action and an intentional conception of power in the organization, may not grasp the whole truth about efficiency. This, because of the blind spots and conceptual problems inherent in the intentional conception of power pointed out in political theory and reanalyzed in this paper.
References:


