Public Entrepreneurship – the Art of Creating Sociality

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Smith was convinced of the necessity of a well-functioning market economy, but not of its sufficiency. He argued powerfully against many false diagnoses of the terrible "commissions" of the market economy, and yet nowhere did he deny that the market economy yields important "omissions". He rejected market-excluding interventions, but not market-including interventions aimed at doing those important things that the market may leave undone. (Amartya Sen, 2010)

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Introduction

The social is today, along with the nation-state, said to be withering or at least at risk of being extinct. Studying its formation reveals a complex web of developments (taking place in the 18th and 19th centuries) through which a specific domain - the social - was formed, “and with it a social way of governing which combined collective responsibility and individual compensation for the ills or risks of the industrial economy.” (Dean, 2008: 30). It is of course important to note that it is in the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial economy (taking place alongside the formation of an industrial economy in the Asian part of the world) that this ‘end of the social’ is proclaimed. It seems also to be a conclusion arrived at from different analyses, but most of them agreeing that this is connected to the parallel weakening of the Nation State (via State-transcending ‘rule of law’, such as in the EU, and liberal democracies’ emphasis on individual freedom, superior to rights of the State). To some extent this follows from Francis Fukuyama’s thesis on the ‘End of History’ (1989), meaning:

"...the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." (1989: 3)
Fukuyama’s thesis engulfs that: 1) modernity meant reaching the final stage in the development of ideologies (so the end of that progress); 2) this means the end to ideological conflicts as liberal democracy and market principles for economic organization represent the winning model; 3) conflicts will no longer generate a model that can displace liberalism; 4) the grand narrative of human emancipation is exhausted (cf. Held, 1993; Lyotard, 1984 on the concept of grand narratives). This has of course been picked up by advocates of neo-liberalism as it provides a sophistication for their argument. Such readings can see Thatcherism and Reaganism in Fukuyama’s message, i.e., that the reaching of some kind of end-state makes fighting for emancipation obsolete. This would be a society that operates on the social as a complex machine that needs to be adjusted and tuned, but not achieved or reached via ideological struggles.

Anglo-American discourse on ‘Social Entrepreneurship’ has a clear tendency to play into this discussion by making a particular representation of the question of the role of Social Entrepreneurship into the naturally central one: how can an extension of the domain of the market bring about solutions to social problems? Which in effect means: how can formerly social problems, re-defined as economic, become subject to managerial expertise and this way be solved? Somehow, there is no cost associated with the loss of the social in such framings. It therefore exemplifies a rather typical functionalism and instrumentalism of managerialism, which operates on the premise that everything can be translated and reduced into a managerial – i.e., economic-behavioural – problem and solved as such.

What we suggest here is that a more social science- and humanities based understanding of the role of entrepreneurship in society provides a distinctly European counter-image. What is important, from such an approach, is the extent to which social problems and opportunities can be a target for entrepreneurial efforts as a sociality-creating force (Steyaert and Katz, 2004; Steyaert and Hjorth, 2006). That is, we want to elaborate on social entrepreneurship as increasing the social capacity of society, rather than extending the performance capacity of management. So, there is a sense in which we might lose sight of the social. Protesters in the streets of Paris in the autumn of 2007 provided an emblematic example of this analysis, carrying placards with the wordings: “Sarkozy détruit le social.”
In resonance with our previous work on this issue (Hjorth and Bjerke, 2006), we will suggest that the social may presently be so contaminated by managerial thinking that it makes sense to seek out a more neutral ‘location’ for sociality-creating processes we here ascribe to entrepreneurship. We investigate whether the ‘public’ could serve as such a ground. This suggestion means for us that we place the citizen rather than the consumer at the centre of our attention. The question is thus: how can entrepreneurship as a sociality-creating force enhance people’s capacity for living. Our ambition is to contribute to this discussion by elaborating on what we will call public entrepreneurship. The purpose pursued by such a development is to argue for that it is meaningful to revitalise the social as a domain, a level of intervention, a reality parallel to (and often in creative tension to) the economic.

The basis for this is found in a revised understanding of entrepreneurship (Hjorth, 2003; Steyaert and Hjorth, 2003; Hjorth and Steyaert, 2004; Steyaert and Hjorth, 2006; Hjorth and Steyaert, 2009; Hjorth, Jones and Gartner, 2008) sometimes referred to as a European- or a Nordic School (Hjorth, 2008). Entrepreneurship is then re-conceptualized as a sociality-creating force, belonging as much to society and not simply to business. We also make use of an analysis of entrepreneurship as distinct from management, the latter being focused on efficient stewardship of existing resources and social control, while the former is animated primarily by creativity, desire, playfulness and the passion for actualising what could come into being. Public entrepreneurship is a term thus meant to emphasise the creative and playful as central to entrepreneurial activity. This is all the more necessary as the 1980s and 1990s saw an embrace of entrepreneurship by management literature and society more generally – the emergence of the ‘enterprise discourse’ (du Gay, 1997). Such a tendency promoted a tamed, controllable version of entrepreneurship. We insist on calling this ‘managerial entrepreneurship’, and describe it as a product of the enterprise discourse.
1. Background: Enterprise discourse and ‘Social Entrepreneurship’

The recent (1980s in the US/UK societies and in the 1990s mainly in Scandinavia and then also Europe more generally) proliferation of an enterprise discourse is understood as driven primarily by a managerial interest in the enterprising employee and citizen. Enterprise discourse produces the managerial entrepreneur, a role that squeezes the citizen off the stage of everyday life as it installs the entrepreneur-as-consumer as a total category. This is the result of and paves the way for a continued shrinking of the welfare state, replaced by markets or quasi-markets for service-offerings, and a self-organising employee (Nayak and Beckett, 2008; Doolin, 2002). This has several implications for how the social achieves being in everyday organisational meta-discourse. To the extent that more and more can be individualised and more and more individuals be responsibilised, the social is ‘pushed back’ to a minimum and costs can be made into a more far-reaching governing tool as it is more easily attributed to individuals than to ‘relations’ (Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; du Gay, 1997). This managerial form of entrepreneurship – enterprise – is understood as a tamed version of entrepreneurship, in which creative, imagination, affect, the body and relational-desiring elements are bleached out for the purposes of securing control and efficiency.

