Excluding the Jews

The Aryanization of Danish-German Trade and German Anti-Jewish Policy in Denmark 1937-1943

By Jacob Halvas Bjerre

Supervisors:

Primary supervisor Joachim Lund (CBS), Secondary Supervisors Christina Lubinski (CBS) and Peter Birkelund (Danish National Archives).

Doctoral School of Organisation and Management Studies
Copenhagen Business School
Sammenfatning

ERM-paradigmets grundtanke er, at en virksomheds samlede risikoeksponering kan anskues og håndteres som en portefølje i en kontinuerlig proces, der integreres i virksomhedens strategiske beslutninger. Den strategiske kobling betyder, at vi bevæger os ind i unikke relationer, hvortil der ikke eksisterer historisk evidens for udfaldsrummet.

Det konceptuelle spring og de praksisrelaterede konsekvenser, der kendetegner forskellene mellem klassisk risikostyring og ERM, er afhandlingens fokus. Forskningsprojektet har strakt sig over mere end 12 år, og det har givet en sjælden mulighed for at følge en moderne ledelsesteknologis livscyklus fra conceptualisering over praksisimplikationer frem til evaluering af konceptets værdi og fremtid.

Afhandlingens kerne er 4 artikler, der hver især søger at belyse et af projektets 3 forskningsspørgsmål, der 1) undersøger koncepternes ledelsesmæssige og organisatoriske orientering, 2) undersøger drivkræfter og motiver for virksomheders adoption af ERM som ledelsesteknologi, og 3) søger indsigt i udfordringer og problematikker, som virksomheder støder på i anvendelsen af ERM -konceptet.

Artiklerne er udarbejdet successivt gennem projektets langstrakte forløb, og afspejler derfor progressionen i konceptuel udvikling og praksisudfordringer, men også i min egen erkendelse.

Den første artikel er en komparativ analyse af fire ERM -rammeværker, der var fremherskende i projektets indledende fase. De er efterfølgende sammensmeltet til to, som til gengæld er blevet nutidens helt dominerende standarder. Analysens primære konklusion er, at rammeværkerne ikke bidrager til at etablere en kobling til de strategiske processer, idet deres indlejrede fokus er rettet mod strategi -eksekvering, men ikke mod selve strategidannelsen. Det medfører, i modsætning til det konceptuelle paradigme, at risikostyringsarbejdet begrænses til en negativ risikoopfattelse. Analysen indikerer
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank the Danish Research Council for awarding me the Forskeruddannelselse uden for Universiteterne\(^1\) grant. I want to thank both the Danish National Archives and Copenhagen Business School for letting me be part of their organizations during my research.

I would like to express my very great appreciation to my main supervisor Associate Professor Joachim Lund at Department of Business and Politics (CBS) for valuable and constructive guidance during all phases of researching and writing this dissertation. I wish to thank my secondary supervisor Senior Researcher Peter Birkelund at the Danish National Archives for his patient guidance and very useful knowledge on relevant archival material. Thanks also to my Secondary Supervisor Associate Professor Christina Lubinski (CBS) for her enthusiastic and very useful critique of my work.

I wish to especially thank Professor Lotte Jensen head of department of Management, Politics and Philosophy (CBS) and Associate Professor Mads Mordhorst head of Centre for Business History (CBS), for letting me become part of the vibrant and inspiring environment at MPP. In addition, I wish acknowledge Mads Mordhorst’s ability to create a competitive, yet warm and open-minded research environment.

I wish to express my thanks to all academic staff at Center for Business History for showing an interest in my project. There was always an open door and an opportunity to take part in inspiring talks as well as discussions about the dissertation or other avenues of research. I have truly grown academically from being part of the staff at the Center for Business History. Thank you all.

I would like to offer my special thanks to Hans Schultz Hansen, Head of Research at the Danish National Archives for his tireless and encouraging support. I wish to thank senior researcher Steen Andersen for his great comments and encouragements, as well as all of the research staff at the Danish National Archives for their general guidance regarding this dissertation.

I would also like to extend my thanks to the administrative and technical staff of both organizations who have been very helpful in providing assistance in various cases from the

\(^1\) “Non-University Research Education” is the official translation of the Danish Research Council. It is intended to strengthen the research at non-university - research institutions by providing funds for pursuing a Ph.D.
simplest of important practical matters to detailed information on rules and procedures. A special thanks to the kind staff at the Ph.D. support at CBS.

Thanks are also due to Head of Archives and Research at Danish Central Library for Southern Slesvig, Mogens Rostgaard Nissen, Dr. Kirsten Lylloff, Dr. Phil. Hans Kirchhoff, Christine Strootmann, Dr. Ingo Köhler, Associate Professor Claus Bundgård Christensen et. al., Dr. Phil. John T. Lauridsen, Manager of Historisk Samling fra Besættelsestiden Henrik Lundtofte, and Jens Andersen – Head of Hanstholm Bunkermuseum.

I am also indebted to the University of Copenhagen for letting me join their history department for a month and a half. Special thanks to Associate Professor Sniff Andersen Nexø and Associate Professor Niklas Olesen for taking good care of me as well as engaging in inspiring discussions. Also thanks to the academic staff and Ph.d. students for welcoming me and taking part in several good talks.

I wish to thank CEO for the Elsass Foundation, Nick Elsass for providing me with interesting and relevant material on the Company Sophus Berendsen as well as his grandfather’s experiences during the time period of this dissertation. I also wish to thank CEO of Raffel & co agentur A/S Christian Raffel for providing me with exciting material on the company’s history.

I would also like to thank the many other Ph.D. students I have met during my journey as a Ph.D. student. Especially, I would like to thank Anders Ravn Sørensen and Ellen Mølgaard for good council and advice on many subjects as well as Valeria Giacomin for the Italian take on both being a Ph.D. student and the world in general.

Special thanks go to my office colleagues at both organizations Benjamin Asmussen, Kristian Bruhn, Anders Dalsager, Ronny Andersen, Lif Lund Andersen and Erik Gøbel. I have enjoyed many good discussions with them on a variety of historical subjects.

Lastly, my kind and patient family deserves the largest thank you of them all. Their various ways of supporting me has been an invaluable help in completing this dissertation. Thank for your sacrifices on my behalf.
Summary US

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and analyze the German *Judenpolitik* in Denmark by focusing on the Aryanization of Danish-German trade relations and anti-Jewish policies in Denmark from 1937 until August 1943. As a second research goal, it examines the reactions of the Danish government to the German *Judenpolitik*. These goals have been developed into four research questions:

1. How was Germany’s ambition to Aryanize its foreign trade developed into concrete policies, and how were these policies implemented into Danish-German trade relations as part of the German *Judenpolitik* in Denmark?
2. How did the German legation assist in formulating and executing the German *Judenpolitik* in Denmark?
3. How did the Danish government respond to the German *Judenpolitik*?
4. Based on the model Stages of Persecution, which stages and forms of *Judenpolitik* can be identified in Denmark during 1937-August 1943?

These are answered by using qualitative and primary historical sources. I therefore apply a historical method which is combined with a four tier analytical approach. The overarching one is Peter Longerich’s definition of *Judenpolitik* understood as a tool to describe and analyze the complex processes of German anti-Jewish policy and politics. This analytical and thematical concept is applied to the Danish-German relationship in the period from 1937 to August 1943. This dissertation suggests that two separate analytical terms are used to describe the Danish-German relationship: collaboration and cooperation. The third analytical approach is the perspectives of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. The main perspective is that of the perpetrators understood as the relevant German organizations and actors, but especially the German legation in Copenhagen and its top leadership. A secondary perspective is the bystander perspective of the Danish government. This dissertation applies a processual bystander view to accommodate for the changes in this position over time. The victim perspective is to a lesser degree represented but applied when possible. The fourth analytical practice is the application
of a ten-stage model: Stages of Persecution. This has been developed by building on previous research in order to identify Judenpolitik’s stages of persecution in Denmark. It consists of the following stages: 1) informal persecution, 2) formal persecution, 3) definition, 4) identification, and registration, 5) exclusion, 6) confiscation and robbery, 7) public stigmatization, 8) forced relocation, 9) deportation, and 10) murder.

Overall, this dissertation shows that the organization the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) from 1937 an onwards pursued an international Aryanization policy creating racial trade barriers which potentially affected companies perceived as Jewish in most countries abroad. In Denmark this policy was largely successful as most Danish-Jewish companies were barred from trading with Germany or restructured to appease German Aryanization demands. The German legation in Copenhagen served as an important partner in this endeavor as it charted, registered, and assisted in excluding Danish-Jewish companies trading with Germany.

Denmark was subject to an intentional and racially motivated Judenpolitik between 1937 and August 1943. This mainly aimed at steadily excluding the Jews in Denmark from several areas of society, but most notably the business area. It was a patient and informal policy due to the nature of the cooperation between Denmark and Germany. In spite of this, a continuous progress in the exclusive Judenpolitik is traceable. We can identify the following typical stages of persecution in Denmark: informal persecution (stage one), and to a much lesser degree formal persecution (stage two). The definition of Jews (stage three), and identification and registration of Jews, partly in cooperation with Danish police (stage four). The exclusion of Jews, especially through Aryanization measures (stage five), and in one instance forced relocation (stage eight).

The analysis of the Danish government’s reaction to German Judenpolitik reveals a flexibility on this policy area which progressively accepted more informal German demands as the war progressed. However, a minority within the government was prepared to accept formal anti-Jewish laws to accommodate for German demands. As a bystander the Danish government thus reacted to the German Judenpolitik by increasingly accepting informal German demands as the war progressed. From the beginning of 1943 the Danish government administrated a discrimination that secured Jews were not hired in higher public positions or the police.
Summary DK

Formålet med denne afhandling er at udforske og analysere den tyske Judenpolitik i Danmark ved at fokusere på ariseringen af de dansk-tyske handelsrelationer og den øvrige anti-jødiske politik i Danmark fra 1937 til August 1943. I tillæg hertil undersøges den danske regerings reaktioner på den tyske Judenpolitik. Disse formål uddybes i følgende fire forskningsspørgsmål:

1. Hvordan blev Tysklands ambition om at arisere sin udenrigshandel udviklet til konkrete politiske tiltag, og hvordan blev disse gennemført i de dansk-tyske handelsrelationer som en del af den tyske Judenpolitik i Danmark?
2. Hvordan bistod det tyske Gesandtskab i udarbejdelsen og gennemførelsen af den tyske Judenpolitik i Danmark?
3. Hvordan reagerede den danske regering på den tyske Judenpolitik?
4. Baseret på modellen faser af forfølgelse, hvilke faser og former for Judenpolitik kan identificeres i Danmark fra 1937 til August 1943?


Den tredje analytiske tilgang, der anvendes i afhandlingen, er perspektiverne ofre, gerningsmænd og tilskuere. Det primære perspektiv er gerningsmændenes, som forstås som de mest relevante tyske organisationer og aktører, men dog især det tyske gesandtskab i København og dets øverste ledelse. Et sekundært perspektiv er tilskuerperspektivet som udgøres af den danske regering. Denne afhandling anvender en processuel tilgang til tilskuerbegrebet, fordi det anerkender, at tilskuerpositionen forandrer sig over tid. Offerperspektivet er repræsenteret, hvor det har været muligt. Den fjerde analytiske vinkel er
anvendelsen af en ti-trins model: faser af forfølgelse. Denne er udviklet ved at bygge på tidligere forskning for at kunne identificere den tyske Judenpolitiks faser af forfølgelse i Danmark. Den består af følgende faser: 1) uformel forfølgelse, 2) formel forfølgelse, 3) definition, 4) identifikation og registrering, 5) udelukkelse, 6) konfiskation og røveri, 7) offentlig stigmatisering, 8) tvangsflytning, 9) deportation og 10) mord.

Samlet set viser denne afhandling, at den tyske organisation Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) fra 1937 og fremefter forfulgte en international ariseringspolitik som skabte handelsbarrierer der baserede sig på de nazistiske raceforestillinger. Denne politik ekskluderede potentielt set virksomheder, som fra tysk side blev opfattet som jødiske, fra den tyske udenrigshandel i de fleste lande. I Danmark var denne politik i høj grad vellykket, da det vurderes, at de fleste dansk-jødiske virksomheder blev udelukket eller omstruktureret for at tilpasse sig de tyske ariseringskrav. Det tyske gesandtskab i København var vigtig partner i denne bestrebelse, da det bistod med at kortlægge, registrere, og udelukke dansk-jødiske virksomheder fra den dansk-tyske samhandel.


Analysen af den danske regerings reaktion på den tyske Judenpolitik viser, at der eksisterede en politisk fleksibilitet på dette område, som bestod i en gradvis accept af flere og flere tyske krav om uformelle tiltag rettet mod jøderne. Imidlertid var et mindretal i den danske regering af flere omgange parat til at acceptere formel lovgivning rettet mod jøderne for at imødekomme tyske krav. Den danske regerings tilskuerposition er derfor karakteriseret ved, at den i stigende grad accepterede tyske krav rettet mod jøderne for slutteligt, fra januar 1943, at administrere en diskrimination der sikrede at jøder ikke blev ansat i højere offentlige embeder eller politiet.
Practical Notes and Abbreviations

Please note that some of the results of this dissertation has been presented in a Danish article.²

This dissertation is written using the American English language. Footnotes are set using the Chicago Manual Style 17th Ed. Full note with the use of Ibid.³ Footnotes are mostly kept in their original language unless a specification in English was needed. Online newspaper articles and online archival material (digitalized sources) are registered with dates. This means an accessed date is not provided, as the article or archival source is dated. (E.g. Aderet, Ofer. “Associated Press Admits It Fired or Transferred 6 Jewish Employees at Behest of Nazi Regime in 1935.” Haaretz, May 10, 2017. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/ap-admits-it-fired-6-jewish-employees-at-behest-of-nazi-regime-in-1935-1.5470709.)

As I use several source collections some source numbers are the same. In order to differentiate these sources, I have included abbreviations of the source collections in brackets. E.g. 10. Das Auswärtige Amt an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft [DK-MAG] refers to Danske Magazin 50 10. Eberhard von Thadden: Notitz [WBK vol. 3] refers to Werner Bests Korrespondance vol. 3. (Please, see reference list for full source details on Danske Magazin and Werner Bests korrespondance.)

Some footnotes refer to Mediastream. Mediastream is a database of digitalized newspapers that is only available onsite at selected libraries in Denmark. I have chosen to consider this source a database rather than a web-site. The is also the case for Politikens Online Arkiv, which is paid service, and referring to a specific URL or access date will not warrant any usage.

All translations are made by the author unless otherwise indicated.

All calculations of historical prices are based on the Danish Statistical Department’s price index calculator, which was last updated in 2017.4

The words ‘Jew’, ‘Jews’, ‘full-Jews’, ‘half-Jews’, ‘Jewish question’, ‘Entjuding’, ‘Mischlinge’, ‘Aryan’, ‘Aryanization’ and other words or phrases related to the language and definitions of the National Socialist dictatorship are not in inverted commas within the main text. This has been chosen in order to avoid an overflow of inverted commas, and in text explanations. I recognize the enforced characteristic of these terms which are oblivious to individual claims of identity, and part of a definitory language aiming at excluding, ultimately murdering, a constructed category of individuals.5

**Abbreviations:**

AA: Auswärtige Amt.
CAU: The Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel
DAF: Deutsche Arbeitsfront
DIIS: Danish Institute for International Studies
DNSAP: Dansk National Socialistisk Arbejderparti
DK MAG: Danske Magazin
NSAP: National Socialistisk Arbejderparti
DNVP: Deutschnationalen Volkspartei
NSDAP: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
NSDAP/ AO: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei /Auslandorganisation
NSDAP-N: National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei - Nordschleswig
PA: Politisches Archiv
RA: Rigsarkivet, Danish National Archives
RfA: Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel
RSHA: Reichssicherheitshauptamt
RuSHA: Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt

5 This follows from Frank Bajohr, “Aryanisation” in Hamburg: The Economic Exclusion of Jews and the Confiscation of Their Property in Nazi Germany, Monographs in German History, v. 7 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 11.
RWM: Reichswirtschaftsministerium
SD: Sicherheitsdienst
UM: Udenrigsministeriet
VoMi: Volksdeutscher Mittelstelle
WBK: Werner Bests Korrespondance
ØK: Østasiatisk Kompagni
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 3
Summary US ...................................................................................................................... 5
Summary DK ...................................................................................................................... 7
Practical Notes and Abbreviations ..................................................................................... 9
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. 13

1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 19
   1.1 State of the Art ........................................................................................................ 22
       1.1.1 Recent Research in Danish Occupation History .............................................. 23
       1.1.2 Research Review on the Historiography of Judenpolitik in Denmark ............... 24
       1.1.3 State of the Art – Aryanization in Denmark ..................................................... 30
       1.1.4 State of the Art: Aryanization in the Foreign Trade .......................................... 32
   1.2 The Danish-German Relationship ........................................................................... 34
       1.2.1 The Use of Cooperation in Danish Historiography ........................................... 36
       1.2.2 The Use of Collaboration in Danish Historiography ......................................... 37
       1.2.3 Defining Collaboration and Cooperation .......................................................... 40
   1.3 Judenpolitik ............................................................................................................ 41
   1.4 Victims, Bystanders, and Perpetrators ..................................................................... 45
   1.5 Stages of Persecution .............................................................................................. 48
   1.6 Analytical Approach and Research questions ......................................................... 55
   1.7 Method .................................................................................................................... 56
   1.8 Sources ................................................................................................................. 58
       1.8.1 Structure of dissertation .................................................................................... 61

2 Aryanizing the German Foreign Trade – The RFA ...................................................... 62
   2.1 Beginnings and Early Goals of the RfA ................................................................. 65
       2.1.1 RfA and Domestic Aryanization Policies ............................................................ 70
2.1.2 The Role of the Devisenstellen ................................................................. 72
2.1.3 Status Report November 1938 ................................................................. 74

2.2 The Second World War – New Tasks for the RfA ........................................ 75
2.3 The Practical Registration Work and Information Flow .............................. 80
2.4 Problems in Mapping and Excluding Jewish Businesses 1937-1944 .......... 84
2.5 Consequences .............................................................................................. 88
2.6 Chapter Conclusion ...................................................................................... 89

3 Aryanization in Denmark 1937-1940 ............................................................. 90
3.1 The Auswärtiges Amt ..................................................................................... 91
3.2 The German Legation and Aryanization ....................................................... 94
3.3 Reactions to Aryanization in Denmark ........................................................ 99
  3.3.1 Negotiating Aryanization ......................................................................... 102
  3.3.2 Media Reactions to Aryanization .............................................................. 106
  3.3.3 Denying Aryanization .............................................................................. 107
  3.3.4 Attempted Aryanization - Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import .................. 111
  3.3.5 The Union of Representatives for Foreign Companies .......................... 117
3.4 Chapter conclusion ...................................................................................... 118

4 Aryanization in Denmark 1940-1943 .............................................................. 119
4.1 Aryanization Prospects in Danish Industry and Trade ................................. 120
4.2 The Correspondence Between Ernst Krüger and the RfA ......................... 124
4.3 Aryanizing Sophus Berendsen A/S 1938-1941 ............................................ 125
4.4 The Danish Government and Aryanization ................................................ 127
4.5 Continued Aryanization .............................................................................. 128
  4.5.1 Aryanizing Lundbeck ............................................................................ 130
4.6 Aryanization in Denmark 1942-September 1943. ...................................... 132
4.7 Chapter Conclusion ...................................................................................... 137

5 Mapping and Registering the Jews in Denmark 1937-1943 .......................... 139
5.1 Danish-German Police cooperation ............................................................ 139
  5.1.1 Prewar Police Cooperation .................................................................... 140
6 Probing the Limits of Cooperation ................................................................. 165
  6.1 Judenfrage Dänemark 1933-1940 ................................................................. 165
    6.1.1 Hjalmar Schacht’s Aryan Certificate .................................................... 169
  6.2 Promoting Anti-Semitism and Race .......................................................... 171
    6.2.1 Anti-Semitic Propaganda ...................................................................... 171
    6.2.2 Jud-Süss ............................................................................................... 177
    6.2.3 Promoting Race .................................................................................... 178
    6.2.4 Jews Excluded from Being in Parts of Denmark .................................... 180
  6.3 German Pressure for Anti-Jewish Laws and the Signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact ............... 180
    6.3.1 The Policy of Exclusion ........................................................................ 184
    6.3.2 Renthe-Fink Proposes Anti-Jewish Laws ............................................. 185
  6.4 The Danish Government’s Discussions on Measures Against the Jews ........................................... 191
    6.4.1 The Limits of Cooperation .................................................................... 194
    6.4.2 Rumors and Public Refusal of Judenpolitik ........................................... 197
  6.5 Chapter Conclusion ..................................................................................... 199

7 Enforcing the Policy of Exclusion ................................................................. 201
  7.1 Renthe-Fink’s anti-Semitism ...................................................................... 201
  7.2 Continued Exclusions ................................................................................ 207
    7.2.1 Excluding Jews from Being Promoted .................................................. 207
1 Introduction

Research on the persecution of Jews in Denmark lacks behind other European countries. Subjects, such as looted art and dormant bank accounts, have not been systematically investigated in Denmark. The Danish Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies was created in 2001 following the signing of the Stockholm Declaration, and among the center’s tasks was researching “the black spots in our history”. It never began thoroughly investigating themes researched in most other European countries. This is mostly attributable to organizational amalgamations. The Center was fused into the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), which had an independent research branch of Holocaust and Genocide studies. However, this was cancelled out as part of the regular reshuffling of research themes in 2013. The last remnants of the Center largely disappeared as the educational obligations of it were outsourced in 2017.6 Its most important historical contribution was the Flygtningeundersøgelsen, which examined Danish refugee policies and its consequences between 1933 and 1945.7

The foundation of the Center followed a European trend to establish national commissions investigating Holocaust-related issues. Twenty-three European countries began investigating e.g. historical Jewish bank accounts as a consequence of the well-known legal claims against Swiss banks in 1996. Countries like Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and even neutrals, such as Sweden and Switzerland, were part of this wave.8 These commissions often uncovered new sources and reinterpreted a nation’s relationship to Germany especially during the period from 1939 to 1943.9 In addition, international research from the 1990s and onwards reflects a renewed interest in events preceding the genocide focusing on the social, civil and

---


7 Lone Rünitz, Af hensyn til konsekvenserne: Danmark og flygtningespørgsmålet 1933-1940, University of Southern Denmark studies in history and social sciences, v. 303 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2005); Hans Kirchhoff, Et menneske uden pas er ikke noget menneske: Danmark i den internationale flygtningepolitik 1933-1939, Dansk flygtningepolitik 1933-1945 (Odense: Syddansk universitetsforlag, 2005); Hans Kirchhoff and Lone Rünitz, Udsendt til Tyskland: dansk flygtningepolitik under besættelsen, Dansk flygtningepolitik 1933 - 1945 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2007); Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke, Demokratiets skyggeside: flygtninge og menneskerettigheder i Danmark før Holocaust, Dansk flygtningepolitik 1933-1945, v. 304 (Odense: Syddansk universitetsforlag, 2005) Until 2017 the remnants of the center carried out important educational work, which has now been privatized.


9 It was e.g. argued Swiss neutrality had been breached in several areas such as trade and transit of war materials Mario König and Bettina Zeugin, eds., Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War. Final Report. (Pendo Verlag GmbH, 2002), 508.
financial exclusion of the Jews.\textsuperscript{10} In contrast, the successful flight of 95% of the Danish Jews in October 1943 and the events surrounding it remains the focus of most publications in the historiography of the Danish Jews during the occupation.\textsuperscript{11} Besides the Flygtningeundersøgelsen only historian Sofie Lene Bak has recently expanded the subject, as well as the time frame, by focusing on Danish Anti-Semitism from 1930 to 1943, the exile in Sweden, and the immediate return of the Danish Jews after the Second World War.\textsuperscript{12} In spite of this, historian John T. Lauridsen’s status from 2008 still rings true:

> “Research on the German policy against the Danish Jews during the occupation has very naturally been concentrated on the action in October 1943 and its immediate preconditions. On the other hand, the roughly 3.5 years preceding it have not been the subject of a thorough treatment since Leni Yahil published ‘Et demokrati på prøve’, 1967.”\textsuperscript{13}

Denmark still struggles with significant research voids, particular when compared to the international historiography of the past 25 years. Besides the ones already mentioned (looted art and dormant bank accounts) the words of the German envoy Cecil von Renthe-Fink in January 1942 points towards several additional unanswered questions:

> “...we will continue our former policy. Our previous practice, whenever an opportunity presents itself to push back the influence of the Jews, or rather to


\textsuperscript{11} Hans Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, University of Southern Denmark studies in history and social sciences, vol. 464 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2013); Bo Lidegaard, Landsmanden. De danske jøders flugt i oktober 1943. (København: Gyldendal, 2013).

\textsuperscript{12} Sofie Lene Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945 (København: Aschehoug, 2004); Sofie Lene Bak, ikke noget at tale om: danske jøders krigsoplevelser 1943-1945, 1. udg., 1. opl. (København: Dansk Jødisk Museum, 2010); Sofie Lene Bak, Da krigen var forbi: de danske jøders hjemkomst efter besættelsen, 1. udgave (København: Gyldendal, 2012).

\textsuperscript{13} John T. Lauridsen, “Tyse akter vedrørende ’Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943,” ed. Erik Nør, Danske Magazin 50, no. 2 (2008): 477 “Research in the German policy against the Danish Jews during the occupation has very naturally been concentrated on the action in October 1943 and its immediate preconditions. On the other hand, the roughly 3.5 years preceding it has not been the subject of a thorough treatment since Leni Yahil published ‘Et demokrati på prøve’, 1967.” // "Forskning i den tyske politik over for de danske jøder under besættelsen har meget naturligt koncentreret sig om aktionen i oktober 1943 og dens umiddelbare forudsætninger. Til gengæld har de knapt 3,5 år forud ikke fået en dybdegående behandling siden Leni Yahil udsendte "et demokrati på prøve". Leni Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve (København: Gyldendal, 1967) Published in English with the title: The Rescue of Danish Jewry: Test of a Democracy (New York: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969); Leni Yahil (1912-2007) was an Israeli professor.
completely eliminate the Jewish influence, will be continued. Also, we shall continue to work towards a greater understanding of the Jewish question here.”

Based on this historical quote, one may ask: How were these eliminatory measures pursued? What was the role of the German legation in pushing back the influence of Jews? These questions indicate a research gap, which can be filled by a coherent and up-to-date analysis of the German policy against the Jews in Denmark during the first years of the occupation. At the same time, this would also create the opportunity for a renewed and closer examination of the responses of the Danish government to these eliminatory goals.

This dissertation responds to this call by addressing a subset of these questions. Inspired by international research it departs from the traditional focus on the dramatic events surrounding October 1943. In the Danish historiography, it thus addresses a largely neglected area of Danish history from 1937 to August 1943. It sets out to explore and analyze the German Judenpolitik in Denmark by focusing on the Aryanization of Danish-German trade relations and anti-Jewish policies in Denmark from 1937 until August 1943. As a second research goal, it examines the reactions of the Danish government to the German Judenpolitik.

The term Judenpolitik was used by the National Socialist dictatorship to describe anti-Jewish politics and policies, and it has recently been argued that "Judenpolitik carved out its own political territory comparable with that of foreign policy, economic policy..." A central part of the Judenpolitik in Denmark was Arisierung (Aryanization) and Entjudung (de-jewification). I follow German historian Frank Bajohr’s broad definition of the term Aryanization as “a synonym for the whole process of economic exclusion of the Jews...”. Entjudung is a much older term implying Jews were to be baptized and renounce their religion to become members of German society. Entjudung during the National Socialist dictatorship came to mean: “A) the step by step process of removing Jews, often ending in the complete removal of Jews, from the working life [Berufsleben] and the economy B) the abolishment of Jewish influences C) forced sales of Jewish


business and confiscation of valuables D) deportation and murder of Jews.” I will apply Aryanization, Entjudung, and exclusion as synonyms, but Aryanization will mostly be used to describe the exclusion of Jews from the economic sphere.

In the existing Danish literature (see section 1.1.3. for a full review) Aryanization is only present as a sub-theme in a few titles, but by drawing these together Aryanization appears to be the result of a more coherent German policy. This becomes even more evident if we draw in the works of Swedish researcher Sven Nordlund, who identifies and examines German Aryanization policies in Sweden.

Aryanization was part of the Judenpolitik in Denmark and we therefore need to address it within this context, but as already noted research on Judenpolitik in Denmark in the period at hand is largely based on research from the late 1960s. A full overview of the historiography is provided in section 1.1.2, at this point it should suffice to mention that on both Judenpolitik and the Danish Government’s reactions to it, we clearly lack a renewed historical analysis, which combines new sources and recent source collections.

1.1 State of the Art

This section briefly reviews recent research in Danish occupation history in order to place the following review sections on the Danish historiography on Judenpolitik and Aryanization in context. This section concludes by reviewing the international literature on Aryanization in German foreign trade, which also provides an important context for this dissertation.


1.1.1 Recent Research in Danish Occupation History

Research into the occupation period has since the 1990’s largely focused on the many grey areas of the cooperation, including a special focus on selected groups that in one way or another are cast as supporters of Nazism. Many independent and minor government funded projects have also shown the consequences of cooperation. We now recognize Denmark’s steady supply of food to Germany accounting for e.g. 14% of Germany’s meat consumption in the critical years of 1943-1945.21 Recent research shows Denmark was ranked 6th among countries importing to Germany. Imports from Denmark to Germany were worth 3.577 million RM and surpassed Sweden by five places on a ranked list.22 Most research has centered on the overall trade relationship with Germany, while some industry-focused studies have explored individual industries, namely, contractors and the farming industry.23 The use of slave labor by some Danish companies engaged in occupied Europe has been revealed, and this has resulted in compensation funds being established for former slave laborers.24

Works on those who are categorized as supporters of Nazism range from political parties to women who dated German soldiers. These research contributions highlight the tendency to focus on groups or individuals who are portrayed as having crossed a moral line by supporting the dictatorship.25 The most recent works include a review of the approximately 50 medical doctors who supported Nazism by enlisting as SS-Soldiers or otherwise. A recent study on the German minority in Copenhagen also focused on the Danish branch of the National Socialist German Worker's Party's foreign branch Auslandorganisation (Organization of Foreign Affairs, NSDAP/AO).26 The most recent publication focusing on an individual is the memoirs of the well-

---


22 Sweden was 11th. on the list exporting for a value of 1.583 mill. RM. Norway was 16th on the list and Switzerland 14th. Jonas Scherner, “Der deutsche Importboom während des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Neue Ergebnisse zur Struktur der Ausbeutung des besetzten Europas auf der Grundlage einer Neuschätzung der deutschen Handelsbilanz,” Historische Zeitschrift 294/2012, no. 1 (February 2012): 112–13 The reference is to the statistics. The article revolves around the reconstruction of the actual import figures.


26 Andreas C. Johannsen, Danske læger under nazismen (København: Gyldendal, 2016); Ole Brandenborg Jensen, Landesgruppe Dänemark: NSDAPs udlændsorganisation i Danmark ca. 1932-1945, University of Southern Denmark studies in history and social sciences, vol. 547 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2017).
known (in Denmark) Danish SS-volunteer Søren Kam, who murdered a Danish editor in 1943. The Danish government requested his extradition several times, yet repeating German governments refused this. In this body of literature, I should like to highlight the research dealing with the Danish volunteers in the SS, which hinted at compliance in the Holocaust by Danes. It was pioneered in 1998 and recently revisited in 2014. This caused the Simon Wiesenthal Center to demand legal action against the few SS volunteers still alive and triggered a public debate. However, demands were eventually rejected by the Danish Judicial system.

The occupation remains a popular theme in many areas of Danish society but it is by and large characterized by individual efforts and interests, rather than larger and collaborative research projects.

1.1.2 Research Review on the Historiography of Judenpolitik in Denmark

Scholarly attention to Judenpolitik in Denmark has mostly centered on events related to the action against Jews in Denmark on the night of the 1st and 2nd of October 1943. The approximately 480 Jews who were deported to the concentration camp Theresienstadt and the rescue of most of them by the white buses campaign has also seen a fair share of research. As a result of this many of the answers explaining why most Jews successfully escaped to Sweden have already been provided by previous research.

The flight was successful due to a host of determinants thoroughly summed up by Danish historian Hans Kirchhoff in 2013. The Jews were warned of the pending action against them by the shipping expert at the German legation Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz. His warning was disseminated throughout the Jewish minority of 7,000 who mostly lived in the Copenhagen area. Most Jews reacted by immediately attempting to flee while others went into hiding with

27 Mikkel Kirkebæk and John T. Lauridsen, eds., Et liv uden fædreland: Søren Kams erindringer (København: Lindhardt og Ringhof, 2015).
30 Hans Søde-Madsen, De hvide busser. 1941-1945. Reddet fra Hitlers helvede. (København: Lindhardt og Ringhof, 2015); Bo Lidegaard, Redningsmænd - skandinaviske aktioner for at redde fanger fra tyske kz-lejre i krigens sidste år (København: Politikens Forlag, 2015); The last chapter in Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 27–30. He mentions: There was a small number of Jews, most Jews lived in Copenhagen, the time of the action was late in the war, the Swedes accepted the Danish Jews ad resistance groups could assist in the rescue. The Danish Nazi party was small and not decisively supported by Germany. The occupying forces were rather passive and the cooperation between Denmark and Germany also played a role.
31 For a full account see Hans Kirchhoff, Den gode tysker: Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz: de danske jøders redningsmand, 1. udgave, 1. oplag (København: Gyldendal, 2013), 154–78.
the assistance of unknown helpers.\textsuperscript{33} The combination of the short distance to Sweden and a more yielding Swedish refugee policy allowed for the Jews to enter Sweden.\textsuperscript{34}

It has been increasingly recognized that the preconditions for the successful flight also rested on a series of German factors. The warning being the most important of these. In addition, the German police was ordered to refrain from using forced entry during the roundup, and the German Navy remained passive as most Jews succeeded in crossing the narrow sound.\textsuperscript{35} International researchers continue to suggest that the German actions were part of a conscious policy aimed at gaining good-will with the Danish government by letting the Jews escape.\textsuperscript{36} Danish researchers have largely rejected this explanation. However, most do recognize that many of the important preconditions for the flight were due to German decisions and reactions.\textsuperscript{37}

One of the most important preconditions highlighted is the nature of the cooperation between Denmark and Germany. Often a shield analogy is used to describe how the cooperation protected Danish Jews, while Israeli Historian Leni Yahil pointed to a specifically Danish and democratic mindset.\textsuperscript{38} The latter has been largely rejected by Danish and international historiography despite a recent, but brief revival.\textsuperscript{39} Yet, the shield analogy of the cooperation has been maintained in the literature.\textsuperscript{40} It stresses that from a German perspective the main goal was to uphold Danish food exports to Germany as well as using the country as an example of


\textsuperscript{34} A nearby neutral country did not guarantee a flight possibility e.g. Switzerland only accepted 2,000 Jews from 1939-1945 Königin and Zeugin, Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War. Final Report., 110.


\textsuperscript{36} Gunnar S. Paulsson, “The ‘Bridge over the Øresund’: The Historiography on the Expulsion of the Jews from Nazi-Occupied Denmark,” Journal of Contemporary History 30, no. 3 (1995): 431–64. Paulsson argues the rescue was mostly possible due to a conscious German strategy to accept the Jews fled. His focus on the perpetrators does seem to have pointed Danish researchers in that direction. ; Recently, this argument has been traced back to Yahil’s work, while British intelligence sources support the argument the German’s consciously let the Jews escape. Please see, Orna Keren-Carmel, “Another Piece in the Puzzle: Denmark, Nazi Germany, and the Rescue of Danish Jewry,” Holocaust Studies 24, no. 2 (2017): 174–76.


\textsuperscript{38} Yahil, _Et Demokrati på prøve_, 22–23 Yahil seems to be the first to use the shield analogy.


how European countries could exist under German domination. These overall goals secured that the Germans accepted that formal anti-Jewish laws were not adopted in Denmark. I largely agree with this perception, still I would highlight historian John T. Lauridsen’s point that “it would be erroneous to stress that the Auswärtiges Amt...because of its special interest to maintain influence in Denmark protected or defended Denmark against anti-Jewish measures. In all of Europe the AA participated in solving the Jewish question and in Denmark too.”41 This does indicate that the image of the cooperation functioning as a shield for the Jews at least could be discussed.

Central to understanding Judenpolitik in Denmark are the two Reichsbevollmächtigten: the diplomat Cecil von Renthe-Fink and his successor from November 1942, the SS-Obergruppenführer Werner Best. Best had relocated to the AA after losing a career struggle with Reinhard Heydrich as head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). In the literature, Renthe-Fink is largely presented as a loyal career diplomat without political ambitions and in opposition to national socialism.42 He is often described as cooperating with the Danes to prevent anti-Jewish measures from being implemented in Denmark.43 This perception probably traces back to Leni Yahil’s acceptance of Renthe-Fink’s postwar explanations. These are on par with the AA’s self-perception after the war according to which the AA functioned as a stronghold against Nazism.44 Renthe-Fink was not in the category of extreme perpetrators, but he has recently been characterized as adaptable to the policies of National Socialism, and German research has pointed to the anti-Semitic elements of his worldviews.45 However, this has not been tied into the research showing that Renthe-Fink was involved in promoting anti-Semitism in Denmark as well as supporting the registration of Jews.46 Despite these findings it remains a characteristic of

43 For one example see Bak, “Jødepolitik i Danmark: Deportation eller uddrivelse? Den tyske faktor i redningen af jøderne i oktober 1943,” 16.
44 Yahil bases her analysis of Renthe-Fink on a postwar correspondence in which he manages to convince her of his good intentions. One example is his argument that he only pretends to initiate economic policies against the Jews in order to buy time and satisfy a radical Berlin. Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve, 76; Lauridsen also points to Yahil’s problematic acceptance of Renthe-Fink’s explanations see Lauridsen, “Tyske akter vedrørende ‘Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943,” 480; For a description of the AA’s self perception please see Eckart Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 1. Aufl (München: Pantheon, 2012), 12.
45 Lauridsen, “Tyske akter vedrørende ‘Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943,” 482; Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 245.
the literature that it mostly focuses on Renthe-Fink’s successor Werner Best in regards to *Judenpolitik* in Denmark. This can probably be attributed to the fact that research has focused on events related to October 1943.

German historian Ulrich Herbert has repeatedly shown that Werner Best was an academic who should be characterized as a radical and ideologically convinced supporter of National Socialism. In addition, Herbert revealed Best as the key legal aid to former members of the Gestapo and the RSHA in postwar trials. These arguments have been embraced by Danish research, where Best was recently characterized as an ideologically convinced desk murderer who overall worked towards the political destruction of Denmark. However, Best was not in a hurry and tactically cooperated with the Danish government as long as it benefitted Germany.

Cecil von Renthe-Fink and Werner Best are both credited with keeping the Jewish question out of Denmark, and they are often depicted as being in opposition to an undefined and supposedly “radical” Berlin. At the same time research has shown that the policies of Renthe-Fink and Best were continuously approved by both Joachim von Ribbentrop and Heinrich Himmler. In some ways this seems to create a paradoxical argument which could also be applied to argue that there was agreement on the *Judenpolitik* in Denmark between Copenhagen and Berlin.

The small amount of research on *Judenpolitik* in the period from April 1940 to August 1943 has identified crucial turning points, which coincide with crises in the Danish German relationship. The Danish signing of the anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941 is one of those peaks as Hermann Göring told the Danish foreign minister Erik Scavenius that Denmark would also have to settle the Jewish question at some point. In his memoirs Scavenius states that he told Göring that the Jewish question in Denmark was non-existent, and he would also pass this

---


message on to the Swedish envoy Gustav von Dardel. Yet, it should be noted that the internal minutes of the Danish civil servants present in Berlin do not provide evidence of such a denial. The signing of the pact caused demonstrations against the Danish government and pressure from the Danish National Socialists to raise the Jewish issue, while a failed arson attempt against the main synagogue in Copenhagen occurred. The concerns were serious as the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Vilhelm Fibiger, was sent to calm the Jewish congregation. However, the actual discussions among the government on these issues remain undisclosed.

The second point of escalation is the so-called Telegram Crisis of September 1942, apparently caused by Hitler’s rage against King Christian X. The King had received a greeting card on his birthday but had only thanked Hitler for it with a brief reply. This enraged Hitler who recalled Cecil von Renthe-Fink who was replaced by Werner Best a month later. The Germans demanded changes in government, and Erik Scavenius became Prime Minister while also serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, Ribbentrop wanted to deport the Jews of Denmark as well as in Bulgaria and Hungary. However, nothing came of this suggestion in any of the three countries.

Leni Yahil was the first to briefly identify the attempts to remove Jews from higher ranking public positions during these crises periods. She also revealed that in November 1942, Erik Scavenius supported this move and the initiative to prevent Jews from appearing on the radio. Danish researchers have shown how Werner Best specifically warned against promoting Jews and giving Jews air time on the radio. These measures are often described over a page or two in the literature and Scavenius’ readiness to accept these steps appear largely unrecognized. Instead, this willingness is interpreted the way the government would legitimize them at the time: as a precautionary measure to avoid harsher measures against the Danish Jews.
Besides the basic timeline accentuated by the two crisis periods, other areas have been identified such as Danish police’s racial examinations of Danish citizens. However, the issue has not been further researched and there is little reflection on the possible consequences of this registration. Instead the main source behind this important disclosure has been used as an example of Danish German cooperation. In addition, the Danish police’s involvement in racial categorization has not been tied to the knowledge of the German registration of at least 2,000 Danish Jews. These findings have only slightly altered the main perception of the registering of Danish Jews, which is often dated to August 1943 and tied to the action in October.

The most thoroughly researched theme in this field is Danish anti-Semitism. Yahil’s brief analysis of the Danish variant of anti-Semitism remained unchallenged until the subject was revisited by Sofie Lene Bak in 2004. She followed the theme in several specific environments and organizations, and Bak was the first to show that the issue of race was more prevalent in Denmark in this period than previously acknowledged. In researching the archives of the Danish Anti-Jewish League and the weekly Kamptegnet, which was the Danish equivalent to the German Der Stürmer, Bak provides us with several examples of physical incidents of anti-Semitism and points to the involvement of Danish Nazi organizations in acts of vandalism in November 1941. Her research unequivocally shows the presence of various kinds of anti-Semitism in Denmark, which had been ignored by previous research.

The attitude of the Jewish minority in Denmark, which was mainly controlled by the leadership of the congregation, requires a thorough reexamination. Yahil sees the congregation as aligned with the Danish government, and showed that it never began planning for the worst. Few other historians have examined the congregation, and the most recent evaluation follows Yahil’s conclusion, while others represent more contesting views. Supreme Justice Judge Carl Bertel Henriques (C.B. Henriques) was head of the congregation, and it should suffice to cite and paraphrase his own perception on the period in order to underscore the congregation’s

60 Kirchhoff, “Endlösung over Danmark,” 2003, 158; Paulsson, ”The ‘Bridge over the Øresund’: The Historiography on the Expulsion of the Jews from Nazi-Occupied Denmark,” 447. Paulsson does mention an out-of-date Gestapo registry, but his source is unknown.
61 Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve, 88–100; Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945.
62 Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 67–68.
63 Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve, 336.
leadership’s attitude at the time. To C.B. Henriques his role was to navigate through the war and his advice to scared members was to “Live just as you do now, and do nothing, because anything can promote repressive actions, and that hurts the Danish government, which has enough challenges.”\textsuperscript{66} It has been argued the leadership thus tied its destiny to the Danish government.\textsuperscript{67} In conclusion, the congregation largely followed and trusted the advice of the Danish government.

\subsection*{1.1.3 State of the Art – Aryanization in Denmark}

Aryanization in Denmark has not been thoroughly researched, but by combining the existing literature, which focuses on other subjects, Aryanization presents itself as a theme deserving more attention. Leni Yahil is again a pioneer when arguing that the German occupiers were reluctant to exclude the Jews from the economy, and she does point to the German Chamber of Commerce (GCC) as registering Jewish businesses. However, she recognizes that she has been unable to follow through on the theme due to a lack of statistics.\textsuperscript{68}

In recent years, it was in particular Sofie Lene Bak who revisited the issue. In her book on Danish anti-Semitism, she points to the GCC as a central organization in these matters, and shows how the issue of race had been discussed in some trade organizations. She showed that a willingness existed to take over contracts from Jewish companies and representatives as some companies specialized in such take-overs. While pointing to government reactions in Sweden and Norway, Danish ones were not examined, as it was not the main focus of her research.\textsuperscript{69} In her later work, she briefly illustrates, the predicaments of small Jewish businesses and draws out the contours of a more extensive Aryanization campaign.\textsuperscript{70}

Danish historian Ole Brandenborg Jensen has touched upon Aryanization in two books.\textsuperscript{71} He partly outlines the basic progress of Aryanization in Denmark and identifies some of the main organizations involved. The GCC is identified as the main organization involved in registration and Aryanization measures in Denmark. Brandenborg Jensen shows that a structure for Aryanization existed before the war as 3,600 Danish businesses were racially categorized by the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{haestrup} Hæstrup, Jørgen, “Jøderne og den tyske besættelse,” 322–23.
\bibitem{yahil} Yahil, \textit{Et Demokrati på prøve}, 101–2 and the footnotes for these pages.
\bibitem{bak} Bak, \textit{Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945}, 70–74.
\bibitem{bak2} Bak, \textit{Da krigen var forbi: de danske jøders hjemkomst efter besættelsen}, 61, 156–61.
\bibitem{jensen} Jensen, \textit{Besættelsestidens økonomiske og erhvervsmæssige forhold: studier i de økonomiske relationer mellem Danmark og Tyskland 1940-1945}; Jensen, \textit{Landesgruppe Dänemark: NSDAPs udlandsorganisation i Danmark ca. 1932-1945}.
\end{thebibliography}
GCC on behalf of the German legation. However, he refrains from examining the role of the German legation, and inaccurately argues that structured Aryanization began in Denmark only in November 1942. He also shows that the NSDAP/AO was involved in examining Jewish companies in Denmark. In addition, he reveals that the GCC received specific guidelines from the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) on how Mischlinge and even persons married to Jews were not to enter into contracts with German companies. Based on this he argues that similar guidelines regarding Jews probably existed, but he has not examined the RfA further.  

It should be addressed that Ole Brandenborg Jensen does not include national and international research on Aryanization into his books. Unfortunately, this leads to conclusions which are outdated and flawed. This is especially prevalent in his second book where he e.g. mistakenly argues that German agents carried specific Hellenic inspired names, although Swedish historian Sven Nordlund in 2005 showed that these were actually part of a code language used by the RfA to categorize Aryan and Jewish companies. Brandenborg Jensen also concludes that the Danish minutes of the meeting in the Danish-German trade committee in 1938 have been destroyed, although they have been used and analyzed in previous research. In addition, he ignores the earlier works of both Leni Yahil and Sofie Lene Bak mentioned above. 

In an earlier book I have shown how Aryanization in Denmark was part of the Foreign Ministry’s concerns and that it became a publicly debated issue, while also providing a few cases of Aryanization. The Danish government largely failed to protect its Jewish business minority before the occupation and largely forfeited protecting it in late 1940. This work lacks the adaptation of Yahil’s works as well as an important source collection. It also omitted the recent work on the Danish Film Industry which showed how Jews in the industry were discriminated against during the period 1933-1945. Lars-Martin Sørensen explains how contracts were cancelled, and Danish-Jewish actors were excluded from the industry before and after the occupation. Incidentally, Sørensen does not incorporate any of the previous research in


74 See chapter four in Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945. 

75 See chapter four in ibid. 

76 Lauridsen, “Tyske akter vedrørende ’Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943.”
Aryanization.\textsuperscript{77} If combined, these works do suggest that Aryanization and Entjudung was more prevalent than previously recognized.

\subsection*{1.1.4 State of the Art: Aryanization in the Foreign Trade}

Influential for our knowledge on the attempts to Aryanize German foreign trade was research originating from Sweden. Although counter-intuitive, research on Danish Aryanization can profit immensely from incorporating these results more systematically. In the wake of the public debates on Jewish assets in Swiss banks, Sweden commissioned a formal investigation in the existence of possible Jewish assets in Swedish banks. To the commission’s surprise they found that Aryanization attempts in Sweden were known by both the government and the public.\textsuperscript{78} The commission’s findings in this area has been picked up by Sven Nordlund in several publications.\textsuperscript{79}

Nordlund shows that the German attempts to Aryanize their foreign trade began in 1937 and spanned all over Europe. He pinpoints the RfA as the main organization behind mapping Jewish businesses with the assistance of German diplomatic entities. This took place by using an elaborate set of codes which were used to racially categorize businesses abroad. In Sweden, German subsidiaries, and companies with Jewish management or ownership were targeted for Aryanization.\textsuperscript{80} To remove Jews from a Swedish company, the RfA and the German legation or German consulates in Sweden would apply a pressure e.g. the threat of terminating contracts. The German Chamber of Commerce in Sweden was assisted in these measures as well. Information on Jewish individuals was obtained from information bureaus as well as other Swedish businesses, but Nazi sympathizers would also assist in this endeavor.\textsuperscript{81}

Nordlund identifies 1940 as a turning point in the RfA as it tightened its policies to secure that all German business connections with Jews were to be severed. Swedish companies were approached by German authorities who pressured the companies to Aryanize. Otherwise they risked losing their import and export rights with Germany or their authorization to sell German goods. In addition, Swedish companies were required to sign a declaration supporting a Europe


\textsuperscript{79} Nordlund, “Albikiades eller Akilles? Ariseringen i Sverige och reaktionerna på denna.”; Nordlund, “Tyskerne själva gör ju ingen hemlighet av detta.” Sverige och ariseringen av tyskågda företag och dotterbolag”; Nordlund, \textit{Affärer som vanligt}.

\textsuperscript{80} Nordlund, \textit{Affärer som vanligt}, 18–20.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 20.
without Jews. The Swedish government investigated Aryanization in 1939 and found that Göteborg’s chamber of commerce was contacted six to seven times a week on the matter. Nordlund concludes that this indicates a large number of Swedish companies were being investigated on the basis of race.\textsuperscript{82}

Nordlund characterizes the reactions of the Swedish government as tied to the progress of European events. Before the Second World War, Aryanization was a publicly debated issue and the Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler would in December 1938 speak strongly against it in a public speech. Nordlund argues that the speech was used to set the stage for the up-coming trade negotiations between the two countries and the debate quickly subsided. Nordlund shows that the speech had international consequences as it sparked a British inquiry into the matter and forced Germany to cease their Aryanization attempts in Great Britain. The Swedes also learned that Aryanization attempts had occurred in Denmark since 1937.\textsuperscript{83}

As war set in, Sweden’s imports and exports related to Germany rose to 80% from 1941 to 1943 leaving Sweden fully dependent on trading with Germany. The main goal for Sweden was to maintain trade and avoid provoking Germany, which resulted in a concession policy during the first half of the war period.\textsuperscript{84} Nordlund argues that the Jewish minority was largely unprotected against Aryanization measures and describes events as “business as usual”.\textsuperscript{85}

Nordlund’s work is a pioneer study into the subject of Aryanization in Sweden, as well as in presenting the important European scope of German Aryanization policies. It provides many important insights and openings for a more detailed study on how many companies were Aryanized and registered as well as the role of the German legation in Sweden. Nordlund pointed to the RfA as the central organization on international Aryanization, but with his intended focus on Sweden he did not undertake a more thorough examination of the RfA.

In addition to Nordlund’s work, two articles shed further light on the RfA’s activities.\textsuperscript{86} They both center on the prominent German political theorist Theodor Eschenburg and his involvement in Aryanizations in Austria and the Danish company Knapp-Union. Knapp-Union was run by a German emigrant whose company had undergone Aryanization in Germany in 1938.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 59–66.
\item\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 47–54.
\item\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 42–47.
\item\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 22, 59–62.
\end{itemize}
Theodor Eschenburg was a leading member of the Prüfungsstelle Bekleidungsindustrie (Vorprüfstelle Knopf- und Bekleidungsindustrie).\(^{87}\) He travelled to several countries, including Denmark and Sweden, possibly to discuss matters locally with representatives from the German legations.\(^{88}\) The articles show how elements of the practical work of international Aryanization took place. In conclusion, research in the international Aryanization policies emanating from the RfA has been identified, but still contain several unexplored opportunities.

### 1.2 The Danish-German Relationship

Central to the period from 1933 to 1945 is the Danish-German relationship, which continues to be a point of discussion especially on the occupation period. We should begin by briefly recapturing events before moving on to the debates on categorizing, and understanding Denmark's relationship with Germany.

It is generally accepted that Denmark followed a policy of neutrality in the period before the occupation on April 9\(^{\text{th}}\) 1940. This was an attempt to repeat the country’s successful strategy of neutrality during the First World War when Denmark had capitalized on trade by selling goods to both warring parties. The claims of the German dictatorship in the 1930s to incorporate German minorities was an ever-present concern for the Danish government as the country harbored a German minority in the border areas of Jutland. The issue moved to the top of the agenda as Germany took over Austria in the spring of 1938 and annexed the Sudetenland, a part of the former Czechoslovakia, in the fall. Germany’s territorial claims were backed by a rising military force, and while the conservatives in Denmark wanted to strengthen the military this was rejected by the Social Democratic-led Government. Denmark found itself militarily isolated as Great Britain declined to assist and talks of a Nordic military alliance fell through in 1937. Without allies, and anxious of Germany’s ambitions, Denmark signed a pact of non-aggression with Germany on May 31\(^{\text{st}}\), 1939.\(^{89}\)

The military attack on Denmark and Norway was codenamed Weserübung and began in the early morning hours of April 9\(^{\text{th}}\), 1940. The battle for Denmark only lasted hours, while the

---

\(^{87}\) Eschenburg’s role in Aryanization as the commissioner in the the area of buttons and closing devices for the clothing industry is evaluated in Eisfeld, "Theodor Eschenburg und die Plünderung jüdischer Vermögen," 111–62.

\(^{88}\) Rohstock, "Vom Anti-Parlamentarier zum ‘kalten Arisierer’ jüdischer Unternehmen in Europa," 51, 55–56.

Norwegians capitulated on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of June.\textsuperscript{90} Denmark officially accepted the German explanation for the attack: it was not intended to violate Danish neutrality or political independence. Denmark was occupied and the historical term for the period remains besættelsesstiden – the Occupation Period.

International research still debates if Denmark’s diplomatic status should be categorized as neutral or in a state of war with Germany.\textsuperscript{91} Most Danish historians argue that Denmark was not in a state of war with Germany\textsuperscript{92}, and Denmark is often described as being neutral, neutral occupied or peacefully occupied. This perception is historiographically termed as the peaceful occupation, (fredsbesættelsen) or the fiction of neutrality/sovereignty (Neutralitets- og suverænitetstaktionen). Denmark was, also by contemporaries during the war, viewed as a special case compared to the rest of occupied Europe.\textsuperscript{93} It has recently been argued that the political actors of the period presented Denmark’s status in a diplomatically flexible manner ranging from neutral, non-belligerent, peacefully occupied and belligerent. The various applications of these terms were dependent on the developments of the war. For example, neutrality was mostly used in the beginning of the war, while being a belligerent was used to side with the Allies at the end of the war. The term peaceful occupation stands out, as it has largely been adopted in historiography. However, it was originally coined and used by the Danish government in 1940 to justify the country’s position. The term became dominant as it was used to describe Denmark’s international legal position by Den Parlamentariske Kommission (the Parliamentary Commission) which postwar examined and exonerated the Danish politicians’ role during the war.\textsuperscript{94} Further, it has been convincingly shown that historiography has largely ignored the war time voices from the leading politicians who spoke of breaches of neutrality or of Denmark being in a state of war.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{90} Bo Lidegaard, \textit{Overløveren, 1914-1945}, 1 udg., 2. opl, Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie 4 (København: Danmarks Nationalleksikon, 2003), 400.

\textsuperscript{91} For full overview of the international attempts place Denmark within occupied Europe see John T. Lauridsen, \textit{Tysk besættelsespolitik i Danmark 1940-1945 : en introduktion til kilder og litteratur}, Danish humanist texts and studies, volume 46 (Kbh.: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2013), 151–65 Lauridsen concludes international research lacks the results of recent Danish research, while Danish research has not adopted the categorizations and typologies of international research.


\textsuperscript{93} Lauridsen, \textit{Tysk besættelsespolitik i Danmark 1940-1945 : en introduktion til kilder og litteratur}, 151, 164.


\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 240–48.
Contrary to other occupied countries, Denmark dealt directly with the German Foreign Office in matters relating to the occupation. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the connecting link to the occupiers, and most communication took place through it, but many minor and practical matters were solved without the involvement of the ministry. From a German point of view historian John T. Lauridsen argues that the German occupation policy in essence remained consistent until December 1943. He argues the main difference from a German perspective were who they negotiated with after the government stepped down in August 1943. He of course acknowledges the German take-over of combatting the Danish resistance movement as well as the removal of the Danish armed forces. However, the overall German goal remained the same: to maintain as much stability as possible and to avoid introducing a new German occupation policy. Likewise, Philip Giltner points to a remarkable consistency in the German-Danish relationship in the economic sphere, which lasted throughout the war.

In Danish historiography the arrangement between Denmark and Germany has caused continuous discussion on which term is the most suited to describe this relationship. The most dominant term is cooperation, while the discussions surrounding the term collaboration has influenced recent definitions of cooperation. In the following I will outline the discussions on the terms cooperation and collaboration in Danish historiography in order to show how they in recent definitions emerge as amalgamated. By bringing in recent international discussions, which questions the use of collaboration, I will end this section by defining the two terms separately for the use in this dissertation.

### 1.2.1 The Use of Cooperation in Danish Historiography

In recent Danish historiography, cooperation, or samarbejdspolitik, is the most widely used term but it lacks solid definition. It has been aptly pointed out that using cooperation “will only offend few, as everyone can place whatever meaning they want into it.” The origins of the term samarbejdspolitik (cooperation) traces back to the coalition governments of the four major Danish political parties the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne), the Social-Liberals, (Det Radikale Venstre), the Conservatives (de konservative), and the Liberals (Venstre) during the

---

98 Giltner, In the Friendliest Manner: German-Danish Economic Cooperation During the Nazi Occupation of 1940-1949, 168.
99 Lund, Hitlers spisekammer, 14–15”Da støder man kun få, for alle kan lægge i ordet, hvad de vil.”
war. In this sense it could be argued that it has the connotations of a national union between these parties. On the other hand, the resistance movement criticized the government’s policies for aiding Germany and used the term as a critique. Using the term cooperation in historiography used to signify the standpoint that the Danish government had struck a morally or politically inappropriate deal with the occupiers. Cooperation has also been divided into passive and active for at least forty years, but this division appears somewhat undefined and rarely applied. In my opinion, Danish historiography still seems to struggle in defining the meaning of cooperation as it is applied as a value free term by historians. In turn, this might also explain its wide usage.

1.2.2 The Use of Collaboration in Danish Historiography

The opposite can be observed with regard to the term collaboration. It is not widely used but has seen some theoretical advancements based on the international literature. The term was introduced into Danish historiography in 1979 by historian Hans Kirchhoff in an attempt to internationalize the subject in Denmark. Despite few and important works building on it, Kirchhoff in 2015 concludes that it “never adapted into consensus Denmark, neither in the public nor among historians”. In spite of this, the introduction of collaboration has over time resulted in the removal of the term “Policy of negotiation” (forhandlingspolitik) from historiography. This term had been coined by Erik Scaevenius, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1940 to 1943 as well as Prime Minister from November 1942. The term was used by many historians who wanted to distance themselves from the popular views of the politicians as being German

102 Ibid., 13–14.
103 Niels Wium Olesen, “Aktivistisk samarbejdspolitik under besættelsen.,” Danmarkshistorien, accessed December 28, 2017, http://danmarkshistorien.dk/leksikon-og-kilder/vis/materiale/aktivistisk-samarbejdspolitik-under-besaettelsen/ The division is tied to the change of Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 8th. 1940. The former, Peter Munch was viewed as passively awaiting German demands. His successor, Erik Scaevenius, is on the other hand, viewed as actively suggesting and seeking cooperation.
105 Often used are Gerhard Hirschfeld, Fremdherrschaft und Kollaboration: die Niederlande unter deutscher Besatzung 1940-1945, Studien zur Zeitgeschichte, Bd. 25 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984); Werner Röhr, Okkupation und Kollaboration (1939-1945), Beiträge zu Konzep ten und Praxis der Kollaboration in der deutschen Okkupationspolitik (Berlin: Hüthig, 1994) A full overview of the international literature is provided in ; Lauridsen, Werner Bests korrespondance med Auswärtiges Amt og andre tyske akter vedrørende besættelsen af Danmark 1942-1945, 151–65 It is also provided in German on pages 221-231.
106 Kirchhoff, At handle med ondskaben. Samarbejdspolitikken under besættelsen., 16”...aldrig vundet indpas i Konsensusdanmark, hverken i offentligheden eller blandt historikere.”
107 Scaevenius, Forhandlingspolitikken under besættelsen.
friendly or even traitors. The few important attempts to apply collaboration in Danish historiography has brought us closer to understanding the motives of especially the political and economic elites as well as the intentional and unintentional consequences of their choices.

Kirchhoff divides collaboration into either ideological or enforced collaboration. He e.g. places local Nazi Parties and German minority groups working to incorporate Denmark into Germany in the category of ideological collaboration. Enforced collaboration removes the element of choice, prompting other historians to point to the fact that it was a conscious choice to collaborate. This developed a focus on the political and socio-economic elites who, within the structures of collaboration, maintained the power to make choices or as it was termed by historian Henrik Dethlefsen an elite that “still had the power and willingness to use it – despite the pressures of occupation”. It has been suggested to divide these choices into being either adaptive or reluctant. Adaptive choices mean to accommodate German wishes before they were made in order to gain political goodwill; reluctant choices were made to stall the progress of German policies as well as to gain time. In a sense these two are located within the attempts to identify what the motives for collaboration were. These motives are described as the fundamental wish to protect the bureaucratic framework and population while maintaining a reasonable material standard of living. In addition, the wish to maintain power under the duress of occupation and the attempts by other groups to gain power has also been pointed to as a characteristic of collaboration.

Hans Kirchhoff has labelled the motives for collaboration as “the ethics of the lesser evil”, in order to acknowledge the extreme pressure and limited options the collaborating politicians were facing. However, he stresses the fact that in both a European and Danish perspective the collaborating governments never followed through on their threats of stepping down. Instead, they fought for any remnant of the nation or the state’s sovereignty which could and should be

115 Kirchhoff, At handle med ondskaben. Samarbejdspolitikken under besættelsen., 19”det mindste ondes etik.”
defended. Kirchhoff has labelled this the “inertia” of collaboration, while others have termed it the “logic of collaboration”. Danish politicians were well aware that their situation could become worse or even untenable, and this was an enforcing factor in the logic of collaboration. Meaning there was always a remnant of democracy to defend, which prevented a break-away from collaboration.116 This logic remained in place in Denmark for the duration of the occupation even though the government seized to function after the uprisings of August 1943, they were still consulted by the civil servants who kept the administration running. Yet, as a telling testament to Kirchhoff’s point the politicians attempted to form a new collaborative government in August 1943 that only failed because the political parties feared losing public support.117

In some ways the terms collaboration and cooperation have increasingly become synonymous in Danish historiography, while there has been attempts to re-define collaboration in order to remove the negative meaning of the word. Historian Aage Trommer (1930-2015) e.g. argues that technically speaking cooperation was collaboration. Later, he geographically split the terms' usage into a Danish area (cooperation) and international area (collaboration).118 Joachim Lund posits “…collaboration is to be understood as cooperation in the value free sense of the word.”119 Steen Andersen argues like-wise that “collaboration…will…be applied as the neutral term for a cooperation…”120 Most recently historian Therkel Stræde understands cooperation “as the Danish political system’s, the businesses’, and the population’s collaboration with the occupying forces”.121

The Danish-German agreement resembles other forms of relationships between Germany and other European countries during the Second World War, and there have been several attempts at defining and categorizing occupied, collaborationist, neutral or allied states in order to point to differences and similarities.122 Collaboration has seen many international, but especially German, definitions as well as categorizations. In the historiography on occupation

---

119 “...at kollaboration skal forstås som samarbejde i den værdifri betydning af ordet.” Lund, Hitlers spisekammer, 16.
120 Steen Andersen, “Forberedelsen af en handelspolitisk tilpasning til nyordningen. Udvalget for økonomisk samarbejde med Tyskland 1940-1941.,” in Fra mellemkrigstid til efterkrigstid, ed. Henrik Dethlefsen and Henrik Lundbak (Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 1998), 206 “...kollaboration vil...blive anvendt som neutral betegnelse for et samarbejde...”
121 Therkel Stræde, “Indledning,” RAMBAM. Tidsskrift for jødisk kultur og forskning, no. 26 (2017): 54 “…samarbejdspolitikken, forstået som det danske politiske systems, erhvervslivets og befolkningens collaboration...”
122 For an extensive overview of these and an analysis of Denmark’s position in a European context see Lauridsen, Werner Bests korrespondance med Auswärtiges Amt og andre tyske akter vedrørende besættelsen af Danmark 1942-1945. Indledning. Oktober - november 1942, 1:151–65.
during the Second World War collaboration comes across as the most theoretically debated term. At the same time there has been an increasing tendency to point to national peculiarities as well. In the international literature there is a current debate on the usability of the term collaboration.

It has been suggested that the many theoretical discussions on collaboration reflect a fundamental problem: the meaning of collaboration is still associated with postwar trials and treachery. The historians who promote the use of cooperation argue the term collaboration has instead become a hurdle for historical analysis. This is because collaboration is often part of national discourses which places collaboration in opposition to patriotic reactions, while ignoring the many blurred lines between collaboration and resistance which occurred from the end of 1943 and onwards.

The international researchers who suggest using cooperation and the ones who have applied collaboration in Danish historiography are in in several ways attempting to examine the same mechanisms. They both stress that the focus area is on the relationship between Germany and the occupied state, while the proponents of using cooperation underscore this term could be applied to examine the reactions of states who were not occupied. They both point to the German need for local cooperation which was often situated with local elites who intended to administrate, keep a lid on resistance, and maintain order. Historians using both collaboration or cooperation acknowledge that the overall circumstances for the relationship between occupier and occupied changed with progress on the battlefields seeing more adaptability in the in period from 1939 to 1942/43 compared to the last years of the war.

1.2.3 Defining Collaboration and Cooperation

Inspired by these important international and national debates on collaboration and cooperation I will define the two terms separately. Collaboration is to be understood as support

---

126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., 13.
of the occupying forces for reasons of personal self-interest or ideological conviction. **Cooperation** is the conscious acceptance of most political and socioeconomic elites to cooperate with representatives of Nazi Germany in a passive or activist manner. This was done in order to preserve political power from challengers on both sides of the political spectrum, while attempting to save Denmark’s political structures as well as maintaining material levels. These motives justified accepting increasing German demands in a self-enforcing logic of cooperation, which created unforeseen results.

Passive cooperation is to understood as a policy which is used to gain time in order to preserve society, and active cooperation is to be understood as accommodating the occupier. Preferably, before demands were made in order to accumulate political goodwill. Unforeseen results mean, that while cooperation might have had specific intentions, the outcomes of these could differ from these.

### 1.3 Judenpolitik

Within the context of the cooperation between Denmark and Germany, this dissertation focuses on the area of race policies as a core component of Nazi ideology. Nazism’s racial ideas, and especially their anti-Jewish core, are often perceived as one of the most central and important characteristics of the Third Reich. One of the first publications to underscore this view was Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann’s book: The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, in which they examine race as the main force behind most social policies. Their conclusion was that National Socialism wanted to redesign society on a global level according to the Nazi racial criteria. The racial ideas were not new but were reshaped “into a comprehensive program for a racial new order. Without a doubt, racial anti-Semitism was the key element in a program designed to achieve the ‘recovery’ of the ‘Aryan Germanic Race’”.

Racial anti-Semitism is to be understood as a term describing a political conviction which was based on the belief that humans could be divided into races, while at the same time employing the stereotypes attributed to Jews by previous forms of anti-Semitism. Numerous studies have shown how the racial question became a pivotal policy area for most German organizations during the era.

---


of Nazism. The term *Judenpolitik* was applied by the National Socialist dictatorship to describe anti-Jewish policies.

*Judenpolitik* has been applied by many researchers but German historian Peter Longerich expands it in his book “Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews.” In the title and in his introduction, he defines *Judenpolitik* as “a term to describe and analyze the complex process of the persecution of the Jews” and dates it as having taken place from 1933 to 1945. The years from 1933 to 1939 are seen as preparatory as *Judenpolitik* was developed as a policy area and saw the build-up of the organizational structures which became central to deploying it.

In order to build an analytical foundation for the use of *Judenpolitik*, Longerich identifies the following binaries, which dominate Holocaust research: intentionalism/structuralism, situation/disposition, center/periphery, and rationality/ideology. The *intentionalist/structuralist* debate divide the analysis into two areas. The intentionalists focus on the intentions of Hitler and his close associates, pointing to a master-plan of murdering the Jews tracing back to the end of the First World War. The structuralists, on the other hand, stress the bureaucracy as a key-factor in initiating and formulating policies against the Jews, which turned into a “process of radicalization” without knowing the end result would be the murder of the Jews. The *Situation/disposition* debate offered two explanations for perpetrators’ participation in mass murder based on the same set of sources. Daniel J. Goldhagen argues the reasons for killing Jews were to be attributed to an anti-Semitic disposition engrained in the killers’ environment since childhood. Christopher Browning employs a sociological approach focusing on situational factors such as peer pressure. Longerich welcomes more recent perpetrator research as it attempts to locate a perpetrators mind-set, initiative and

---

131 Longerich, *Holocaust*.
132 Ibid., 17.
133 This may be an attempt to redefine the Holocaust, which is often understood as the period from 1941-1945 when the genocide took place.
135 Ibid., 16.
136 Ibid., 14–15; For an extensive overview of the debate see Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2008), 237–81. While Kershaw still place a great deal of emphasis on Adolf Hitler (the Final Solution would not have happened without him), Kershaw argues that the intentional and structuralist models do not provide “satisfactory explanation” to the overall question of how the Holocaust occurred. Quote is from page 260.
maneuverability within a specific contextual setting opposing the earlier depictions of anonymous desk-perpetrators. Centre/periphery studies claim to have been divisive in emphasizing either rationality or ideology. For example, the use of Jewish forced labor can be viewed “rationally” to secure production, while the ideological argument dictates an interpretation of mind-set. Longerich finds that these pairs have become too one-dimensional for a meaningful analysis of Judenpolitik. Instead, he synthesizes them into being mutually dependent in their analysis of the same problem: to explain the complex processes of the persecution and murder of the European Jews.

Longerich boils intention and structure into one by placing the emphasis on human agency. An agency which has intentions and functions, while also being central to creating bureaucratic structures. The center and periphery studies are likewise linked to one another as regional initiatives are viewed as important contributions to the development of centrally issued policies. The rational and material elements such as confiscations of assets and e.g. forced labor are combined with the ideological arguments which legitimized these actions. According to Longerich the material policies in turn served as a proof of the success of the ideology.

By fusing the opposing standpoints, Longerich foregrounds the complexities of Judenpolitik, and essentially turns Judenpolitik into a meaningful and applicable meta-term. This serves as my starting point for the analytical and methodological approach in this dissertation. In order to stress the complexities of the term Longerich disposes of the idea to date when a decision to murder Europe’s Jews was taken, which was a main question of the Holocaust literature in the latter half of the 1990’es as well as the beginning of the 2000s. Longerich regards it as a futile question to answer, as it does not acknowledge the varied developments of Judenpolitik. Instead, attention should be directed at the complexities and inter-linkages with other policies, he argues. This idea builds on his findings in Politik Der Vernichtung from 1998 in which he located the escalating phases of the Judenpolitik. He especially showed how genocidal ideas were part of the decisionmakers’ mindset from 1939-1941, and combined them with their

140 Longerich, Holocaust, 15–16.
141 Ibid., 16–17.
142 Longerich’s own Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung (München: Piper, 1998) was an attempt to contribute to this debate but found escalating phases.
143 Ibid.
application in a murderous campaign against a variety of Germans deemed racially inferior as well as the mass-murders of Polish citizens.

There is a semantic problem in translating Judenpolitik as the German term “Politik” is two separate English terms: Policy and politics. Policy is understood as the long-term goals and strategies used to reach the utopia of a racially purified society by using measures of "exclusion, segregation and elimination of the Jews". Longerich argues, this utopia was the very idea of National Socialism, which was to be reached for Germany and its’ people to fulfil their assumed potential. Longerich equates Judenpolitik with other recognizable areas of politics such as foreign- and social politics. He does so in order to underscore its importance and to place it within the context of political dealings. This means that Judenpolitik became an area which competed with other political areas, but also influenced them greatly: as “the National Socialists tended to understand traditional political fields...in a racist manner and to redefine them along racist lines”. This means the policy of Judenpolitik to a greater or lesser extent became part of all political areas. In turn, the term politics is to be understood as the practical implementation of these policies.

Policies adopted the National Socialist idea of a racially purified society in a multitude of ways. Yet, Longerich highlights the fact that they were subject to both internal and contextual factors as well as being extremely complex in their interlinkages with other political areas. This means an analysis focusing on areas of Judenpolitik needs to take several factors into account. Judenpolitik functioned in an ever-changing political context, which caused tactical changes. Judenpolitik could thus be altered, withdrawn or accelerated if needed – it could even be contradictory, Longerich argues. To analyze the complexities of Judenpolitik it needs to account for German policies and alliances in occupied Europe. An analysis must also account for how the racial ideas became part of other areas in the contexts of e.g. trade and food issues.

In addition, such an analysis must consider how perpetrators, victims and bystanders reacted. To Longerich perpetrators are “active protagonists who could operate on their own initiative and understand intuitively what the leadership required of them”. Implementing Judenpolitik commanded consensus on the basic principles in order to function, while also being

---

144 Longerich, Holocaust, 17.
145 Ibid., 17–19.
146 Ibid., 18,20.
supported by parts of the population. Longerich also suggests that the actions and behaviors of victims and bystanders became increasingly important as the war progressed. He further underscores that focusing only on a perpetrator perspective after 1942 is unsatisfactory as the reactions of the other two groups increasingly affected Judenpolitik. A last subject to be considered in an analysis of Judenpolitik is the possible persecution of other groups.\textsuperscript{147}

In the context of this dissertation, Judenpolitik is understood as a tool to describe and analyze the complex processes of how German policy and politics related to Jews and their discrimination unfolded in Denmark from 1937-1943. In applying the descriptive and analytical term of Judenpolitik to the relationship of Denmark and Germany means to incorporate other policy areas, which affected Judenpolitik, as well as taking the political context, at any given time, into consideration. It should be stressed that Judenpolitik in general developed differently within the German dominated continent and could be scaled up or down at various instances. Since Raul Hilberg introduced the three categories of victims, bystanders, and perpetrators in 1992, they are used by most researchers in the field to gain differentiated perspectives on the events from 1933-1945.\textsuperscript{148} An exploration and analysis of the Judenpolitik in Denmark will also apply these perspectives in various degrees.

\section*{1.4 Victims, Bystanders, and Perpetrators}

Raul Hilberg presented victims, bystanders, and perpetrators as three groups that experienced the events from 1933-1945 in distinct ways and applied their own set of attitudes and reactions towards them.\textsuperscript{149} These categories have become highly successful and are applied by almost all researchers who examine this period.\textsuperscript{150} The main perspective of this dissertation will be that of the perpetrators. Perpetrator research today is nuanced taking the organizational frameworks into account, while also acknowledging human intent, personal restrictions, and possibilities. The bureaucrats, or Schreibtischtäter, desk perpetrators, are no longer seen as just the proverbial cogs in an anonymous bureaucratic setting. Instead, the boundaries of initiative are examined, while there is also a clear tendency to analyze which initiatives came from the bureaucracy rather than from the top echelons of the Nazi party. Focus now rests on the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 21.
\item \textsuperscript{149} Ibid., IX.
\item \textsuperscript{150} E.g. Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Penguin, 2007), XIX places his work within the perpetrator category.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
interchanging ideas between Berlin and locally situated organizations and individuals, in the development of both anti-Jewish policy and the murder process.\(^{151}\)

The main perpetrator groups in this dissertation are identified as primarily the organizations of the AA and RfA and to a much lesser degree the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (RWM) and NSDAP/AO. For the region of Denmark, the central perpetrator group is the German Legation (Gesandtschaft) in Denmark, but the focus lies mainly on analyzing Cecil von Renthe-Fink’s role (1937 to September 1942) and Werner Best’s (November 1942 to August 1943). Clearly, the murder process did not ensue in Denmark, and the focus is on the perpetrator’s role in the development of the exclusive elements of *Judenpolitik*.

I acknowledge that this is an unbalanced analytical perspective, which is justified by the need to first focus on the groups and individuals that had the power to formulate and enforce the *Judenpolitik* in Denmark. I would argue that the insights to be gained from this perspective will provide for a firmer base for future research to thoroughly analyze the consequences for the victims, as well as their reactions. On the other hand, some sections of this dissertation are devoted to the categories of bystanders and victims.

The understanding of the bystander category during the Holocaust has seen an increasing recognition of the complexities associated with defining and evaluating this category. The evaluation of the bystander role has been broadened, and the bystander is rarely described as only having two options: to assist or not. It has been suggested that in evaluating the bystanders’ options one has to focus on locating and describing the limitations of the bystanders’ actions.\(^{152}\) The definition of the group itself appears difficult due to the relatively long time period of twelve years, while it geographically centers on the European continent. However, international bystanders were found in both Shanghai and the USA. Countries which both enforced strict refugee policies by having fixed limits on the number of refugees they would accept. At the same time bystanders range from individuals to governments in varied contextual settings, which often affected bystanders.\(^{153}\)

---


To accommodate for these difficulties recent research suggests to clearly define the groups examined, and take on a processual view of the bystander(s) in order to acknowledge the circumstantial variations which took place in a dynamic historical setting.\(^{154}\) This has opened up for acknowledging the possibility of e.g. switching categories from bystanders to perpetrators, but also from bystanders to helpers.\(^{155}\) Robert M. Ehrenreich and Tim Cole argue that the category shift occurs when bystanders, often in a gradual process, assist the perpetrators to reach the perpetrators’ goals. On the other hand, perpetrators become bystanders if they stop aiding these goals or assist victims in e.g. hiding.\(^{156}\) The process analysis has been applied in a recent examination of Swedish refugee policies. This study concluded that Sweden slowly progressed from being a bystander nation employing discriminatory measures, which limited the number of Jewish refugees, only to initiate rescue initiatives later in the war.\(^{157}\)

Following the recommendations of international research in this area the Danish government is identified as part of the group of bystanders in this dissertation, which over time saw several changes (see appendix one). It operated with the following intentions and limitations:

“The intention of the government policy was to maintain as much of the nation’s sovereignty as possible, and to secure the population and the democratic institutions against Nazification and German violence and against other disasters of the war. The measure was adaption to German demands and neutrality in the battle of the great powers”.\(^{158}\)

The Danish government thus cooperated to reach these goals within the limitations of negotiation set by the German occupiers. Germany viewed this cooperation as being for the benefit of Germany in the period at hand due to e.g. the Danish exports. (See above).

The victim category is a much less disputed area, but discussions of victim hierarchies and genocides have seen their share of discussions in relation to memorial representations and the

\(^{154}\) Ibid., 36.

\(^{155}\) Bloxham and Kuschner, *The Holocaust: Critical Historical Approaches*, 176 They use the example of Poland by showing 28,000 Jews were assisted by Polish citizens in Warsaw, while the killings of Jews in the polish village of Jedwabne commenced with the assistance of Polish villagers.


\(^{158}\) Kirchhoff, *At handle med ondskaben. Samarbejds politikken under besættelsen.*, 184"Regeringspolitikkens mål var at fastholde så meget af statens suverænitet som muligt og sikre befolkningen og de demokratiske institutioner imod nazificering og tysk vold og imod krigens øvrige ulykker. Midlet var tilpasning til de tyske krav og neutralitet i stormagtstopgøret.”
uniqueness of the Holocaust. In comparison to the perpetrator and bystander groups there will be less focus on the victims in this dissertation, but there will be several cases illustrating the predicaments of, especially, the Danish-Jewish business community.

1.5 Stages of Persecution

The persecution and murder of the Jews is largely viewed as a non-linear process. Longerich and others have shown that Judenpolitik in the 1930’s was mainly an attempt to push the Jews to emigrate from Germany. The onset of war began a motion towards a formalized policy with the intention to murder the Jews. This was developed during the murder of disabled German citizens and the killing of Polish intellectuals.

All areas under German domination were subject to either formal or informal forms of Judenpolitik. A wide array of Holocaust literature points to the importance of bureaucratic rules and hierarchy in the persecution and murder of the Jews, while underscoring that these formal rules were subject to independent self-initiative and local variations. Indeed, corruption, bribery, and spontaneous shooting sprees stand in contrast to formal rules. It has also been pointed out that informal measures often were just as effective as formally constructed bureaucratic measures in e.g. the area of Aryanization. Similarly, local exclusive measures against Jews in Germany were often ahead of national ones.

In the context of the Holocaust the formality is bound in the legal, intentionally discriminatory, and anti-Semitic laws and decrees. These are mostly found in the Western European countries, but also in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. In contrast, Poland, Ukraine, the Baltics, and the conquered parts of the USSR were subject to many of the same measures as in countries with anti-Jewish laws and decrees, but more often than not this was in an informal manner. Overall, the killing of the Jews was never formulated in a legal context, but rather

---

160 Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung; Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, 268–69.
161 e.g. Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, 249.
163 Ibid., 3–4.
ordered within a military structure, while murders were already commencing. One example is Himmler’s order on the 19th of July 1942 to murder the Jews of the General Gouvernement after having visited Auschwitz. However, the extermination camp of Chełmno, using air tight trucks as mobile gas chambers, had already been in use from the end of 1941, and from March 1942 the Belzec extermination camp was murdering Jews in gas chambers.165 In essence the genocide itself remained in a sense legally informal, but within a highly recognizable modus operandi.

The flexibility of the informal and formal measures has been pointed to as being a trademark in the development of the persecution and murder of the Jews as it was tied to the importance of local circumstances.166 However, we should recognize that whether the measure was formal or informal it was always tied to prejudice as “…prejudice is crucial to the understanding of any case of genocide and the persecution of minorities. When genocide occurs, it is because a certain group has been singled out, turned into “the other”. Its victims are not randomly chosen.” 167 Raul Hilberg might have said it best; “In the final analysis, the destruction of the Jews was not so much a product of laws and commands as it was a matter of spirit, of shared comprehension, of consonance and synchronization”.168 In this sense, and despite the non-legal Entjudung measures in Denmark, they were still aimed at a well-defined minority within the confines of the idea to remove or destroy the Jews.

In order to provide a general overview of the most common phases of Judenpolitik I present a ten-phase model that categorizes the different elements of Judenpolitik. This is done in order to identify the various stages of persecution, which can be identified in Denmark. It expands on Raul Hilberg’s four phases of definition, expropriation, confiscation and murder.169 In addition, it draws much inspiration from Gregory Stanton’s ten stages of genocide developed to identify and locate genocides in order to prevent them.170 The ten-phase model, Stages of Persecution, presented below is to be understood as a general tool to identify elements of Judenpolitik.171

---

165 Poland saw decrees e.g. definitions and markings of Jews. On the other hand, the creation of closed ghettos “did not proceed form any order or basic plan, the procedure was remarkably similar in all cities.” The mobile killing units, Einsatzgruppen, in Ukraine, the Baltic, and the USSR identified Jews in villages and would then shoot them in nearby locations. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3rd ed, vol. 1 (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2003), 217–18, 223, 297–305; Longerich, Holocaust, 330–35.


169 Ibid., 1:50–51. Interestingly, this idea is based on an affidavit from 1945 to be used in the Nuremberg trials.


171 First presented in Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 33–39 but changed somewhat in this version e.g. the expansion on Aryanization.
The phases are not static and do not necessarily follow a set order rather, they are overlapping, happening simultaneously, or are skipped. Clearly, the national varieties in *Judenpolitik* are not contained in these stages as each country had a unique contextual setting often highly dependent on the relationship with the occupier, which to some extent shaped the response to persecution and murder of Jews. Just looking at Scandinavia reflects this diversity. In Denmark, persecution remained informal, in a legal sense, and went directly to the deportation phase. In Norway most phases were implemented through the collaborative nature of the Quisling government, while in Sweden the informal Aryanization attempts seem to have been the only phase employed.

1. **Informal persecution**

Informal persecution emanates from specific groups, but it can be promoted and initiated by official parts of the bureaucracy, the police or the military. If that is the case persecution often presents itself as well-organized and expansive. There were many forms of well prepared and organized informal persecution measures during the Holocaust, but most notably were the deportations and mass-murders which were never formal in a legal sense.

2. **Formal Persecution**

The formal organization came from a host of bureaucratic entities which supported the judicial persecution of the Jews in creating and developing the anti-Jewish laws and decrees as well as taking the legal steps needed within the confines of these laws.

3. **Definition**

Defining whom to persecute is a necessary prerequisite for any discriminatory measure. The Nazi-German definition of who was Jewish was defined in the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, despite legal persecution taking place before 1935. The Nuremberg laws were later expanded to encompass two categories of so-called mixed-bloods (Mischlinge) the categories being defined as follows:

---

• A Jew had 3 or 4 Jewish grandparents.
• Mischlinge of the 1st degree had two Jewish grandparents.
• Mischlinge of the 2nd degree had one Jewish grandparent.

On the surface, the definition was a blood-related one, but when defining whether a grandfather was Jewish or not, the definition became much more uncertain and essentially religious. The German Interior Ministry argued in November 1935 that race was still at the core of the laws, but due to the practical work in assessing who was Jewish or not, it was decided that a person who belonged to the Jewish religion also belonged to the Jewish race. In essence, this somewhat undermined the racial biological argument. Definitions in other countries followed the Nuremberg definitions, but could adopt local variations.\textsuperscript{173}

The Nazi dictatorship had a monopoly on defining who was Jewish. This was neither a personal nor a religious decision, but rather imposed on the individual from the outside.\textsuperscript{174} In the history of the Holocaust, there are numerous examples of people who never regarded themselves as Jewish, but by definition of the dictatorship were categorized as Jewish nonetheless. This was e.g. the case for Christians who had Jewish grandparents.

\textbf{4. Identification and registration}

After defining whom to persecute the identification and registration of individuals, and later companies, was needed in order to initiate discriminatory measures against them. Identification and registration were completed in several ways, such as a legal demand to register oneself, search for Jewish names in publications, or the use of confiscated lists from Jewish congregations or organizations. This information was often used to create elaborate registries of both Jews and Jewish companies.

\textbf{5. Exclusion}

This phase is characterized by the attempt to exclude all Jews from public life and the economy. Both formal and informal initiatives often targeted Jews in positions on state or regional level, but also Jews in prestigious positions in society such as professors, lawyers and

\textsuperscript{173} Hilberg, \textit{The Destruction of the European Jews}, 2003, 1:70, 77; E.g. in Italy the definition was mainly tied to belonging the Jewish religion Hilberg, \textit{The Destruction of the European Jews}, 2003, 2:706; Friedländer, \textit{Nazi Germany and the Jews Vol. 1. The Years of Persecution}, 1933-1939, 152, 368.

\textsuperscript{174} Bajohr, “\textit{Aryanisation}” in Hamburg see his footnote no. 2; Stengel describes it as “the humans which were declared to be Jews by the National Socialists” Stengel, “Einleitung,” 9.
doctors. Companies were also targeted as well as Jews in the performing arts. Jews were also excluded from pursuing formal education in many instances. Later came the geographical exclusion from e.g. parks, restaurants and hotels.

**Aryanization** overlaps phase five and six. It is a main theme of this dissertation and therefore it will be described in depth here. The term is regarded as problematic, however it remains the most widely used term which will be defined as measures designed to exclude the Jews from the economy and to transfer Jewish owned property to Aryans.\(^{175}\) In order to contextualize Aryanization we need to briefly revisit its development in Germany. Recent research has characterized Aryanization as coming from below, essentially being informal, until Germany absorbed Austria in March 1938 and a series of state laws were issued to formalize the process.\(^ {176}\)

Before the spring of 1938 Aryanization involved different actors and had regional characteristics while the national government would only intervene if foreign affairs were at risk. This was the case if local Aryanization attempts e.g. targeted businesses with international ties.\(^{177}\) Half of the approximately 100,000 Jewish companies were closed or sold before being legally required to do so for various reasons, but the risk of persecution has been identified as a major contributor to these sales.\(^ {178}\) It was e.g. a dominant characteristic of sales that prices went down as persecution intensified.\(^ {179}\)

On the 14\(^{th}\) of June 1938, the definition of Jewish companies and assets came into effect through the third addition to the Nuremberg Laws, and it has been characterized as the starting point for judicially based racism in the economy. The definition of Jewish companies was as follows:

- There was one Jewish owner or partner in the company
- There was one Jewish board member in the company

\(^{175}\) Bajohr, “Aryanisation” in Hamburg, 11, note 2. Bajohr also uses Entjudung - de-Judaisation. For a thorough discussion on the development of the term see ; Köhler, Die “Arisierung” der Privatbanken im Dritten Reich: Verdrängung, Ausschaltung und die Frage der Wiedergutmachung, 38–39; While Kreutzmüller, Final Sale in Berlin rejects using the term altogether as he deems it too imprecise.

\(^ {176}\) The idea of Aryanization from below is coined in the introduction of Bajohr, “Aryanisation” in Hamburg; Köhler, Die “Arisierung” der Privatbanken im Dritten Reich: Verdrängung, Ausschaltung und die Frage der Wiedergutmachung, 174–77.


• 25% of the stock was owned by Jews
• Half or more of the votes belonged to Jews
• The company was considered 'under practically Jewish influence'
• A subdivision was regarded as Jewish if a Jew headed it.

The phrase ‘under practically Jewish influence' is a very flexible category and should be viewed as presenting the possibility for discrimination in various situations. It should be noted that the definition in some cases made it simple to convert a company from Jewish to Aryan, as replacing a board member could be sufficient.\(^{180}\)

The Night of Broken Glass, or Kristallnacht, occurred on the night from November 8\(^{\text{th}}\) to 9\(^{\text{th}}\) 1938. During that night, most Jewish stores and synagogues were destroyed or damaged all over Germany. It was staged and mainly perpetrated by the regime who attempted to frame it as the people’s revenge for the murder of the German diplomat Ernst vom Rath in Paris by the young Herschel Grynszpan, who was Jewish. Kristallnacht had numerous consequences for the Jews, but for Jewish businesses it is generally considered the final push. It became illegal for Jewish businesses to exist in specific business areas as of the 31\(^{\text{st}}\) of December 1938, while it became fairly impossible for the rest to maintain a business. Industrial enterprises and real estate owned by Jewish companies as well as their securities could be ordered to be sold by a given deadline. In essence these laws opened for the total liquidation of all Jewish businesses in Germany.\(^{181}\)

Most Aryanization initiatives and laws developed in Germany were later reformulated as laws and decrees in occupied Western Europe. This often occurred with the cooperation of the local administrations, but with local variations. For example, the valuables of the Norwegian Jews were kept in Norway to pay for the administration, while in the Netherlands the process was never completed, as 1,000 Jewish companies still existed in 1945. A marked characteristic of the Aryanization in Western Europe is the cooperation of national banks and administrative organs in the process. The occupied Eastern areas were subject to a much more haphazard and informal process of Aryanization. Other aspects of Aryanization besides the confiscation of business or


\(^{181}\) Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 2003, 1:123–25; In Kreutzmüller, Final Sale in Berlin it is shown how some Jewish businesses challenged the liquidation measures as late as early 1942.
transfer of business assets include the confiscation and robbery of personal belongings, such as money, jewelry, furniture, art, real estate, land, bank accounts, stocks and pensions. The complicity of local populations in buying or taking over Jewish assets and companies has been labelled a form of economic anti-Semitism.\textsuperscript{182}

6. Confiscation and Robbery

The robbery of Jewish assets in all variations usually took place during all stages of the Holocaust in some form, but usually after registration of Jews and companies. Often it began on a small scale and was continuously increased. Wealth and other valuable assets were confiscated either partly or as a whole. This process took the formal form of taxation laws targeting Jews, forced deposits of wealth, bonds and stocks, but also laws demanding sales of property and real estate. Laws against owning specific items such as e.g. bicycles or radios were also applied. At the same time laws removed the rights to insurance payments and pensions. Informally the robbery took place in many instances from 1933 in enrichment searches by NSDAP members. Later, the “wild” enrichment raids were carried out in the proverbial East in local areas, the ghettos, and the camps.\textsuperscript{183} After deportation, sales or robbing of Jewish homes would often take place. Even after the murder (stage ten) gold teeth were extracted from the bodies and some corpses were exploited for medical purposes. Proof of death was sometimes applied to secure valuables in other countries.

7. Public Stigmatization

Jewish individuals and business were stigmatized through publicly wearing or displaying a form of the star of David, which varied in design. Businesses were legally required to display their racial category by 1938, but earlier boycott attempts had identified most of these. For individuals the public stigmatization was first introduced in Poland in 1939 and in Germany in September 1941.\textsuperscript{184}

8. Forced relocation


Forced relocations, forced concentrations and ghettoization took place in most countries as Jews were forced to move to designated areas. Afterwards these would often be forcibly moved to transit camps or ghettos, which increased their concentration. Ghettoes were most prominent in Eastern Europe where the number of Jews were the greatest. The ghettoes were run by Jewish councils who would mostly enforce the decrees from their captors. The ghettoes were over time closed as the “inhabitants” were deported and the last larger ghetto, Lodz, was only closed in May 1944, and its “inhabitants” deported.

9. Deportation
After forced relocation the next step would often be deportation to a killing site. Deportations took place all over Europe and mostly by train. Poland was the primary destination as the two main ghettoes, Warszawa and Lodz, as well as the six extermination camps were located here. Jews were also deported to the Baltic areas where extensive shootings took place. Many European Jews were deported to Poland, while Jews in Poland were taken to a ghetto or directly to an extermination camp. The Jews in the Baltics and the occupied parts of the former USSR were often murdered close to their home and were rarely deported.

10. Murder
The genocide of the Jews was done through shootings, use of gas vans, the exterminations camps, in concentrations camps and through the so-called death marches. The first Einsatzgruppen, killing squads, would kill leading members of the polish society in 1939. These squads would follow the advancing army into Russia to round up the Jews and shoot them. These units were often assisted by gas vans and this type of killing was also applied in the first extermination camp Chelmno. The other extermination camps had gas chambers. Auschwitz and Majdanek used the toxic cyklon B gas, while the others used the exhaust gasses from large engines. Jews were also murdered in the concentration camps through a conscious starvation and overworking regime. In these camps Jews were subject to arbitrary violence and medical experiments. As the eastern front closed in on the camps in Eastern Europe most “prisoners” were forced to walk to camps located in Germany. These have been labelled death marches as thousands died or were murdered. It is estimated that between five and six million Jews were murdered during the Holocaust.

1.6 Analytical Approach and Research questions
This dissertation sets out to explore and analyze the German *Judenpolitik* in Denmark by focusing on the Aryanization of Danish-German trade relations and anti-Jewish policies in Denmark from 1937 until August 1943. As a second research goal, it examines the reactions of the Danish government to the German *Judenpolitik*. The analytical approach applies *Judenpolitik*, cooperation and the perspectives of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders as well as the model Stages of Persecution – all discussed in sections 1.2-1.5 above. This analytical approach will be applied to answering the following research questions:

1. How was Germany’s ambition to Aryanize its foreign trade developed into concrete policies, and how were these policies implemented into Danish-German trade relations as part of the German *Judenpolitik* in Denmark?
2. How did the German legation assist in formulating and executing the German *Judenpolitik* in Denmark?
3. How did the Danish government respond to the German *Judenpolitik*?
4. Based on the model Stages of Persecution, which stages and forms of *Judenpolitik* can be identified in Denmark during 1937-August 1943?

1.7 Method

The research questions will be answered by examining a host of primary historical sources. These are interpreted through a three-step historical method of 1) source criticism 2) triangulation, and 3) hermeneutics.\(^\text{185}\) This method will be briefly described below.

As a consequence of the fact that historical sources are often preserved in a fragmentary or partly manner, source criticism is applied to establish validity by identifying the circumstances of their creation like e.g. author and date as well as contextual circumstances.\(^\text{186}\) This includes evaluating the author(s) of the sources for bias as well as credibility.\(^\text{187}\) Triangulation refers to an application of validation through data comparison within the social sciences. However, historians also apply triangulation by using several sources and secondary literature. This is done


\(^{186}\) Ibid., 306.

\(^{187}\) Ibid., 313–15.
in order to detect additional sources which contradict and confirm the findings. Generally, there is a high emphasis on sources written as close to events as possible in order to avoid “retrospective bias”.

The hermeneutic approach in history is to be understood as a contextual historical interpretation of meaning in texts. The primary source at hand is interpreted in relation to other sources in order to establish a contextual interpretational setting. Secondary sources are applied to provide and locate contexts which will assist interpretation, which builds on the triangulation principle. Meaning and thus research also depends on the reader’s contextual setting. The hermeneutic method acknowledges that interpretation is shaped by the researcher’s contemporary setting as well as a predisposed mindset. It has also been argued that a conscious recontextualization of sources allows for new insights into existing historical positions.

The hermeneutic circle is used to describe how the interpretation of sources is situated both with the researcher and previous research in a dialogue with the source. This dialogue is highly dependent on the research question(s) being pursued but is also an interchanging positioning between the part (the source), and the whole. Ideally, this allows for a source being used for answering other research questions as well as a continuous re-reading and understanding of the sources.

This three-step historical method is applied throughout the dissertation. It is combined with the analytical approaches presented in sections 1.2 to 1.5. It is a conscious choice to contextualize and interpret the primary sources by applying the notion of Judenpolitik and the model Stages of Persecution in order to connect events in Denmark to an international context within the overall framework of German anti-Jewish policy. Each chapter will relate to the research questions, while the identifiable steps in the model Stages of Persecution are pointed to. The categories of perpetrators, bystanders, and victims will be applied to serve as a point of

---

190 Ibid., 321.
view as well as to trace possible bystander progression. The main perspectives remain that of the perpetrators and bystanders, but when possible, the victim perspective is included.

1.8 Sources

I use primary sources from the Bundesarchiv, Berlin, Lichterfelde, the Politisches Archiv (PA), Berlin, and the Danish National Archives. The Bundesarchiv holds the sources from the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) as well as the archive material of the German legation in Copenhagen related to trade. Sources from the legation that are not related to trade are located at the PA.

The sources from the RfA has not previously been fully researched, and I have focused on two types of sources which serve as entry points into the organization. These are Handakten and Rundschreiben. Handakten contain selected files deemed important by the heads of the RfA and Rundschreiben detail and outline the procedures of the RfA. In addition, sources related to Denmark were as far as possible identified. In addition, sources from the (PA) have been used to trace the role of the NSDAP/AO in this policy area. The RfA still contains a host sources relating to its work on Aryanization, especially on how it was pursued in other countries. The sources examined thus represent a limited, but consciously chosen sample of available sources. The sample of sources is evaluated as large enough to make conclusions on the overall Aryanization polices of the RfA. Selected parts of the RfA’s archive which relate to Denmark are also used. However, it is possible that sources relating to Denmark are found in other archival categories of the RfA than the ones examined.

The archival material from the trade section of the Gesandtschaft revealed 10,000 letters from the period of 1940-1944, which racially categorized companies in Denmark. It seems this type of letters is not preserved from before January 1940 or was transmitted in another manner. The correspondence appears to be missing for the following months: June and July (1940), April to September (1941), November and December (1942), January and February (1943), and lastly June to December (1944). 3,500 of the letters from the occupation period will serve as an analytical sample of the information exchange between the German Gesandtschaft in

---

194 The register of the RFA mentions the existence of a partial card registry containing the names of the companies examined and their racial status. However, the Bundesarchiv claim this is at the National Archives in Washington and Washington claims it is in Germany. Unfortunately, a continuous correspondence with both archives and individual research on my part has not located the remnants of this registry.
Copenhagen and the RfA. A sample has been selected due to the overwhelming and time-consuming task of manual registration of all addresses, companies, and individual names, which would require at least six months of full-time registration. I acknowledge that a complete registration would allow for a more exhaustive result. However, the sample clearly reveals the existence of an elaborate information exchange regarding race, and that numerous Danish companies were examined according to race across the country. Sources from the trade department of the AA, are also examined to trace the involvement of the legation in these matters, and this includes selected sources from the German Chamber of Commerce in Denmark found at the Danish National Archives.

Sources used from the PA also focus on content relating to Jewish policies in Denmark. A majority of these were published in a commented source collection in 2008. A host of additional sources from the AA in relation to Denmark were published in 2015 in a large 10 volume work which was limited to the period from November 1942 to May 1945. Relevant sources from both of these publications have been consulted to locate sources on Aryanization. In addition, files from the Danish Foreign Ministry’s group 140 contain examples of Danish-Jewish companies that were Aryanized as well as the Danish government’s reaction to these. Several cases are used that show how German Aryanization took place and affected these companies.

Selected postwar trial material is used to show how Danish anti-Semites became paid aids to the German legation to promote anti-Semitism, register Jews, and how members of the German police continuously registered Jews in Denmark. Postwar trial material, especially the interrogations always pose a risk of misinterpretation. I have applied the following rule of thumb to postwar defense strategy. It often seeks to assign responsibility further up the system in order to minimize one’s personal role and to suggest one’s actions had a moderating effect in an otherwise brutal system.

The Danish and German police cooperated on registration matters, and the 17,000 cases of the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs (SPSA), the AS-cases, have been examined for the Copenhagen area from April 1940 to October 1943. A number of cases reveal that the Danish

---

195 Lauridsen, “Tyske akter vedrørende ’jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943.”
police performed an unknown number of racial investigations on behalf of the German police. These sources reveal how registration measures proceeded.

Granted, more postwar trials of the Danish and German staff at the legation would have allowed for a deeper examination of registration, and there exist similar cases of the SPSA from many other Danish cities. However, the files from Denmark's second largest city Aarhus only contain 1,664 cases, while larger provincial cities on average have between 350 to 800 cases, and smaller cities have around 89 to 300 cases. Copenhagen has been selected as most cases are from this city, and most Jews lived in Copenhagen.

In addition, sources from the Danish Foreign Ministry, especially group 120, contain relevant dealings of this ministry relating to Jews and Germany. The official, but often short, minutes of the meetings in the cabinet have also been used. The minutes are supplied with additional material from the recently published diary of the Minister of Public Works Gunnar Larsen, which had been largely inaccessible beforehand, and the published minutes of the meetings in the Nine-Man Committee. The Nine-Man Committee, officially the National Assembly's Coordinating Committee, functioned as the connecting link between the political parties and the cabinet from July 1940 to October 1943. In October it was expanded to thirteen members despite the government not functioning as an executive. The private archive of the Minister for Industry, and Trade, Halfdan Hendriksen, is used to further supplement our knowledge on the content of the cabinet meetings. Other minister's archives have been consulted and these include Kristen Bording, Thune Jacobsen and Jørgen Jørgensen. These have not revealed material on the proceedings in cabinet meetings.

There are known instances of trade organizations that have discussed Judenpolitik and especially Aryanization as well as other exclusive measures, however I have chosen to focus mostly on German archive material and Danish government files in order to establish the deliberate attempt to exclude Danish Jews from the economy. This choice focuses the dissertation and will provide the foundation for further research into how individual organizations reacted to pressures for the exclusion of Jews. These could include trade organizations, but also other organizations such as the Association of Danish Journalists or the Association of Doctors.
On a more general level, most researchers agree that much of the material on the legation’s work in Copenhagen is still missing due to destruction of archives in April 1945.\textsuperscript{198} One example is the archives from the German consulates in Denmark, which are missing from both the PA and the Bundesarchiv.\textsuperscript{199} The reports on Danish German trade relations, written by Franz Ebner, head of economics and trade at the German Gesandtschaft in Copenhagen, were published in 2012, but do not reveal anything on anti-Jewish policies or Aryanization.\textsuperscript{200}

The Danish Ministry of Trade must have been involved in the Aryanization issues. However, extensive searches in the archival registries as well sampling of possible relevant files have not revealed any material on Aryanization or anti-Jewish measures in this ministry. This is also the case for trade negotiations in the Danish Foreign Ministry, which could contain sources related to Aryanization. Despite extensive searches in these sources the subject has not been identified. Previous research in this ministry does not mention the subject either.\textsuperscript{201}

\section*{1.8.1 Structure of dissertation}

Chapter two focuses on answering the first part of research question number one by focusing on the RfA and the policies developed to Aryanize the German foreign trade. Chapters three to nine all focus on \textit{Judenpolitik} in Denmark. Research question number four will be answered by identifying the stages of persecution in each of these chapters. Chapter three to four will focus on answering the second part of research question one. These chapters partly answer research questions two and three on the subject of Aryanization. Chapter five focuses specifically on registration measures in Denmark, which to a lesser degree is touched upon in all chapters. In a sense chapter five functions as an overlap between the Aryanization theme, and other areas of \textit{Judenpolitik}. As already noted registration serves as a necessary step to enforce and pursue discriminatory measures. The German legation’s assistance in formulating and executing \textit{Judenpolitik}, as well as the Danish government’s reactions will be at the center of chapters six to eight. Chapter nine functions as an epilogue before chapter ten concludes. Chapter nine goes

\begin{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{199} All consuls were registered by the Danish Foreign Ministry. According to their files German consulates existed in: Esbjerg, Fredericia (from 1944), Frederikshavn, Helsingør, Horsens, Kalundborg, Kolding, Korsør, Nykøbing Falster, Næstved, Odense, Randers, Ringkøbing, Rønne, Skive, Svanke, Svedborg, Sønderborg (1937-1942), Thisted (until 1944), Aabenraa, Aalborg and Aarhus.


\end{flushleft}
beyond October 1943 to reveal how Judenpolitik continued as the German occupiers sought to partly erase the written memory of Jews in Denmark as well as promoting anti-Semitic arguments.

2 Aryanizing the German Foreign Trade – The RFA

This chapter explores and analyzes the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) in order to answer the first section of research question number one “How was Germany’s ambition to Aryanize their foreign trade developed into concrete policies?” The RfA became the central organizational unit that pursued a Judenpolitik aiming at Aryanizing the German foreign trade all over the world.202 Sections 2.1 and 2.2 will show how the RfA was chosen for this task, and how it developed several policies to reach this goal. These processes are essential in order to understand the Aryanization measures pursued in Denmark both before and during the occupation. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 especially focuses on the registration processes of the RfA, which were set in motion in order to map Jewish businesses in the world. In many ways the RfA is a good example of how Judenpolitik was adopted into foreign trade policy while being fused with ideological and racially motivated goals. The main focus of the chapter remains the policies rather than the actors of the organization. However, we can conclude the upper-echelons of the organization appear well-educated with at least half of them holding a doctoral degree.203

In 1933, The Zentralstelle für den Außenhandel (ZfA) was renamed Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel. The organization was placed under both the German Foreign Ministry, Auswärtiges Amt (AA) and the Ministry of Economics, the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (RWM). In the AA, it was part of Office X which dealt with Trade Politics. In RWM, it was Office V – simply called RfA. The RfA was headed by Oskar Wingen (AA) and Eugen Baumgartner (RWM).204 Oskar Wingen had a doctoral degree in Political Science and after four years in other positions he entered the AA in 1919. He was head of the archives before becoming part of press matters (department P) in 1921. In the 1930s he had a briefer, but important position at the Propaganda Ministry (1933-1934), and until 1935 he was Saarbevollmächtigen des Reichskanzlers. He reentered the AA in 1935 and headed department X from October 1938 until he retired in

202 In the selection of sources I have examined, I have identified 35 different countries, which include most of Europe, but also countries such as Australia, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Brazil, India, Mexico and Iran. Examples are found in BA, R9I 634-635.
203 “Geschäftsverteilungsplan (2),” February 1, 1941, BA, R9I, 3175.
204 Carmen Lorenz, Introduction to the register of Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (Bundesarchiv, 2007).
November 1944. Eugen Baumgartner had a career in a private company before entering the RWM in 1934. He took over the leadership of the RfA in 1937, but our knowledge of his career is very limited.

The zenith of the RfA was in 1941, when it had five independent departments and approximately 50 offices of various sizes and areas of expertise. There were several underlying trade offices which reported to the RfA. Most important were the 22 Außenhandelsstellen that were organized locally, but the various Prüfungsstellen for the individual trade sectors, e.g. leather, were also influential. The RfA can be viewed as an information center for all aspects of foreign trade. It published news on trade relations and was up-to-date on relevant foreign laws (e.g. tax laws) which could affect German trade. The Aryanization measures treated below were located in department III later IV, and are thus to be viewed as only a part of this organization’s many tasks which is illustrated by figure 1 and appendix 3.

---

206 “Personalakten Eugen Baumgartner,” 1937 1934, BA, R9i, 669 His file appears incomplete and his name is missing from the usual biographical handbooks.
207 “Geschäftsverteilungsplan (1),” July 1, 1939, BA, R9i, 3175; “Geschäftsverteilungsplan (2).”
208 Please see Rohstock, “Vom Anti-Parlamentarier zum ‘kalten Arisierer’ jüdischer Unternehmen in Europa,” 52–57 for an example of this.
209 Lorenz, Introduction to the register of Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel.
Figure 1: The organization of the RFA 1941 - Appendix 3 contains all the office's names.
2.1 Beginnings and Early Goals of the RfA

A key component of excluding the Jewish trade partners was to register them. This seems to have taken place from as early as 1933 by both NSDAP/AO and RfA. In early 1937, the process was formalized, and the RfA was charged with charting and removing international Jewish representatives.\textsuperscript{210} The mission statement for RfA read "...that only through 1) a systematic registration of every German export company and 2) every representative for German companies abroad could the goal of a complete Entjudung be reached."\textsuperscript{211} This was a clear international and ideologically motivated goal of enormous dimensions. It was deeply rooted in the Nazi belief that Jewry was to be considered a world-wide threat aspiring to control the world's economy. It should be stressed that the policies of international Aryanization thus

\textsuperscript{210} The term representative is to be understood in a broad sense: any person affiliated with the German company abroad. Examples are: importers, agents or persons hired directly by the company abroad.

\textsuperscript{211} ...dass nur auf dem Wege einer systematischen Erfassung 1.) sämtlicher deutscher Ausfuhrfirmen und 2.) sämtlicher Vertreter deutscher Firmen im Auslande, das Ziel einer restlosen Entjudung erreicht werden konnte. ""RfA und die Entjudung der deutschen Firmen-Vertreter im Auslande.," November 22, 1938, BA, R9i, 152.
commenced before the legal Aryanization process began in Germany in 1938. As such it was one of many policies directed at the Jews, which had begun in a legally informal manner and later became formalized. Yet, it should be noted that in the context of other countries this policy had to be carried out in an informal manner in the prewar period.

The RWM, the AA and the NSDAP/AO were the organizations responsible for formalizing the process of Aryanizing the foreign trade and setting the long-term goals. By examining the letter exchanges, guideline proposals, and decrees which were circulated among these organizations we can locate how the RfA became the central organization in this area. The guidelines and decrees agreed upon forms the basis for the implementation of the bureaucratic work. The RfA was responsible for setting this in motion in order to remove Jewish influence from the German foreign trade.

The initial description of what was envisioned was formulated in early 1937 by the Staatssekretär in RWM, Dr. Hans Ernst Posse, and commented by the AA and NSDAP/AO. It was expected that Germany would gain an economic profit by excluding Jews from foreign trade. There are several legitimizing arguments for this policy in Posse’s letter. Replacing Jewish representatives in German companies abroad would support and apply National Socialism’s fundamental view on Jews to international trade relations. Posse also acknowledges the existence of political and racial reasons, but he does not elaborate on these. The Jews were characterized as being both powerful and hostile to Germany. Their influence was estimated as being so strong that the excluding policies against them had to remain secret. Posse expressed his fears of the Jewish world press and this fits into the National Socialist perception that the Jews controlled the world’s media. For all these reasons Jews were to be excluded from the foreign trade. Posse feared that some German companies would be reluctant to fulfill the demands to remove their Jewish representatives due a risk of economic loss. Posse argued that the only feasible way to control the process without damaging foreign trade would be to use the state’s organizations. To Posse, the predominant problem in fulfilling these exclusive goals was finding suitable replacements for the Jewish representatives.

---

212 I recognize that ‘legal’ Aryanization processes in Germany came after years of informal Aryanization attempts that were ideologically and sometimes financially backed by the dictatorship.

213 “Posse zu Auswärtige Amt und NSDAP/AP,” February 8, 1937, PA, R27275.
Posse expected careful test-runs were needed in order to probe the possibilities of exchanging Jewish representatives with non-Jews. This precaution was deemed necessary in order to avoid suspicion and impairing foreign trade. This had to be achieved country by country, while remaining sensitive to the various national characteristics of each country. Posse estimated that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were the most suitable countries to initiate these policies in. Ideally, the Jews were to be replaced by Germans or members of the German people (Volksdeutsche). The Außenhandelsstellen were to work from case to case while the legations of the AA would provide information on which German companies employed Jewish representatives. The AA would also have to assist in identifying and suggesting suitable replacements. The RfA was supposed to be the central organizer of these efforts, but Posse had already initiated the practical work as German companies claimed they were unable to find suitable replacements. Posse had been involved in these cases in order to replace the Jewish representatives and concluded there had been a traceable rise in their removal. The letter from Posse initiated a process to formalize the procedures to replace Jewish representatives. However, it turned out that several other informal initiatives had already been pursued in other branches of the National Socialist state and party organizations to reach the same objective. One such organization was the NSDAP/AO.

The former English citizen Ernst Wilhelm Bohle headed the NSDAP/AO. Having studied and married in Germany, he joined the party in 1931 and the SS two years later. He switched his British citizenship for a German one in 1937. The reasons were ideological, as he viewed Hitler as Europe’s savior from communism and the Jews. Carrying the high-ranking title of Gauleiter, Bohle was to organize all party activities outside of Germany. A main element of his work was to mobilize the almost 30 million Germans around the world to locally support National Socialism. The foreign trade branch (Außenhandelsamt) of the NSDAP/AO was headed by Alfred Heß, brother to the more famous Rudolph Heß, and Alfred Heß was placed just below Bohle in the NSDAP/AO.

Heß and Bohle agreed on Posse’s draft decree, and it was distributed to all German legations who became part of these measures. The NSDAP/AO agreed the time seemed right to formalize

214 Ibid.
215 Horst H Geerken, Hitler’s Asian Adventure (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2015), 43–44; Frank-Rutger Hausmann, Ernst-Wilhelm Bohle, Gauleiter im Dienst von Partei und Staat (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009), 9, 21, 52.
the process of Aryanizing the foreign trade as it would accommodate National Socialist thought and incorporate country-specific difficulties. Heß and Bohle explained that the draft was similar to the guidelines the NSDAP/AO had followed for years. The NSDAP/AO had used party members residing outside of Germany to determine who could be trusted in economic matters, and Jews were distrusted. Heß and Bohle had used party members for this task as they were believed to be more attuned to who were Jews or not. Formal supporters of the party were thus considered trustworthy partners in replacing Jewish representatives. Heß and Bohle characterized Jews as untrustworthy and unwanted. They envisioned the day when Germany’s foreign trade would be emancipated from Jewish influences. Yet, they wanted to expand these measures to also exclude emigrants from Germany and persons hostile to Germany, and these ideas were included in later decrees. With NSDAP/AO’s acceptance of Posse’s ideas the RWM charged the RfA with continuing the process of Aryanizing the foreign trade.

In August 1937, the RfA had formulated an elaborate set of guidelines on how to replace Jewish representatives. The goal was explicitly described as being the complete exclusion of the Jews to be reached through perseverance and hard work. The guidelines were legitimized through characteristic anti-Semitic rhetoric combined with fear and concern. Using the anti-Semitic perception of the Jews as being connected in a world-wide network they were regarded as an enormous threat to Germany, and their numbers alone was a sufficient reason to act against them. The Jews were seen as having the decisive advantage as they could collectively decide to terminate trade with Germany. At the same time Jews were labelled as untrustworthy and disloyal trade partners who based their choice of trade partner on economic parameters. The main concern expressed in the guidelines was that German foreign trade would risk being damaged by Jewish trade boycotts and Jewish attempts to turn the international political climate against Germany. It was argued that Jews had the means to change both the material setting and the overall attitude towards the German economy. The possible damage to the foreign trade and the German economy was the main concern in initiating a policy replacing the Jews. Replacements therefore had to be carried out carefully and trustworthy replacements should be identified before Jewish representatives could be excluded. Germany’s first priority was to obtain new and non-Jewish representatives. It was acknowledged that it would take years to

---

complete the replacement process. The guidelines thus seem to mark the beginning of the formal incorporation of Judenpolitik in foreign trade relations.

The first guidelines were elaborate and extensive in laying out concrete procedures to reach the goal of Entjudung in the foreign trade, while assigning the necessary bureaucratic roles to the various organizations involved. The RfA also attempted to strengthen their position in this area through the phrasing in the guidelines, but let us begin with the content of the guidelines. They emphasized Jews could no longer be appointed as new representatives, commissioners, branch managers, or managers of subsidiaries in German companies in other countries. If at all possible, new appointees were to be chosen from German citizens in the country at hand. The most important goal was the replacement of the Jewish representatives with non-Jews. As envisioned, this exchange had to be done carefully and without attracting attention. The guidelines thus became a very elaborate and formalized attempt to enforce Aryanization in other countries in an informal way.

German companies were responsible for finding suitable persons for new appointments, while the replacement of Jews was to be accomplished in coordination with the German trade organizations assisted by the RfA and its Außenhandelsstellen. The RfA was to monitor and assist in the Aryanization of representatives. The RfA would cooperate with other branches of the economy, as well as party organizations. The Industry and Trade Chamber (Wirtschaftsgruppen oder Fachgruppen der Industrie oder des Handels) was one such group, while the RfA also coordinated efforts with, especially, NSDAP/AO and the leadership of the Gaue.

Replacing a Jewish person required proof of race. If the representative was Jewish, a review process of contracts, etc., would begin. The replacement had to be completed if possible, but problems in finding, e.g. a suitable new representative, were to a certain degree expected and accepted. However, the RfA stressed that continuous efforts to exchange the Jewish representative had to be carried out. Later editions to the guidelines allowed for one contract with a Jewish representative while pursuing new business opportunities, but from August 1939 new permanent representatives could not be Jewish.

---

218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 “Geschäfte mit Jüdische Gelegenheitsvertretern,” August 26, 1939, BA, R91, 623; In 1938 it was required by law that Jewish companies in Germany were to Aryanize their representatives abroad. This might be connected to the racial stereotype of Jews being connected world-
The RfA reasoned that the first and most essential piece of information needed to successfully replace the Jews was their identities. The cornerstone for success was thus a continuous, confidential, and updated information flow on both Jewish and non-Jewish representatives for German companies. The information was transmitted by circulating letters, as well as through discreet oral messages. The replacement of Jews had to be completed with the acceptance of the company in question, but should problems arise, the RfA would step in as a mediator.222

In October 1937, these guidelines were accepted by the AA, NSDAP/AO and the RWM. Only in October 1940 would major changes occur to these guidelines (see section 2.2). However, a decree to replace Jewish representatives had already been sent out in the summer of 1937. The decree originated from Minister of the RWM, Hjalmar Schacht, who thus appears to have been fully knowledgeable and supportive of the idea of Aryanizing the foreign trade. The decree caused confusion on how to implement it, and the RfA’s guidelines could no longer remain secret. In December 1937 the guidelines were distributed to the leading members of the various business organizations such as Reichsgruppen, Wirtschaftsgruppen, Wirtschaftskammern, Industrie- und Handelskammern, who would enact them in order to Aryanize foreign trade.223

2.1.1 RfA and Domestic Aryanization Policies

The RfA’s bureaucratic control over this policy area resulted in involvement in the domestic Aryanization policies as well. This occurred if international business relations were present in the company being Aryanized. The RfA thus supported the regime’s domestic Aryanization program by providing both mapping capabilities and knowledge. Several examples show this. In the summer of 1938, the 3rd addition to the Nuremberg Laws would eventually define Jewish companies. While the laws banned Jews from a number of industries, it was still not formally illegal to be a Jewish business owner. The RfA was charged with making two lists regarding German-Jewish export companies. The first list contained Jewish firms with export figures

\[\text{wide and thus an attempt to prevent transferring company assets to other countries “III A 11/478. Auswechslung Jüdischer Vertreter,” August 15, 1938, BA, R9I, 633.} \]

\[222 \text{“Richtlinien betr. Erneuerung der Vertretung deutscher Firmen im Ausland.”} \]

exceeding 100,000 RM in the fiscal year of 1937, and a status on the progress of Aryanizing these firms. The second list was to provide an overview of all Jewish export firms that had been Aryanized in 1938 as well as the major firms Aryanized in 1937. These lists were used to evaluate the Aryanization prospect for Jewish companies exporting goods worth more than 100,000 RM. This entailed more detailed information on the individual company and the RfA would assist in supplying the main arguments for a company’s Aryanization.224

Jewish victims of Aryanization who had fled Germany or Austria would from their new countries of residence attempt to secure valuables from their ‘old’ firms through legal claims and lawsuits. Their legal standing was much better, and this challenged the domestic Aryanization policies of Germany. The RfA would attempt to obstruct legal action by agitating for a faster domestic Aryanization process and provide concrete directions on how to proceed. The RfA advised that Aryanized companies in Germany under kommissarische Verwaltung were to transfer the companies and valuables to new owners as soon as possible. This would deter or cancel lawsuits and claims against the company being Aryanized. This would also deter legal claims from other companies who e.g. had outstanding claims against the company in Germany.225

The RfA had experienced the greatest difficulties in winning such cases in the USA, Great Britain, and in some South American countries who lacked clearing agreements with Germany. The RfA placed some hope on an Albany, USA court ruling as it had gone against the Jewish refugee in question. The court argued it had inadequate jurisdiction to interfere in sovereign states, and concluded it was unauthorized to make legal judgements against Germany. Countries with clearing agreements made it easier for German companies to win cases or secure dues from business partners in those countries. As we know, such cases also occurred in Sweden.226

This means that prewar Aryanization challenged the judicial system in other countries. The former owners judicially contested the Aryanization in courtrooms outside of Germany, and this forced other countries to take a position on this part of Judenpolitik. The matter is not further researched within the context of this dissertation, but it opens up for an avenue of further research initiatives into how several countries’ legal systems reacted to Germany’s anti-Jewish

225 “13-795 Beitreibung...Arisierung begriffen deutschen Firmen etc.,” July 20, 1939, BA, R9I, 623.
226 Ibid.
policies. The approximately 340,000 prewar Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria means there is a potential to examine a number of court cases to establish how receiving countries legally positioned themselves in regards to Germany’s domestic Aryanization policies as well as their international implications.

There are several examples of how Jews who had fled Germany were still subject to discrimination and the striking feature is the worldwide scope. A few examples should be sufficient to highlight this feature of international Aryanization. In the spring of 1939, William Anschel had fled to Australia from Cologne. In Cologne he had owned the company Wilhelm Anschel and partly owned the company S. Rosenthal & Co. He now tried to keep his German company alive by securing imports through a newly formed Australian company, but the RfA disallowed his representation for any German company - even his own.227 Another example is A. E. Khazam from Berlin, who in the summer of 1939 tried his luck as a refugee in Baghdad, but the RfA again stepped in and disallowed him as a representative for German companies.228 In this fashion the policies to Aryanize the foreign trade targeted Jewish refugees residing in other countries who potentially had already been subjected to Aryanization measures in Germany.

2.1.2 The Role of the Devisenstellen

The currency offices (Devisenstellen) were introduced into public German economic life in 1934 in order to assist in putting controls on Germany’s foreign trade as it had suffered from a foreign currency deficit since 1931.229 The currency offices also became highly important in the expulsion and robbing of Jews, but the following will only focus on the collaboration between the currency offices and the RfA.230

The date is unclear, but most likely in early 1938, the RWM had included the currency offices in the process of removing Jewish representatives abroad. The involvement of the currency offices caused several problems outside Germany, as the diplomatic representations were not informed of this step. The currency offices demanded that international payments were only received by Aryan representatives and proof of race was required. As a consequence, Jewish

representatives in other countries were not receiving payments from German companies. Jewish representatives began appealing to their national governments to interfere in order to receive payment. Nevertheless, the practice was continued, and only through the cooperation of the Außenhandelsstellen was it possible to transfer money to Jewish representatives abroad. In cases where there was a risk of financial loss or expensive lawsuits exceptions were allowed. In September 1938, a decree laid out the formal procedures, and misunderstandings were supposedly rooted out. Essentially, German companies would be unable to pay their Jewish representatives without the cooperation of government organizations. This rule would eventually end most business relationships with Jews outside of Germany.231

From the vantage point of the RfA the cost of Aryanizing the foreign trade was considered too high. Jewish representatives who had been replaced received financial settlements e.g. because of breaches of contract fees. In the summer of 1938 these settlements were characterized as too high and unreasonable. Proof of expenditures was now demanded from German companies in order to be eligible for compensation in such settlements and further precautionary measures were taken in order to minimize expensive settlements.232

It was advised to cancel contracts with Jewish companies if the cost was not too high, and compensation contracts were to be approved by the RfA.233 Contract obligations were to be kept if the option to cancel them without consequences was non-existent. The Außenhandelsstellen could demand that a German company cancelled their contracts, while the company could argue against this decision via a cumbersome application process. The application had to include the opinions of the local Devisenstelle, Industrie- und Handelskammer, and the Außenhandelsstelle on the case.234

From the Danish-Jewish merchant Harald Michelsen and the Danish business owner Arthur Wittrock we have very concrete proof that the Devisenstellen were also involved in Aryanization abroad. Michelsen had secured a copy of a letter from the Oberfinanzpräsident in Leipzig informing German companies that from December 1938 payments from Germany to Jewish representatives, employees and managers abroad could not be made. Exceptions were only to

231 “Abbau Jüdischer Auslandvertreter,” September 13, 1938, BA, R3131, 9040.
be made if the company could prove the contracts had been terminated.235 This was also the case with Arthur Wittrock. His business connection in Stuttgart, Bernhard Seidelmann, wrote that he was obliged to prove, through the Außenhandelsstelle, that Wittrock was Aryan in order to pay him.236

2.1.3 Status Report November 1938

Shortly after the Kristallnacht in November 1938 the RfA summarized their activities for the past year. Possibly, the report was part of the many new initiatives against the Jews that followed in the wake of the November pogroms. The report reflects the self-perception of the RfA and provide a status of their policies to Aryanize the foreign trade in late 1938. The guidelines mentioned in section 2.1 were characterized as providing the sense, tactic, and technique (Sinn, Taktik, und Technik) for pursuing the goal of Entjudung, and they had been distributed to all German legations.237

The report also highlights some of the problems that had arisen between the RfA and NSDAP/AO. However, the argument of effectivity had superseded the organizational disagreements between the two, and the RfA were in charge of this policy area. The RfA thus took lead in the massive registration of Jewish representatives and in finding suitable replacements. The NSDAP/AO and local economic entities, Gauwirtschaftsberate, also played role. They were contacted when German companies would not concede to the RfA’s recommendations or were perceived as acting maliciously. The report shows that even the Gestapo was used against companies that were reluctant to replace their Jewish representatives. This had proved to be an extremely effective way of enforcing the Aryanization policies of the RfA. These enforcing measures emphasize that the policy was supported and implemented by several organizations within the National Socialist dictatorship to e.g. coerce German companies to fall in line.238

The status of the RfA’s registration work in late 1938 was also summarized in the report and illustrates the enormous task being undertaken. It was estimated that 150,000 representatives still had to be registered abroad, and 150,000-200,000 German import/export companies were

237 “RfA und die Entjudung der deutschen Firmen-Vertreter im Auslande.”
238 Ibid.
connected to these representatives. The office on race matters in the RfA now employed 18 people. 14 of whom were tasked with only writing registration cards. The number of registry cards had grown to around 400,000 and the average daily correspondence regarding race in the foreign trade numbered 400 letters. Possibly in a bid for more resources the RfA argued that adding more staff would expedite the task of registering both Aryan and Jewish representatives.239

2.2 The Second World War – New Tasks for the RfA

The beginning of the Second World War on September 1st 1939 was an escalating catalyst for the international Aryanization policies of the RfA as well as the Judenpolitik in general.240 The organization’s position on Entjudung was strongly enforced, combining their usual arguments with legitimizing war rhetoric. In addition, it was expected the war would soon end and make it illegal to trade with Jews. The escalating character is apparent in two reprimands from February and June 1940 to the leading cadres of the Außenhandelsstellen and the diplomatic legations. The aim was to enforce the replacement policy further by pressuring German companies to sever their contacts with Jewish firms abroad. The RfA stressed that the war should not pause Entjudung. Rather, the war was a reason to enforce it. The RfA was especially critical of companies who neglected their "Entjudungspflicht". In this manner the Aryanization policies were associated with a sense of patriotic duty.241

War, race and politics were intertwined in the second reprimand that was issued in the middle of the German offensive against Belgium, the Netherlands and France (May 10th – June 25th, 1940). It was based on information from the NSDAP/AO, which claimed Jewish representatives were not being replaced quickly and energetically enough. The RfA pointed out to the German companies that they had to ruthlessly exploit the war to exclude all Jews residing outside of Germany from the foreign trade. Companies were advised that as soon as the war ended it would become illegal to export to Jewish companies. The goal of illegality was in this manner used to legitimize the recommended and enforced exclusionary measures.242

239 Ibid.
240 See e.g. Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung Chap. IV.
242 “Beschleunigung der Entjudung der Auslandsvertretungen deutscher Firmen während des Krieges,” June 3, 1940, BA, R91, 621.
In addition, the RfA issued an additional set of guidelines underlining that contracts with Jewish representatives had to be terminated as soon as possible in Europe and overseas. Companies were first to terminate existing contracts, and the RfA suggested using the argument that the war had caused turnovers to drop. Contracts in the making had to be denounced at all costs. This was especially important regarding overseas contracts, claimed the RfA. However, the technicalities for how to terminate contracts with Jewish representatives in enemy countries had not yet been worked out as very high compensation fines were being demanded from Jewish companies. Companies were reminded to only accept compensation claims if Jews (in their host countries) possessed a legal position that made it possible for them to bring cases before the courts.\textsuperscript{243} It was all underlined in the following statement:

"In the meantime, it should become clear to every German company that this war is not only directed against the Western powers, but also against Judaism as their most willing and driving companions in all countries. Overtly or covertly recalcitrant companies are to be reported to the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel."\textsuperscript{244}

This racial war rhetoric foreshadowed later internal arguments used before and after entering into the war against the Soviet Union on June 22\textsuperscript{nd} 1941. It is also evident that some German companies were still reluctant in accepting the policies against their Jewish trade partners.

The responsibilities of the RfA were expanded in October 1940, while new and powerful organizations became users of the RfA’s expertise. A new set of guidelines for foreign trade had been accepted by RWM and AA, along with the Ministry for Domestic Affairs (Reichsministerium des Innern) and the Army High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht). Even Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler had accepted them. The new guidelines broadened the scope and could potentially damage a much broader range of Jewish companies and Jews. The regulations stated that new importers and recipients of German goods abroad, as well as companies importing goods into Germany, had to be Aryan and not hostile to Germany. The RfA was thus charged with registering a new category involved in trade: those who were politically unsuitable or seen

\textsuperscript{243} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid. Es sollte jeder deutschen Firma inzwischen klargeworden sein, daß dieser Krieg nicht nur gegen die Westmächte geführt wird, sondern auch gegen das Judentum als deren willigste und treibende Gefolgschaft in allen Ländern. Offen oder versteckt renitente Firmen sind der Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel mit Beziehung auf dieses Rundschreiben zu melden.".
as a threat to German national security. This brought communist companies into the scope of the RfA along with companies that had or had had relations with Great Britain and later the USA or USSR.

In the fall of 1941, the Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft agreed to let the RfA take the lead in registering Jewish and “enemy” companies and transfer such knowledge to the RfA. The minister was Walther Darré, the author of the influential Blut und Boden texts, and a great supporter of Nazism’s racial ideas. Apparently Darré’s ministry had also been registering Jewish companies outside of Germany. The RfA was thus charged with expanding this policy area, which also resulted in stricter, but still informal, rules against Jewish companies in other countries.

The guidelines of October 1940 underscore that all import and export trade was now heavily influenced by the guidelines of the RfA and backed by powerful organizations. The RfA was responsible for almost all of the practical work. The guidelines provide insights into how these measures were to progress and how the anti-Semitic perception of Jews was used to legitimate this policy. The main principle behind the guidelines was to exclude Jews from being importers of German goods.

It was expected to become illegal to deliver goods to Jews in the near future and this was used to argue that German companies should proceed with exclusive measures immediately. It was a goal in itself to prevent Jews or others deemed unfriendly to Germany to earn money by trading with Germany. The argument was that Jewish trade would financially strengthen Germany’s enemies. The overall policies were not to harm the general economy of the Reich, but the main objective remained the purification (Säuberung) of Germany’s foreign business relations. At the same time, the new guidelines identified the RfA as the center for registration and information. Private messages from German companies on the racial composition of foreign companies were no longer to be accepted. Only information from the German legations across the world and German Chambers of Commerce would be considered valid.

247 “Geschäftsverbindungen mit ausl. Vertretern, Abnehmern, Lieferanten und Exporteuren.”
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
The practical way to proceed towards the goal of *Entjudung* varied according to the three groups targeted by the Aryanization policies. The three groups were 1) representatives 2) foreign importers of German goods and, 3) foreign companies exporting to Germany. Jewish representatives were to be replaced by Aryan ones as soon as possible. All new representatives had to be examined to ascertain their racial and political background. Exceptions could be made if the deal had to be sealed quickly, but afterwards the representative had to be categorized as non-Jewish otherwise the contract was to be terminated.\textsuperscript{250} Foreign companies with exclusive import rights were to be treated as representatives and were to be excluded if they were Jewish or deemed hostile to Germany.

The procedures to exclude Jewish importers depended on the status of the country in which they resided. In militarily occupied countries, it was not illegal to sell goods to Jewish customers, as they still possessed a great deal of the market shares in some industries the RfA reasoned. It was argued that a general ban against trading with Jews would, at the moment, take too heavy a toll on foreign trade. It was advised that the occupied countries keep their domestic supplies at an acceptable level. However, the RfA instructed German companies to strive to replace Jewish customers with non-Jewish ones if possible. At the same time, the individual Prüfungsstellen could decide to issue a general ban on delivering goods to Jews. This had already been done in August 1940, as the Prüfungsstelle for leather had banned exports to Jews in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{251}

Delivering goods to Jews or “deutsch-feindlicher Firmen” in other countries would at the moment be prohibited. It was expected that German companies would refrain from delivering goods to Jewish customers as long as the practice did not harm German exports. A distinction between new and old business relations was made to manage the process. New business relationships had to be investigated for their racial and political composition if it involved one of the following:

1. Contracts which insured customers\textsuperscript{252}
2. Exclusive import rights

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{252} Vertraglich festgestellter Kundenschutz
3. Long-term delivery contracts
4. Contracts of a high value

It was accepted that a German company might enter into one short-term contract without disclosing the racial or political composition of the importing company. Exempted from these rules was the area of the Generalgouvernement in Poland, where all companies were to be investigated. Older business relations were to be replaced if at all possible.

Imports were also part of these guidelines. The RfA turned it into a general rule that foreign export companies were only to be examined for their racial composition or political position if they were to enter into long-term contracts with German companies. The rule was based on a set of general instructions the RWM had issued on the 9th of April 1940 regarding foreign exporters and suppliers to Germany, stating that importing goods from Jews or enemies of Germany was to be avoided, as it would economically strengthen companies who were hostile to Germany. Instead, import policy had to be used to exclude Jews and hostiles, while at the same time strengthening German nationals or German-friendly companies abroad. Companies that had suffered losses as a consequence of their trade relations with Germany were to be given a high priority. However, this was only to be carried out if it did not damage the overall import relationship with other countries. Overall, these guidelines remained in place for the rest of the war, yet in the summer of 1941 Mischlinge (half-Jews) were also excluded from taking over contracts from Jews. Though it remained legal to trade with Jews, the new guidelines expanded the exclusive policy in all areas, as a rising number of companies outside of Germany could be affected by them.

The tendency to expel Jewish companies from the foreign trade also caused some confusion as the Prüfungsstellen to a certain extent could craft their own policies. A letter exchange between the RfA and the German Chamber of Commerce in Copenhagen in late 1941 reflects this confusion and provides some insight into which bans were in place regarding Denmark. The RfA had to clarify that policies were changing on a daily basis, as Prüfungsstellen und Vorprüfungsstellen could decide to exclude the Jewish companies in an entire country from

---

253 A value is not specified on the document
254 "Geschäftsverbindungen mit ausl. Vertretern, Abnehmern, Lieferanten und Exporteuren."
255 Ibid.
256 "Halb-Juden in der Auftragsverlagerung," June 12, 1941, BA, R9I, 616, 2.
receiving a specific type of goods. For example the Prüfungsstelle for leather industries banned delivery to Jewish importers in France, Belgium, Norway and Denmark on January 14th 1941, while the Prüfungsstelle für Textilindustrie already had a general ban on delivering to Jewish firms in almost all countries including Denmark. Evidently, Jewish companies in Denmark could not receive leather or products related to the textile industry. On the other hand, the Prüfungsstelle Metallindustrie prohibited delivering goods to Jewish and hostile companies in December 1941, however, repair companies in Denmark, Italy, Croatia, Sweden, Rumania, and Hungary were purposely omitted from these instructions.

It is important to note that it never became completely illegal to export goods to Jewish or hostile companies if it influenced negatively on the German armaments industry. However, this was only applicable to Jewish or hostile companies which had a track record of importing from Germany. Despite their status of 'old' importers, their racial category still had to be registered. As pointed out earlier all new importers had to be pre-approved as Aryan or non-hostile to Germany by the RfA before trade could commence. Generally speaking, it was expected that German exporters would refrain from delivering goods to Jewish companies. Even though there were some exceptions to the policy of excluding Jewish companies, they were registered as Jewish, and the ultimate goal was still to eliminate Jewish companies from the German economic sphere of influence.

### 2.3 The Practical Registration Work and Information Flow

In order to fulfill the task of Aryanizing the foreign trade it is evident that its success rested heavily on the registration of Jewish companies and Jews. The RfA became the main information center in an elaborate network in which foreign companies and representatives were categorized according to German race laws. The country-specific investigations were most commonly carried out by the German diplomatic representations and local German Chambers of Commerce, but other organizations were involved or already engaged in similar activities aiming at the Aryanization or exclusion of Jews outside of Germany. The Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) seems to be the largest entity involved, but they too were to be decoupled from the

---

257 "Nichtbelieferung jüdischer Firmen im Ausland,” November 27, 1941, BA, R9I, 617.
258 “Belieferung jüdischer Abnehmer in Frankreich, Belgien, Dänemark und Norwegen,” January 20, 1941, BA, R9I, 643.
259 “Nichtbelieferung jüdischer Firmen im Ausland.”
process to avoid doubling work. Yet, other minor organizational entities were also involved in the Aryanization process.

The following examples cannot be considered a complete overview, but they represent the contours of a complex and multitudinous effort to internationally exclude Jews in a host of areas. In August 1939, the German Chamber of Patent Lawyers (Patentanwaltskammer) was placed in charge of registering foreign patent lawyers who were Jewish. The RfA argued that the matter was of too little importance for them to handle. Thus, if German companies were looking for patent lawyers outside of Germany, the chamber was to be consulted on questions of race. A small note from 1940 also reveals that the RfA had inquired of the Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda if they possessed a list of Aryan hotels in world capitals, and such a list could indeed be found, but at the Reichsverkehrsgruppe Hilfsgewerbe des Verkehrs. Clearly, the RfA was not the only German organization that mapped Jewish enterprises abroad and attempted to exclude them. The exclusive character of the German Judenpolitik was international and seems to have been pursued by an unknown number of German government organizations. The RfA was predominant in this work, but many other entities of the dictatorship aimed at stopping Jewish companies and businesses in other countries from generating revenue from the German economy.

Keeping track of registered companies was a main task of the RfA. Information on specific companies was copied and distributed to the relevant legations and German Chambers of Commerce abroad. The Außenhandelsstellen also received copies, and from 1941 the Prüfungsstellen were included in this information exchange. Several registries of Jewish companies must have existed, both domestically and at the German legations. The local registries were made to minimize the flow of letters to the RfA, who experienced a steep rise in incoming letters regarding race. The RfA was heavily burdened, as it received more than 145,000 questions on matters of race and political threats in 1941 alone. As the chart shows the busiest years were from 1939-1942, and the decline might be attributed to the many Aryanizations in occupied countries.

263 “Rassefeststellung ausländischer Patentanwälte,” August 17, 1939, BA, R9I, 623.
265 “Geschäftsverbindungen mit unerwünschten ausländischen Firmen,” March 14, 1941, BA, R9I, 616, 1.
Figure 3 Number of annual incoming letters on racial matters.  

In order to keep this type of correspondence a secret an elaborate code language was developed, which was used to pose and answer questions. Essentially, the code language underscores the diplomatic sensitivity needed in attempting to informally pursue Aryanization outside of Germany. In addition, it was not just a matter of cataloguing who was Jewish or Aryan, as companies were also defined as Jewish if the Jewish ownership was above 25%. The code language was developed to encompass all the different categories needed and derived from Greek and Roman mythology. The first set of codes was distributed in January 1938, but they were later expanded as the RfA was also charged with cataloguing if companies posed a political or security risk in 1940. The following is a complete list of these code words:

**Questions:**

Andromache = Is [company name] Aryan?

Ariadne = Is [company name] non-Aryan?

Cato = Is there a political or security risk associated with [company name]?

Cleopatra = Does [company name] have Jewish employees?

---

266 Based on “RfA Statistik 1937-1944,” 1937 1944, BA, R9I, 167. The numbers for December 1937 are missing and not included in the graph.

267 Svend Nordlund appears to be the first to point to the two central codenames Achilles and Alchibiades in Nordlund, “Albikiades eller Akilles? Ariseringen i Sverige och reaktionerna på denna...” 575–77, however he does not locate the question/answer possibilities or other codenames.
Melpomene = Are there Jews in the leading bodies of [company name]? How large is the Jewish influence?

Xantippe = Is there Jewish capital in [company name]? How big is the capital? What share of the capital is Jewish?

Answers:
Achilles = The [company name] is Aryan.
Alcibiades = The [company name] is Jewish.
Archimedes = The [company name] is Aryan, but it employs Jews.
Diogenes = There are non-Aryans in the [company name] leadership.
Euripides = The owner is Aryan. Parts of the company is owned by Jews.
Hercules = The owner of [company name] has the nationality of the country. The company is not influenced by Jews.
Juno = There are not political or security risks associated with trading with [company name].
Leonidas = It has not been possible to confirm the racial composition of [company name]. It is not suspected of being non-Aryan.
Nero = There is political or security risk in trading with [company name]
Odysseus [Ulysses] = It has not been possible to confirm the racial composition of [company name], but it is suspected to be non-Aryan.
Socrates = The [Company name] is influenced by Jewish capital. The share is about x/100 th.

The code language reflected the racial views of the Nazi regime. Without going into greater details of Greek and Roman mythological history, it will suffice to mention that Achilles, of course, is associated with positive connotations that the Nazis regarded as important. Alcibiades, on the other hand, was a character who befitted the negative stereotypes of Jews. In Greek mythology Alcibiades switched sides if it was to his benefit, and in the end, he was murdered for...

his treachery. It is worth noting the Cleopatra/Archimedes constellation, because it shows companies were potentially registered for the mere employment of Jews.

Changes in policy were also communicated using the code language as the following example will show. Leonidas and Hercules companies were equated with Achilles companies in late 1939. Companies suspected of being Jewish (Odysseus) could no longer be tolerated as trade partners. Existing Odysseus companies now had to be categorized as Jewish or not, and contracts were only allowed on a short-term basis. Jewish companies, companies where the leadership was Jewish (Diogenes) or those partly owned by Jews (Euripides) had to be replaced by Aryan companies. Companies that employed Jews (Archimedes) could be kept, but were to be pressured to replace an unknown percentage of their Jewish employees. Only a minor warning was issued for Socrates companies – beware of the Jewish capital.269 Just a month later, questions of race (Andromache/Ariadne) were to include information about whether the representative was already hired or in the process of being hired.270

Interestingly, the code language was only to be used between the RfA and the Außenhandelsstellen, and it was directly advised that only a small number of the AA’s legations were to be informed. Possibly the RfA wanted to avoid dissemination to consulates.271 Information on the racial category of a company was provided free of charge by the RfA in the summer of 1938. However, the AA was not ready for this step and kept charging fees, as companies could get the same information for free from the Außenhandelsstellen. In the end, it was decided that all correspondence related to Aryanization in which the legations had to be involved was to be carried out through the RfA.272

2.4 Problems in Mapping and Excluding Jewish Businesses 1937-1944

The many guidelines, rules and decrees draw a somewhat ideal image of how the Aryanization efforts of the RfA were intended to function, however the practical work of registering, replacing or excluding Jews did not proceed as smoothly as intended. This is indicated by the many memos sent to the organizations involved in the process. The memos reflect the practical problems the RfA and its affiliations faced, while also showing the limitations of the policies of the RfA. A

constant problem was keeping information secret, while at the same time making sure it was disseminated so Jews could be excluded. An additional concern was the question of correct information of e.g. street names, and dealing with nations who were critical of the anti-Jewish views of the RfA. The following examples illustrate this type of problems.

The information on race was in many instances not treated confidentially by the various Außenhandelsstellen and some companies. One example from 1938 shows a telegram disclosing the racial category of a French company in plain language. In late 1938, the RfA also learned that some companies passed on the RfA’s racial categorization to their Jewish representatives, and this revealed the source. This caused problems for both the AA and the RfA. The RfA feared Jews would use this information to promote agitation against Germany, while Aryans would attempt to secure unqualified proof of their non-Jewishness. The issue caused severe embarrassment and administrative problems for the RfA. The RfA responded by threatening those who leaked such information with court sanctions and a general loss of trust by the German business community. The RfA also revised its stamp. All letters were from then on stamped with the words "confidential" and included the abovementioned threat.

The task of registering and answering questions about the racial composition of foreign companies was a continuous problem due the enormity of the task. In early 1938, the RfA had to ask companies to stop sending reminders regarding unanswered questions on race. The RfA bluntly reasoned that they lacked personnel while the foreign legations were having difficulties in answering questions on race. This was most likely because such investigations had to be pursued precatiously and were time consuming.

