Globalization, Governance and Security Management

Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2001
San Francisco, Aug 29-Sept 1st

Panel sponsored by the Research Committee on Political Sociology:
What Does the State Do When It Rules Today?

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Introduction

This paper reflects a concern with the changes in ‘statecraft’ that go with globalization. We are taking a general interest in recent public sector reforms transnationally, but at the present point, the intention is to use security as the empirical domain in which to track and distil the changes wrought in ‘governance’ – in state institutions and practices as they intersect with other parts of society.

The notion of a state being responsible for security is something very crucial to state-ness – and also a very old notion. Concepts like the Pax Romana reflect a perception of a social order as defined by the institutions that establish ‘peace’, i.e. an orderly and regular basis for transactions among men. If state-issued laws rule society, human insecurity is seen as limited by the protection and stability of those laws. Theories – like Hobbes’s - that confront a hypothetical state of nature with a social contract ending or preventing individuals from constantly struggling with each other, also conceive of security as the nodal function of any state. There is an external side to it, too as cemented by the peace of Westphalia: in 1648, participating states agreed to respect each others’ internal arrangements for peace, law and order – sovereignty and security. In the same (post-)Renaissance period, the perception of the function of the state is changing in the direction of what Foucault (1979) calls governmentalization: the state is no longer an external object for the ruler; a wise ruler governs with an eye to the prosperity of his population, attempting to increase the value of his territory (Burckhardt, 1860). Such a shift of perspective adds numerous and complicated concerns to the task of statecraft, but security remains an overriding one.

In the last few decades, another major shift in the function of the state has been theorized, induced by broader material and symbolic processes related to ‘globalization’. The state is now assuming new functions, reneging on old ones. It changes the way it goes about its tasks in a number of domains, not least in the domain of security in which external relations between states as well internal questions of law and order are being problematized and handled in new ways.

The concept of security has mostly been addressed and analyzed in political and international relations theory, and debates have tended to focus on the conflicts between states and the implications of these conflicts. Because the state, in the perspective of liberal ideology and mainstream political science, has been the very impersonation of community and collective identity, the security of the state, its sovereignty and its borders, could be seen as determining the security of all. Especially during the conflict-ridden bipolarity of the Cold War, security was viewed in relation to the issues of ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘national interests’. With the emergence of a multipolar world order since the late 1980s, however, discussions have taken new turns that challenge conventional understandings of national sovereignty and interests, and hence also of security (e.g. Shapiro et al. 1996; Lynn Doty 1996; Weldes 1995; Kaldor 2000): to a large extent, the security of the nation is no longer seen as depending mainly on a military defence of its borders and institutions. Instead, the maintenance of national and international social order as well as the management of the physical environment are presented as crucial tasks for the reproduction of security.

At the same time, ‘security’ and its twin concept of ‘risk’ have entered the discourse of other fields of social and cultural theory. Recent studies of risk and security highlight how damages, losses, fears, worries – i.e. ‘threats to security’ or ‘insecurity’ - are simultaneously produced by and affecting human life and social structure in late modernity. Some of these studies address risk and insecurity as ontological issues, assuming increased riskiness and insecurity in hi-tech, globalized life. Other studies focus on the discourses of risk and security, including crime and the private consumption of security,
analyzing how and why security seems to occupy more and more of people’s minds, the public agenda and policy concerns (Beck 1992; Hope and Sparks 2000; O’Malley 2000; Dean 1999; Lupton 1999; Loader 1999). Risk and security tend to sometimes overwhelm some of the classical concerns of social science like solidarity, justice and welfare.

Both the discussions about new forms of security and the theories of risk society frequently refer to ‘globalization’ as a possible overarching concept for the broad changes connecting these new concerns: expanding transnational interaction, connectivity and reflexivity have been seen as giving rise to, or perhaps expressing the consequences of, the sweeping changes in the role of the state as well as the accompanying shifts in social structures, institutions and processes. Like security and risk, globalization is often viewed as simultaneously material and symbolic: it is a material process of emerging flows and connections, and at the same time a discursive practice, dominating the public agenda with new social and cultural concerns (Robertson 1992; Albjow 1997; Bauman 1998; Robertson and Khonder 1998).