Social entrepreneurship, launched in the wake of this ‘enterprise discourse-society’ we consider highly problematic, since it thrives on a mis-representation of entrepreneurship and this way – under false flag – accomplished a further managerialisation of society predicated on its economisation. Naturally, as if Fukuyama’s thesis was incontestable and unproblematic, those who write the history of social entrepreneurship, ‘Social Entrepreneurship’ players like Ashoka’s William Drayton, also situates the ‘rise of the social entrepreneur’ to this time (Drayton, 2006), the time of enterprise discourse. Just like with Taylorism, enterprise discourse also emerged as a complex web of forces, working as a program populated in the language of efficiency and fuelled by an ‘alliance between macro-political aspirations and the powers of expertise’ (Miller and Rose, 1993: 93). The citizen – and we shall expand on this analysis later – is re-described in terms of the consumer: “The citizen is now assigned a vital economic role in his or her activity as a consumer.” (Ibid, p. 99). It runs through organisations (of all kinds) too, and entrepreneurship has come to represent this new basis for reproducing the governable employee – the one that is in business for him- or herself within the company (as Rosabeth Moss Kanter put it, 1983).
In order to understand social entrepreneurship as something other than a further domain where the productivity of enterprise discourse is demonstrated, we need to start from a different description of entrepreneurship. Different from the one popularised in management and explored for the purpose of individualising and responsibilising employees and citizens in the name of increased efficiency. Such a description of entrepreneurship (e.g. Hjorth, 2003) asserts that what cannot be lost from sight when trying to identify the entrepreneurial are the creative and playful elements, without which we are dealing rather with economic agents more generally. Entrepreneurship, when operating as a socially creative force, is described here as ‘public entrepreneurship’. To the neo-liberal programme of ‘social entrepreneurship’ we thus present an alternative – ‘public entrepreneurship’. Social entrepreneurship, as a product of enterprise discourse (managerial entrepreneurship), operates with a concept of the social that is made an epiphenomenon to the economic. We need to mark the distance to such a view, and mark the difference by starting with the public (later defined) so as to avoid the artificial separation of the individual and the social that serves this economic atomism typical of an instrumental behaviourism by the help of which management can address the governable homo oeconomicus.

This paper seeks to clarify how the citizen (rather than the customer) can operate as an entrepreneur in the public (rather than the social) to create sociality. The point is to contribute to a counter-image of social entrepreneurship, one that is European. By this (almost impossible qualification) we here mean that what we have named public entrepreneurship answers to a genealogical analysis that affirms research as an art of contextualisation and multidisciplinary conversation. This means not only rejection of functionalism (Morgan, 1980) and tendencies to silence knowledge’s intimate and necessary relationship to power (Foucault, 1980), but perhaps more importantly an acknowledgement of the co-constitutive nature of individuals and society (Massumi, 2002: 71): “Individuals and society are not only empirically inseparable, they are strictly simultaneous and consubstantial.” This means it is meaningless to conceive of an individual outside society, and of society without individuals: in other words – Massumi adds – “…they might be seen as differential emergences from a shared realm of relationality that is one with becoming – and belonging.” (Ibid., p. 71).
We are interested in a particular question regarding the actualisation of such entrepreneurial forms of entrepreneurship in the public - how ‘public entrepreneurship’ can be actualised. The field of practices that public entrepreneurship operates on is the social having-become-economised. It is ‘creating sociality’ that represents the crucial ‘win’ in our perspective (public entrepreneurship). In order for this to happen, dominant, normal practices need to be interrupted, postponed, and deferred. Entrepreneurship achieves this by creating affect or intensities. Such an intensity/affect generates a pause, an in-between, an entre through which the introduction of new configurations is subsequently made possible.

We are not trying to reconnect to society as a State-regulated apparatus by promoting a unitary concept such as the ‘public’ or the ‘citizen’. Instead, with this writing we are interested in destabilising the presently dominant order in which the coding and recoding of desire is regulated by the ‘social entrepreneurship’ discourse. Why? Precisely because this represents a limiting constraint on the socius, which is where the potential for free or willful action of individual bodies in society is exploited by attractors that make desire productive in pre-determined ways; Massumi, 1992). By constantly imposing a unitary form, it prevents the emergence of experimental assemblages, of events. We may thus suggest that ‘social entrepreneurship’ is such an attractor that exploits the desire for producing sociality – to solve problems that manifest in the public – by making available attractors that direct this desire into pre-coded options. We need therefore to emphasise experimentation and event so as to describe and analyse what is different with entrepreneurial entrepreneurship.

Beyond our interest in performatively destabilising the dominant order of thinking the relationship between entrepreneurship and society, i.e., enterprise discourse and its codings and re-codings of desiring social production, we are also interested in analysing the role of affect/intensity for destabilising dominant codings of entrepreneurship into social entrepreneurship. That is, how does entrepreneurial entrepreneurship – entrepreneurship that interrupts pre-codings by the help of affect/intensity – create sociality in the public? How can the citizens become public entrepreneurs in this sense? In view of this introduction we would state the purpose of this chapter as providing a perspective that allows us to imagine a future and practice of citizen-entrepreneurs, creators of new forms of sociality enhancing the fellow-citizens’ quality of life, possibilities for living, and creative capacity, a practice breaking the normalising tendencies prescribed for consumer-citizens in enterprise discourse.
After this background (part 1) the paper will strive towards this purpose with the help of the following structure: Part 2 provides a background and elaborates on central concepts. Part 3 will discuss ‘social entrepreneurship’ as a received managerialist notion of the entrepreneurship–society relationship; Part 4 will elaborate on the role of affect/intensity in transforming the social; and Part 5 will initiate a development of ‘public entrepreneurship’ as an alternative image of entrepreneurship’s role in society, where we rely on ‘entrepreneurial entrepreneurship’ (Hjorth, 2003) and the way affect can provide means for actualising this, what we will call, ‘public entrepreneurship’.