In late summer 1939, the RfA had to remind its users to recycle available information in order to avoid repeating the cataloging process. Companies were also conducting their own research into who was Jewish or Aryan. Continuous warnings were issued by the AA to stop such proceedings that were regarded as endangering foreign trade relations. Such questions were to be sent directly to the RfA. As a response, the RfA had to stress their leadership role. It seems

---

275 "Streng vertrauliche Behandlung amtlicher Auskünfte über Rassezugehörigkeit.”
277 "IIib2 Handels-Auskünfte," June 23, 1939, BA, R91, 634.
companies were to be continuously reminded of this and warned they could face legal charges.²⁷⁸

A continuous concern was the status of foreign trade relations. In 1939, it seemed some German companies were trying to exclude buyers of German goods. This had caused the media in some countries to write about the incidents, while it had also reached parliamentary circles in a number of states.²⁷⁹ This caused concern, as it endangered not only foreign trade, but also the overall relationship with those states.²⁸⁰

The position of the RfA was that German companies had to be “educated” and this could only be done if the information from the RfA was trustworthy.²⁸¹ In the summer of 1939, the RfA had to emphasize that only Jewish representatives were to be replaced, not Jewish buyers of German goods. The misunderstanding had caused the work-load of the RfA to rise, but also underscores the fact that some of the German businesses involved in foreign trade had either misunderstood their obligations or expanded them.²⁸²

In early 1941, it was decided to publish approved replacement companies or persons to make it easier for German companies to find replacements. However, the names of blocked companies and persons were not publicized.²⁸³ Still, some found their letters remaining unanswered for too long and turned to the local embassies. The Rfa attempted to end this practice. In late December 1941, it was becoming increasingly difficult to keep-up with the number of requests as they numbered 145,000 that year. At the same time the RfA argued that if the information was not monitored, cross-referenced and registered correct, it would lead to the same question being asked and answered multiple times. The RfA was busy, and many companies complied with the procedures, even though it seems the RfA in some instances became a bottleneck for trade.²⁸⁴

On the 19th of December, the RfA sent out a plea to German diplomatic representations and consulates with trade responsibilities. The RfA asked to be the central information hub on racial matters. This would lighten both the burden of registration and of answering the same question more than once. In order to ease the information flow, it would suffice to write the category of a company on the received letter from the RfA and then return it. The leaders of the RfA further

²⁷⁸ “IIIA/820 Noch immer private Rassefestellungen durch deutsche Firmen im Auslande,” June 21, 1939, BA, R9I, 634.
²⁷⁹ See chapter three for the reactions in Denmark, Sweden and partly Great Britain
²⁸⁰ “II A/11/808 Andromache-Anfragen,” June 16, 1939, BA, R9I, 634.
²⁸¹ “Klagen über unvollständige Anschriften,” June 9, 1942, BA, R9I, 639.
²⁸² “II A/11/808 Andromache-Anfragen.”
²⁸³ “Geschäftsverbindungen deutscher Firmen mit ausländischen Vertretern,” January 30, 1941, BA, R9I, 622.
indicated that questions on race were to originate from the RfA in order to be answered. As late as 1943, the RfA requested that inquiries be made only in writing to avoid misunderstandings which could arise over the phone. It was important to keep the information flow streamlined and correct. This indicates persistent problems in receiving and registering correct information.

One example is from June 1942. Registering Jews and Jewish firms from Hungary correctly was problematic. The causes were usually due to misspellings of the local language e.g. the spelling of "(correct) Scsuska (false) Sesuka" led to misunderstandings both by those who inquired about the company and in the following registration of the company. The RfA strongly urged correspondents to secure correct information to avoid such misunderstandings.

Part of the exporting textile industry in Germany did not thoroughly comply with the exclusion of their old Jewish customers. German textile exporters simply asked the Prüfungsstelle for the racial composition of a given company, despite already knowing it to be Jewish. The importer was given the benefit of the doubt until further research had been done, thus allowing the deal to go through. Since textiles were often traded on a yearly basis, the exporter could then report that the deal had gone through and no further proof of the importer’s racial composition was needed.

Textile exporters could easily find approved Aryan importers and were strongly encouraged to do so to avoid further paperwork. However, all new business connections had to be pre-approved as Aryan before trade could commence. Old business connections also had to be approved when a business deal was about to be closed. This memo shows that the textile industry in particular kept supplying their Jewish business connections, despite the RfA. However, it is also evident that the RfA was an important organization in enforcing pressure on the export companies to terminate trade with Jewish importers. These kinds of omissions lead to a meeting between the Prüfungsstelle Textilindustrie and the RfA, resulting in a reprimand and new guidelines specifying the obligations of the textile industry.

Germany’s Italian ally did not share the visions of the RfA and instead worked to the opposite effect. The Italian state allowed former Jewish representatives of German companies in Italy to

286 “Überwachung der geschäftlichen Verbindungen deutscher Ausfuhrfirmen mit dem Ausland,,” May 24, 1943, BA, R9I, 639.
287 “Klagen über unvollständige Anschriften.”
288 “Belieferung ausländischer Abnehmer auf dem Gebiete der Textilindustrie,” June 3, 1941, BA, R9I, 639.
import goods, but also allowed export to foreign Jewish companies. In the summer of 1942, the AA and RWM had been informed that Italian companies had an excessive fondness (Vorliebe) of exporting to foreign Jewish companies. This had been an issue since 1939, as Jews who had previously represented German companies instead became representatives for Italian firms. Clearly, Italy had a more relaxed position on a world economy without Jews. The issue had even been on the agenda of the German-Italian trade talks in the spring of 1942. Yet, it was still an issue in December 1942. The RfA found that Jews who had been fired as direct representatives of German companies with some success imported goods from German companies. From the perspective of the RfA, this presented a problem, and a memo from December 1942 laid out new rules for the effective removal of Jewish importers in Italy. The memo shows that, even though the RfA tried to exclude Jews, there were loopholes. However, the memo also indicates the continuous attempt to reach the overall goal of excluding Jews from trading with Germany.

2.5 Consequences

It seems only a few reports on the overall progress of Aryanizing the foreign trade have survived the war, but we do have some indicators besides the numerous letters on race. A suggestion to copy the British “Blacklists” was turned down in a meeting between RWM, RfA and the NSDAP/AO in the middle of 1941. The main argument was the extensive registry of 60,000 companies at the RfA contained sufficient information, as 20,000 companies had been examined for their racial composition, and 7,000 of them were deemed Jewish. These numbers seem to have risen quickly. By spring 1942, the office had registered 26,000 Jewish companies and one-man businesses in the Netherlands, while the number of one-man Jewish companies in Romania was 40,000. The replacement process in Romania showed that by November 1942, a total of 1851 German companies had replaced their Jewish representatives without noticeable difficulties. There were some questions regarding the 30-40 Romanian anti-Jewish laws affecting economic areas, as well as the definition of Jewishness. In Switzerland, 516 German companies had replaced their Jewish representatives and removed 463 additional

289 "Italienische Ausfuhr an Juden im Ausland.,” June 13, 1942, BA, R91, 639.
290 "Weiterbtätiung ausgemerzter Auslandsvertreter deutscher Firmen,” December 16, 1942, BA, R91, 639.
292 "Notat,” May 27, 1942, BA, R91, 152.
representsatives that were regarded as hostile to Germany (e.g. companies or persons deemed sympathetic to one of the Allied countries). Unfortunately, we only have a very fragmented overview of the numerical consequences of the work of the RfA. Further research is needed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the work of this large organization and its overall consequences for companies as well as individuals on a global scale.

2.6 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Germany’s ambition to Aryanize its foreign trade was formalized from 1937 and onwards. The RfA was charged by the RWM to formulate guidelines that aimed at the exclusion of Jewish representatives abroad. From 1940 onwards, these measures were expanded to include recipients of German goods abroad and importing companies. This had the potential to fulfill the intended goal of a complete Entjudung of the German foreign trade. It never became illegal to trade with Jewish companies. However, the exclusive policies seem to have been applied if they were not damaging to trade related to the war effort. Through an elaborate code language, a host of foreign companies and individuals were racially categorized and registered with the assistance of German legations and German Chambers of Commerce. The intentions of the RfA did not always proceed as anticipated and a host of memos reveal problems in the area of secrecy and legal claims in the prewar period. It has been identified that the Prüfungsstellen had the power to close off Jews from importing a specific type of goods in individual countries.

Foreign trade was clearly used as a political instrument to reach racially motivated political goals. The policies were aimed at severing the international ties of most Jewish economic influences related to the German economy. On the basis of this, I would argue that we need to rephrase our understanding of Aryanization as a purely German phenomenon before the outbreak of war. Rather, it should be viewed as a global and continuous policy from 1937-1944. This opens the field for many new questions. How did other governments and Jewish companies react under the racial pressures before the war? How did German companies react in the international context of Aryanization? Did the early Aryanization attempts make it easier to

---

293 RWM, “Ausschaltung jüdischer und deutschfeindliche eingestellten Vertreterfirmen,” November 1942, BA, R3101, 3041. It is not possible to conclude if these numbers cover the period from 1937 to 1942 or just 1942.
Aryanize the Jewish companies in e.g. France and the Netherlands after their occupation as many of them had already been registered?

The next two chapters will show how the policies of the RfA were implemented in Denmark from 1937 to 1945. Though the RfA is not the main subject of this dissertation the following two chapters could be regarded as a focused case study into the implementation of RfA’s policies. As such Denmark serves as a rare case allowing us to follow RfA’s Aryanization policies over a longer period of time in a setting without a legal framework for the persecution of Jews. These results should be applicable to later international cross-case studies. We now move our focus from the RfA to explore how these goals and policies were pursued in Denmark. Through the assistance of the German legation these developed into one of the most successful areas of the German Judenpolitik in Denmark.

3 Aryanization in Denmark 1937-1940

The chronological scope of this chapter is the pre-occupation, and for this period it seeks to answer part two of research question one: How were the policies of the RfA implemented in Danish-German trade relations? This opens up for partly answering research question two and three on the role of the German legation in Copenhagen as well as the Danish government’s reactions to the Aryanization attempts. Section 3.1 is devoted to an overview of the relevant sections of the Auswärtiges Amt as well as selected staff at the German legation in Copenhagen. Section 3.2 follows the legation’s role in beginning to examine and register Danish-Jewish businesses as part of the RfA’s policies. Section 3.3 is the largest part of this chapter, and the main theme is the Danish government’s reaction to the German Aryanization measures. In subsections I examine the reactions of the media, and the Danish-Jewish business minority that sought the assistance of the Danish Foreign Ministry in order to counter the German Aryanization measures. The ministry had to react to these concerns as well as consider how possible steps to protect Danish-Jewish citizens would be perceived by their German counterparts. The chapter thus provide the perspective of perpetrators, bystanders, and victims to these events. I will continuously relate events to actual cases, yet the main case of the chapter will be that of Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke import in section 3.3.4. It will in a detailed manner reveal how Aryanization took place in the Danish setting in this period. Related to the model Stages of
Persecution the chapter will show existence of informal measures against Jews in Denmark (stage one), registration (stage four), and exclusive measures against selected areas of the Danish-Jewish businesses (stage five).

3.1 The Auswärtiges Amt

Before beginning to examine how the RfA’s policies were implemented in Denmark we need to devote attention to the main German organizations involved in Denmark: the Auswärtiges Amt (AA), the German Foreign Ministry, and the Gesandtschaft, while focusing on the area of Judenpolitik. The AA has been the subject of several major studies. The most recent one, Das Amt confirmed the findings of earlier studies. It dissolved the narrative of the ministry as a stronghold against Nazism and revealed how the German diplomatic corps had remained surprisingly unchanged after the end of the war. The German Foreign Ministry promptly adapted to National Socialism, including its Judenpolitik. The ministry became nazified at an increasing pace after 1937 as senior staff joined the party and the SS in growing numbers, while new employees were recruited from those organizations. The reasons for senior staff to join them has been suggested as an amalgamation of opportunism, career concerns, organizational pressure and ideological beliefs. The Foreign Ministry was likewise shown to have been active in planning and promoting the Final Solution. Additionally, it had promoted anti-Jewish measures in countries that were German allies or satellite states.

In the context of this dissertation we should take note of some of the central personalities residing in Berlin, who became involved in the Danish-German relationship, first of all the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1938 Joachim von Ribbentrop. Despite his meagre involvement in Danish affairs he was consulted on the most important issues. At same time most dealings between Denmark and Germany took place through their respective foreign ministries. Denmark was in this way the occupied area on which Ribbentrop could exert the most influence. In regards to Denmark Ernst von Weizsäcker was also quite involved in Danish affairs. He had served at the German legation in Copenhagen (1924-1927) as Gesandtschaftsrat. From 1938-1943 he held the

294 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik.
296 For details see especially the first half of Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik.
position of Staatssekretär, Undersecretary of State, the highest civil service position in the AA and ranked just below Ribbentrop. The head of AA’s department for Scandinavia was Werner von Grundherr. He entered the AA in 1918 and was German envoy to Finland from 1925 to 1934. From 1934 and onwards he was the AA’s head of department for Scandinavia and the Baltic countries.

The key department of the AA on Jewish matters was Abteilung Deutschland which was recreated in 1933 and placed under the present Undersecretary of State, Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow. In 1933 his nephew Vicco von Bülow-Schwante became the leader of department Deutschland. He was an anti-republican who had been politically engaged from 1928 as a member of the German National People’s Party, Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP). He was responsible for justifying the National Socialists’ racial policies by providing statistical material intended to substantiate the perceived negative Jewish influences. This type of reports could be regarded as spin doctor manuals as they provided an arsenal of positive arguments for German domestic policies that could be applied by the German legations as counter arguments. Emil Schumburg was the first Judenreferent, expert on Jewish affairs, of the AA from 1936-1940. He was briefly leader of Dept. Deutschland in the AA in 1939, for which he had been working since 1933, and he was behind drafting some of the reports, mentioned above, that Bülow-Schwante would transmit to German legations. In 1936, Himmler personally enlisted Emil Schumburg into the SS.

The more well-known Martin Luther headed Abteilung Deutschland from 1940 and handled Jewish questions as well as race issues. He worked closely with Adolf Eichmann’s department to diplomatically prepare and secure the deportations of Jews. He was promoted to Unterstaatssekretär in the AA in 1941 and represented the ministry at the Wannsee conference in 1942. His career ended as he attempted to remove Ribbentrop in early 1943. This caused his imprisonment in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp from February 1943. Under Luther the department extended its role as an information hub in the AA as it secured, and transferred

299 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 43–47.
information from the many German legations on Jewish matters. Furthermore, the department coordinated efforts against Jews with the RSHA as well as office D III.\textsuperscript{301} (See below).

Office D III was the main office for Jewish Matters in Dept. \textit{Deutschland}. Office D III was headed by Franz Rademacher in 1940, but he was removed when Luther was imprisoned. Rademacher was the second \textit{Judenreferent} and worked closely with Luther. Rademacher was deeply involved in writing several of the key documents of the so-called Madagascar plan. The plan envisioned the deportation of the German Jews to the, at the time, French Island, and this is regarded as the first territorial final solution. Rademacher was generally involved in arranging deportations from all over Europe, but after Luther’s removal Rademacher served in the navy for the duration of the war. He served two postwar prison sentences, became advisor to the Syrian government and spied for West Germany before dying in 1973.\textsuperscript{302}

I have already touched on the leadership of the German legation in Copenhagen, but to briefly summarize: Cecil von Renthe-Fink headed the legation from 1936 to September 1942 and Werner Best succeeded him for the duration of the war. Ernst Krüger was Consul General and Trade Attaché. Krüger came to Denmark in 1915 and received the title of consul and trade attaché in 1919. In 1937 he was promoted to Consul General. Krüger is important because he handled the extensive correspondence between the German legation in Copenhagen and the RfA. As I will show later, he was directly involved in the Aryanization processes in Denmark and reported on the racial composition of Danish companies to the RfA.\textsuperscript{303} Higher-ranking Danish civil servants gave Krüger the best of recommendations after the war, and he was allowed to stay in Denmark as a special gesture. They described him as being against Nazism and helping Danish-Jewish businessmen who were being targeted by the German Chamber of Commerce or people in Berlin.\textsuperscript{304} Contrary to this perception, I will show he was actually involved in Aryanization measures.

Gustav Meissner was also involved in anti-Jewish measures in Denmark. He was the \textit{Presse Attaché} of the German legation in Copenhagen 1940-1943, and managed department IV on


\textsuperscript{303} “Letter correspondence between the RfA and German legation - Multiple letters 1940-1944,” 1940, BA, R91, 324, 325, 358, 1856-1867.

culture, press and radio. Meissner was an early member of the Nazi party, having been employed at Dienststelle Ribbentrop in 1937 with Nordschleswig as his area of expertise as he was fluent in both languages. He was associated with Martin Luther, the leader of *Abteilung Deutschland* from 1940. This connection was to Meissner’s benefit during his years in Denmark. He became part of the German legation from the 9th of April 1940. Werner Best did not side with Meissner’s ambitions. Meissner joined the front soldiers at his own wish a couple of months after Luther was removed in February 1943. Another important person is Paul Kanstein who rose to the rank of SS-Brigadeführer in 1942. He had made a career for himself in the German police. From 1937 he was the leader of the Stapoleitstelle Berlin and in 1939 Vice President for the police in Berlin. He was sent to Denmark in April 1940, where he headed the police department at the German legation, and was responsible for the security of the German troops. Kanstein viewed the collapse of the cooperation as a personal defeat and requested for transfer, which was granted in October 1943.

Lastly, we should mention Paul Barandon. He was the Gesandter, envoy, and deputy manager of the German legation from January 1942. He headed the legation in the interim between Cecil von Renthe-Fink and Werner Best. Barandon had been in the AA since the beginning of his career and had been a party member since 1937. He was recalled to Berlin in January 1945. According to postwar interrogations Ribbentrop moved Barandon to a position as AA’s representative at the German Military high-command (OKH) until March 1945. According to Barandon, Ribbentrop wanted to be informed of the work of the OKH. Within the context of *Judenpolitik* Barandon was not a novice as he had investigated staff members in the AA in order to locate possible Jewish ancestry.

### 3.2 The German Legation and Aryanization

Aryanization in Denmark in the prewar years rested on the partnership between the RfA and the German legation in Copenhagen. The RfA relied heavily on information from Denmark to

---

306 Ernst Klee, *Das Personen Lexikon Zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945* (Hamburg: Nikol Verlag, 2016), 298.
fulfill their task of Aryanizing the foreign trade between the two countries. The most important aid for the RfA in Denmark was the German Gesandtschaft, and the German Chamber of Commerce in Denmark (GCC) performed investigative tasks for the legation. Trade Attaché and Consul General Ernst Krüger was charged with reporting, and answering questions on the racial composition of Danish companies. He would correspond extensively with the RfA on these matters.

The GCC’s role mainly consisted in registering and investigating who was Jewish, while also overseeing the Aryanization process. This work began in Denmark in 1937. The German Chamber of Commerce was founded in November 1936, but the formation was a dual project between the establishment (AA) and the NSDAP’s representatives in Denmark. The idea for a chamber of commerce in Copenhagen was voiced from several sides as early as 1934. The embassy showed great interest in the matter, as Ernst Krüger unsuccessfully attempted to control the formation process on behalf of the Gesandtschaft. In 1936, the NSDAP’s Landeskreisleiter in Denmark, Rittmeister Haupt, informed the AA he would found the GCC in collaboration with other German businessmen in Denmark. The chamber did not initially have support from all parts of the established National Socialist bureaucracy, and the RfA did not officially recognize the GCC until late October 1937.310

Haupt lost his position as Landeskreisleiter to Ernst Schäfer in 1939. The year before, Haupt had already been replaced as Hauptgeschäftsführer in the GCC by Kurt D. Buck.311 Buck was redrafted into the army in 1943 and was replaced by Arnold Brauer. The leader of the GCC was its president, Herbert Danielsen. He maintained continuity in the organization, as he held the presidency from 1936 until the end of the war. Danielsen was also the financial secretary of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) in Denmark. Clearly, the GCC had strong ties to the party in Germany. It should probably be regarded as a German organization, because it mainly worked for the NSDAP’s financial interests in Denmark. The evident political orientation towards Germany was also reflected in the composition of the executive committee, since the majority were required to be German nationals. However, on the surface, the GCC attempted to appear as a legitimate and neutral organization working to improve trade relations between the two

310 “Krüger til Pohlmann,” June 16, 1934, BA, R9I, 23.
311 Jensen, Besættelsestidens økonomiske og erhvervsmæssige forhold: studier i de økonomiske relationer mellem Danmark og Tyskland 1940-1945, 44-45.
countries. The GCC reached a membership zenith in May 1943, when almost 2/3 of its 1845 members were Danish.312

The GCC had a clear racial profile being hostile towards Jews and Jewish companies from its foundation. This is revealed in a membership exclusion in the summer of 1942. Count C. Ahlefeldt-Laurvig was a member of the executive committee of the GCC and a lawyer. In a description of the case, he briefly summed up the GCC’s position on Jews: "From its foundation the Chamber of Commerce has not wished to admit non-Aryan members or firms where the Jewish element is present."313 The Judenpolitik was a part of the GCC’s identity and the organization participated in enforcing it.

In the summer of 1941, the Danish Nazi Party tried to establish an organization called the Danish-German Commercial Advisory Board (Dansk-tysk Erhvervsråd.) It resembled the GCC so much that the Reichsgruppe Industrie warned the RfA and others not to cooperate with the organization. In the fall the Danish Nazis had reduced the scope of their organization to just registering party members and planned to function as a volunteer advisory organization. The party was probably not influential in the Aryanization attempts in Denmark, but it seems probable it might have assisted in pointing to Jewish influences.314 This unsuccessful attempt to establish a trade organization fits the overall perception of a Danish Nazi Party that never successfully became a part of the German occupiers’ plans.315

As already noted the German Gesandtschaft was by far the most important collaborating organization for the RfA. The German legation had been charged by the RfA with providing information on the racial composition of Danish companies. The correspondence between Krüger and the RfA is mainly missing for this period, and quite fragmented. Yet, the remaining correspondence does show the personal involvement of Ernst Krüger and Cecil von Renthe-Fink. In the following, I will closely analyze the known incidents.

In 1936 Renthe-Fink and DAF had disagreed on policies in Denmark. In 1936, DAF had publicly announced its intentions to replace Danish representatives of German firms with Germans. This had been criticized in the magazine for Danish company agents, and Renthe-Fink advised

312 Jensen, Besættelsesstidens økonomiske og erhvervsmæssige forhold: studier i de økonomiske relationer mellem Danmark og Tyskland 1940-1945, 40–47.
314 “Handelsverkehr mit Dänemark,” June 16, 1941, BA, R9I, 1164.
315 Lauridsen, Dansk nazisme 1930-1945 - og derefter, 461–64.
caution. He argued that Germany should not aggressively push this “healthy goal” as it would turn the Danes towards England. In the end, Renthe-Fink suffered a small reprimand. In essence, Renthe-Fink had agreed with the intentions, but not the method.

Krüger became involved in a case in May 1938 in which the currency office of Bremen had asked a German company to prove that its payments were being made to an Aryan company. This links into the argument made earlier that the currency offices played a role in the RfA’s Aryanization efforts. Krüger argued that such measures would cause strong public reactions in Denmark, but as we shall see later, this was not the case. Despite his warnings Krüger answered the request and the company in question was categorized as non-Jewish. Krüger did attempt to affect the policies of the RfA by advising that the currency office should not pursue the matter further. However, Krüger was informed that wherever possible, contracts with Jewish firms were to be terminated. It appears unlikely, but as far as we know, this was the first direct order coming from Berlin to initiate Aryanization initiatives in Denmark. The legation began to follow the new policy in its own way.

Possibly in order to save face locally, the Gesandtschaft had officially argued that the currency office’s claims for proof of being Aryan had been raised due to a mistake. However, the cases and complaints from Danish companies escalated. Renthe-Fink did not argue against the practice, but he raised awareness of specific Danish laws that secured compensations for firms who did not receive due payments. His advice was to pay the firms regularly in order to avoid the larger compensation fees.

Renthe-Fink was fully involved in the racial categorization of the company Aram Nichan in Copenhagen. Seven days after the request had been received, Renthe-Fink wrote “Further research has shown that Aram Nichan, Kopenhagen K, Hauserplads 18, apparently is to be considered Jewish. He can therefore not be recommended as a representative for German firms.” There were also recommendations of Danish lawyers who suited the racial policies. In 1938, the race of Danish lawyer Svend Harms was categorized as Aryan, and then recommended

---

316 “Vertreter deutscher Ausfuhrfirmen nov. 1936- april 1937,” 1937, BA, R901, 67777.
318 “Ariernachweis durch ausländische Firmen.,” December 30, 1938, BA, R901, 67777.
for his successful work for German firms in debt collection cases. Later that year the RfA also approved lawyer Kjeld Rørdam as a legal representative for German firms in Denmark.320

Renthe-Fink and Ernst Krüger were directly communicating with the RfA in Aryanization issues and proposing adjustments to suit local circumstances. They had formally disguised existing attempts at Aryanization and supported the introduction of the informal racial division in Danish German business relations. Renthe-Fink in this way supported the policies of the RfA. He was also personally involved in specific cases in which Danish representatives were racially categorized. The result of these would mean either the acceptance or exclusion as representative for German companies in Denmark. Other German organizations also sought the expertise of the legation in racial matters.

The Reichspressekammer was a subsection of Goebbels’ Reichskulturkammer that organized the press according to the party’s interests. It was headed by SS leader Max Amann, one of Hitler’s earliest followers. In the middle of 1937, the chamber requested a list of Danish companies available for selling German papers and periodicals in Denmark. The only demand was that the companies were Aryan. If only Jewish companies were available, the Reichspressekammer wanted to know to what degree they were Jewish. The German legation in Denmark replied that A/S Bladkompagniet had the broadest distribution network, but it was owned by newspapers known to have Jews among their stockholders. It did suggest the Aryan company A/S Bladhandlerforbundet, but characterized their distribution network as more limited. Though we do not know the outcome of this request, it seems very likely that German government organizations were avoiding Jewish companies, thus pursuing the exclusion of Jews in their foreign relations as well.321 However, we know little of the border-crossing Entjudung measures pursued by other organizations in National-Socialist Germany before the war commenced.

This was also the case when Goebbels’ propaganda ministry began asking a host of questions on Danish suppliers of press photos. Seven companies were to be examined from April 1939 to June 1939; all but one passed the test of not being led by “Jews or German emigrants”. Signed by Renthe-Fink, a letter declared the photo service Paul Martin Meyer was Jewish. This basically

321 “Der Präsident der Reichspressekammer an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Kopenhagen.,” June 22, 1937, PA, Kopenhagen 54.
ended their potential business with German customers. Renthe-Fink had been personally involved in examining the racial composition of Danish companies and excluding the Jewish one. Renthe-Fink is thus to be considered part of the informal Aryanization policies being pursued in Denmark on a very detailed level.

3.3 Reactions to Aryanization in Denmark

The Danish Foreign Ministry’s knowledge of the German Aryanization procedures must have begun in late 1937 and possibly sooner. In early February 1938, the ministry tried to determine how to react in cases of Jews being excluded from German firms in Denmark. The ministry was also aware of cases in which Danish-Jewish business owners, representatives or employees in Germany were being targeted for discrimination when they negotiated import contracts. In order to gain knowledge on how other countries proceeded in the matter the Netherlands were contacted. They seemed to have reached an agreement with Germany on the issue, but the Dutch denied this was the case. Instead, they wrote that racial matters were being dealt with in the context of informal negotiations between German and Dutch government trade representatives. We are unaware of the strategies or agreements the Netherlands were pursuing or getting in these trade talks. However, Aryanization at this early stage was apparently an issue in the Dutch-German trade relationship as well.

As we saw in Chapter Two, in the early stages of international Aryanization the processes set in motion by the RfA were not kept confidential. This was probably why a Danish-Jewish merchant could pass on detailed knowledge of the Aryanization attempts set in motion by the RfA. The letter was passed through the Grosserer-Societetet, the Danish Merchants Association, and forwarded to the Danish Foreign Ministry in anonymized form. Through a colleague, the Danish merchant had access to a circular letter from the German Velvet and Silk Weavers’ Association. It stated that Jewish representatives abroad were to be fired without damaging the overall foreign trade or the Four-Year Plan. The letter also revealed that information was being gathered on the racial composition of Danish firms by using information bureaus. The Danish-

---

323 This matter is not researched further in this dissertation, yet underscores that there existed discrimination against Danish-Jews in Germany before the war period.
326 The four-year plan intended to reshape Germany’s economy into a war economy. It was headed by Hermann Göring.
Jewish merchant in question claimed 80% of his turnovers could be attributed to his agency for several German companies. The application of German race laws in Denmark would force him to close down, he argued. He attempted to counter the exclusive processes by stating that the German policy had to be contested, as “Danish Merchants quite undeservedly were being financially destroyed by a foreign power...” Clearly, foreign trade was being used to achieve racial political goals by using formal demands in Germany and to impose informal Aryanization policies outside of Germany.

The Danish Foreign Ministry received further confirmation of the German policies from the consulate in Hamburg in the summer of 1938. The consul, Marinus Yde, wrote that the German government was behind charging exporters not to hire Jewish agents and to sever their ties to old connections. It had caused some concern in the German business community, showing there was some reluctance to follow suit. The consul’s message was hastily passed on to the Danish Ministry for Trade, Industry and Shipping, but more followed. The business environment in Germany was also turning sour for German Jews as well as Danish Jews who were company owners or employed by Danish companies. Marinus Yde, met with representatives for Danish-Jewish interests in Hamburg. The meeting mainly concerned the registration demands for Jewish assets, but Jews, including non-German Jews, were also forbidden to visit the Hamburg stock exchange. The consul foresaw the closure of several foreign businesses in Germany, as access to the stock-exchange was necessary to trade and survive. Sales of foreign Jewish businesses were completed without consideration for the businesses’ goodwill and essentially meant a great loss for foreign Jewish businesses in Germany.

On the matter of Jewish representatives, the consulate in Hamburg reported on several cases in the summer of 1938 in which Danes were attempting to push out Jewish Danes as representatives for German firms. Although there are few details, it is evident that Danish Jews were not only being targeted by German firms, but also by an unknown number of fellow Danish business men who were ready to take over their positions as representatives. In this manner these Danes actively participated in the success of the German Aryanization attempts and

328 “Jødefølgelsen i Tyskland...,” July 28, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b.
329 The consul advised that Danish Jews in Germany followed German law in this question.
330 “Den tyske regerings stilling til ikke-ariers...,” June 30, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b; “Jødespørgsmålet i Tyskland. Den tyske rigsborgerlov,” July 1, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b The Danish embassy sent an analysis of the 3rd. addition to the Nuremberg Laws which targeted Jewish businesses. This included forced registration and denial of access to the stock exchanges in Germany for Jews. Of course these laws also defined a Jewish company. This meant the Danish government was fully aware of these laws.
exploited them for personal gain. The consulate also provided an example of the German-Jewish Iwan Levy, who for several years had represented Roulunds Fabrikker in Odense, Denmark. He was experiencing many difficulties, because he was Jewish, and “he had to let his business Aryanize”. He promised to open a small factory in Denmark, if he could emigrate, but was discouraged from doing so by the consul, who referred to the strict immigration laws in Denmark.

The Danish Foreign Ministry files do not provide us with much information on how Danish companies located in Germany adjusted to the anti-Jewish rules in Germany. We only know of four cases. One seed company whose owner was Jewish closed and moved to Denmark. E. Fjeldsøe, the Danish agent for several poultry firms in Denmark, had been asked if he was Aryan and if the companies he represented were Aryan or led by Aryans. The Danish company Fisker & Nielsen transferred their Jewish manager from Germany to the Netherlands. The Danish contracting company Christiani & Nielsen relocated two Jewish engineers to Copenhagen.

The ministry does not seem to have been involved on behalf of the targeted Jewish owners to secure assets or values.

The reports from the consul and the Danish foreign ministry’s knowledge raises the question: how did foreign companies located in Germany react to Aryanization demands from 1933-1939? The issue of German companies’ reaction to Aryanization is considered a must in most German historiography on this theme, while the largest American companies have also seen their fair share of investigations. This area could deserve, at least, further research into Danish companies as a host of questions come to mind: Did they fire their Jewish employees or not? Did they buy Aryanized German companies to gain market shares, or did they remain uninterested? Danish research is silent on the issue, which makes it difficult to confirm the reports. However, such procedures against foreign companies in Germany do contain the

331 I have been unable to locate further information on Iwan Levy.
332 “Jødiske repræsentanter i Tyskland for danske firmaer,” June 29, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b.
333 “De tyske ariseringsforanstaltningers virkninger for danske firmaer og forretningsmænd.,” January 11, 1939, RA, UM 140.N.33b; Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938–1945, 158.
334 Andersen, De gjorde Danmark større: De multinationale danske entreprenørfirme i krise og krig 1919–1947, 128.
elements of diplomatic problems, which larger nations such as the USA, the United Kingdom and France possibly felt obliged to comment and react on.

3.3.1 Negotiating Aryanization

In the summer of 1938, the issue of Aryanization had also reached the Danish Minister of Trade, Industry, and Maritime Affairs, Johannes Kjærbøl, who forwarded a message from Alfred Raffel A/S, a Danish steel importer, to the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter Munch. Several German companies had withdrawn their contracts from Raffel. The names of several other companies being subjected to Aryanization were supplied to the Foreign Ministry by Ludvig Elsass, the director of Danish steel company Sophus Berendsen. These cases included: Harald Michelsen’s Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import, James Polack’s removal from AGFA in Denmark and C.B. Henriques’ removal as chairman of Siemens in Denmark. We will follow both Harald Michelsen’s and James Pollack’s companies later in the chapter, but first we turn to the Aryanization of the famous perfume 4711 in Denmark.

In 1902, Moritz R. Henriques took over as exclusive representative for the popular perfume 4711 from Cologne – the Echt Kölnisch Wasser, the eau de Cologne. In 1932 he established a factory to produce the perfume in Denmark, managed by his son Kai Henriques. They were required to buy the needed raw materials to produce the perfume from the German company and to refrain from selling other brands. In 1938, the turnover was 900,000 DKR (30 mill./2017), and a fixed percentage of the turnover was paid to the main company in Germany. In March 1938, a visit to Cologne had dire consequences for the positions of the two Danish managers. They were notified that new “Aryan regulations” meant the discontinuation of the contract. The managers of 4711 had attempted to keep the Danes on board by creating a new company in which the wife of Kai Henriques, who was most likely not Jewish, was to own 25% of the stock, but this attempt failed. Moritz’s contract would expire on January 1st 1939, and six months later Kai’s contract as factory manager was to expire. Apparently, all avenues of finding a solution had failed, and Moritz R. Henriques praised the management of 4711 for these attempts. The appeal to address this “injustice”, as Moritz termed it, was made to the Danish Merchants’ Association and the Danish Foreign Ministry.

---

336 “Kjærbøl til Munch,” June 18, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b.
These cases prompted discussions in government and the top-level of the Danish Foreign Ministry on how to diplomatically address the issue in a more formal manner. German Aryanization policies in Denmark were discussed at a cabinet meeting in the summer of 1938. The Foreign Minister was to participate in a meeting of the so-called Oslo states, and the “...question of the dismissal of Jewish agents in businesses as such demands are being raised from the German side.” The issue of Aryanization was thus to be discussed among a wider group of smaller European states. This underscores that the informal Aryanization policies set in motion by the RfA were having an effect on these states.

The Danish government proceeded to raise the question of Aryanization in the Danish-German Trade Committee (det Dansk-tyske handelsudvalg) during the summer of 1938. The main aim of the committee, headed by higher-ranking civil servants, was to solve trade issues between the two countries. Denmark was represented by a senior civil servant in the Danish Foreign Ministry, Nils Svenningsen, while the Germans were represented by Alex Walter. Walter had negotiated trade agreements with Denmark since 1936 and was well connected in Berlin. The minutes of the meeting emphasize the clash of the small, independent democracy and the rising National Socialist state enforcing its Judenpolitik. Denmark’s position was diplomatic and pragmatic. Svenningsen believed the problem consisted of two separate issues 1) Jewish agents for Danish companies in Germany and 2) Jews, living in Denmark, who were agents for German companies. The strategy was to forfeit the case for Jews working in Germany and carefully argue against German Aryanization policies in Denmark. Svenningsen claimed Denmark had no intention interfering in the domestic policies of Aryanization. However, he diplomatically stressed that Jews working for Danish companies in Germany should not be fired too hastily as it could damage Danish-German trade relations. He thereby forfeited protecting Danish-Jewish citizens working in Germany. This might be viewed as diplomatically sound, and in line with the
strategy to not provoke Germany. However, it stands in contrast to the Foreign Ministry’s usual code of conduct which is to secure and protect Danish citizens. To Svenningsen, the issue of Jewish representatives for German firms in Denmark was a more serious matter, as several agents had complained to the ministry. Svenningsen advanced cautiously on Denmark’s behalf. He claimed that Denmark knew it could not interfere in these cases, but felt obliged to raise the matter. The main argument was that trade relations risked being damaged due to possible boycotts and loss of goodwill towards Germany. In addition, Svenningsen noted that the lay-offs of Jews were pursued by German firms without the support of the German government. Svenningsen also stressed that a difference between Aryan and Jewish did not exist in Denmark. The arguments appear weak and were contrary to the knowledge of the ministry. He might have thought he could gain goodwill by acting very restrained.\(^{342}\) Svenningsen thus tried to challenge Germany’s racial views, but this was refused by his German counterpart.