Discussions of globalization have pointed to the difficulty of viewing security and risk in terms of traditional distinctions between internal and external threats: the novel porosity of the state system invites considerations of social, physical and environmental threats that exist across national boundaries instead of either staying inside the nations or creating problems between them. In fact, by producing new types of threats and insecurities as transnational flows of people, money, technology and ideas increase and penetrate established institutions, globalization not only alters the scope and potential for intra- and international conflicts. It also sets a new agenda for how to manage threats to security, redefining the role and capabilities of social actors conventionally involved in security provision and management, in particular the state.

In what follows we will explore some of the changing practices and discourses in the domain of security, with a view to demonstrating the connection between the changes in security handling and the general developments in the role of the state. In addition, by using the security domain as our empirical object, we hope to demonstrate the importance of these changes in statecraft, seen in relation to crucial topics in liberal political discourse. We will be looking at how the modern state currently identifies, problematizes and acts upon insecurity and risks – central concerns to any state, and not least to a democratic one. Additionally, these changes affect not only the state proper, but also numerous other societal actors, as the nature of governance is changing towards a more complex picture of several actors in a multitude of networks, different from the traditional image of a sovereign nation-state.

We have organized the paper as follows: Section one sketches a few assumptions about the current transformation of modern statecraft in a context of globalization. We hypothesize a double move in governmental practices: on the one hand towards a multilevel, transnational governance system which redefines and, some would claim, weakens the role of national government and sovereignty. The emergence of this system reflects that a diversity of powers and authorities now operate in and across societies. On the other hand, a move towards the inclusion of practices from business management, e.g. the ‘new public management’ or ‘corporate model’, in public sectors, in order to replace traditional and purportedly inefficient public administrations. These changes are often analyzed as either ideologically determined, an effect of the ascendance of neo-liberalism, or as a functionally rational choice to accommodate the more complex tasks of contemporary government. Adopting a poststructural approach, we see these changes as reflecting the ascendance of a new ‘governmentality’ in the Foucauldian sense. In this way, we are led to analyze the knowledge and kinds of expertise that
make possible the intervention of authorities, state and non-state, in societal domains, as well as the process of disseminating these particular discourses across institutional borders.

Section two discusses a number of changes in the configuration of political rationalities and governmental technologies in the security domain. Basing our account on a brief review of recent research on the subject, we suggest the ascendance of new governmental rationalities and technologies in the security domain and point to profound changes in the the relation between state and society.

Originally intended as the empirical part, section three has not advanced further than an attempt at developing our research questions for empirical studies. The paper builds on a reading of the recent literature on security, and on some preliminary investigations in Southern California. It is our plan to develop a research design that can serve as a launch pad for in-depth case studies in that region and elsewhere.

1. From 'government' and 'administration' to 'governance' and 'management'.

Recent sociological and political science theorizing about the state has observed a change, in particular over the last couple of decades, in patterns of state ruling, indicating a move from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. That is, from a model of a supreme and sovereign state government, hierarchically organizing the rule of society, towards the acceptance of a multilevel, transnational governance system, consisting of many different and interacting participants in a network, with partially overlapping and segmented domains. According to this literature, the challenges to state sovereignty come from without and within and impinge on state rule and sovereignty in various ways (e.g. Pierre, ed., 2000).

First, the increasing transnational deregulation of financial markets and the ensuing volatility of international capital have divested the state from much of its traditional capability to govern national economic life. Adding to this, the rapidly expanding transnational policy networks, involving state professionals, academia and consultants, have modified or even eroded the state’s capability to govern political and social life within national territory (Pierre 2000:1; Hansen ea. forthcoming). Second, the state has been challenged domestically by new constellations of social forces: with the waning of industrial society, there is no stable configuration of interests and interest organizations, and with the rise of ‘information society’, the state's monopoly of information is being undermined. Finally, there has also been a growing tendency to view the state not as a solution but rather as a source of societal problems, not least poor economic performance. This view has lead to deregulation, and the responsibilization and even empowerment of non-state sectors – private enterprises, organizations and NGOs. In terms of ‘external sovereignty’, a ‘global polity’ (Higgott and Ougaard, forthcoming), or of an anarchic mix of regional integration or imperialism (Held e.a.1999; Jackson, 2000), seem to be emerging. As to the question of ‘internal sovereignty’, the central state’s hitherto uncontested areas of responsibility have been increasingly challenged by the destabilization or erosion of traditional bases of power through decentralization and the empowerment of non-state actors within national territory.

In sum, the move from government to governance has implied a decentering of authority: the hierarchical, territorially bound patterns of nation-state government have increasingly been complemented, challenged and in some respects even replaced by more polyarchical, deterritorialized networks of governance, public and private, ranging from the most local to the global level (Duffield 1998; Kaldor 2000). Modern societies, originally built by the national institutions of the market and by
political systems with a national mandate, co-extensive with the territory of the nation-state, have irreversibly been linked to actors outside the nation’s borders.