2. Contextualising central concepts

The recent and ongoing entrepreneurialisation of society – via enterprise discourse’s productivity throughout society (Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; du Gay, 1994) – is performed also in the name of dealing with the problems of the welfare state (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). What was once thought by Adam Smith to be a framework for the social administration of capitalism (Meuret, 1993; Sen, 2010) – economics in the sense of a political economy – has gradually become a framework for management of society. Enterprise discourse plays an important role in making this substitution of administration for society pass unnoticed, as if neutral and natural. We are perhaps loosing sight of the social. Rather than being constituted by the relational ethics of the public, the latter which is defined by Immanuel Kant as resting on a central principle - publicity in turn defined as “…a ‘transcendental concept of public right’ based on citizens’ fundamental dignity and moral sovereignty; as a moral principle and legal norm; and as an ‘instrument’ to achieve both individuals’ independent reasoning and legal order in the social realm.” (Splichal, 2006: 696), the social is increasingly re-described as part of the economic.

The social was invented (in the ‘Third Republic’, France 1870-1940), using the notion of solidarity, to make visible the State’s responsibility to compensate for the weakness of the market, to protect the population from unjust distribution of resources (Donzelot, 1988; 2008; Dean, 1999; 2008). In the early 20th century, not the least through F. W. Taylor’s ‘normalisation’ of work as optimal adaptation to the tempo of the machine of production (1911-), economy was made to rule over the social, and resistance against withering social rights can now be irrationalized as bad for the economy, i.e., the worker’s wage (Donzelot, 1988).
The public we can find indirectly specified already via the Roman virtues of *abundantia* (the idea that there is enough food and prosperity to cover all of the populace) and *aequitas* (the idea that the means should be equally shared amongst citizens; the governing ones as well as the governed ones). This resonates with Kant’s understanding of the public in that it also emphasises the transparent nature of the public - that the rationality underpinning the public is also publicly communicable.

Maybe the social is lost to the economy. This would in turn mean that ‘the public’ has gradually become synonymous with ‘audience’ or ‘consumers in general’. If this is the case, the role of manager has acquired preferential right of interpretation beyond its ‘home-domain’ of the company, as the most successful way of handling the economisation of society since the second world war—as Gordon, 1991, has pointed out – has been to managerialise one’s identity. This, in turn, resonates with Bentham’s utility principle for regulating the public – maximisation of happiness is the criterion of rightfulness to attend to here (Splichal, 2006). Now it can be claimed there is a line running through a liberal principle of government – placing managing rather than ruling – at the centre, and the proper governing of the self that enterprise makes normal, leading to this further managerialisation of one’s ‘business of living.’

The current dominant form of political economy – enterprise discourse-powered neo-liberalism – can also be said to disguise itself as non-political and address individuals not as citizens but as ‘entrepreneurs’ (at work) or enterprising consumers (in the experience economy). Responding positively to such calls is rewarded not only with status and financial means, but also with the ability to speak truth and be right (as we learned from Foucault). The weight of ‘rationality’ is bestowed upon the argument of those speaking consistently with the dominant discourse, which in turn stigmatizes the opposing view as irrational, abnormal, false or wrong.

If ‘social entrepreneurship’ represents one such positive response to the managerialised society’s call on individuals to desire a specific form of social production (solving social problems by economising them), how could ‘public entrepreneurship’ be different? The point is that the coding and recoding of desire to produce (or social production), which happens in the ‘socius’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983), consolidates the social as a form of the economic
precisely as this coding is dominated by capitalism. The coding and recoding of desire prepares subjects for social roles and functions. The socius is where desiring production is territorialised on products, solutions, organisations, companies, or societies after which subjects become targets of discourses setting up formations where, in turn, certain rationalities exercise control and ensure the governability of subjects: subjects now desiring what they have invested in or established intensified relationships to. The problem is that this coding of desire in capitalism, when dominated by managerial-governmental rationality, makes the roles of consumer and enterprising employee into privileged subject-positions. Our desire to create is channelled into consumption and into being in business for oneself within the company (cf. Kanter, 1990).

Enterprise discourse, entrepreneurship and affect/Intensity
Enterprise discourse achieves its productive function not simply as it is prepared by and prepares the ground for neo-liberal economy of the 1980s and 1990s version. It summons its force by reactivating a citizen-as-economic-man contrasting with Adam Smith’s conception of the individual qualifying as citizen to the extent that s/he contributes to the production of wealth (Meuret, 1993: 71). Gordon (1991) has described neo-liberalism as recycling the economic man by simultaneously re-activating and inverting its central premise. Amartya Sen (2010) has convincingly argued, though, that the ‘economic man’ was not for Adam Smith what his later liberalist- (Mill, 1844) and neo-liberalist (Friedman, Becker) readers wanted it to be. Smith was more nuanced and maintained the position elaborated in his earlier work – The Theory of Moral sentiments – to balance the relationship between the market and state institutions (Sen, 2010).

The autonomy of ‘economic man’, popularly ascribed to classical liberalist conception, is lost in the neo-liberalist managerialisation (recall Taylor’s role in submitting the social to economic government in the firm; Donzelot, 1988). The latter instead aims at making up the governable subject (du Gay, 1994). Classical liberalism imagines that the freedom of the individual is secured through autonomy vis-à-vis state rule. The individual was, however, dependent upon the institutions guaranteeing this autonomy. Taylor makes the ‘empowered’ worker dependent upon managerial government for the life as someone valuable to the company. Discipline is transferred to the machine via the economy of tempo and the
setting of norms for how to make use of time in adjusting to the machine of production (cf. Chandler, 1977). What is the social context for this work-place development?