Walter basically discarded all arguments from the Danes by providing unmistakable National Socialist rhetoric. He stated that the position of the Jews in public as well as in business life had been changed – and continued:

“National Socialism views unregulated participation from Jews as incompatible with the will of the German people, and it was its intention, the will of the movement to limit Jewish activities in Germany. This was not just the wishes of one party or a specific social class, but the collected perception of the German people. Germany was conscious of the grave difficulties that would arise by pursuing this perception.”\(^ {343}\)

Walter claimed that the German government was prevented from interfering in individual companies’ pursuit of the will of the people, and the current challenges this created were regarded as temporary. The Jews were seen as acting against German interests everywhere and viewed as a world-wide threat. Walter then moved on to blame the Jews for several incidents including anti-German boycotts. He claimed that Jewish representatives for German companies

---

\(^{342}\) “Anvendelse af jødiske agenter i den dansk-tyske samhandel,” July 20, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b; Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 86–88; Jensen states the Danish minutes do not exist and seems to have missed the passage from Bjerre 2015 Jensen, Landesgruppe Dänemark: NSDAPs udlandsorganisation i Danmark ca. 1932-1945, 206.

\(^{343}\) “Anvendelse af jødiske agenter i den dansk-tyske samhandel.”
had acted disloyally by promoting non-German companies in order to damage Germany. Walter’s arguments were consistent with National Socialism’s ideas, and the policies of the RfA.

Walter would transmit the Danish concerns to his superiors, while arguing that he could not interfere in the matter. At the very end of the meeting, Svenningsen repeated his main argument: that the issue of Aryanization had the potential to damage trade relations between the two countries. He thus tried to re-frame the argument away from the racial and anti-Jewish points employed by Walter, but was unsuccessful.344

The Danish Foreign Ministry only mildly contested Aryanization, but there were limits to Aryanization in Denmark. These are found in internal discussions and correspondence to other ministries. The Danish government defined their limits in a legal sense as it argued it had no cause to interfere if contract agreements were not violated. This meant that if agents and representatives were fired within the framework of legality it was considered futile to raise the issue, despite the evident racial and anti-Jewish reasons behind the lay-offs. This stance was explained to the Danish Ministry of Justice in August 1938:

“Should the attempts from Germany later be directed at businessmen of Jewish descent living in this country who are not (agents, exclusive importers, representatives etc.) in a special judicial agreement with a specific German company, the Foreign Ministry believes that it should be considered to contact the German government.” 345

This stance had several options built into it, and was clearly not a bulletproof defense of the Danish-Jewish business minority. The case for representatives was forfeited, while it was only “to be considered” to raise the matter on behalf of other categories of Jewish businesses if problems were to arise.

The Danish Foreign Ministry did intervene in a few cases in which Danish companies were not being paid because they were considered Jewish.346 In November 1938, the Danish Merchants Association asked the Danish Foreign Ministry to confirm whether the German

344 Ibid.; German minutes are found in BA “Jüdischer Vertreter in Dänemark,” August 16, 1938, BA, R901, 67777.
345 “Udenrigsministeriet til Justitsministeriet,” February 3, 1939, RA, UM 140.N.33b; Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 96“Skulle bestræbelserne fra tysk side senere blive rettet imod her i landet boende forretningsmænd af jødisk afstamning, der ikke (som agenter, eneforhandlere, repræsentanter o.l.) står i særligt kontraktforhold til vedkommende tyske firma, mener udenrigsministeriet, at det bør optages til overvejelse eventuelt at rette henvendelse til den tyske regering.”
dictatorship was pursuing a deliberate policy of exclusion, meaning a policy demanding Danish-Jewish representatives to be either laid off or their contracts terminated upon renewal. The Danish Foreign Ministry answered it had passed on the question to their legation in Berlin and in doing so evidently deferred the matter, despite their knowledge.  

In early 1939, the Danish Ministries also learned of the GCC’s attempt to categorize companies according to the racial definitions of Germany. The Ministry of Justice obtained several documents showing that a Danish merchant had been investigated and asked to disclose his race according to the Nuremberg laws. This was an obvious informal use of the German race laws. It was news to the Foreign Ministry who had been unaware of the GCC’s activities. In late August 1939, it even seems the GCC tightened its measures, as it attempted to pressure their members to fire Jewish employees. This was, for example, demanded of the Danish merchant Karl Kiefer. The GCC wanted the Jewish employee replaced. However, the Foreign Ministry interfered, but the outcome remains undisclosed. The case illustrates how a pressure was applied on Danish companies to let their Jewish employees go in order to become members of the GCC. The extent is unknown, but it opens up for the potential discrimination against Jews who were merely employed by companies trading with Germany.

3.3.2 Media Reactions to Aryanization

In an article headlined “Unheard of Nazi-German Attacks on Danish Business Life”, the Danish Communist newspaper Arbejderbladet was one of the first to publicly report on the German Aryanization attempts in Denmark in May 1938. The article argued that Germany had attempted to control who was in charge of the companies trading with Germany. The paper had supposedly learned that the GCC had requested the Danish Merchants’ Association to inform their members that companies without Jews would be preferred as German trade partners. At the same time, the article referenced the general tendency that German firms were firing their Jewish representatives abroad.

In the summer, the newspaper Aftenbladet ran a smaller piece with the headline “Germany Demands Aryan Proof from Foreign Companies”. Remarkably, the article focused on the British reactions to the German politics. The correspondent described how British firms were being
asked to prove they were not owned by Jews or persons of Jewish origin. Proof would only be accepted if it was confirmed by the German Embassy in London or the British Chamber of Commerce. The British Minister of Trade, the conservative Oliver Stanley, would reject the attempted interference in British trade relations. This was possibly one of the first public statements made by another country against the policies pursued by the RfA. This shows not only the international scope of the RfA’s policies, but also that they were being challenged in other countries.

In the autumn of 1938 the Danish newspaper Ekstrabladet confirmed the existence of an official German policy aimed at replacing Jewish business representatives based on information from a “large Danish company”. Their German business relation had openly stated that the German authorities demanded proof that representatives of German companies were of Aryan descent. There were other examples of companies being split up according to race, while others denounced the German demands. The articles show that German Aryanization attempts had become a public issue, and that the introduction of Judenpolitik’s Aryanization aspects were being dealt with in various ways within the Danish business community.

3.3.3 Denying Aryanization

Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler had spoken on Aryanization at the students’ association of Göteborg in early December 1938. The speech caused public debate in Sweden, but Swedish historian Sven Nordlund has pointed to the speech having very little effect on the Aryanization attempts. The Danish diplomats in Sweden confirmed that Sandler had given an unmistakable warning against Germany’s attempt to Aryanize Swedish business life. In addition, they verified the content of the Swedish newspaper articles on the speech. The Swedish papers mostly focused on the warning given to Germany, but Sandler had also cautioned Swedish businesses who were to refrain from answering questions on race. He had stressed that the Aryanization attempts must be terminated in order to preserve the positive trade relations between Germany and Sweden. Sandler undeniably spoke against the German policies and directly challenged international Aryanization.

351 “Arisk,” Ekstrabladet, September 6, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b.
352 See Nordlund, Affärer som vanligt, 49–52 for the reactions in Sweden.
353 “Den danske legation i Stockholm til Udenrigsministeriet,” December 10, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b Press clippings were provided from Social-Demokraten and Svenska Dagbladet 9-12-1938.
The articles in Swedish newspapers revealed that the following different categories of Aryanization were being pursued in Sweden:

1. German companies had dismissed Swedish-Jewish representatives
2. Germany has demanded termination of contracts for Swedish Jews who were representatives of Swedish companies selling German goods
3. Companies in Sweden with subsidiaries in Germany had been asked to provide information for both entities:
   a. If the white-collar workers were Aryan
   b. If the capital in the company was Aryan

Sandler’s speech had a marked effect on Danish affairs. The Danish Foreign Ministry had to publicly comment on the matter, and as we shall see it would officially deny the existence of Aryanization in the Denmark.

The Danish newspaper Politiken reported on Sandler’s speech and underscored Swedish newspapers’ support for Sandler. Several statements from the Swedish newspapers revealed the policies of the RfA and were cited by Politiken. The main concern was not Jews being let go from German companies in Sweden, but the fact that Aryanization was supposed to be enforced outside of Germany. The Director of the Swedish Chamber of Trade in Stockholm had stated that it “...had received numerous complaints over German companies which had cancelled their contracts with Swedish firms that were owned by Jews or employed Jews...”. The article briefly described the Danes as having decided to “suffer and be quiet”. This basically meant that Aryanization in the Danish public was perceived as unchallenged by the government, which was not far from being correct.

The Swedish statements forced the Danish Foreign Minister since 1929, Peter Munch, to comment on Sandler’s speech and Aryanization in Denmark. Only a day after the article, an interview with Munch was on the front page of Politiken under the headline “No ‘Aryanization’ of Danish Business Life”. The minister stated that there had been rumors of Aryanization in

---

354 Ibid.
355 “Sveriges presse om Sandler-Talen,” Politiken, December 10, 1938, Politikens Online Arkiv”... har modtaget adskillelige klager over, at tyske firmaer har opsagt deres kontrakter med svenske firmaer, som indehaves af jøder eller har jøder ansat”, ”Lide og tie.”
Denmark, which seemed similar to the Swedish experiences. However, the known examples had been researched and Munch claimed they were false. Munch’s statement clearly did not correspond with the ministry’s knowledge. The public statements of both Sandler and Munch were picked up by the press service in the German Foreign Ministry, and Renthe-Fink also wrote a brief summary of Munch’s statement, but without commenting on it.

Munch’s statements caused a brief and short-lived public reporting on Aryanization, which was followed in the ministry. The articles demonstrate that the scope and policies of the RfA in Northern Europe were known to the business environments. The Jewish weekly, Jødisk Ugeblad, perceived Sandler’s speech very positively, as it was interpreted as a defense of liberty against Nazism. The article described how demands for proof of race from German companies were a well-known occurrence in the Danish-Jewish business minority. The Danish Foreign Minister was criticized for being excessively diplomatic in denying the existence of the phenomenon in Denmark. The weekly’s article was picked up by Arbejderbladet a few days later.

The Aryanization attempts also became part of an international public debate. The issue was raised during a questioning session in the British House of Commons in late December. A Labour member enquired of the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, if the government was aware of the dismissals of Jewish employees and what the government intended to do to prevent it. Hoare replied the matter would be investigated, while stressing that decent British companies should refrain from being part of such conduct. Deutsche Zeitung, a paper in German printed in Moscow, wrote a piece on the German Aryanization attempts in Scandinavia. The article has several examples of Aryanization explaining “...the Fascists’ furious anti-Semitic campaign and overall demand for the Aryanization of trade companies”. Examples from Denmark were AGFA and the publisher Høst, which I will comment on below. Deutsche Zeitung also provided examples from Norway, where stores apparently had used posters to signify they racial status. It seems the sources were communist papers and parties from other countries, most likely within Scandinavia. Quite surprisingly, the British working-class newspaper The Daily Herald in

360 “Faschistische Wühlarbeit in Skandinavien,” Deutsche Zeitung, December 24, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b; „die Faschisten eine wütende antisemitsche Kampagne und fordern überall die ’Arisierung’ der Handelsfirmen.”
December 1938 had a small article with the headline “Nazis ‘Purging’ Danish Firms”. According to the article, the Danish publisher Høsts Forlag had a large bookstore, which had been visited by a seemingly normal German customer. However, the visit resulted in a letter giving the business this warning: stop selling anti-German books or lose your privilege to sell German textbooks.  

The Norwegians also had a round of public debate regarding Aryanization attempts in Norway in January 1939. It spanned various newspapers, which reported different opinions on the matter. The Communist newspaper Arbeiderbladet were hardliners against the practice, while others such as Morgenbladet and the trade paper Norges Handels- og Sjøfartstidende downplayed events and reported the issue was marginal. They only knew of a few companies that had been asked about their racial composition. However, Norway’s trade organization spoke of several incidents of Norwegian merchants being asked about their race and families.  

Returning to Foreign Minister Munch’s denial that ended up backfiring. This was partly due the media exposure, and partly because more business owners contacted the ministry with examples of Aryanization. One was the A/S Dansk Patent Kontor, Danish Patent Office Inc., which apparently, as a result of German pressure, had restructured as the Jewish person in the leadership had stepped down. As a consequence, the Danish Foreign Ministry produced an overview of the Danish patent business, which seemed to be dominated by Jewish leadership or personnel. Many had lost their German clients, who had transferred their business to Aryan offices. The Ministry decided not to raise the case with the Germans based on the estimation that it would be futile. Evidently, the ministry rejected to challenge Aryanization despite its obvious effects in this business area. A lawyer provided clear evidence that his client, the company Jul. Zacharias, had been asked in plain language in the following manner:  

“...as you are our representative we kindly ask you to inform us if your company is Jewish or under Jewish influence.”  

The lawyer had replied that the company’s owner was 100% Aryan. 

---


363 “Note om dansk-jødiske patent bureauer,” March 15, 1939, RA, UM 140.N.33b.


365 Ibid.
3.3.4 **Attempted Aryanization - Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import**

In the following we will look at the case of the textile company Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import. The case provides an in-depth perspective from the viewpoints of victim, perpetrators, and bystanders on Aryanization in Denmark. The case reveals many details of the company’s problems, and the detailed knowledge the Foreign Ministry was gaining. The case also reflects the effects of RfA’s Aryanization policies on the Danish-Jewish business community. It begins with a discussion between the German company Fr. Küttner A.G. from Saxony and the Danish Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import. In 1938, they had been business partners for the past 15 years, but the partnership was now characterized by distrust. Harald Michelsen, the owner of Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import, wanted a Danish lawyer to oversee negotiations on how to proceed, because the “...word of the Israelites would, according to German law, never be respected by the law against a German Aryan’s.”\(^{366}\) Apparently, Michelsen had been fired by Küttner. However, Küttner’s largest customer in Denmark would only accept Michelsen as their representative. Küttner had sent Dr. Treischke to handle affairs in Denmark. Dr. Treischke had been very satisfied with Michelsen’s work over the past 15 years, but the German government had forced Küttner to fire Michelsen, Dr. Treischke explained. The president of Küttner was also Wirtschaftsminister of Saxony, and he disallowed Jews in his company, including Jews not residing in Germany. The lawyer suggested the formation of a purely Aryan company, with Michelsen in charge of sales, but both parties rejected this strategy. The lawyer also touched on the subject of economic losses for Germany, but according to Treischke:

> “The present German government was indifferent to the subject of economic loss of a business, when the state’s political interests and the state’s idea were to be implemented, as the state now has the greatest authority over individual or economic interests.”\(^{367}\)

It is evident that this company mainly complied with RfA’s policies – and Germany’s, for that matter. It also underscores the view that these policies to a certain extent ignored the possible economic losses which arose from pursuing racial goals within the foreign trade.

---

\(^{366}\) “Skandinavisk Kunstsilke Import, Landsretssagafører E. Repsdorph. Afskrift til udenrigsministeriet,” June 15, 1938, RA, UM, 140.N.33b”...at israelitterne’s ord - i henhold til tyske love - aldrig har ret og gyldighed overfor en tysk ariers...”

\(^{367}\) Ibid.”...at det var den nugældende tyske regering liggeyldigt, om et foretagende økonomisk led tab, når statens politiske interesser og statsideen skulle gennemføres, da staten nu har størst ret over det enkelte individ eller de økonomiske interesser.”
Küttner instead suggested appointing a new agent, while keeping Michelsen on as a dealer without mentioning his exclusive rights. A “gentlemen agreement” (sic) would secure Michelsen a customer base defined by Küttner. This would protect him from being ousted by the newly appointed agent, Küttner argued. Küttner was seemingly attempting to find a creative solution, but they still needed an official acceptance of the agreement from Berlin. Küttner’s motive was not to help Michelsen, but to secure their largest Danish buyer.

Two months later, the case remained unresolved, and Michelsen continued to be excluded by other German companies. The German company Kötitzer Ledertauch- u. Wachstuch-Werke had also given their notice of termination to Harald Michelsen. According to Michelsen, Kötitzer had secured the acceptance of a change of agent from its Danish customers before terminating the contract. Michelsen was also indirectly obstructed from doing business with the main German producer of Vigogne Yarn, a mixture of wool and cotton, Vigognespinnerei, in Saxony. Michelsen’s requests for price lists were left unanswered, and by ignoring him, the company indirectly excluded him from their business network.368

Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import began a struggle to keep its imports from Germany by directly contacting the management of the German companies and the Danish foreign ministry, thus challenging the German Judenpolitik in both countries. Several arguments were employed towards the German businesses. The business-related ones focused not only on long-term business relations and rising sales, but also on the risk of damaging sales by excluding Michelsen. He used a national argument, stressing that the proceedings against Jewish business partners would damage Germany’s image. Moral arguments and family history were also employed. Contract terminations were viewed as unfair and Michelsen argued that his mother’s family belonged to the German Jews who had opened the Hamburg/America route.369 In this way he applied his personal contacts and personal life to underscore positive examples, while pointing to several possible negative consequences.

Towards the Danish authorities, Michelsen challenged the German policies by emphasizing economic losses and Germany’s problematic interference in Danish domestic affairs. He pointed to a 75% loss in turnovers due to Aryanization, and that the German mixture of politics and business would eventually lead to unforeseen consequences. He stressed that the contracts

369 Ibid.
were terminated for one reason only: he was Jewish. Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import asked for the protection of Danish Jewish citizens, clearly stressing the national argument. The repercussions were also felt by the staff of the company, some of whom would have to be dismissed due to the dramatic decline in turnovers. This argument could be expected to find fertile soil due to the high unemployment rates in Denmark. The company suggested it could open new avenues of income by being allowed to import yarn and silk from other countries.

In November 1938, the predicaments of the Danish company escalated further. The spinner factory Gustav Vogel in Saxony announced that it would become illegal for them to wire payments to foreign representatives who were Jewish. After this date, exceptions could only be made if Vogel proved the relationship with the representative had been terminated. Michelsen alerted the Danish Merchants’ Association, which asked for confirmation of the German policies later that month. Michelsen also tried to argue his case directly with the Danish foreign ministry using legal, national, economic and personal arguments:

“If we cannot get the needed support from the Danish state, it will mean that our existence as merchants and humans are threatened, this means we cannot keep our staff or our home... we are aware that we must look at this as members of a society as a whole. If it is the case that the Foreign Ministry believes it cannot secure our interests as Danish citizens against the German state, we hope that through you or other Danish authorities, we will be given the chance to rebuild our business through other countries that are not against trading with Danish citizens of Jewish faith.”

Michelsen moved on to suggest that increased imports from England would solve his problems. This was a clear challenge to both the German Aryanization policies and the vague stance of the Danish government.

Munch’s public refusal of the existence of Aryanization in Denmark prompted Michelsen to write again. Under the heading “Aryanization of Danish business life”, Michelsen contested the
Judenpolitik of National Socialist Germany. He provided evidence that Danish Jews were being subjected to strong economic pressure because of their race, and he argued that this was interference in domestic affairs. He understood that Denmark’s relationship to Germany was sensitive and issues had to be handled quietly, but he pointed to the ministry’s obligation to protect the interests of Danish citizens. He continued:

“It begins with the Jews, but the Germans might someday also deny paying or working with Danish subjects of the Catholic faith or Danish subjects that are Social Democrats, Social Liberals, Conservative etc. because this does not fit Germany...”

It seems the Foreign Ministry did not engage in the case to assist Michelsen, but the knowledge was now extensive, and the examples so numerous, that the ministry had to react in the form of issuing a set of internal guidelines on the matter in early 1939.

The letter titled “The German Aryanization Measures and their Consequences for Danish Companies and Businessmen” was transmitted to most Danish legations in Europe, which clearly emphasizes the ministry’s extensive knowledge of the matter. The letter ended:

“The incidents mentioned are only examples of the consequences of the possible general rule that German companies must dismiss their Jewish agents, representatives and directors in foreign countries and presumably free themselves of connections with Jews where this can happen without damaging the German export interests.”

The Danish Foreign Ministry’s knowledge was extensive and precise. In these sentences the ministry specifically summarized the policies of the RfA. However, the ministry did not challenge the German position or defend the Danish-Jewish businessmen. The ministry was in the dark on the issue of importers who were not agents or representatives. However, the ministry was not

376 Ibid. “Det begynder med jøderne, men tyskerne kan måske en skønne dag også nægte at betale eller arbejde med danske undersåtter af katolsk tro, eller danske undersåtter, som er socialdemokrater, radikale, konservative, venstre etc., fordi dette ikke passer Tyskland...”
377 “De tyske ariseringsforanstaltningers virkninger for danske firmaer og forretningsmænd.”“Foranævnte tilfælde er kun eksempler på konsekvenser af den vistnok generelle regel, at tyske firmaer skal afskedige deres jødiske agenter, repræsentanter af filialdirektører i udlandet og vel herudover i det hele frigøre sig for forbindelse med jøder, hvor dette kan ske uden at skade tyske eksportinteresser.”
interested in contacting the German government to clarify the matter. This basically means they feared to raise the issue at all.\(^\text{378}\)

The ministry summarized some of the known cases including James Polack.\(^\text{379}\) Polack had been the exclusive Danish-Jewish representative of the German AGFA in Denmark since 1927.\(^\text{380}\) Polack’s success led to the creation of an independent AGFA branch with Polack as both its director and chairman of the board. In what seems to be one of the first Aryanizations in Denmark he was in December 1937 informed that his contract would not be renewed. He would have to leave the company upon expiry of his contract in December 1938. Yet, in the summer of 1938 he was asked to cease coming to the company premises.\(^\text{381}\) Financially, Polack was grossly denied the value of his stocks and had a sum of money blocked in Germany. The stock was sold at a rate of 100, but the buyer, the Danish Bank director Eigtved, estimated to I.G. Farben the value as being more than 500. Polack also had RM 4905 in a pension fund in Germany which was blocked and could not be transferred to Denmark via the Danish-German clearing account.\(^\text{382}\) His attempt to construct a new company based on imports from other countries was unsuccessful due the unwillingness of the Danish government to lift the general trade restrictions.\(^\text{383}\)

The ministry’s summary of known cases contained new additions, which have not been preserved on the main file. The company Anton Petersen & Henius A/S, which imported book printing machines from Germany, had been re-structured according to German demands. It had changed its composition of the management and sold its stocks to Aryan family members.\(^\text{384}\) The merchant Jørgen I. Meyer had been fired as exclusive agent of Johann Maria Farina and Schwarzkopf Perfumes. Two advertising companies were also targeted and had lost their German customers. The chairman of the Jewish congregation, C.B. Henriques, had been removed from the board of directors of Siemens in Denmark. Apparently, he had refused to step down voluntarily, prompting a change in the number of board members from eight to seven. As

\(^{378}\) Ibid.

\(^{379}\) Skandinavisk Kunst-Silke Import, Alfred Raffel and Sophus Berendsen please see Sophus Berendsen case in chapter four

\(^{380}\) This case also used in lesser detail in Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 91-98.

\(^{381}\) “James Polack til Udenrigsministeriet,” December 27, 1938, RA, UM 140.N.33b.

\(^{382}\) Ibid.


\(^{384}\) “Referat af møde med Direktør Henius,” April 25, 1939, RA, UM 140.N.33b.
the majority of the board were Germans, they voted Henriques out.\footnote{De tyske ariseringsforanstaltningers virkninger for danske firmaer og forretningsmænd.} This Aryanized the Siemens branch in Denmark.

Denmark seems to have been the only Scandinavian country to refrain from issuing a formal diplomatic protest against the German Aryanization attempts in Denmark. The Norwegian Government had raised the issue directly with the German Foreign Ministry in early January 1939. It claimed that German procedures were damaging trade relations and that Norway considered these actions as an interference in its domestic affairs. The Germans replied that the government was not involved, and as Alex Walter had argued in Denmark, it was the choice of the German companies to freely choose their trading partners. If they terminated contracts with Jews, they acted according “…to the current German mindset…” However, German companies were not to enquire directly if a company was Jewish, and the German Foreign Ministry would assist on a case to case basis. In this manner, the German government denied being involved, while at the same time condoning the practices of the German companies. It is evident that the Germans tried to avoid acknowledging any government involvement in the matter.\footnote{Handelsforholdet Norge-Tyskland. Jødespørgsmålet., February 16, 1939, RA, UM 140.N.33b.} It is hardly possible to make an exhaustive comparison between the reactions of the three countries as we remain uninformed on how Norway proceeded in the matter. As we have seen Sweden’s Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler openly contested the Aryanization policies, and that Sweden quickly returned to a “business as usual” policy.\footnote{Nordlund, Affärer som vanligt, 17.} However, it is remarkable that Denmark was the most cautious of the three, and this might be related to the border issue.

Denmark’s only known protest remains the one voiced at the meeting between Svenningsen and Walter in the summer of 1938, which was not made public. The reasons behind the lack of a more formal reaction are probably to be found in the Danish government’s perceptions of its geo-political situation. It was the dominant position of the Foreign Ministry that events in Germany, at any given time, would directly influence Denmark. This view affected most policy areas. The tendency was to be very cautious and avoid provoking Germany. As the 1930’ies progressed this predisposition was enforced by key factors: such as the rising military power of Germany and its’ wishes to reset the Versailles treaty by reclaiming German minorities and territories. In addition, Denmark was militarily isolated. In regards to \textit{Judenpolitik} we know of a
similar Danish reaction in January 1939. The AA demanded of foreign powers that they
discontinued employing Jews as consuls in Germany. Denmark complied quietly, while Sweden
and Norway considered formal reactions. The case and reaction has been labelled a
“comprised narrative about Denmark’s relationship to Germany in the 1930’ies”. Denmark
thus seems to have been more cautious than its Scandinavian counter-parts. The most
outspoken difference between Denmark’s and Sweden’s reactions in relation to Aryanization in
the prewar period appear to be a public stance against Aryanization. However, the rights of the
Jewish businesses appear to have been abandoned by both countries in order to prevent
damaging the over-all trade relations with Germany.

3.3.5 The Union of Representatives for Foreign Companies

As explained in the introduction an overall examination of the organizations related to foreign
trade it not included in the scope of this dissertation. However, historian Sofie Lene Bak has
shown the matter of Aryanization was discussed within the Union of Representatives for Foreign
Companies (Foreningen af repræsentanter for udenlandske firmaer). There were concerns
within the organization on letting a Jewish representative negotiate with the GCC. Despite the
fact that the attempts to maintain trade used to be an unpolitical area this was no longer
achievable by 1938. The union harbored several examples of representation for German
companies being awarded based on race. The annual assembly in February 1939 revealed that
racial discrimination was prevalent. The chairman, Christian Hjelm Bang, stated at the meeting
that the union could not intervene when contracts between Jewish representatives and German
companies were terminated within the framework of the law. However, official commentaries
at the meeting reflected that an unknown number of non-Jewish members had sought to secure
the representation of German companies, and take advantage of the situation.

This was also the case during the Occupation. At a meeting of the Union of Representatives
for Foreign Companies in February 1942 it was discussed if the Arbitration Committee should be
headed by the Jewish member Michael Cohn. The minutes do not seem to completely reflect
the discussions at hand, but Cohn was reelected with fifty-three votes, though forty-two
members had voted against him. The vote on his position probably reflect it was a disadvantage

388 Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 70–73.
389 Lund, Hitlers spisekammer, 28–30”...en komprimeret fortælling om Danmarks forhold til Tyskland i 1930’erne.”
390 Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 70–72.
the he was Jewish as every other position up for election saw unanimous votes. The Danish Chamber of Merchants’ annual assembly in 1942 reflected some of the same concerns. It was proposed to terminate the tradition of forced membership in order to exclude the Jews from the organization. The proposal was voted down, but a group of members, possibly in association with the anti-Semite Aage H. Andersen, wrote to the minister of trade to raise the same issue.  

These examples sketch a dispute within the Danish business environment on how to respond to a political landscape effected by racial ideologies. The examples also point to a willingness within the Danish business community to replace Jews. The full scope remains undisclosed and reveal a research gap in need of a closer investigation into the replacement of representatives on company level as well as the organization’s knowledge and reactions in the matter.

3.4 Chapter conclusion.

This chapter has shown how the RfA’s policies were implemented in the Danish-German trade relations, and how it was assisted by the German legation even involving the envoy Cecil von Renthe-Fink. Despite a fragmentary set of sources several cases of Aryanization show how the policies of the RfA directly affected the Danish-Jewish business community. As a bystander to the German Aryanization measures the Danish government remained passive in its response to protect the Danish-Jewish business minority. The government, represented by the Danish Foreign Ministry, displayed an extreme sensitivity towards Germany in this issue. It refrained from assisting Danish-Jews employed in Germany. In Denmark the ministry would only interfere if there were a breach of laws. This was in spite of the obvious hardships especially Danish-Jewish representatives of German companies were facing.

In regards to the stages of persecution we find that several German or German friendly organizations were involved in informally pursuing Aryanization measures in Denmark. Stage one is thus characterized by high degree of structure and organization. It also specifically targeted Jews, which means the definition of Jews (stage three) must have been employed. It is also quite obvious throughout the chapter that the stages of identification, registration, and exclusion (stage four and five) are found in the prewar period. The exclusive measures within Aryanization (stage five) were targeted at Jewish representatives. They were removed by discontinuing contracts or through demanding changes in company management.

391 Ibid., 70, 73.
This chapter has also pointed to other possible areas of exclusion. The GCC’s pressure on Danish companies to let go of their Jewish employees in order to achieve membership points to the possible existence of a much broader discrimination. This is also the case regarding Danish-Jews employed in Germany who seems to have experienced being removed from German companies. The research from Sweden reveals Swedish companies with subsidiaries in Germany were asked to provide information on both their employees and the capital of the company. It remains an open question if Danish companies of the same sort were subject to the same questions, and if so how did they react? Similarly, what was the reaction of Danish companies located in Germany during the rise of the dictatorship. How did they react to the racial policies? Did they fire their Jewish employees or did they attempt gain market shares through the Aryanization policies in Germany?

The Danish sources also reveal several countries were discussing international Aryanization. The meeting of the Oslo states of Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden brought it to the international agenda. However, Danish sources also point to discussions on the issue in Britain. Only further research will allow us to compare the reactions of various governments on a transnational level, but it was clearly an issue most countries had to address in some way.

4 Aryanization in Denmark 1940-1943

This chapter follows the continued implementation of the RfA’s Aryanization initiatives in Denmark during the occupation. Throughout the chapter we will follow how the legation assisted in and continued to enforce Aryanization. It will show how the goals of the RfA were almost completed by September 1942 as most Danish-Jewish representatives and importers had been Aryanized through exclusion. Also, most Danish-Jewish companies who were dependent on direct imports of raw materials or other imports from Germany were Aryanized according to Cecil von Renthe-Fink. The chapter will close by revealing Renthe-Fink’s last push for further Aryanization measures. A part of this was to suggest to informally introduce the third addition to the Nuremberg Laws in Denmark. The third addition to the Nuremberg Laws came in 1938 and among other things added a definition of Jewish companies to the laws which originated
from 1935. These ideas were picked up and followed through by Renthe-Fink’s successor Werner Best. The above themes partly answer research questions one and two, and are covered in sections 4.1 to 4.6. The exception is section 4.4, which deals with research question three: the reaction of the Danish government. That section will show that by late 1940 the Danish government would no longer raise concerns regarding Aryanization measures with German representative. Instead, the government would only attempt to diminish effects in single cases.

The preceding years had seen a great pressure being asserted on Danish-Jewish companies. This will be evident in the Aryanization cases of the steel company Sophus Berendsen (section 4.3) and the medical company Lundbeck (section 4.5.1). These will also focus on how the company owners were removed but continued to assert influence on their companies. In a couple of minor cases it will be specifically shown how the Danish domestic market was also affected by Aryanization.

This chapter will show the following stages of persecution can be identified. The informal measures against Jews in Denmark (stage one), registration (stage four), and exclusive measures against Danish-Jewish businesses who traded with Germany or sold German goods (stage five). The chapter will open by introducing two German reports on Danish Industry and Trade. They show that the goals to Aryanize several sectors in Denmark were a consequence of German domination and the continued registration of Jewish companies.

4.1 Aryanization Prospects in Danish Industry and Trade

Two reports from 1940 show how the information gathered by the RfA with the aid of the German legation and the GCC was put to use in order to locate, analyze and recommend the removal of Jews in selected Danish business sectors. The main purpose of these reports was to chart Danish business areas, but the following paragraphs will focus on the reports’ advice on Aryanization. The reports originated from the industrial and trade groups of the RWM, Reichsgruppe Industrie and Reichsgruppe Handel. As most other government entities these Reichsgruppen were affected by the belief in victory in the summer 1940, which lead to numerous ideas on how to restructure Europe including enforced Aryanization. Both Reports show overwhelmingly detailed information on the overall industries and were preoccupied with

---

disclosing the racial configuration of companies and industries. In addition, there are several concrete suggestions for further market gains to be made by removing Jews.

Under the heading "Entjudung der dänischen Wirtschaft", the report from the industrial group of the RWM, from August 1940, shows the intention to Aryanize the industrial sector in Denmark as well as the usage of the RfA’s registration efforts. The report mentions hundreds of companies and fourteen had been racially categorized as Jewish. The report recommended that German style Aryanization measures should be implemented immediately in the sectors of iron, steel and sheet metal, in spite of the Jewish influence being characterized as small. The first step to be taken was installing German trustees (Treuhänder), in Jewish firms in Denmark. Afterwards, negotiations for takeovers should be initiated, and German companies could be brought in as replacements in the long run. If objections occurred they would be dampened by excluding the companies from receiving “raw materials, machines and so on”. In this manner, a company would be forced to discontinue production. It was even estimated that Aryanization would not cause any loss of market shares for the companies in question.393

The report shows that Judenpolitik could be applied to gain market shares, and it seems to be an implicit understanding that Jews were to be removed. The suggestion to insert trustees does not seem to have been successful, but as the case of the steel company Sophus Berendsen will illustrate the company was none the less Aryanized. The Danish historian Joachim Lund has aptly characterized the overall report as a modest wish list of the German industrial areas, with the exception of the passages of Aryanization, which are labelled as “controversial” and immoderate.394

A similar report was published by the Reichsgruppe Handel in November 1940. The Danish trade sector was appraised in detail to identify possible areas for German companies to influence or take over in a postwar setting. In addition, it suggested how to proceed in Germanization and Aryanization. In the fall of 1940 it was not necessary to initiate an extensive replacement campaign for the benefit of German companies. Rather, Denmark should remain untouched during the war while preserving the most important industry: farming and livestock. The goal was to replace Danish companies with German ones after the war, though the report did suggest

394 Lund, Hitlers spisekammer, 60–62.
the removal of Jewish and “enemy” influences from Danish companies. The reasons were
described as political and economic, while employing arguments that accentuated, the highly
stereotypical, presumed negative effects of Jews in businesses. For example, it was argued that
the absence of Jewish influence in Danish trade had allegedly secured a stable market. This was
because (non-Jewish) market leaders had refrained from taking advantage of dominant
positions and thus avoided capital flight. The Jewish companies that existed would eventually be
minimized due to a decrease in living standards, the authors believed. At the same time the
report provided concrete suggestions on how to proceed in specific areas.  

Østasiatisk Kompagni, ØK, (East Asiatic Company) was rightly evaluated as one of the biggest
trading companies in Denmark. That is why its takeover was deemed immediately necessary.
The report contained suggestions for ØK’s Aryanization and take-over. ØK’s valuable assets
included trading companies, industrial plants, and an important shipyard. In addition, the
company owned plantations which were controlled through subsidiaries and
Interessengesellschaften (partnerships). The Germans were still examining the capital flows of
the company, but had traced connections to "English-Jewish high finance": Hambro’s Bank in
London. It was advised to strive for taking over the company by forcing Jewish and British
capital out of the company. However, it had to be pursued carefully in order to prevent the losing
the overseas positions in East Asia. Interestingly, the report also focused on maintaining the
company’s goodwill in East Asia and Africa. The suggested first step was to prevent the company
from selling its subsidiaries or overseas holdings. 

The report included a comprehensive analysis of Jewish influence in several other industries
in the Scandinavian market, but focused mainly on Denmark. The jewelry trade was surveyed as
consisting of 20-25 wholesale businesses in Scandinavia and a multitude of small retail stores.
There was a slight Jewish influence in wholesale, whereas retail was categorized as
overwhelmingly Jewish. It was reasoned that the Jews had secured the retail market as a result
of their “enormous capital power”. It was predicted that the removal of the Jews would secure
a satisfactory opportunity for German businesses to conquer the jewelry retail businesses in
Scandinavia.