This situation has raised new questions about the possibilities of governance: how can societies be governed if ‘traditional’ institutions of power like the nation-state are being fundamentally redefined and perhaps outright eroding (Amin and Hausner 1997; Pierre 2000). One way of discussing it is to reflect on state capacity and capability: some authors have claimed that the state has lost its capacity to regulate, it has become obsolete, a hindrance for the unfolding of market forces (Ohmae, 1985), or has been undermined by strong business interests (Scharpf, 1991). Others disagree: the state retains powerful capacities to regulate the economy, controlling levers that no one else can touch (Weiss 1998; Kitschelt e.a. 1999) or is still able to uphold the contract with its citizens by maintaining levels of living that satisfy the majority of the population (Garrett 1998).

A discussion of ‘state capacities’ employs an institutional notion of the state – the state as a unitary actor, with clear borders and definable resources. That notion reflects the classical ideal of the sovereign nation-state, and as the problem under discussion is that this ideal is dissolving, a different concept and approach seems called for. Recently, Foucault-inspired theorizing has suggested a perspective on government as a process: instead of discussing the state, Foucauldians analyze the processes of government (or governance), looking at the effects of power throughout society. Governing not only takes place in networks involving both state and non-state actors, but also works through the understandings individuals employ to manage their lives (Rose and Miller 1992; Dean 1999).

A closer look at the state proper, the institutional state, reveals that there has been a second, and related, shift in state discourse and practice: In addition to – or perhaps as part of - the move from government to governance, there has been a gradual shift from ‘administration’ to ‘management’. Public sector managerialism is, as we have demonstrated elsewhere (Salskov-Iversen et.al. 2000; Hansen et.al. 2001), evidently part of a wider trend that has brought market mechanisms and managerial techniques into spheres of society not hitherto permeated by the market: the personal sphere, the family, voluntary sectors, and most significantly, the state. In the perception of the state sometimes broadly called ‘Keynesian’, the state was seen as being responsible for society-wide welfare optimization. There has been, in political discourse, a gradual shift away from such an optimistic notion, and towards more reliance on the market – and at least the state’s ability to optimize societal welfare is now seen to depend on the efficiency gains to be had from applying management techniques and using market mechanisms. Many service functions are privatized, and businesses and NGOs are let in to take part in the running and planning of public affairs.

Managerialism replaces the legal-political logic of classical public administration and builds upon a different perception of the state. The state is now represented increasingly as an institution doing two things: delivering collective services to a large and diversified group of customers, and inspiring groups and individuals to govern themselves in certain directions. The classical administrative logic legitimized the state by letting it optimize its political neutrality, its ability to accommodate different societal interests and procedurally follow certain liberal-democratic legal ideals. The emerging management logic has a strong emphasis on cost efficiency instead of legal effectiveness, seeks flexibility rather than predictability, and stresses the states’ capacity to service the business sector (Hood, 1998; Salskov-Iversen e.a., 2000; Clarke & Newman, 1997; Ferlie e.a., 1996).
The move from administration to management has not implied the unrolling of regulation as such, but the implementation of new forms of regulation, often based on marketization and consumerism. As a type of regulation, management resembles administration in that it aims at the organized, governed disposition of resources. But where 'administration' is tied to public bureaucracy, public sector values and rule-based organizational technologies, 'management' introduces private sector ideas. It is more role-based - instead of rule-based - and emphasizes organizational techniques such as competition, cost and performance measurements, evaluation and strategic thinking.

In our study of the correlation between globalization and changes in statecraft, we will investigate governance and managerialization as manifested in the security domain. Our approach will be, first, to study the particular systems of knowledge that make possible the changes of conceptions and practices in the domain of security. We see the very discursive codification of a sovereign state government, and of its particular divisions and spheres, domains and problems, as resting on particular systems of knowledge and thinking about the possibility and practice of state rule – a set of political rationalities. We will focus on the possible changes of such rationalities in the domain of security. Second, we find it important to explore the techniques and procedures through which different authorities at multiple levels, but in particular state organizations, have tried to give effect to their rationalities – the technologies of government (Dean, 1999). In other words, when seeking to detect current changes in statecraft through the exploration of a specific object of governmental intervention – in this case the security domain – we will analyze the particular political rationalities and governmental techniques through which security is effected.