Liberalism’s problem of integrating free individuals into a political order is solved during the build-up of the Welfare State by developing collective schemes of security – multiplication of the socialisation of risk – through which ‘freedom’ is collectively guaranteed. Unemployment support makes the individual independent of any particular employer, and relies instead on a socialised risk, the guarantor in the end being the state. However, freedom had to be re-defined in order for the State to legitimately exercise an active role in setting up the conditions for working markets; markets not only for exchange but for competition.

Neo-liberalism thus moves government into the sphere of individual. Freedom is now not a freedom from oppression, but freedom to seize opportunities and realise your full potential. This is the call upon the enterprising individual of competition, mis-represented in management as simply ‘the entrepreneur’. The neo-liberal promotion of a governable homo oeconomicus makes it easier to manage individuals as their freedom depends on their willingness to participate in a new opportunity-freedom system – market-based competition. They shape their conduct according to a certain way of performing the self and exercising freedom. This ordering of one’s self, this mode of shaping conduct, is what is stimulated by a certain governmental rationality (Foucault, 1991). Neo-liberalism developed a critique of inefficiencies attributed to the excessively bureaucratised welfare state. Collective schemes of socialised risk took away incentives to work and made individual efforts insignificant. The cure was the return of the entrepreneur, but in a governable form. Management provided the example of how to control the structuring and distribution of opportunities and thus the exercise of freedom as enterpriser. The welfare state was pushed back in order to set free the potential of new markets or quasi-markets where services could be offered to enterprising consumers. New public management entered public organisations in the name of ending the bureaucratic era (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Society was to be entrepreneurialised, but was in effect managerialised.

The citizen is now ‘empowered’ as an economic agent. At work or at home, we are exposed to opportunities the exploitation of which belongs to the responsibility of the enterprising
individual. The initiative-taking and self-organising, competing consumer/employee is the one that obtains the deals. In-between Smith’s citizen-as-wealth-producer and the enterprising citizen of present day we have witnessed a gradual enlargement of the domain of the market. This also means a gradual expansion of the domain proper to management knowledge as expertise. Our possibilities of imagining entrepreneurship exercised in the role of citizen thus depends upon our ability to diagnose the citizen-enterpriser in the managerially defined role/function made governable and useful (in economic senses) in the enterprising society, as in ‘social entrepreneurship’. ‘Social entrepreneurship’ is thus not so much an oxymoron as an attempt to promote the ‘citizen-as-managerial-entrepreneur’ answering to the governmental rationality of neo-liberalism, intensified in enterprise management, seeking to forge an initiative-taking and self-organising individual. We are not unemployed but job-seeking; not homeless but rough-sleeping. That is, we are consumers in a new opportunity structure, provided by operators on new markets made possible by a crumbling societal responsibility.

We may speculate as to what extent the inclusion of the social in the economic, of society in the economy, is also represented by an absorption of the citizen into the role of consumer. It seems that the establishment of economy as a particular form of reality, as a level of intervention, taking place according to Foucault (1991), during the 18th century (Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations* was published in 1776) has gradually eroded the status of the citizen by waves after waves of addressing the consumer through the operation of the market. It is here that the public becomes important as a way of diffusing the social, pluralising its forms beyond the economic and providing virtual space for the citizen as relationally defined by an ethics of responsibility for the creation and re-creation of the public. Accomplishing such a differentiation of the social, opening a space for public citizens, decentring the citizen-consumer, is of course a political project. Affect/intensity has an important role to play in such processes.

Entrepreneurship has the power to provoke conceptions of what the social could become, beyond the limits of the necessary as confirmed by today’s dominant institutions. Politics (of aesthetics), Rancière (2004) asserts, is the interruption of the distribution of the sensible so as to provide those with no or a very small part in the community with a new role, a say. In Deleuze’s (1998) terms this would be the setting free of a people to come, the missing people. If we have shown that the social is at stake, we have also shown that the
missing people are the citizens beyond their role as performed within the gallery of the consumer/competitor. We turn to ‘public entrepreneurship’ as a force in the creation and recreation of sociality that can supplement the dominant interpolation of individuals as citizen-consumers in the social-as-economy with constructing citizens of a more entrepreneurial kind in the public.

**Conceptual framework**

Central concepts in working toward the purpose previously stated, i.e., that of providing a perspective that allows us to imagine a future for citizen-entrepreneurs, are those of citizen, consumer, social and public. In addition, our interest is in entrepreneurship as creating affect/intensity, and how this capacity can accomplish interventions in the distribution of the sensible, interruption of the dominant coding of desire in the socius, so as to create the presently missing role of citizen beyond the horizon of the competing consumer/employee and managerial entrepreneur. Apart from the short genealogy of the enterprise society, indicated above, this requires a distinction between the managerial- and the entrepreneurial entrepreneur (Hjorth, 2003). The potential of entrepreneurship as a force in creating new forms of sociality is arrested at the present by being normalised, tamed, managerialised in ‘social entrepreneurship’ discourse. We here attempt a move:
3. Value, Citizens, and ‘Social Entrepreneurship’

Welfare State, Value

The post-industrial society alters the economic order of the industrial society. Reflections over the normalities of the industrial society therefore help us understand the scope of the present changes. Toffler (1984) is one of those who have shown how high-modern societies changed from hosting economies where value was primarily based on land, gradually transforming into economies of what Marx called the holy trinity of land-labour-capital. The industrial revolution places a strong emphasis on the labour-capital relationship and this is prioritised by political economy. The ‘laissez faire’ policy vis-à-vis the economy, as argued for by the physiocrats in the late 18th century, is based on their identification of ‘natural tendencies’ in the economy (cf. Hirschman, 1977). By the end of the 18th century, the discussion moves from the Physiocrat’s fixation on land as the basis of value (together with labour) to more clearly include capital. Emerging industrialisation of course drives this development. Marx, Mill and Ricardo refine these discussions:
“The product of the earth – all that is derived from its surface by the united application of labour, machinery and capital, is divided among three classes of the community, namely, the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock or capital necessary for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is cultivated.” (Ricardo 1817: 3)

Marx protests against the tendency to see land, labour, and capital as equally important for economic value, and Jones and Spicer report (2005: 186) how he ironises this:

“They have about the same relation to each other as lawyers fees, red beets and music’ (Marx 1894: 814). […] Marx asks how anything other than the products of human labour can be attributed with value, and finds appeals to the self-valorising character of capital to be a shabby case of self-interested presumption.”