396 ibid.
397 ibid.
Several other industries were noted for their Jewish presence. The import and distribution of coffee products was largely concentrated on Jewish hands. The most important and substantial company in this field in Denmark was De danske Cichoriefabriker A/S. The company produced coffee surrogate products, and the company value was calculated to 20 million DKK. (519 mill. /2017 DKK). The other companies owned by Cichoriefabriker A/S were C.F. Rich & Sønner, De danske Chicorietørrerier, and De Forenede Kaffesurrogat- & Cichoriefabrike". Other importers of coffee and coffee substitutes were labelled as influenced by Jewish capital. It was recommended that German companies would attempt to gain influence over these companies. Nine metal retailers were known and one was categorized as Jewish. In addition, the tobacco and fur industries counted twenty large companies including one Jewish company. In five companies, the racial composition had not yet been established. Six large department stores were under investigation in order to determine their racial status, as the report claimed they had a collected turnover of 100 million DKK – amounting to 2.5 billion DKK in 2017 prices. The production of porcelain was perceived as being under considerable Jewish influence.398

Clearly, the intentions to remove the Danish-Jews in specific companies and business sectors are present in these reports. Although the effects on most of the companies in these reports have not been investigated, they are telling in their intent to remove Jews. Moreover, they reflect several instrumental arguments as Jews, almost as a matter of fact, are to be removed in order to gain market shares and create opportunities for German companies. The reports also underline that the registration work of Jewish companies undertaken in Denmark was by no means innocent, but was used and applied in order to plan and attempt to remove Jews.

The registration and data collection of Jewish businesses in Denmark was not limited to larger companies and even included one-man businesses in Copenhagen. At least one of the invading German troop units carried with them a written order instructing them to avoid Jewish stores. The order also specified that they could not ask if a store was Jewish.399 Around the turn of the year 1940 the offices of Erich Lüdke, supreme commander of the German troops in Denmark (April 1940 - September 1942), had issued a list of small Jewish stores in Copenhagen. It seems this index specified, which businesses were to be avoided by German soldiers. The list includes businesses in the textile industry, such as tailors and other types of clothes-related businesses,

398 Ibid.
399 Henning Poulsen, Besættelsesårene 1940-1945 (Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2002), 130.
as well as food retail stores. The list comes across as incomplete, but there are 214 individual businesses and their owners on the list. Given that there were only about 7,000 Jews in Denmark, this list alone provides the names of 3.05 % of the Danish Jews. We are thus able to conclude that the registration process went beyond the categories of importers and exporters, but also included the smallest units of local Jewish businesses. At the same time it suggests that small Jewish stores were supposed to be boycotted by German soldiers.

4.2 The Correspondence Between Ernst Krüger and the RfA

The correspondence between the RfA and the German legation on the racial composition of Danish companies was maintained by Ernst Krüger. As pointed out in the introduction it consists of 10,000 letters from the period of 1940-1944. It seems this type of letters is not preserved from before January 1940 or was transmitted in another manner. However, some of letters sent after January 1940 refer to earlier letters on the same company going back to as early as 1937. It is worth noting this type of correspondence continued until May 1944 in Denmark. In order to gain an overview, I have examined 3,500 of the letters from the occupation period. They will serve as an analytical sample of the information exchange between the German Gesandtschaft in Copenhagen and the RfA.

Generally, they show a continuous correspondence on Danish companies of all sizes and places ranging from a clothes store in Lemvig to the filet factory in the city of Rønne on the Island of Bornholm. In the sample 150 different Danish cities have been identified, and most correspondence centers on the larger cities of Denmark. If Jews or Jewish capital was involved the correspondence would often be of a longer character. One example is the company Oversøisk Kurve- og Bambus Industri, which in January 1940 had been categorized as a “Diogenes” company meaning there were Jews in the leadership. This had been repeated in August, but in January 1941 the RfA inquired if the “Alcibiades Nathan” had been removed.

Most of the correspondence originating from the legation on non-Jewish companies appears as in the picture below. It employs the code language specifying the company as Leonidas/Juno

---

400 “Nichtarische Geschäfte des Kleinhandels Kopenhagen,” est. fall 1941, RA, Militärarchiv Freiburg, Danica, Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Dänemark.
401 See an example in “Deutsche Gesandtschaft an Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel,” February 12, 1941, BA, R9I, 1856.
403 “Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft,” January 31, 1941, BA, R9I, 1856 I have been unable to disclose if he was excluded or not.
– Leonidas meaning it has not been possible to confirm the racial composition, but it is not suspected of being non-Aryan. Juno meaning there are not political or security risks associated with trading with the company. In the example below the address is not provided, but most letters were supplied with an address.

![Image](image_url)

**Figure 4:** The source is BA, R9I, 1864. In the sample analyzed there are four company’s originating from Lemvig

Based on this sample, as well as Renthe-Fink’s status reports (in section 4.6) it seems most Danish companies trading with Germany were categorized according to the Nuremberg race laws.

### 4.3 Aryanizing Sophus Berendsen A/S 1938-1941

The Aryanization of Sophus Berendsen is a revealing case as it shows the actions and reactions of perpetrators, bystanders and victims. It involves German actors and organizations from both Berlin and Copenhagen, while underscoring the rather passive bystander role of the Danish government. Tellingly, it is also an example of how one company reacted when being targeted for Aryanization. In the period at hand, Sophus Berendsen was among the largest steel
companies in Denmark and was headed by its owner, Ludvig Elsass. The German Aryanization policies had affected the company as early as 1938 and along with other companies Elsass contacted the Danish Foreign Ministry to raise their concerns over termination of contracts as well as the lay-offs of Jewish agents for German firms. In November 1938 Elsass had an exchange of opinion with Nils Svenningsen. Svenningsen pointed out the Danish Government could not assist in matters which existed between two companies as the German dictatorship was not involved. This was similar to the arguments Alex Walter had used. (See chapter three).

Elsass had quite the opposite experience. He had personally dealt with several German companies. The persistent and continuous pressure from German authorities was the reason behind the termination of contracts. Elsass’ experience was that German companies were fighting to maintain their old and better qualified representatives. Elsass thus challenged the official explanations and argued that the matter had to be raised in meetings between the dictatorship and Denmark. As we know this was to no avail. (See chapter three).

The occupation enforced the Aryanization attempts against the company. The Danish government appears to not have been involved in the negotiations between Sophus Berendsen and Germany companies as things progressed negatively. The German company Differdingen Stahlwerke A.G. was represented in Denmark, Norway and Sweden by Sophus Berendsen A/S. Differdingen was about to enter yet another contract with Berendsen in May 1941. Clearly, Differdingen was not in compliance with the guidelines from the RfA. This resulted in a visit from Stahlunion-Export GmbH’s executive Adolph Schmitt to the German legation in Denmark, and this changed the course of events.

With the cooperation of the NSDAP-AO, Differdingen was persuaded to change their representative. Instead, the Danish steel company Lemvigh-Müller A/S became their new representative.

In the fall of 1941, Sophus Berendsen A/S was Aryanized. Elsass, the steel company’s CEO, was forced out, and the Supervisory Board was purged of its Jewish director C.B. Henriques, lawyer to the Supreme Court and director of the Danish-Jewish Congregation. The reason was not made public, but major Danish newspapers reported the change. It only took little insight to

---

404 Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 85–86.
406 Ibid.
408 “Vertreter der Differdinger Stahlwerke A.-G.,” May 2, 1941, BA, R91, 3169.
know that both Elsass and Henriques were Jews.409 According to Elsass’ own account of the events, he was forced out by the Germans and had to sell his stock, his house and summerhouse on a pro forma basis.410 Elsass instead had an office at an insurance company with a direct line to his former company. He directed his former company from that office until October 1943, when he fled to Sweden as the German’s attempted to arrest and deport the Jews. Only in November 1945 could he formally re-enter the company, along with his son Adam Elsass.411

The case shows that a constant pressure was being applied on the company and there seems to have been a direct German involvement in restructuring the company along racial lines. In essence, the identification of the company as Jewish led to its Aryanization in the duration of three years. Impressively, Elsass appears to have maintained some control despite having lost all formal involvement in the company. We can only guess as to why the process of regaining formal control of the company seems a prolonged affair. In this case the government reacted passively in the prewar years, and possibly attempting to not to provoke Germany, while almost quietly accepting these policies in spite of the hardships the Danish-Jewish business minority experienced. (See chapter 3). I recognize the difficulties of the government to interfere directly in such cases during the war years, but as I will show below this was not a coincidence as the government largely forfeited to involve themselves in this area by late 1940.

4.4 The Danish Government and Aryanization

As we recall, the RfA sent out new demands in October 1940 to make sure importers and exporters as well as recipients of German goods were not Jewish. These demands quickly affected Danish trade. In late 1940 the Danish Association of Merchants sent several examples of letters from German companies, which seems to be directly related to the new guidelines of the RfA. In these letters, Danish companies were asked to stop visiting and selling to Jewish companies. The letters also asked companies to prove the recipients of German goods were

409 “Ny direktion og bestyrelse i Sophus Berendsen A/S,” Nationaltidende, September 16, 1941; “Ændringer i ledelsen af akts. Sophus Berendsen,” Politiken, September 16, 1941; “Den nye ledelse i aktieselskabet Sophus Berendsen,” Politiken, September 17, 1941 A third person, Director V. Hassing also left the board, but I have unable to disclose who that is.
411 Based on “Ludvig Elsass levnedsbeskrivelse til ordenskapitlet,” 1956, Kindly provided by his grandchild Nick Elsass; “Sophus Berendsens øverste ledelse,” Berlingske, November 6, 1945.
Aryan. In addition, a number of German companies requested lists of known Jewish companies.\textsuperscript{412} This knowledge prompted a discussion in the Danish Foreign Ministry which included Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius, and the decision was the following:

“It is hardly useful to raise these issues as regular cases...we have to wait until single cases arise, which we might smooth out confidentially”.\textsuperscript{413}

This meant that the attempt to defend Danish-Jewish business life had largely been forfeited by the Danish government. As bystanders with the ability to at least raise concerns on behalf of the Danish-Jewish business life they generally choose to remain silent. This opened for further Aryanization measures being pursued without being challenged by the Danish government. It would appear as if Judenpolitik in the area of Aryanization had few limits for prevailing in Denmark.

4.5 Continued Aryanization

The Aryanization attempts of the RfA directly interfered with the Danish domestic market and in troublesome cases the RfA had a decisive role on how to proceed. In the following paragraphs I will examine a few cases that show how the RfA, Prüfungsstellen, the German legation, and Danish companies were involved in Aryanization of the Danish domestic market, which depended on German imports. One such case is between the Bavarian company A.G. für Bleicherei, Färberei, Apparatur und Druckerei Augsburg and their Danish representative company Boas & Gautier. The Danes were ordered to cease entering into contracts with Jews and terminate existing contracts with Jewish companies. This order would affect the Danish-Jewish firm Engelhardt & Lohse in Copenhagen. However, the German legation in Denmark warned that a breach of contract would lead to recourse claims, as it violated Danish law. In the case at hand, the arguments of the legation were accepted, but the RfA and the Prüfungsstelle Textilindustrie disallowed future contracts with Jews.\textsuperscript{414} This meant that upon renewal of the contract Engelhardt & Lohse would be excluded. In this way, Danish laws regarding contract

\textsuperscript{412} “Grosserer-societetet til Udenrigsministeriet,” December 13, 1940, RA, UM 140.N.33b.

\textsuperscript{413} Ibid. Handwritten by Scavenius on the letter from the Merchant’s Association “Det kan næppe nytte, at ville rejse disse spørgsmål som en alm. sag...vi må vente til der opstår enkeltager vi evt. kan glatte ud underhånden.”

\textsuperscript{414} “Correspondence RFA, P.st. Textil, Außenhandelsstelle Südbayern,” June 1941, BA, R9I, 616.
breaches were accepted, but mainly because of the possible economic losses. The main component of the order remained in place. In the long run Engelhardt & Lohse, would be excluded from buying goods imported from Germany even though this interfered directly with the Danish domestic market.

A different approach came from a German cosmetics company.\textsuperscript{415} It demanded of their representative, the Danish company Georg Tranberg, Copenhagen, to sign a declaration stating it would not sell goods from the Germany company to Jewish customers. The responsibility for securing that German goods did not reach Jewish customers was thus placed with Georg Tranberg. The RfA and the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemische Industrie became involved, as the Danish company was a member of the GCC. In this industry, it was not a general rule to discontinue delivering to Jewish companies. However, German companies could of their own accord demand that their goods would not be supplied to Jewish companies.\textsuperscript{416} This shows how there were various policies at play, but the overall tendency was clear: even the Danish domestic market was to be conformed along racial lines if goods were imported from Germany. Danish companies thus became involved in the Aryanization process although the scope of their involvement needs further examination.

One case illustrates a direct and international involvement in the exclusion of the Swedish-Jewish company A. B. Varukontor. It was a combined effort by the Danish company Duelund Nielsen, the German company Röhm & Haas G.m.b.H and the RfA. The flow of goods was as follows: Röhm & Haas supplied the raw materials for Duelund Nielsen’s production of plexiglass for watches. The finished product was exported to the Swedish-Jewish company A. B. Varukontor in Stockholm. The company held the exclusive import rights from the products of Duelund Nielsen - even from wholesalers.\textsuperscript{417}

A rather creative idea was used in order to bypass and exclude the Swedish company while avoiding legal complications. The German and Danish companies were assisted in their endeavor by the Außenhandelsstelle für das Rhein-Maingebiet. The plan was for Röhm & Haas to redirect their raw materials to a larger wholesale company in Denmark who would hire Duelund Nielsen as producer of watch glasses. Yet, the contract would specify that the raw materials would only

\textsuperscript{415} The name is not disclosed.
\textsuperscript{416} “Correspondence GCC, RFA, Wirtschaftsgruppe Chem. Ind. Oct-Nov.,” 1941, BA, R91, 617.
\textsuperscript{417} “Lieferung von Plexiglas nach Dänemark,” March 1942, BA, R91, 608.
be provided if the wholesaler took over the export rights of Duelund Nielsen’s products to Sweden. The RfA agreed to the plan in March 1942.418

The plan was not bullet proof as Duelund Nielsen risked losing its exports to Sweden. Yet, it would be a convincing counter-argument to underline the fact that the company’s production would come to a standstill without the needed raw materials. From a German perspective the Swedish-Jewish company would be excluded from receiving products made from German raw materials. The maneuver had the potential to open the Swedish market for Duelund Nielsen’s products, while Röhm & Haas G.m.b.H avoided indirectly supplying a Jewish company with German goods. The example illustrates how Danish exports to countries within the German sphere of influence were subject to, or involved in, measures to exclude Jews in other countries. There are probably similar cases, but is seems more likely such matters would be settled without involving the RfA.

4.5.1 Aryanizing Lundbeck

The Aryanization of today’s medical giant Lundbeck reveals how companies attempted to avoid the demands of the RfA. In addition, it underscores how information on race travelled through an elaborate and international information network. Lundbeck had humble beginnings, but the partnership between the founder Hans Lundbeck and Eduard Goldschmidt drove the company in the direction of the chemical and medical industry. Born in Czechoslovakia, the Jewish Goldschmidt had been living most of his life in Hamburg. At age 23 he joined Hans Lundbeck in Denmark and their co-operation was sealed with a partnership in 1924. Goldschmidt’s German connections secured Lundbeck sole production and sales of substances like painkillers in Denmark. After his long period in Denmark, Goldschmidt became a Danish citizen in mid-March 1939.419

Only a few months later, the RfA sent out a warning. Lundbeck & Co. was suspected of having camouflaged its Jewish ownership by constructing a new company named Hans Lundbeck. In January 1940, Goldschmidt left the company Hans Lundbeck. This resolved the matter from the perspective of the RfA and the company was now considered Aryanized. As a consequence of this change, Germany companies were advised to transfer their business from Lundbeck & Co.

418 Ibid.
to Hans Lundbeck. In the spring of 1940 the RfA had definite proof that Goldschmidt was Jewish, because his birth certificate had been recovered from the Jewish congregation in Prague.\(^{420}\) Information on Jews was thus assembled from a variety of sources and applied locally as well as internationally. This could indicate that there was a central organization in charge of maintaining a registry over Jews from Europe as a whole - perhaps even in countries outside of Europe as well. The RfA certainly did so in regards to businesses, but other organizations involved could be the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, which headed the persecution and murder of the European Jews.

Goldschmidt formally removed himself from Lundbeck & Co in late 1940, but informally continued to work for the company. His decision probably Aryanized the company, and saved it from closing as it was highly dependent on trade with Germany. Lundbeck produced a new medical product in 1941 that cured some, but not all, bacterial infections. The production of the medicine relied heavily on raw materials from Germany. In 1942 a patent dispute evolved between German companies and Lundbeck. This led to negotiations with German representatives from several medical industrial companies, as well as Lundbeck & Co. It was attempted to solve the patent issue in Malmö, Sweden, as Goldschmidt met with representatives from the German company in question. Hans Lundbeck was bedridden in Denmark, and the patent issue could not be formally solved because Goldschmidt was Jewish. However, the agreement was formally sealed after the war. It is surprising that Goldschmidt participated in these meetings showing his informal role was strong, and that it was respected by his German counterparts. Goldschmidt fled with his wife to Sweden in October 1943, but he remained continuously informed about company matters. He even maintained an active role in the company despite his exile, and after the war he reentered the company without difficulties.\(^{421}\)

The Lundbeck case shows that companies would go to some lengths in order to maintain key business interests. This is seen in many other countries as well, but in Denmark it probably worked more smoothly, as formal laws against the Jews were not introduced. The overwhelming majority of the Jews later successfully fled to Sweden. This allowed for, in this case, continuous contact between key persons and the company. The German companies’ willingness to solve

---

\(^{420}\) “Lundbeck & Co,” May 30, 1940, BA, R901, 67777.

\(^{421}\) “‘Alcibiades’ Firmen,” September 15, 1939, BA, R91, 623; Jacobsen, Lundbeck, 32, 38–42, 46.
patent disputes despite Goldschmidt being Jewish appears extraordinary compared to the other cases presented in this dissertation. We should note that the second meeting took place in neutral Sweden and not in Denmark, indicating that a meeting in Denmark was deemed too difficult or dangerous. It remains unknown how the Danish government reacted in this case or if it became involved at all. There were probably many business relationships which were solved, one way or the other, without the involvement of government organizations.

4.6 Aryanization in Denmark 1942-September 1943.

In January 1942, Renthe-Fink could conclude that Aryanization measures in Denmark had resulted in the Entjudung of representatives, and that Danish-Jewish firms who imported from Germany were being “eliminated”. Renthe-Fink wrote so in an introductory letter to a large report on the composition of the Jews in Denmark. In the letter, which will be analyzed in greater detail in chapter seven, he described the German Judenpolitik in Denmark in general. He also presented the following status of Aryanization in Denmark:

“Not mentioned is the purification process that the legation has done in association with the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel for years. The Jewish representatives for German firms have been removed if we with certainty have been able to determine their Jewish characteristic.”

The Aryanization process to exclude Jewish representatives had begun in 1937. Five years later it was estimated as almost complete in Denmark. Cleary, the legation had played their important part in the Aryanization process in Denmark. As we saw, this corresponds to the first goal of the RfA: to remove Jewish representatives. The second was to exclude Jewish companies from the German-Foreign trade. Renthe-Fink reviewed this process as being well under way considering that several of the Prüfungsstellen were prohibiting the delivery of German goods to Jewish firms. Renthe-Fink argued that, as Germany was practically the only import option for Denmark, “a strong elimination process of Jewry in these firms has begun”. However, the

422 In the report on the composition of the Jews please see chapter seven.
424 “...hat ein starker Ausscheidungsprozeß des Judentums aus diesen Firmen eingesetzt.” Ibid.
many intermarriages of Jews and the Danish upper-class slowed down the progress as this complicated identifying who were Jewish.

It seems to be the case that most Danish-Jewish companies who were dependent on imports from Germany had been Aryanized by the summer of 1942. The cases of four textile companies that were being denied raw materials from German companies will illustrate this.425 Silkeborg Tekstilfabrik was regarded as particularly important by the Danish authorities as it was to produce roughly half of Denmark’s standard underwear in 1942. In December 1941 the company had received letters from German exporters blatantly stating they could not deliver goods to a company with two “non-Aryan” board-members.426 Krüger regarded it as highly unlikely that Silkeborg Tekstilfabrik would receive goods from Germany, because it was “not pure Aryan”.427

The discussions on imports to the four companies were handled by the Danish-German trade committee, and Alex Walter was almost clinical in his response. Two companies, including Silkeborg Tekstilfabrik were producing standard goods, and if the Jewish board members were not removed the companies could expect deliveries to be discontinued by June 1942. Dansk Kunstsilke Industri and Dansk Garn Industri had already received goods under the condition that the Jewish board members were removed. In order to receive raw materials from Germany again they had to be replaced. In addition, Jewish stock-owners were to be removed. Walter confidentially let on he would attempt to exempt Danish-Jewish companies who were approved for imports by the Danish currency office. The Danish Government wanted to know if the two companies should postpone replacing the Jews and the Jewish capital. Walter’s reply was “I recommend that the companies...are purified as suggested by the German side”.428 There was not any hope for the other two companies either. This was in spite of Danish attempts to repeatedly raise the case with Walter and in late April the companies were informed by German authorities that deliveries for the second quarter would be otherwise disposed of. The board member in question left his position and stated that “the problem is solved.”429

It seems highly likely that the number of Danish-Jewish companies dependent on German imports was dwindling fast as even the company designated to produce half the country’s

425 The four companies were Silkeborg Tekstilfabrik, Henriques & Løvengreen, Dansk Kunstsilke Industri, Dansk Garn Industri.
427 “Note fra møde med Krüger,” December 30, 1941, RA, UM 140.N.33b1 “...ikke er rent arisk.”.
428 “Note fra mødet med Alex Walter,” December 5, 1942, RA, UM 140.N.33b1 “Jeg henstiller, at firmaerne...rensbes på den fra tysk side foreslåede måde.”
429 “Silkeborg Tekstilfabrik til Udenrigsministeriet,” May 6, 1942, RA, UM 140.N.33b1 “...problemet er ude af verden.”
underwear was Aryanized. The German representatives Krüger and Walter were not in doubt: Aryanization would be the end result. This is a further indication that the Aryanization policies of the RfA were pursued in Denmark with the assistance and knowledge of representatives from the legation. The case never went to higher levels of the Danish government, but was handled by high-ranking civil servants. The attempts to save the Danish-Jewish board members and stock owners was practically non-existent. The strategy seems to have been to protract time before Aryanization became inevitable if the company was to survive. The arguments from 1938, that the division between Aryan and Jewish in Denmark did not exist, were nowhere to be found in 1942. Tellingly, the last piece of archival material from the foreign ministry’s main case on the issue of Aryanization is from May 1942.

In September 1942 Renthe-Fink concluded that the last Jewish agents and representatives had been removed. In addition, Jewish importers in Denmark had been ausgesmerzt (eradicated). The first goals of the RfA had been completed in Denmark and most Danish-Jewish companies were now considered Aryanized. There were still Danish-Jewish companies left who depended on Germany in some way: those who produced for the German war industry and those who were not directly dependent on German imports. Renthe-Fink was ready to move against the latter group and wanted to expand Aryanization further by proposing the following policy:

“...the question remains, if the elimination or at least the limitation of the Jewish influence in Danish businesses that are not directly dependent on German imports are to be attacked. An effective means of pressure would be to introduce terms for the delivery of fuels from Germany...”430

Renthe-Fink’s analysis of the import structure for fuels revealed that it was controlled by only eight Danish companies. He suggested to change the terms of delivery in such a manner that German coal would only reach Aryan companies. Fuel deliveries were controlled by the Danish government, but Renthe-Fink creatively suggested to bypass these control points. He highlighted that such measures were not to be formally approved by the Danes and could easily be enforced.

430 “Entsteht die Frage, ob nicht die Ausschaltung oder wenigstens Einschränkung des noch bestehenden jüdischen Einflusses in solchen dänisches Gewerbetrieben in Angriff angenommen werden soll, die nicht unmittelbar als Importeure von Deutschland abhängig sind. Als wirksames Druckmittel kämen Bedingungen in Frage, die an die Lieferung von Brennstoffen aus Deutschland geknüpft werden können.” "44. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt," September 15, 1942, DK MAG.
Renthe-Fink believed similar measures had been applied in Hungary, thus displaying a knowledge of anti-Jewish policies elsewhere.431

He further wanted to expand the Judenpolitik in Denmark by informally applying the third addition to the Nuremberg laws of 1935. The third addition came in 1938 and defined Jewish companies. He wanted to apply the legal term “analogy”. This is used to assign a legal consequence if a law does not exist, by using an existing law as inspiration.432 In this way Renthe-Fink tied it directly to the anti-Jewish laws in Germany. It is worth noting the law of 1938 also includes the definition of Jews according to the Nuremberg race laws of 1935.433 One could argue it had the potential to de-facto introduce the Nuremberg race laws in Denmark as well as the third addition from 1938. Werner Best followed through on this suggestion in January 1943. (See below).

The law of 1938 also stipulated a registration of Jewish companies. Renthe-Fink expected it would be difficult, but by no means impossible to compose a list of Danish-Jewish companies. Essentially, a lot of the mapping had already been done in the legation’s work for the Rfa. The largest Danish-Jewish companies were breweries and banks, which should be targeted first. Renthe-Fink expected the Jews to attempt to rally the population against the Germans. Renthe-Fink also believed the Danish government would view such a policy as an attack on Danish independence. Despite these concerns, Renthe-Fink recommended proceeding, but with some flexibility. The German war economy was not to suffer from these measures, and this was similar to Rfa’s overall guidelines. An extended deadline was to be given to make room for Danish firms to begin a Freiwilligen (voluntary) exclusion of Jewish influence.434 This was an elaborate proposal, which was approved by Berlin in October with the promise of further guidelines being provided soon.435 Unfortunately, these guidelines are missing. It seems the so-called Telegram Crisis (see chapter eight) stopped further development of Renthe-Fink’s proposal, but his replacement, Werner Best, followed up on the matter in January 1943.

431 Ibid.
432 Renthe-Fink uses “analoger Anwendung”. Analogie describes a method of assigning a legal consequence to situations the law remains silent on. One speaks of a law or regulation gap. If an offense is not regulated, a similar, analogous regulation can be used. For a more judicially founded discussion please see Nigel G. Foster and Satish Sule, German Legal System & Laws, 4th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 73–75.
433 Reichsgesetzblatt 1938 I, Schönfelder, Deutsche Reichsgesetze (Beck, 1944), 627.
434 “44. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt.”
435 “50. Martin Luther an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft Kopenhagen,” October 8, 1942, DK MAG.
Werner Best took over from Renthe-Fink in November 1942 (see chapter eight). Best wrote two large reports on the Jews in Denmark in January 1943 and April 1943, which are elaborated on in chapter eight. These reports also contained the subject of Aryanization. Best had been in Berlin in early January 1943 receiving new orders on Aryanization measures in Denmark. The orders to Rüstungsstab Dänemark were to cut off Jewish industrial firms in Denmark from the production chain. Rüstungsstab Dänemark had already reduced the number of Danish-Jewish companies on contract from 12 to six since September 1942. This process could have been the work of the RfA or it could have resulted from Renthe-Fink’s proposal from September to cut off German supplies to Danish-Jewish firms. The remaining six firms were to be excluded from future contracts, but only if this would not have a damaging effect on production related to the war effort. Danish-Jewish firms who were on contract Rüstungsstab were now to be evaluated for exclusion. In addition, they were to be informed that they would not be eligible for additional contracts: “Because of new orders from the Reich, Jewish firms were not to be engaged.”

Standard Elektric was considered Jewish, but it was agreed that its Jewish manager Gunnar Meyer-Gelberg would be allowed to remain in the company until an agreement between the Danish branch and European Standard Elektric was finalized. Yet, he apparently stayed on until 1946. Best agreed to let Meyer-Gelberg stay in the company due to its importance for the war economy, which trumped Aryanization measures. However, Best did stress that Jewish influence was to be excluded if at all possible. The case illustrates the level of political acceptance needed for a Jewish company to maintain a trade relation with Germany at this point. However, it also raises the question of how many Danish-Jewish industries had been working for the German war effort in order to remain in business.

The January orders also contained the application of the third addition of the Nuremberg laws to Denmark. Danish-Jewish firms were from now on to be categorized and registered according to these as suggested by Renthe-Fink in September 1942. As we know, this had been done since 1938 by the RfA, but this order was directly aimed at Denmark. In Best’s second report on the Jewish question in April 1943 Best estimated that there were 345 independent Jewish firms left in the Danish economy. The overwhelming majority were the 313 wholesale dealers, whose

---

influence had diminished significantly. There were twenty-two factory owners and only four companies engaged in the stock exchange, while six were in banking. Such a detailed report indicates that a full overview of the Danish-Jewish companies now existed. Best estimated the economy as being almost uninfluenced by Jews. Since his meeting with *Rüstungsstab Dänemark* in January, three of the six Jewish companies had been excluded. One company had been Aryanized by changing the composition of its supervisory board, while the contracts of two companies had not been renewed. Best could conclude that out of 700 Danish companies producing for the German war effort, only three were Jewish.439

### 4.7 Chapter Conclusion

In September, 1942 Renthe-Fink reported that the Aryanization process regarding Danish-Jewish representatives and import companies was complete. This answers the last part of research question one as we are able conclude that the policies set in motion by the RfA in 1937, with few exceptions, appear to have been successfully implemented in Danish-German trade relations. Yet, it should be underscored that some cases reveal that Danish-Jewish business owners maintained some control of their companies. It should also be noted that Jewish companies still existed before events in October 1943. However, despite the lack of official laws against the Jews in Denmark the companies targeted for Aryanization, and the individuals associated with these, were formally removed from being business owners, CEOs, board members or owners of more than 25% of the stocks in companies. These findings indicate that Aryanization was probably the most successful part of the *Judenpolitik* pursued in Denmark. Further, they challenge our understanding of the Jews in Denmark as being largely untouched by the German occupation.

The results on Aryanization was due to the efforts of the RfA, the local involvement of the German legation, and to some extent German companies. We can conclude on research question two that the German legation’s role for these policies to succeed appear fundamental through providing local racial investigations. Renthe-Fink actively assisted in the suggestion for further measures of Aryanization by attempting to prevent fuel supplies from reaching Jewish companies, as well as to propose to use the definition Jewish companies as it was formulated in the Nuremberg laws. Renthe-Fink would do so by applying the legal term “analogy”, which in

---

the absence of one law uses an existing law as inspiration. His successor Werner Best would implement this in January 1943, and at the same time limit the Jewish companies producing for the German war effort. It could be discussed whether this could be labelled as a formal law against the Jews in Denmark. It was probably perceived as such by the Germans, but it appears never to have been announced or otherwise publicized.

In answering research question three, the Danish government’s response appears meagre, and largely failed to protect several civil rights of the Jewish minority such as trade rights, and formal ownership rights in companies. As a bystander the government in this area appears to have remained largely passive.

We lack an in-depth perspective from the victims’ point of view on the possible personal and financial consequences of the Aryanization policies. Questions such as how being removed from a company affected their identities as members of the business community, and being part of Danish society at large? How many were informally deprived of company ownership and how many were forced to sell their stocks? And what personal and financial consequences did this result in? These unanswered questions, combined with the removal of Jews from companies, and the few known forced stock sales (James Polack (chapter three), Dansk kunstsilke industri, and Silkeborg tekstil fabrik in this chapter) do raise an interesting issue of the removal of wealth from Jews, which is directly tied to the Aryanization process in Denmark.

Lastly, the use of Danish-Jewish companies in the German war effort is an area that could deserve a comprehensive analysis in order to locate the scope and reasons behind this. Possibly, the answer might be that the survival of the business was deemed most important given the circumstances. However, several moral questions will probably surface if this is investigated.

In regards to the stages of persecution we find that Aryanization measures in Denmark continued to be applied informally through an extremely high degree of structure and organization (stage one). The introduction of the formal application of the Nuremberg Laws in defining Jewish companies at least raises the discussion if this is to be regarded as part of stage two – Formal laws. However, they were never publicized or, as far as we know, passed on to the Danes. From a German perspective these were applied. They were used to Aryanize and exclude Danish-Jewish companies producing for the German war effort (stage five).

Clearly, the definition of Jews was informally applied (stage three). Again, we can locate the stages of identification, registration, and exclusion (stages four and five). The exclusive measures
within Aryanization (stage five) targeted Jewish representatives and Danish-Jewish import 
companies. Aryanization understood as the exclusion of Jews from the economy appears 
complete for these two groups. Lastly, the chapter opens up for the possibility of the presence 
of stage six as forced stock sales appear to have occurred, but as the sales are not disclosed we 
cannot decisively conclude that stage six was present.

5 Mapping and Registering the Jews in Denmark 1937-1943

In the previous chapters we have touched on how registration of Jewish companies took 
place, and that this knowledge was applied in order to exclude Jews from the trade relations 
between Denmark and Germany. The registration of Jews is thus a fundamental prerequisite for 
any anti-Jewish measure. This chapter follows the registration process of Jewish individuals in 
Denmark by exploring the cooperation between Danish and German police. In doing so the 
chapter partly answers research questions two and three on the theme of registration. Sections 
5.1 and 5.2 provides an overview of Danish-German police cooperation in the period from 1933 
to 1945. It also focuses on the presence of key Gestapo members who were responsible for 
registering Jews in Denmark.

The last third of the chapter, sections 5.3 to 5.5, shows how the registries of Danish Jews were 
created. It partly builds on previous research which has concluded that a registry of at least 2,000 
entries had been created since the middle of 1941. It has been strongly suggested that the 
Gestapo possessed other sources of information, and not only relied on stealing the membership 
protocols from the Jewish congregation to draft the lists of arrests used in October 1943.440 
Postwar court case material will be used to further expand our knowledge on these registries. 
This will allow us to conclude that an extensive registration process was being undertaken by 
German police from early on. In addition, new sources will be presented revealing that Danish 
police assisted in investigating the racial background of refugees as well as an unknown number 
of Danish citizens.

5.1 Danish-German Police cooperation

As early as May 1933 the German legation in Copenhagen was instructed to begin registration 
of refugees, including Jews, who had emigrated to Denmark. The order originated from the

440 Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 471–72.
Geheime Staatspolizeiamt, later called the Gestapo, and the legation from then on performed registration and surveillance tasks for one of the dictatorship’s most oppressive organizations. These tasks were to be carried out for the sake of state security as all refugees were presumed enemies of Germany. Communists, pacifists, Social Democrats and Jewish intelligentsia had to be registered, even if they were not engaged in political activities. The Gestapo intended to create a registry of all these groups, including information on their whereabouts, travels and networks. The AA charged all diplomatic entities to adhere to the demands of the Gestapo. As a result, all German emigrants in Denmark and elsewhere were to be registered by the German diplomatic corps.\textsuperscript{441} In this manner the AA supported the persecution of political and racial enemies outside of Germany. At the same time the Gestapo would form partnerships with the Danish police and share information on refugees as well as communists.

5.1.1 Prewar Police Cooperation

The prewar cooperation between German and Danish police focused on communists and refugees including Jews. Three branches of Danish police were working on foreigners and radical political groups. These branches were organizationally placed under the Criminal Police in Copenhagen. The first branch was the Section on Foreigners and Visas, formed in 1919.\textsuperscript{442} The second branch, Section D, had been established in 1931 and functioned as the national information hub on security matters related to politically radical individuals and organizations.\textsuperscript{443} The third branch was the Security Police, founded in 1939 under the Federal Police to control and combat the illegal work of radical political parties and groups.\textsuperscript{444}

Gestapo’s registration of Jews, and communists was revealed through a publicly debated asylum case from 1938 which exposed Danish police suffered from security breaches as well as infiltration. In the high-profile libel case between the Minister of Justice, Karl Kristian Steincke and Frits Clausen, leader of the DNSAP, stolen material from the police’s refugee files was presented as evidence. This resulted in house searches and internal investigations of the police. These showed police section D’s specialist on Nazism, Kaj Yttesen, had been a double-agent and

\textsuperscript{441} “Ref. D. 1173, Emigrantenerfassung,” May 22, 1933, PA, Kopenhagen 76.
\textsuperscript{442} Rünitz, Af hensyn til konsekvenserne: Danmark og flygtningespørgsmålet 1933-1940, 28–29.
\textsuperscript{444} Ibid., 117, 122–23.
it was estimated he had been working 51% for Germany and 49% for Denmark. More than 1,000 pieces of information, primarily on German immigrants and Jews, had reached the hands of the Gestapo.\textsuperscript{445} The consequences for Yttesen were minor as he was demoted to regular police, but it forced retirement upon Yttesen’s superior Andreas Hansen. The investigation into Andreas Hansen showed that in 1934 he had covered-up police informant and Nazi member, Carlis Hansen’s abduction of a German communist in Denmark.\textsuperscript{446} Another consequence of these investigations was the imprisonment of Fremmedpolitiet’s police officer Max Pelving who was exposed as an informant.\textsuperscript{447} It has been emphasized that the police leadership appears oblivious to the possible consequences these leaks and infiltrations could have for refugees.\textsuperscript{448} The Gestapo possessed detailed knowledge of these individuals including addresses and political opinions. This allowed for a close monitoring of communists and several emigrant organizations.\textsuperscript{449}

It has recently been documented that this information exchange also existed on a higher and more formalized level. The Gestapo and Danish police both regarded the communists as dangerous enemies and this resulted in the formation of cooperative information networks before the war. It has lately been argued that the twenty German police officers who came to Denmark on April 9\textsuperscript{th} 1940 were in fact well-known peers.\textsuperscript{450} The formal and detailed information exchanges between the two police forces began in 1935 and continued into the occupation period.\textsuperscript{451} The Rigspolitichef, National Police Commissioner, and later Minister of Justice, Thune Jacobsen, had excellent connections with German and Austrian police. In 1939, Jacobsen informed the German Gesandtschaft that he had increased surveillance of immigrants and asked for assistance against the communists.\textsuperscript{452} The prewar connections laid a solid foundation for the cooperation of the German and Danish police during the occupation.