It is through the study of such rationalities and technologies that one can depict the particular ways state practices are articulated into the activity of security handling. Taking our lead from the theories of ‘governmentality’ (Rose & Miller, 1992; Dean, 1999) we hypothesize that what we may find are instances of two technologies of government: first, governing through the installing of technologies of the self: instead of direct state provision or control, contemporary governance (Dean talks about a current phase of ‘advanced liberalism’, which is neo-liberalism enriched by forms of conservatism; 1999, p. 174 n.1) tends to work through a process where discourses are developed for self-governing. Groups, organizations and individuals will employ the ideas, understandings and forms of knowledge contained in these discourses. Secondly, we expect to be able to point to a tendency towards the state – as institutionally understood – being preoccupied with governing itself. A ‘government of government’, or reflexive government, is hypothesized as being in ascendancy: the public sector is becoming focussed on the monitoring of its own activity, explaining, developing and analyzing its own functioning.

2. Transforming statecraft and the security domain: Towards security governance and management

Recent research on security points to a transformation of the security domain – a transformation linked to global developments, to the ascendance of new beliefs as to who governs what, and to the emergence of new modalities of intervention. In short, governmental rationalities and technologies in the domain of security are taking new forms.

First, a number of analysts have pointed to the importance of globalization as a meta-process permeating much of what is happening, shaping political rationalities. ‘Threats to security’ are inscribed and problematized by authorities in ways that embody various forms of reflexivity which, in
turn, rest upon imageries frequently related to global or transborder issues. The sense of competitive pressures from transnational companies and international organizations gives rise to new ideas about how to govern ourselves if we are to survive and prosper in a globalizing world. Transnational flows of immigrants and goods like drugs and arms give rise to a generalised sense of post-modern ‘insecurity’, both socially, culturally and epistemologically (Wagner 2001; Hope and Sparks, 2000).

The new rationalities of government take as their point of departure the existence of this globalizing world, and the question of security becomes a problem of how to manage the social order in a way that retains competitiveness towards other localities on the global scene. The risk factors of unsafe social groups, environmental hazards and economic adversity are seen as something to protect against while the power and resources of transnational businesses call for an inviting posture. The governance question, then, becomes one of securing against the risks and producing conditions favourable to business by orchestrating cooperation between affected actors.

Several authors have observed that solutions to the modern governance questions are frequently found in increased reliance on individualism and markets. Private provision, individual responsibility, and the commercial operations of businesses have come to be seen as superior to state organizations and public provision in many fields, also in the security area. In earlier times, state responsibility for internal security to a large degree evolved from dissatisfaction with private practices: the development of the ‘governmental state’ from the 18th century to the near present is described as a movement from private provision towards state responsibility (Garland 1997:178). That may be only or mostly true for the Anglo-Saxon countries. Now, private policing and the private security industry are again on the rise (Sklansky 1999), offering a unique vantage point for exploring changes in the “private-public” distinction. Security is now not only invoked as a justification for governmental policies but emerges also as a commodity worthy of being purchased in the market place (Loader, 1999).

In accordance with the general tenets of New Public Management, ‘commodification’ and ‘consumerism’ are seen as having an impact on the security of groups and individuals, and by implication on the nature of citizenship and community (Hope, 2000). “Commodification of basic social goods like security thus has the effect of reducing citizenship to a brand of consumerism. Those without the financial and other resources essential to exercising the muscle of consumerism are effectively excluded from citizenship and its protections. The danger is that this trend will lead to a segregated society where basic values of political and social justice are undermined by the differential capacity to buy security” (Zedner 2000: 209). The commodification of security may then mean that security is no longer perceived (if it has ever been) as an unquestionable right for citizens but as a commodity to be bought by consumers in the market place.

A number of the new governmental technologies are found to be of a neo-liberal character, relying upon a concept of governing through rational individuals: privatization, corporatization and insurance, for example. Private security companies are acquiring a global character: “The exponential growth of private security in the United States has been mirrored in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and to a lesser extent, the rest of the world. Private security industry is global in another sense as well: ownership and operation of the industry is increasingly multinational” (Sklansky 1999:1181). In stead of relying upon state provision, public agencies, local government and private citizens are increasingly buying security from guard companies and suppliers of security hard- and software.