The ‘trilogy’ land-labour-capital remained more or less intact throughout the welfare state era, strongly animated by the way in which Keynesian economics successfully outflanked the Austrian school’s (Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and partly within this school, Joseph Schumpeter) ideas in criticising and questioning economic orthodoxy in the 1920s. Keynes successfully argued that classical economic theory lacked a working macro economic theory, and his own General Theory (1936) was well-timed in providing for governments an active role in preventing the kind of macro-economic problems experienced in the late 1920s and 1930s. The build-up of the welfare state model leaned heavily on a Keynesian line of thinking, not the least since it provided for the state a model of linking the economic and the social in a circular manner (Donzelot, 1988): The social is used to get the economic in balance which enables the pursuit of social politics. The Keynesian model increased the governability of society by providing variables for anticipating and regulating fluctuations in the economy.

The welfare-state was the result of a history of debates over how to publicly protect the freedom of the individual and still reserve agency for the state, strong enough to keep society intact and weak enough to not make individual freedom into an merely a façade (cf. the discussed shift from Liberalism’s passive government to neo-Liberalism’s active government above). Social rights – providing protection of individuals whenever responsibility exercised in private or civil relationships are inadequate – were developed as a ‘practical application of the theory of solidarity’ (Donzelot, 1988: 396). Social economy emerged as a theoretical domain slowly resulting in a certain school of thought. The State was re-thought as the cement of society and the so-called German school was leading the way,
focusing on the socialisation of risk via insurance as the way to realise collective solidarity (rather than individual responsibility). There is a certain sense in which focus on the social is accomplished by this emphasis on solidarity. The new school also saw the traditional reliance on individual motivation (Liberalism) as part of the problem. The insurance solution gave the state the means to maximise solidarity within the existing structure. Enterprise discourse (neo-Liberalism) can in this sense be said to re-focus on the individual level. This time, however, it gains popularity by pitching efficient management of competition against inefficient bureaucracy. Scholars like Paul de Gay (1994; 1997) have criticised precisely this mis-representation of bureaucracy by management, where the latter typically suggests that bureaucracy (a core element in the administration of solidarity as socialised risk via societal institutions) is ethically non-defensible as it is “…inimical to individual self-realization, personal responsibility and other enterprising virtues…” (du Gay, 1994: 660).

Enterprise discourse was politically fuelled with the Thatcherism and Reaganism of the 1980s, which applied the theories emerging out of Friedman’s interpretations of (for example) Hayek’s theories, the land-labour-capital trilogy is slowly altered by an emphasis on entrepreneurial profit as a fourth source of economic value. This answers also to an emphasis on individual motivation to compete as a supplement (if not replace) collective solidarity as the focus on the State’s governmental rationality. This is the essence of neo-liberal enterprise discourse (du Gay, 1997; Hjorth, 2003) that becomes highly productive as it resonates with the views of important stakeholders in society: 1) Politicians realise (by the help of David Birch’s studies of job-creation in the economy (1979; 1984) that it is rather new and rapidly growing companies, not the big ones, which generate new jobs; 2) Managers find that they have exhausted concepts of total quality management and business process re-engineering, and sense that competitiveness in the 1990s is spelled speed, innovativeness and flexibility, i.e., entrepreneurship (Kanter, 1990; Peters and Waterman, 1982); 3) Academia explodes with courses, conferences, new journals, and chairs within the field of entrepreneurship. This is one of the most, perhaps the most, rapidly growing areas in 1990s academia, first in the U.S. (Katz, 2003) and later in Europe, primarily in Scandinavia (Hjorth, 2008).

Value, in the context of an economised society, is almost automatically understood as economic value, and the conceptual conditions of what qualifies as capital (Dean and
Kretschmer, 2007) is now lost. The ground for this shift is prepared not the least by Gary Becker’s work in the 1960s on human capital. Anything is considered translatable into capital, meaning into what facilitates the creation of value. The individual’s intellectual resources are this way made into the object of management, but more importantly also into an object of technologies of the self. To the extent that you are an enterprising employee, your capacity to create value for the company/organisation is considered higher. That is, you are human capital to your employer. Ideas and knowledge are discussed more as private rather than public goods. This background includes the Chicago school (from where both Gary Becker and Milton Friedman emerge). Neo-liberals adjust the Liberalist model by saying that it is not exchange but competition that is important, and that for competition it is not equality but inequality that is the driver. For this reason, the primary economic agent is the competitor, which in neo-liberal economics terms is the entrepreneur (Donzelot, 2008). Our point is that it should more properly be named, the enterpriser.

When we start from the public as a balance between the social and the economic, prioritising the consumer is no longer seen as natural, but as an active result of an achievement. Neo-liberalism represents such a re-description as a return of the free agent, but it is notably the governable enterpriser, the auto-regulating human of competition. We define the public as an in-between, the set of relations, constituted by the social places that are regulated by state structures as well as civil society (White and Hunt, 2000). Enterprise discourse, through which neo-liberalist economy efficiently operates, has pushed ‘social entrepreneurship’ as a new form of freedom. The consumer’s domain is enlarged while the citizen’s is shrunk as we are all buyers of services on markets driven by competition. Neo-liberalism sees ‘social entrepreneurship’ as a success not the least as a force collapsing the distinction between social and economic. The social is now an epiphenomenon to the economic, making it available for management as expert knowledge. The state’s role is to ‘intervene in favour of the market […] in such a way that the market is always maintained and that the principle of equal inequality produces its effect.’ (Donzelot, 2008: 124).

Entrepreneurship, as we understand this here (and this may be distinctly European), cannot be reduced to ‘value creation’ in an economic sense. The point of entrepreneurship as a societal force (Hjorth and Steyaert, 2003; Steyaert and Katz, 2004; Steyaert and Hjorth, 2006) is to be
found in its capacity to create new forms of sociality in the public. Not primarily new economic value, but new forms of sociality. This means, an intensification of the relational nature of individuals, a heightened sense of responsibility for the other (guaranteed by respect for the otherness of the other), and subsequently increased capacities for living. That, in turn, can well lead to the creation of new economic value. But that is derived result. What we focus on here is the process making *that* result possible. The process needs to be understood in terms of how the possibilities for living are enhanced for citizens. *Sociality* is then understood as a collective engagement (affective relation) that generates an assemblage (a project, a group of people). Such an assemblage/project is a heterogenous multiplicity bound together by its function vis-à-vis other socialities in the public, and by the needs of engaged citizens/users. Public entrepreneurship thus makes the public (transparent, open, in-between State and the private) central. This does not rule out market-based solutions to social problems, but solves social problems as such and not by translating them into economic ones.

**Citizens**

The concept of the citizen has a complicated history of its own. Thomas Hobbes’ critique of Aristotle’s conception of the citizen becomes influential during the end of the 17th and 18th centuries. Aristotle said man was born fit for society, whereas Hobbes emphasised: “Man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education.” (1983: 44). Character, and developing a character, was deemed important and it oriented the individual towards the public, towards the kind of responsibility one has to the public (cf. Greenblatt’s 1980 study of self-fashioning in 16th century England). We here find connections attaching this discussion to the Roman virtues we have mentioned above – *abundantia* and *aequitas* – which stipulate a social relatedness to the populace, to the public, for which one shares a responsibility. From the 20th century, however, a shift in emphasis appears: personality rather than character becomes important. This shift from character to personality corresponds to a shift from responsibility for others to a typical high-modern responsibility towards oneself. One is responsible for realising one’s potential:

“The quest for personality resonates with an expanding individualization that is marked by the rise of a consumer market which encourages the expression of individuality through the structured choices of the market.” (White and Hunt,
We see how the role as consumer pushes back the role of citizen, and how this corresponds to a simultaneous shrinking of the ‘public’ and enlargement of the market. Participation in public affairs, famously analysed by Albert O. Hirschman’s theory of ‘Exit, Voice, Loyalty’ (1970), is more and more regulated by a cost-calculus. The ‘free choice’ of the customer is equated with freedom. Neo-liberalism’s initial emphasis on the State’s active participation in creating the right conditions for competition – aimed at setting the table for the entrepreneur – resulted, as we have elaborated above, on an emphasis on the enterpriser. The distinction is little noticed due to the fact that managerial representations of entrepreneurship equates the two and forecloses an understanding of the difference. Importantly, though, the enterpriser is a manipulable homo oeconomicus (Gordon, 1991), a receiver of a pre-structured playground. The entrepreneur, in contrast, we suggest needs to be understood as a playful, creative, idiosyncratic actor on stages they help to build.

Neo-liberalism realises that the consumer-citizen will not re-create market-conditions where competition will prevail, but instead eventually lead to monopolistic situations, which call for intervention and a subsequent socialistic State (Schumpeter, 1976). It is for the prevention of this scenario that the ideal actor is changed from consumer to entrepreneur. This is the core of the enterprise discourse of the 1980s and 1990s. However, we have identified this as an enterpriser, set up via technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988) that increases peoples’ self-awareness (Townley, 1995) rather than leave space for their world-formation (Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus, 1997). Entrepreneurial entrepreneurship is always collective, creative and, in the case of public entrepreneurship, productive of new forms of sociality.

That side – what we here refer to as the citizen side rather than the consumer side – shows evidence of growing stronger in a new generation of self-reflective citizenship that is able to act upon an understanding of how markets work (e.g. Moisio and Askegaard, 2002).

**Bureaucracy, Ethics and Social Entrepreneurship**

New public management, the central branch of enterprise discourse that operates on public organisations specifically for the purpose of managerialising them, has created lots of
necessary organisational changes. It has, however, been primarily about moving ‘entrepreneurial governance’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) into these organisations, meaning quasi-markets are established where competition can become a ‘quasi’-driver. The logic, gradually clarified by in Williamson’s work (e.g. Williamson, 1979), means leaving to the market what it is not absolutely necessary to keep within the organisation, and relying on enterprising employees’ orientation towards the customer (with demands) rather than the citizen (with rights).

We all know that hospitals, railway operations, telecommunications, and so on, are part of histories heavily burdened by the downsides of bureaucracy. What is significant, though, is new public management’s success in turning attention away from the efficiencies and generally good sides of bureaucracy (cf. Du Gay, 2000; Kallinikos, 2004), as are well developed in Weber’s concept of the bureau, and instead refer to bureaucracy as a ‘composite term for the defects of large organizations’ (as du Gay, 2000: 106, puts it). New public management’s critique of ‘bureaucratic rationality’ – that bureaucracy slows down the allocation of resources to the extent that it makes organisations suffer unnecessary costs – also places emphasis on its ethical downside, that it prevents the free agent. We have shown, however, that the curious effect of enterprise discourse is the manipulable rather than free player.