Insurance is the classic liberal technology for providing social and economic security for individuals – or rather individuals’ assets. In the insurance business, companies protect property, and market
mechanisms distribute gains and losses. Individuals buy insurance from the companies, and the companies are part of the general security business, constantly exhorting customers to buy more security equipment (Baker, 2000; Ericson e.a., 2000). Among the emerging rationalities of government one may also find a number of notions that rely less on the market – notions about governance that involves the cooperation between the state, non-state groups, NGOs, voluntary associations and the like. The existence of security arrangements on the interface between state, society and the private sector is in no way new, but it has taken a different character over the past couple of decades: multi-agency-approaches, inter-agency co-operation and partnerships. Some of these arrangement may be ‘communitarian’ in the sense that they base governance on the common identities and social integration of the community. But the can also be inscribed in a managerialist discourse: “In this emergent discourse, the community appears as a network of agentive, expert and independent actors who enter partnerships with police. The twin centres of the ‘social’ and ‘state’ which had been fundamental to earlier welfare discourse of community policing accordingly have been greatly attenuated by models of government which focus on the individual and on voluntary organization” (O’Malley and Palmer 1996:138). Here, the ‘communitarian’ idea of welfare state policing is seen as stretched by neo-liberal notions, implying that the bond between authority and community is rather an individual contract. Likewise when governments put up CCTV surveillance in city centres, they express a wish to normalize and harmonize community morals – but they do it as an attempt to install individual responsibility in those parts of the population that seem deficient in that respect (Coleman and Sim, 2000). Among current notions in the field of policing, ‘community policing’ is one popular trend in reforming police work. It rests upon the conception that reduction of crime is a community concern, and that co-operation between police and citizen groups is one way of increasing security. The current trend, however, seems to some extent to point away from those ideals and towards a notion of the police instructing citizens to think like policemen – installing ‘technologies of the self’ in citizens through managerial and marketing methods (O’Malley & Palmer, 1996). ‘Zero-tolerance policing’ is another reform discourse mixing managerialist techniques and communitarian thinking: through constant surveillance and intervention, authorities pressure individuals into conforming to community standards as seen by the police (Stenson, 2000). The ‘vigilante’ groups emerging in many places also represent a communitarian thinking in the sense that the average citizen is seen as capable of maintaining order instinctively, representing community norms that are internalized and undisputed (Zedner 2000; Johnston, 1996). Vigilantism targets individuals and population groups labelled as ‘suspects’. Participants in vigilantism are private citizens whose engagement is voluntary – it can be seen as a kind of “autonomous citizenship” that emerges when an established order is under threat. It also often involves planning – i.e. it is rarely entirely spontaneous - including surveillance of an intended victim or the observation of a particular location (Johnston 1996:222).

One important feature of managerialization is the systematization of knowledge: to be managed, organizational activities have to be measurable, inscribed in systems of reporting and monitoring. It is a classic trait of the security area that surveillance, intelligence gathering and registration forms a

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1 Insurance, though, is not wholly individualistic or rationalistic, hence not all-out neoliberal. It has a conservative-communitarian streak as well: the original concept of ‘moral hazard’ was in the insurance business used about customers with actually deficient morals. The idea was that morally upright customers would act upon a rationality of ‘solidarity’ and not try to optimize their benefits in the interaction with the companies, a notion still in existence in insurance companies (Baker 2000, from Ewald 1999).

2 The police force of Oceanside, a South California city, offers two-week courss for citizens in ‘law enforcement’ (San Diego Union Tribune, August 8, 2001)
crucial part of the activity – and not only for external security: a large part of police work consists in producing knowledge about risk and disseminating it to other public agencies – planning agencies, health and social ones - and to private companies like insurance firms. In this process, the police produces distinctions between risk and security, between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and reproduces knowledges about governance inscribed in the institutions and processes they follow (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Ericson 1994). The managerial technologies applied by the police in these and other efforts are seen by critics as implying an emphasis on measurable activities rather than on solving problems that may be intractable and resistant to management (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996; Zedner, 2000). While they by doing that co-opt citizens as customers, they also reproduce a selection and segmentation of citizen groups, confirming their status as either central or marginal, risky or valuable to society.

3. A framework for case studies

It is our assumption that the new rationalities and technologies of government are spreading globally: through professional communities, international organizations, academic networks, etc. - what we have in other papers termed ‘transnational discourse communities’ – they travel across national, sectoral and ideological boundaries (Salskov-Iversen e.a., 2000). New Public Management manifests itself as a discourse of administrative and governmental reform in local governments in a number of rather different localities – in, for example, Mexico, USA, UK and Germany (ibid.; Salskov-Iversen e.a., 1999; Hansen, 2001; Salskov-Iversen, 1997).