Bauman’s ‘Modernity and the Holocaust’ (1989), is perhaps the strongest critique of the ethical effects of bureaucratic rationality. This is of course important and valid critique. What we speak about here is the ethics of equality and fair, skills-based, treatment, disregarding personal preferences. That is, the functions of the bureau that most of us rely on everyday, on the way to and at work: documentation, skills-based recruitment… What Bauman correctly warns us against is the tendency of bureaucracy to ‘undermine the possibility of individuals exercising a capacity for moral action’ (du Gay, 1999: 575), by its hyper-rationalism, appalling impersonalism and destruction of moral personality. Bauman points out: “the bureaucratic culture which prompts us to view society as an object of administration . . . was the very atmosphere in which the idea of the Holocaust could be conceived, slowly, yet consistently developed, and brought to its conclusion.” But, as du Gay (1999) is equally right in pointing out, Bauman bases his critique of bureaucracy on a different reading than suggested by Weber’s own:
“For Weber, bureaucracy is a particular instituted style of ethical life or *Lebensführung*. In his account, the impersonal, procedural, expert and hierarchical character of the bureau is not treated as a symptom of moral deficiency; instead the bureau is represented as a specific ‘order of life’ subject to its own particular *modus operandi* (1978 II: 958).” (du Gay, 1999: 581).

Bauman’s warning, however correct as such, is thus based upon something else than bureaucracy as conceptualised by Weber. Indeed, it would instead more precisely direct us towards neo-liberalism’s transformation of political economy from an administration of capitalism (as suggested by Adam Smith) into a more general management of society. It is management’s prioritization of the calculable that brings along a rule-based ethics consistent with such a line of thinking. This is what prevents the exercise of moral action that Bauman speaks about and which has been painfully evident in the herd-type behaviour that accelerated the financial crisis of 2008-9 (Lewis et al, 2010).

When the managerial critique of public organisations targets bureaucracy it simultaneously legitimises a transformation of the basis on which individuals are accountable for their acts: from a relational ethics to a calculable measure of their profit-generating capacity. New public management, and enterprise management have had the unfortunate effect of critiquing bureaucracy in the name of entrepreneurship, without leaving further space for anything else than the economic human. Certainly a more cost conscious and customer-oriented human qua employee, but not a more fully human in terms of ethically conscious and relationally oriented. In perspective of the history of management, this is not strange or unexpected (Hoskin, 1998; 2006; Hoskin and Macve, 1988). But entrepreneurship, in the context of the public, in society, is about something else. It is about the passionate engagement, based upon a relational ethics of shared responsibility for the public, driving the creation of new forms of sociality that enhances the possibilities for living. How is affect and intensity part of actualising this ‘public entrepreneurship?’

4. Affect/intensity and the relational constitution of the public

When *homo oeconomicus* gradually (during the 16th to the 18th centuries) crowded out alternative regulative ideals for understanding Western life (Hirschman, 1977; Huizinga, 1955), art was simultaneously assigned a marginal place. Modernity, characterized by
scientific reason joining (and sometimes replacing) God as a ruling force, simultaneously prescribed for art a place within Sunday culture (Huizinga, 1962). The continuity of a hierarchy between lent and carnival (Findlen, 1998) secured the subsequent hierarchy between seriousness and play (see Umberto Eco’s, 1994, *The Name of the Rose*). The sciences started to lock human knowledge into neat boxes used for building disciplines at universities (first established in the 12th century), where analysis qua Galileo and Descartes (detachment from the studied and from one’s passions; law-based, context-free) could become practiced.

With inspirations from Gilles Deleuze’s concept of art, and by Jacques Rancière’s elaborations on the politics of aesthetics, we can argue against modernity’s assignment of a marginal place for affect and intensity – by referring this to art and dislocating this outside of everyday seriousness, such as science and business. Our emphasis on entrepreneurship as the desire to create (novelty), which in turn is seen as what sets it apart from management’s focus on utilizing resources efficiently, relates it to art as a practice sharing this effect upon the social, i.e., the creation of the new by resisting the coding of desire into pre-fabricated social machines of production. Resonant with Rancière’s idea of the aesthetic regime, we would say that entrepreneurship and art both affect the dominant distribution of the sensible in society. Art as well as entrepreneurship affect the sensible order that determines how we perceive things and which forms we use for engaging with it in various places (Rancière, 2006). Art and entrepreneurship creates affect and intensity. This is an opening movement that increases peoples’ capacity to create, to actualise new practices of living in concrete experiences and situations. That is, this is how public entrepreneurship operates on the social by creating sociality.

Public entrepreneurship creates the context in which affect and intensity is a trace of the potential of new sociality being created as made evident by intervention. That is, entrepreneurship interrupts and postpones the continuity of the normal, clearing space for the new to emerge. Entrepreneurial visions, narratives of what could become, function like refrains sung by the bird that seeks to draw a territory in the spring. The refrain establishes the ground of possibility – the terrain that may become the home of something new – and the assemblage of individuals bound together by this potentiality. We are summoned by the entrepreneurial story, and to the extent that this generates affect, we are pulled out of our conventional thinking and need to start figuring out anew how things could be imagined, told,
lived. New forms of sociality are generated and new social practices for living are possibilised. This we here refer to as public entrepreneurship. There are numerous great examples: -“I have a dream!”; -“Ich bin ein Berliner!”; -“Yes, we can!”

These events, turning me towards my sociality-creative capacity, form the entrepreneurial rather than the enterprising subject. What this subject desires, we argue, is the openness, the poetic of the aesthetic experience. At the same time, it is the aesthetic element in the experience that forms the desiring subject. The question is: How does the aesthetic experience work? Consider Massumi’s (2002: 197, emphasis in original), conception of experience: “Every experience, as it happens, carries a ‘fringe’ of active indetermination. Experience under way is a constitutionally vague ‘something doing’ in the world.” This emphasizes what traditionally would be described as the aesthetic quality of experience, but which is characteristic of experience as such. It is this indeterminacy that constitutes its openness which in turn is why it is the stuff that both entrepreneurship and art can creatively use. It constitutes the in-between, the entre- of entrepreneurship, but also the generative indeterminacy of art.

What is the context in which we may locate this experience? It relates to Heidegger’s aesthetic experience discussed as the experience of an event, not reducible to, or controllable by, a subject. The event is characterized by participation and disorientation. A subject position is the possible effect of such an event and not the condition for its appearance. Participating in the event means a discontinuity from the everyday ongoingness of life. We find this emphasised also in Vattimo’s (1992) and in Benjamin’s (1999) discussions of the aesthetic experience, where the blow, the (German) stoss, or shock, marks this discontinuity that leaves us in a state of disorientation, indeterminacy, openness, play.