The studies quoted above demonstrate that NPM discourse does appear in the governance of the security field. In much of the literature, however, there is a tendency to see recent reforms as straightforwardly neo-liberal as well as a failure to distinguish the way in which concrete reforms connect with local contexts, at least partially reflecting and adapting to the specific problematic of each locality. There is a need for a study that connects the globalization perspective on NPM with a detailed study of local manifestations. Our efforts so far have been on a rather general and preliminary level, investigating the discourse of NPM in the talks and texts of local governments on the cutting edge of administrative reform. The next round of case studies should go deeper into practical applications, following specific measures of developing governance. To that end, besides selecting the security domain, we have identified three regions where we plan to perform comparative case studies.

The first study is a locality in Southern California, where we plan to scrutinize some of the developments in security governance. In this part of the United States all the different trends in this domain have been experienced: privatization of security, zero-tolerance policing, vindictive penology, and the communitarian technologies of communal security and neighbourhood policing. Southern California is a very mixed region in these respects: The managerialization of the public sector is progressing unevenly but significantly, applying management discourse to improve responsiveness and efficiency (Salskov-Iversen e.a. 2000). In the public safety area, developments are uneven and trends diverge: the Los Angeles police still struggles with old-fashioned incompetence and corruption. Almost in the whole region, there is a widespread adoption of private, commercially acquired security equipment and practices (Sklansky, 1999). In some parts of the region, however, the discourse of community policing thrives – in San Diego County and in the city of Chula Vista, for example.
The security situation, the context of these policies, is very complex – it is a fast-growing, extremely unequal, multicultural society, and the presence of the US-Mexican border adds both a clash of cultures and an international security dimension to the situation: in this region, globalization has had some of its most concrete and diversified consequences (Andreas, 2000; Herzog, 1990). In the wake of the end of the Cold War and the enactment of NAFTA, there has been a decline in the military presence of national armies, and a turn to more commercial concerns. This has led to a growth of cross-border problems like smuggling and illegal immigration, an increase in social inequality and a sprawling urban growth (Lenderking, 1996). On the other hand, San Diego has experienced an economic boom, and for a decade in the nineties, crime as measured in official statistics actually declined.

The second case study is a Mexican one, perhaps Tijuana. Security problems in Mexico are of a different kind, as the fundamentals of institutional infrastructure are not in place: rampant corruption and widespread violence are the very concrete problems that must be addressed in most parts of Mexico. NAFTA has not yet brought wealth and economic growth, but rather confronted Mexican society with a number of difficult transition problems. Mexico, however, has also encountered the new technologies of government: through their dealings with the World Bank and the IMF, Mexican authorities have been required or inspired to work apply Good Governance or NPM discourse in administrative and policy reforms (e.g. Salskov-Iversen et al 2000; Hansen et al 2001). As to the security domain, the new Panista government has introduced a series of programs and initiatives with a particular view to incorporating citizens more actively in the handling of security, and, not least, in monitoring governmental activities: ‘Ojo Ciudadano’ (Citizens Watch/Eye).

The third case study will be German: also a large and wealthy nation, Germany has a well-developed institutional infrastructure and an entrenched tradition for state intervention in the solution of societal problems. The German state is functioning on very legalistic premises – somewhat different from the more pragmatically inclined US state and the heavily politicized Mexican one – and managerial thinking has not been encouraged by the federal state. A number of grass-roots, local, and professional initiatives have, however, set in motion a deployment of managerial discourse also in German local governments. Security problems in Germany are the typical contemporary ones of moderate economic dislocation – the closing of old industries and the growth of new ones, the migration of people from poor regions to richer ones – and of a modern lifestyle: drugs and financial crimes. Bremen is an example of a German city-state that has been comparatively hard hit by economic change, and is only recently begging dragged up from a long slump. One of the means of restarting Bremen’s economic and social dynamics has been the application of Neue Steuerungsmodell (NPM), not least in the police force.

In each of the three case studies, a specific programme or locality will be followed to investigate the way in which this particular programme in this particular place constructs a problematic to act upon, a rationality for acting and a technology for creating solutions. In earlier studies, we have found a number of similarities between the discourse of local governments, as they all apply managerialist discourse in their reform efforts. Studying more concrete activities in the security domain, we also expect to distil some contrasts between the three, and to be able to discuss the ways in which the emerging rationalities and technologies of government move in the globalizing universe.
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