Deleuze regards this as an opportunity and asks us to grasp this (entrepreneurially, we would add) as a challenge to transform life, to create in this in-between (in the impossible necessity, as Derrida called it). Deleuze suggests ‘difference’ and ‘becoming’ are concepts for understanding and operating in this in-between (entre-concepts; Steyaert, 2000), which denies us the possibility of thinking in terms of ground and closure. How does affect/intensity enable creation of new sociality? An entrepreneurial intervention creates affect that takes us back from composites of experience and habituated ways of living.

“Affect, as presented in art, disrupts the everyday and opinionated links we make between words and experience” (Colebrook, 2002: 23). “Affections are
what happens to us (disgust, or the recoil of the nostrils at the smell of cheese); perceptions are what we receive (odour, or the smell itself). Affects and percepts, in art, free these forces from the particular observers or bodies who experience them. […] Affects are sensible experiences in their singularity, liberated from organising systems of representation.” (Ibid., p. 21-2, emphasis in original).

Skilfully staged interventions/disruptions play with the sensation- as much as the perception side of experience.\(^1\) It is of course in our “organised systems of representation” that we feel comfortable and oriented. “Destroying” this sense of homeliness, affect re-locates us into a space of becoming – of becoming reoriented. This provokes either pleasure or discomfort in that we are offered to make sense of our experience, to enjoy a moment of ‘being lost’ (without support in habit), or to escape its potentiality.

Learning from art as a method for creating assemblages, projects, groups, engagements for a world-to-come, seems to hold great promise for altering the distribution of consumers and citizens in society (Austin and Devin, 2003). We are of course always balancing these roles – together with several others – in conducting ourselves in public, at work, at home. ‘Public entrepreneurship’ works by intensifying and radicalising the social, and thus cannot stay within the limits of managerial entrepreneurship as promoted in enterprise discourse. It would have to operate in the public, that which remains more open and undetermined, and through the role of citizen. ‘Social entrepreneurship’ stages the social as an epiphenomenon to the economic and offers the enterprising consumer as role (promoted simply as ‘the entrepreneur’). This is how neo-liberalism decodes and then recodes the subject on the templates for action it benefits from. If we seek entrepreneurship as a creative force – capable of generating sociality – we need to resist this tendency. We suggest calling this creation of new forms of sociality by the engagements of citizens ‘public entrepreneurship’. Art as the context for an intensified aesthetic experience can function as a most forceful method for interrupting consumers and address them as citizens. Let us conclude by elaborating on this ‘public entrepreneurship’ and its promise of creating space for new sociality.

\(^1\) “…’perception is used to refer to object-oriented experience, and "sensation" for "the perception of perception," or self-referential experience. Perception pertains to the stoppage- and stasis-tending dimension of reality […] Sensation pertains to the dimension of passage, or the continuity of immediate experience (and thus to a direct registering of potential) (Massumi, 2002: 258-9).
5. Public entrepreneurship: the art of creating sociality

When, in the name of management-entrepreneurship (e.g. new public management or ‘social entrepreneurship’), one tries to instigate market-mechanisms as a solution to problems attributed to bureaucracy, the effect is that of a further economisation of the social and a subsequent pushing back of the citizen and an enlargement of the domain of the customer.

We see the point with public entrepreneurship as trying to channel the creative force of entrepreneurship into the building of a society with greater possibilities for living for citizens.

Stressing the relational ethics of a responsibility for the public, we have opted for ‘public entrepreneurship’ as better describing how new forms of sociality can be created. Such creation is driven by citizenship, constituted by this relational ethics. From this conception of the role of entrepreneurship in society, we can ask the central question: ‘What’s the social in social entrepreneurship?’ (Steyaert and Hjorth, 2006).

We share with our previous commitment that ‘public entrepreneurship’ needs to be seduced by ‘the other’, by the social as a strange attractor, as a virtuality to be actualised (Ibid., p. 7). Public entrepreneurship is our answer to how such an intensification of the social can be thought and practiced.

Public entrepreneurship, like all entrepreneurial entrepreneurship, functions by bringing fodder to the desiring production that actualises virtualities in assemblages – projects, groups, teams, networks. This is a process – entrepreneurial creation – that primarily uses passionate speech, improvisation and convincing resonance to articulate images of ‘what could become’.

This demonstrates the need for a relationally constituted ethics to be part of creations of sociality, for it is in the open, in the indeterminate, in undecidability that Bauman’s ‘moral action’ is both possible and necessary.

The virtual, in our case, is the creation of new forms of sociality in the public; sociality that will enhance the possibilities for living for citizens. It is by intervening in the relationships between the sayable and the visible that ‘public entrepreneurs’ can reach the doable by providing a tactical goal that focuses the social production: this is how – ‘I have a dream’ channels social production into one direction. Public entrepreneurship calls on the citizen, and therefore also maintains that radical democratic force that addresses anyone. Our habitual consumer-script is marginalised and we therefore have to start thinking rather than use someone else’s thoughts. Art is referred to in this paper as a method for staging, arranging,
preparing, potentialising the social in order to increase the probability for an assemblage to form and increase its productive capacity. But this is not the basis for a rule or a general strategy. There is nothing preventing such creations from becoming re-coded on the subject of the consumer. An ethical reflection nurtures resistance to this comfortable sliding into consumption-convention. We are thrown into the openly relational, the realm of ethics, where we have to make choices. From there it becomes more obvious that those choices that are prepared for us also limit our freedom. We sense that freedom is not reducible to freedom of choice, i.e., the consumer’s freedom.

With this idea of ‘public entrepreneurship’ and the role of affect in making it actual, we have tried to create an image of ‘public entrepreneurship’ and the citizen to which it is related, as a sociality-creating force. At most it hopes to become a transformative insinuation in the important discussion of how we may imagine new (sustainable) forms of sociality.

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