### 5.1.2 Police Cooperation During the Occupation

\textsuperscript{445} Rünitz, \textit{Af hensyn til konsekvenserne: Danmark og flygtningespørgsmålet 1933-1940}, 224.
\textsuperscript{447} Rünitz, \textit{Af hensyn til konsekvenserne: Danmark og flygtningespørgsmålet 1933-1940}, 225–30.
\textsuperscript{449} Illustrative is also the case against the German Marine Officer Horst von Pflugk-Harttung. It was revealed he had 14 informers seven of these were Danish and nine were German. They had mostly supplied information on military matters and Danish infrastructure. As many as 30 spies working for Germany were arrested from September 1939 to April 1940 Stevnsborg, \textit{Politiet 1938-1947. Bekæmpelsen af spionage, sabotage og nedbrydende virksomhed.}, 181–88.
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid., 15, 19.
\textsuperscript{452} Kirchhoff and Rünitz, \textit{Udsendt til Tyskland}, 60–61.
The police cooperation during the occupation was formalized on the 14th of April 1940, but for several days the German military security police, the Abwehr, and the Geheime Feldpolizei used the information obtained in the prewar years to make a series of arrests. These included several Danes, even a member of Danish Parliament, German immigrants, British and French nationals, maybe even Polish citizens. However, most were later released due to the Danish-German agreement on police jurisdiction. The Gestapo and SD were not established as official organizations until August 1943. The German occupation plans specified the idea that law and order was to remain with the Danish police and courts. This proposal was accepted by the government. The Danish police took over investigations, interrogations and arrests. The Danish government used the agreement to prevent the introduction of martial law and until August 1943 largely succeeded in securing that most Danes were judged according to Danish laws. More importantly, the death sentence was avoided until August 1943.\textsuperscript{453}

The overall responsibility for the success of this arrangement resided with the Danish Minister of Justice. The first, Svend Unmack Larsen, had been minister since September 1939, but proved too tempered for the delicate negotiations with Germany and was replaced by Harald Petersen in July 1940. Petersen had been a State Prosecutor in Copenhagen since 1932, and he was considered a tough negotiator. This apparently, resulted in his removal in June 1941 when Thune Jacobsen replaced him as one of the non-affiliated ministers. Jacobsen was an ambitious police lawyer who is remembered as the creator of the modern Danish police. He had an international outlook which was mostly directed towards Germany and he was the first Rigspolitichef (National Commissioner of the Danish Police). Jacobsen is somewhat of a puzzle. Despite his major and important political position, as well as being the head of a police force responsible for hunting communists and resistance fighters, we lack a contemporary analysis of him and his deeds during the war. He was unpopular during the war and highly criticized after the liberation.\textsuperscript{454}

Most of the cooperation regarding police matters was handled in meetings between Thune Jacobsen and Paul Kanstein who were personal friends even using the informal “du” to one


another. Kanstein’s career track is quite remarkable. He was educated as a lawyer and began a successful career in the Gestapo in 1934 reaching the position of police Vice President in Berlin before being ordered to Denmark. From April 1940 until October 1943 Kanstein managed the German Legation’s section for inner affairs being responsible for the security of the German troops and the police department. He was a member of the SS reaching the rank of SS-Brigadeführer in 1942 and left Denmark in October 1943. Recent research has revealed him as extremely tactical while being in line with the party policies e.g. against the Jews. His cooperative partners in the Danish government held him in high esteem. They gave him positive letters of confidence during his postwar trials and denazification hearings which helped secure him a life in peace from 1948.455

On a more practical level the Statsadvokaten for Særlige Anliggender (State Prosecutor for Special Affairs, SPSA), was set up to handle police matters between Denmark and Germany. The office was to collaborate with the German military security police in matters of spying, sabotage and disruptive measures. The SPSA was to investigate and make arrests in cases involving Danes and Germans. The German army only agreed conditionally and were affirmed in their right to protect themselves by using martial law if necessary. It was a fragile agreement. It was repeatedly used by the Germans to threaten the Danes to comply or see the formal arrival of the Gestapo. During the first years of the occupation this cooperation went smoothly, but as the illegal press gained momentum Danish police was increasingly labelled as German henchmen. The beginning of armed resistance in 1942-1943 saw the Germans utilizing military courts, but sentences remained limited to imprisonment until the end of August 1943, when the death sentence was introduced and applied.456

There were four different leaders of the SPSA during the occupation. The first one, Harald Petersen, was in office for two months until his appointment as Minister of Justice. Eivind Larsen was then head of the SPSA until the 21st of June 1941, when he was promoted to head of department in the Ministry of Justice. His successor, Poul Kjalke, was removed after a disagreement with the Ministry of Justice and the Germans. The loyal Troels Hoff took over in February 1942 and remained in this position for the duration of the occupation. The SPSA resided

at the HQ of the Police in Copenhagen and the many day-to-day cases were handled by SPSA’s police called the AS. This force was headed by Jens Peter Odmar. He was an ambitious police commissioner who came from Section D. In January 1942, he fused Section D into the AS and became very powerful. He was in charge of the many known and unknown registries of Section D. In the spring of 1941, the AS consisted of 13 officers with German language skills, but as the case load grew so did the office. A year later, 24 officers and three lawyers were employed, and in 1943 the number of officers had risen to 40.457

5.1.3 Gestapo in Denmark 1940-1943

Henrik Lundtofte’s book on the Gestapo was a first. He analyzed the organization’s role in Denmark as it gained executive powers with its official establishment in September 1943. His research is intentionally brief on the period from 1940 to September 1943. However, many of the men who became part of the Gestapo in Denmark from 1943 had been staff at the German legation in the preceding period. We can therefore point to a continuity in personnel, indicating that they performed other police tasks. One of these was intelligence gathering on known enemies of National Socialism including the Jews. Without applying the name Gestapo, the organization was incorporated as part of the legation’s staff. In 1940, more than twenty members of the Gestapo were in Denmark, a number that had risen to 62 by the summer of 1943. The first addition of eleven men came in late 1940 and represented a 35% increase in staff, while subsequent additions came in January and July 1943. Werner Best would also secure a separate police battalion of 500 men in May 1943. The formal Gestapo office for Jewish Affairs, IV-4-B, was only established in September 1943. This was headed by Kriminalrat Erich Bunke, yet by February 1944 only one person worked in the office as most Jews had fled or been deported.458

As we know Kanstein headed inner affairs and just below him was Regierungsrat Anton Fest who headed the police department at the legation. Fest was educated in law in 1930 and joined the NSDAP in 1933. He became part of the SS in 1934 and a year later he joined the Gestapo as well as being recruited for the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). In April 1940 he was attached to the German Legation in Copenhagen with the SS-rank of Sturmbannführer. He was basically

457 Ibid., 62–68.
the Gestapo leader in Denmark, and was disguised by the diplomatic title Police Attaché, which was used for police leaders in neutral and German allied countries. There were seven main offices under Fest, four of which were headed by Hans Hermannsen (more on him below). These offices were: Counterintelligence, Central registry, Border Surveillance and Gegnerbekämpfung – combatting enemies. These enemies were the ideological enemies of Germany: communists, emigrants, Jews and freemasons. Hans Hermannsen came to Denmark as a local Gestapo expert with experience in combatting communists in Flensborg.

Figure 5: Police Organization at The German Legation Dec. 1942. Based on WBK vol. 10, pp. 162-171.
5.1.4 Gestapo’s Hans Hermannsen and His Associates

There has been little attention in Danish research to Hans Hermannsen’s role in regards to Jews, while his participation in combatting communists is well-described. This is surprising, as he was presented as the expert on Jewish affairs to Eichmann’s deputy Rolf Günther who came to Denmark in September 1943. Günther was in Denmark to oversee the attempt to arrest and deport the Danish Jews. As Hermannsen was head of four of the police offices including the registries we need to take a closer look at him. Hermannsen, nicknamed “uncle Hans”, was in Denmark for the duration of the occupation and carried the ranks Kriminalrat and SS-Hauptsturmführer. His career in Flensburg police saw him gaining infiltrating and registration skills, while in 1935 taking over the leadership of the city’s Gestapo office. He was responsible for placing many Flensburg communists in prisons or concentration camps. However, testimonies after the war also reveal him as behaving nonviolently and sometimes warning both Social Democrats and Jews in the local area. A case used to underscore this trait is the Jewish Alexander Wolff’s revisit to Flensburg in 1966 as Wolff described Hermannsen in positive terms. Contrary to this, Danish research has shown how a battered Wolff was literally thrown over the Danish-German border in 1938 while his farm was vandalized and taken over by the city of Flensburg. Wolff’s mother and wife were relocated to Berlin, but were later murdered during the Holocaust.

Hermannsen became a specialist in building information networks during the 1930s. He recruited informers north and south of the border, while also infiltrating the German refugee milieu in Denmark. In 1936 Hermannsen even went undercover as a businessman and travelled to Copenhagen to gain an overview of the refugee milieu in Denmark. He met with informants, who provided addresses of German communists in Denmark and disclosed the courier lines between the two countries. Hermannsen’s cooperation with Danish police was thus well established as he relocated to the Danish capital in 1940.

---

462 Ibid., 108–10.
463 Ibid., 112; Rünitz, Af hensyn til konsekvenserne: Danmark og flygtningespørgsmålet 1933-1940, 310–12“af den depression det tyske folk var kommet i efter attentatet i Paris”. The assault in Paris was the shooting of the German diplomat Vom Rath by the Jewish refugee Grynzpan. The German leadership used this as a pre-text to release a wave of violence in Germany and Austria.
Hermannsen reached Copenhagen on the 20th of April 1940 and like all German police officers, he was officially tied to the German legation. Gestapo’s official establishment in August 1943 saw Hermannsen named head of office IV-1-A which combatted communists. His career in Denmark before August 1943 was varied. He began building registries of communists and Jews, while postwar testimony confirms his close cooperation with Danish security police and its manager Jens Peter Odmar. Hermannsen described how Danish police performed observations and conducted questioning of communists on his request. He was afterwards provided with the information the Danish police had collected.

Hermannsen was involved in a host of controversial and violent events during the occupation. In June 1941, the Danish police arrested a row of communists on German demand and Hermannsen made sure that German communist refugees were also apprehended. Many of whom later perished or were killed in Germany. Hermannsen took part in the deportation of 150 Danish communists in October 1943. After August 1943, he planned and executed 10 raids on so-called anti-social Danes. Many of which were deported. Hermannsen also combatted the Danish resistance movement. However, Hermannsen helped some Danish Social Democrats and resistance fighters during the occupation. So much so that Danish obituaries in 1952 praised his deeds except for the communist newspaper Land og Folk. Lundtofte concludes that Hermannsen could be viewed as the personification of the cooperation between German and Danish police.

Hermannsen is in many ways a controversial and contradictory figure and maybe his label as a “prototypical opportunist” is the most adequate. He was neither a stereotypical Gestapo man nor a clear-cut rescuer. Evidently, he knew how to protect himself and get involved with the right people, but as his German biographer states: “Undeniably, Hermannsen was employed in the Gestapo for more than 12 years in one of the most profoundly criminal and central institutions of radical measures in the NS-State and was responsible for several communists’ deaths.” In some instances, previous research seem to neglect that he was not only an employee, but had extensive leadership responsibilities during most of his career. It has been argued that his positive deeds in Denmark were the reason he escaped justice after the war, but
he functioned as a counterintelligence officer for the British and then for the Americans until he died in 1952.468

Fritz Renner was one of Hans Hermannsen’s closest associates and member of the Gestapo in Saarbrücken before coming to Denmark on November 23rd, 1940. His main task seems to have been registering the Jews in Denmark.469 Previous research has presented us with one elaborate example of Renner’s work as Heinrich Himmler had ordered the arrest of the presumed Danish-Jewish professor Walter Thalbitzer. Thalbitzer, an expert on Inuit culture, was to work in the concentration camp Dachau on the horrible medical freezing experiments.470 Kanstein was to concoct the appropriate reasons for Thalbitzer’s arrest and Fritz Renner was to examine Thalbitzer’s heritage via published genealogical works. In a four-page report Renner unraveled Thalbitzer’s family history only to conclude he was not Jewish.471 As the question came directly from Himmler, his superiors must have trusted Renner’s skills, and he clearly knew his sources. Fritz Renner was one of the few persons who would be assigned work in the official Gestapo office for Jewish affairs IV-4-B as it was established in September 1943.472 He is also known for his attempts to catch fleeing Jews during October 1943. He did so along with Paul Hennig (see section 5.3.1) and during a shoot-out in Tårnbæk Renner or Hennig killed Claus Christian Heilesen who assisted in helping Jews escape.473

One of Renner’s associates in gathering intelligence on Jews was Gustav Oehlerking, of whom we know very little. He came to Denmark in January 1943 as one of the fifteen new German police officers who were instated at the German Legation. He was 53 years old when he arrived in Denmark from Hannover with the title of Kriminalobersekretär – a middle rank.474

5.2 Police Cooperation on the Enemies of Nazism

5.2.1 The Communists and the Resistance Movement

469 Lundtofte, Gestapo!, 95, 106, 110–11.
472 Lundtofte, Gestapo!, 95, 106, 110–11.
During the war Danish and German Police cooperated their actions concerning communists, the resistance movement, refugees and Jews. Let us first look at the cooperation on Communists and the resistance movement in order to establish the nature of cooperation against groups considered enemies of Germany. The German attack on the Soviet Union enforced Danish-German cooperation further. Danish police were in charge of arresting Soviet citizens along with Danish communist leaders and Danish police overzealously executed the task. The Germans had demanded at least 70 arrests, but the Danes arrested 168 including 20 non-members of the communist party. Two of the three communist members of the Danish Parliament were also arrested, and several other waves of arrests were carried out by Danish police until August 1943. 250 communists were interned in the Horserød camp and most were deported along with the Danish Jews in October 1943. The Danish government also made the communist party illegal in August 1941 in order to prevent damaging the politics of cooperation with Germany. This was a violation of the constitution, yet all the remaining parties voted for the law. The Danish government framed the law and internments of the communists as being Danish initiatives by arguing the law would eventually have to be instituted. Still, the arrests were made on German demand. The government could argue that jurisdiction was still in Danish control, but it was a jurisdiction that violated the constitution.475

Cooperation also took place in regards to the resistance movement. Resistance became a rising concern for the Germans as 1942 progressed. The German police presence was increased, even though Danish police still performed many of the investigative tasks and made the arrests. Prime Minister Buhl’s speech in September 1942, asking the population to report resistance members, and the King’s public denouncement of sabotage in May 1943 were attempts to keep some control over jurisdiction at the expense of the resistance movement.476 In essence, there was a well-established cooperation between Danish and German police, which was supported at the highest levels of government even against the resistance movement.

5.2.2 Police Cooperation on Refugees

German refugees in Denmark were generally considered as enemies of the dictatorship, and were of special interest to German police units such as the German Military Intelligence unit

(Abwehr) and The Secret German Military Police (Geheime Feldpolizei). These units were also central to the German police and intelligence activities in Denmark in the period before 1943. We know little of their activities in Denmark, but have some information on the cooperative nature between them and the Danish Police through some well documented cases.

On the 16th of April 1940 the Germans requested a full census of all foreigners in Denmark and shortly afterwards the Danish Ministry of Justice announced The Act of Obligation to be Registered for Foreigners. This act made it was mandatory for all foreigners older than 16 to register in person at the local police station during May 1940. The rules also applied to Scandinavians and stateless persons who were most likely Jewish individuals. 28,632 persons were registered during the month of May, and the information was passed on to the Germans. For the Copenhagen area alone, the tally was 14,400 persons. The main registry of these people was at the SPSA, with a copy located at section D of the Copenhagen police. A month later, the Abwehr demanded an overview of all the formalities regarding the registration process of foreigners. This included questions such as what kind of stamps were used? Which forms and IDs were used? The Danish police replied quickly and self-flatteringly concluded: “...here in Denmark there is widespread control of the foreigners and a thorough control over the individual foreigner”. Several arrests of refugees were made and the most current estimate shows that 155 refugees were handed over to German police. This included 20 Jews, 18 of whom, were later murdered in the camp system. The authors of the four-volume examination of the Danish refugee policies from 1933-1945 describe these arrests in detail, but the cases from the SPSA reveal an additional request for the arrest of 55 German emigrants on the 28th of August 1940. There also exists a further request to arrest 32 Dutch citizens in the summer of 1940. These were carried out, but are not included in previous research and additional requests possibly exist. The actual number of arrests thus appears to be higher than previously acknowledged and

477 Bekendtgørelse om Anmeldelsespligt med hensyn til udlændinge 30. April 1940.
479 Kirchhoff and Rünitz, Udsendt til Tyskland, 112.
480 Ibid., 476, 479.
481 Ibid., 118–19.
482 “1605 Tyske emigranter,” August 28, 1940, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
483 “448. Liste over hollandske og belgiske statsborgere,” June 1, 1940, RA, AS-Sager Kbh. The list was provided to the German authorities in May. It seems the arrests of the Dutch citizens took place during the summer of 1940.
it seems to be impossible to give a satisfactory numerical result. However, it can be concluded that there was a high degree of cooperation in this area.

German police continued to focus on refugees, and in late 1940, Anton Fest demanded that Danish police raided the Danish refugee committees. The weak pretext had been a suspicion of propaganda. Danish police searched the premises of the three main refugee organizations in Denmark: 1) The Matteotti Committee, which had mostly helped Social Democrats fleeing from Germany 2) The Committee of the 4th of May 1933, which had assisted Jewish refugees 3) the Åndsarbejderkomiteen, which had mostly assisted intellectuals of all kinds. The Danish police confiscated all material, including registry cards, correspondence etc. and it was all handed over to the Germans. This secured further intelligence on many of the German refugees.\(^{485}\)

In December, Fest specifically requested more information on refugees and stateless persons from Germany, Austria, the Czech lands and Poland. In addition, Fest wanted a complete copy of all Danish refugee cards, with an indication of who were Jewish. This clearly underlines the extensive intelligence gathering, and the continued German interest in registering Jews. Fest’s request caused internal discussions between the Danish Ministry of Justice and the Foreign Ministry, but also revealed that the Danes had already labelled all registry cards involving Jews with a “J”. The police possessed a complete overview of Jewish refugees on two sets of registry cards: one set with basic information and a set with extensive information. The Ministry of Justice suggested agreeing to the German request by supplying them with a copy of the cards with basic information as the German’s already possessed a copy of the census on refugees. As a consequence of this it would only be a matter of time before German police had determined who were Jewish. The Foreign Ministry disagreed and the request was denied. The Germans countered this decision by requesting access to the registry in order to take notes. Kanstein revealed that many of those who were of interest were Jewish refugees. This request was accepted and the end result was potentially the same: critical personal information ended up in German hands.\(^{486}\)

The case developed further in December 1941, as Fest now requested a copy of all former German citizens including information on race. It was apparently the German consulate in Copenhagen that required this information, and they quickly followed up on Fest’s request. In

\(^{485}\) Kirchhoff and Rünitz, *Udsendt til Tyskland*, 90.
\(^{486}\) Ibid., 204–5.
February 1942 the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice gave in. Fest received a copy of 989 registry cards on Jews which contained information on 1414 persons including their addresses. All Jewish refugees were thus registered less than two years after the occupation with the aid of the Danish government and police. Historians Hans Kirchhoff and Lone Rünitz conclude: “In this manner they were well-prepared for the day the ‘Jewish question’ in Demark would also find its ‘final solution’. Now, the only thing missing was similar information about the Danish Jews.” The cooperation on Jewish refugees must be labelled as almost unlimited assistance to German police. These actions amounted to cooperation and assistance in Judenpolitik, as well as potentially putting these people at risk. The interest in the foreign Jews shows that Judenpolitik’s racial categorization, and registration was applied in Denmark.

5.3 German Registries of Danish Jews

Paul Hennig and Lorenz Christensen are the most important Danish aids in creating registries of Jews. I will provide a short biographical account of them with a focus on their involvement in this area. These will build on the knowledge we already possess of them from historian Sofie Lene Bak’s research. Bak was the first to research the main anti-Semites Lorenz Christensen and Paul Hennig and connect them to the German Legation.

5.3.1 Paul Hennig

Paul Hennig (1902-?) had a German mother and had attended the German school in Copenhagen. From 1928-1932 he was an assistant to Otto Brenner at the company Personalhistorisk Institut. The company performed genealogical research and provided discounts for members of the DNSAP and the National Socialistisk Arbejderparti (NSAP). Hennig was a member of NSAP, and in 1933 he began his independent genealogical business, Arierregisteret (the Register of Aryans). Evidently, it was focused on providing proof of race in accordance with the Nuremberg Laws. In April 1941 he was also the CEO of the Race Political Office under DNSAP. He wrote numerous articles for the anti-Semitic weekly Kamptegnet, but after a dispute with the editors Aage H. Andersen and Olga Eggers, he was fired. During this

---


period, he had also been paid by the GCC to perform racial investigations into Danish businesses. In the spring of 1942, he became part of the SS. He was located in both Berlin and Copenhagen, but the circumstances appear cloudy. He came back to Copenhagen in January 1943 to assist in translation and genealogical work. Under Ersatzkommando Dänemark he was to certify that young SS volunteers were Aryan including their fiancées if they happened to be engaged. Afterwards, the paperwork would be sent for approval at the Rasse- und Siedlungs Hauptamt (RuSHA) of the SS. Paul Hennig’s role in the anti-Semitic paper Kamptegnet will be analyzed in chapter six.

5.3.2 Dr. Lorenz Christensen

Dr. Lorenz Christensen is one of the most central Danes in regards to Judenpolitik in Denmark. Previous research has labelled him as the German’s de facto Judenreferent from February 1943 to 1945, but documents from his postwar trial reveal he was an official one only from the spring of 1944. (See chapter nine). Postwar he managed to present himself as an independent business man from 1933-1940 in Deutsche Wirtschaftsberatungsstelle. From 1941-1943 he was presented as a researcher on the Jewish question. Closer inspection into these claims show he was much more. Previous research has already shown he became increasingly anti-Semitic in the 1930s and a supporter of National Socialism. His “business” was to secure loans and promote trade with Germany, yet from 1935 it was financed by Volksdeutscher Mittelstelle (VoMi).
Lorenz Christensen had since his younger years been interested in genealogy. As the category of the Volksdeutsche was defined in March 1939 his skills were needed on a professional level. The Volksdeutsche were ranked just below citizens of the Reich, but were considered members of the German people.496 People who felt or wished to be part of the German people had to prove their descent and race. In the late 1930’s Christensen began to issue certificates of ancestry (Ahnenbriefe) to prove Aryan descend. He would obtain the necessary proofs of births, baptisms, marriages and deaths from many Danish parishes.497

In early 1940 Lorenz Christensen returned to Kiel University after a dispute with Jens Møller. Christensen had received his doctoral degree there and returned to continue working on the university project Handwörterbuch des Grenz und Auslandsdeutschtum, which was used to legitimize border revisions. The Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel (CAU) was headed by Otto Scheel from 1933-1945 and he was from the town of Tønder which had been German before the referendum in 1920. Scheel headed the Instituts für Volks- und Landesforschung which had been formed in January 1938 by Hinrich Lohse. Scheel was head of the institute which researched the history of the peoples, political history and race in the border area.498 In the fall of 1940 Christensen again became part of this institute.499

The occupation of Denmark saw Christensen being recruited to the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). He would pass on knowledge of trade in the area and suggest companies suitable for the German war industry as well as point to possible informers. He informed the SD of boycotts against German businesses in the region and would send evaluations of the Danish National Socialist leadership.500 In October 1940 he became head of the Sippenanzlei Nordschleswig, which was funded by VoMi, but part of National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei - Nordschleswig

496 Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945., 71–72.
499 “Udskrift af Østre Landsrets dombog.”
500 Ibid.
(NSDAP-N). Contrary to Christensen’s postwar testimony he is described as sometimes wearing an SS uniform with SD insignia, indicating that he might in fact be a member of the SS.

Lorenz Christensen was hired by the head of press affairs at the German legation, Gustav Meissner, to assist in composing a report on the Jews in Denmark. (See chapter six). Renthe-Fink prolonged Christensen’s employment and it lasted until the end of the war. As part of his official work for the legation he created a registry containing information on at least 2,000 Danish Jews for the report, but it probably also served as research for his book, Det Tredje Ting (The Third Power), the principal anti-Semitic piece in Danish and published in the fall of 1943.

5.3.3 German Registries

In order to prepare the postwar court cases against Paul Hennig and Lorenz Christensen, the Danish police conducted many pre-trial interviews with former employees at the German legation. Danish police would in their questioning focus mostly on establishing if the material gathered on Jews was used for preparing the action against the Danish Jews in October 1943. However, these interviews throw light on the cooperation between the German police and the Danish anti-Semites by revealing how the registration offices functioned at the legation. This included details on Gestapo’s work.

Apparently, the genealogical office at Dagmarhus (the administration offices of the legation) contained large posters of family trees and registries of Jews. Yet, most registries had been burned just before the war ended. In this office the registries over Jews were kept and Paul Hennig would explain that Fritz Renner had three separate registries on: 1) Danish Jews 2) Jewish Companies 3) Foreign Jews. Paul Hennig evaluated the registries as follows: “...probably all Jews were in it along with a number of persons who were erroneously assumed to be Jews...”. Lorenz Christensen would state that the registries contained information on people who were not pure Jews and relatives, which underscores the extensiveness of these registries.

501 Ibid.
504 Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 212–14.
Christensen probably intended to diminish the value of the registries, but as we have already seen exclusive measures were also pursued against people who were related to Jews or regarded as “Mischlinge”. Paul Hennig also disclosed that Fritz Renner had been charged with creating a registry of the Danish Jews. As Renner came in late 1940, it indicates that registration probably began that year. The office of registries also held catalogue cards of priests and doctors as well as overviews of lodges and sects in Denmark.508

Postwar, Hermannsen would continuously argue that the raid against the Jewish congregation in September 1943 had formed the basis for the action in October, but several times he disclosed that as Renner’s superior he was fully aware of Renner’s work.509 As we recall Hans Hermannsen headed these offices until the middle of 1943, and must have been monitoring the registration process. In addition, he would personally make requests to the SPSA to investigate on the race of Danish citizens (see the following sections). This implies a more direct involvement in the registration process.

There seems to have been a close working relationship between Renner, Hennig and Christensen. A former Gestapo officer would explain that Renner worked almost exclusively on Jews, while Hennig would assist him on daily basis. Christensen functioned as Renner’s local expert and advisor on Jewish Affairs in Denmark. Interestingly, it is also disclosed that Anton Fest would be consulted on all important questions relating to the Danish Jews.510

Eberhard von Löw was part of the SS from 1935 and worked on security issues in Schleswig-Holstein. In April 1940 he was relocated to the headquarters of the RSHA’s dept. VI, later dept. III. He was to build an office responsible for occupied Germanic countries and his specific area of expertise was on Denmark. Löw requested Christensen to create an overview of the Danish Jews in the beginning of the war, but postwar Löw stated the RSHA never received it. Given the fact that registration work was made, it seems unlikely the information was not passed on to the RSHA, but this remains to be confirmed.

Löw’s request, fulfilled or not, shows the RSHA’s early interest in this area in Denmark. Christensen’s selection as author indicates that his expertise on Jews was valued even by the

---

RSHA. There is no doubt that extensive registration measures took place almost from the beginning of the occupation. Previous research has not focused on Danish police’s cooperation in this area. This is the focus of the remaining part of this chapter.

5.4 Danish Police and Racial Investigations

The phone rang at the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs on the 29th of April 1943. It was the German assistant detective Fritz Renner. Renner’s call was related to N.A., a former social-democratic member of parliament and supposedly Jewish. Renner wanted Danish police to investigate her race and they acted swiftly finishing the report in one day. N.A. was no longer a member of parliament, but had been so for seven years. She had been registered by the police for belonging to the leadership of the Social Democratic Information and Propaganda Department which combatted Communism and National Socialism. Police in her birth town of Horsens could report her parents were now living in the town of Virum, not so far from Copenhagen, and they were now questioned.

The police knocked on her parents’ door at two o’clock in the afternoon on the 29th N.A.’s mother answered the door and confirmed her identity. The two officers then began questioning her about the couple’s race. Were they Aryan? Were they sure they did not have any Jewish blood in their family? The couple denied by giving extensive details on their family history. The local policemen could conclude they were probably not Jewish, and “Neither of the two questioned persons carries the slightest look of being of Jewish descent”. This was Danish police carrying out racial investigations on behalf of German police. The local police chief reacted strongly against this kind of work, but to no avail.

N.A.’s parents became curious as to who the policemen were. The husband was a former member of the Danish Social Democratic Party and contacted Alsing Andersen. Alsing Andersen was a Social Democrat, member of parliament since 1929 as well as a former Minister of Defense and Finance. In April 1943 he was the General Secretary (forretningsfører) of the party. Alsing Andersen contacted the Ministry of Justice and raised a host of questions. Had the Minister of

---

511 Matthias Bath, Der SD in Dänemark 1940-1945 Heydrichs Elite und der “Gegenterror,” 2015, 41–42; “Rapport vedr. Dr. Lorenz Christensens forbindelse med S.D.”
513 “Alsing Andersen til Thune Jacobsen,” May 7, 1943, RA, UM 120.d.28.g. 1909-1945.
514 “14372. Angående forespørgsel på Jader” “Ingen af de to afhørte personers udseende bærer mindste præg af jødisk afstamning.”
515 Ibid.
Justice given orders to perform the interrogation? Could the Germans ask a local precinct to perform such interrogations? With what right had the interrogation taken place? Was it a common practice or a single case? We do not know if Alsing Andersen received answers to these important questions, but the internal discussion that followed between the Danish Foreign Ministry and the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs supplies us with the answers.\(^516\)

The State Prosecutor for Special Affairs at the time, Troels Hoff, wrote a report to the Foreign Ministry. It is well attested that the SPSA's office was involved in investigations the Germans requested as this was part of keeping the Danish police and the judicial system in Danish hands. However, Hoff's answer shows that the SPSA also provided sensitive information on Danes based solely on German requests. Hoff stated:

“From the present German authorities, the department receives a large number of requests regarding Danish citizens. The information wanted is: if individuals are sentenced or known by the police, and sometimes their family relations, if they are politically known and in addition if they are Aryans or of Jewish descent. The requests are increasing.”\(^517\)

Evidently, this practice had existed for some time. Hoff explained the German reasons for asking such questions were to prove if the following categories of Danes were Aryan:

- Women who were to marry Germans
- Danish citizens who sought employment in German organizations in Denmark or Germany
- People who wanted to travel to Sweden or Germany
- Owners of Danish companies who wanted to trade with Germany

Hoff argued it was in the general interest of Danish citizens, “especially the many non-Jewish ones” to provide the Germans with information on race. However, he did not express

\(^{516}\) "Alsing Andersen til Thune Jacobsen."

\(^{517}\) "Troels Hoff til Udenrigsministeriet," May 19, 1943, RA, UM 120.d.28.g. “Fra de hervede tyske myndigheder modtager afdelingen et stort antal forespørgsler om danske statsborgere, idet det ønskes oplyst, om de pågældende er straffet eller politimæssig bekendt, undertiden også om deres familiære forhold, og om de er politisk bekendt samt i en del tilfælde om de er ariere eller af jødisk herkomst. Forespørgslerne er stigende.”
The SPSA would utilize numerous sources to answer these requests such as: police registers, the registry of commune residents\(^\text{518}\) (Folkeregisteret), and the Ministerialregisteret or church protocols.\(^\text{519}\) If the police had failed to ascertain answers from these sources they would attempt to conduct a voluntary interview of the person of interest. Hoff added, “In singular cases, where the police have wanted to avoid asking the individual directly, and where they were expected to not being able to provide the answers themselves, others have been questioned”.\(^\text{520}\) Basically, the Danish police used all available sources to perform uncritical racial registration on the basis of the German racial laws and definitions. Hoff made sure future requests would be made in writing. A phone call had been sufficient for Danish police to investigate and answer questions regarding Danish citizen’s judicial, political, or racial status, but Hoff now made sure future requests were made in writing. This is confirmed by the cases, which from approximately that date is supplied with a written note, while previous cases often refer to a phone call.\(^\text{521}\)

The family, mentioned above, had been one of those cases where a personal inquiry had to be conducted in relation to their daughter. Hoff’s explanation of this specific case shows how the police had generally proceeded in such matters. A phone call from Fritz Renner at the German legation had been sufficient to set off an investigation into the racial composition of the family. The request was based on the suspicion of the possible Jewish maiden name of N.A.’s mother. The police had, with the aid of local authorities, used the Folkeregister and the church protocols in order to answer the question. It is also worth noting that this case clearly falls outside of the categories mentioned by Hoff.\(^\text{522}\)

The Danish Foreign Ministry became involved and the minister, Scavenius, was informed of the matter. The ministry reasoned the best-case scenario was to refrain from answering this type of questions, but as the practice had existed for “a long time”, it would be too difficult to discontinue it without risking political problems. A main argument employed by Nils Svenningsen

---


\(^\text{519}\) Jørgen Stenbæk, “Kirkebøger,” *Den store danske* (Gyldendal), accessed March 20, 2017, http://denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sideId=106527 These protocols registered births, baptisms, given names, name changes, confirmations, engagements, marriages, deaths and funerals. Other religions were also required to maintain such protocols.

\(^\text{520}\) “Troels Hoff til Udenrigsministeriet” “I enkelte tilfælde, i hvilke man har villet undgå at rette henvendelse til den pågældende selv, og hvor de ikke kunne antages at kunne give besked, har ahæring af andre end dem selv fundet sted.”.

\(^\text{521}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{522}\) Ibid.
was the risk of raising an issue that potentially brought the Jewish question on the agenda. “For the sake of both the Jews and all of society’s interest, we have to accept some smaller unpleasantness.”

One important item rests in the investigative file on N.A., which apparently did not become an issue between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice. It is an empty application form required to be filled out when applying for return travels from Denmark. Two of the fields stand out as travelers from Denmark were required to put down their religion and race on the form. It is uncertain when the questionnaire was issued, but it originated from the office of the Rigspolitichefen. It shows that race, despite its informality, was being enforced in such a way that it appeared on formal travel questionnaires issued by Danish police.

5.5 The Cases of the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs

The SPSA performed thousands of investigations at the request of the Abwehr and the German legation. These requests mostly regarded Danish citizens. In addition, inquiries regarding immigrants, and sometimes their arrest, were also made to the SPSA who followed through on them. The answers to all requests usually contained information on a citizen’s former breaches of law, political standpoint and sometimes family relations. This kind of personal information was forwarded without the consent of those involved and it usually originated from Section D’s registries on e.g. communists and members of the Danish Nazi party. The overall number of requests and answers to the Germans have not been fully accounted for, but a sample from April 1943 shows that Danish police provided information on 412 Danish citizens that month. Questions on race were rare, and they mostly originated from the police section of the legation. Most questions on race were asked by Hans Hermannsen, Fritz Renner or Gustav Oehlerking. As we saw earlier, these were the policemen working on registering Jews.

My examination of the roughly 17,000 case files for the Copenhagen area shows that the majority of these can be grouped into the following categories:

---

523 “Svenningsen til J.Herfelt,” May 27, 1943, RA, UM 120.d.28.g. 1909-1945.
524 “14372. Angående forespørgsel på Jøder.”
527 Stevnsborg, Politiet 1938-1947. Bekæmpelsen af spionage, sabotage og nedbrydende virksomhed., 361 Stevnsborg very briefly mentions the passing of information on race. He bases it on the Parlementariske Kommission’s findings and has not researched the actual cases, which was not his intention.
• Answering questions from Abwehr or the Reichbevollmächtiges office regarding:
  o Information on thousands of Danes’ political and criminal records, sometimes also family relations and economic issues
  o Questions on refugees: their addresses, marital status and so forth
  o Requests to perform investigations of places, addresses and interrogations of persons on behalf of the Abwehr
  o A few cases on communists, the rest are in a separate archive
  o Few questions on race
  o Questions on foreigners who were not refugees

• Incidents between Germans and Danes:
  o Incidents involving shooting and stabbing with bayonets
  o Rape, sexual abuse and the spreading of venereal diseases
  o Violent incidents such as fights and brawls
  o Smaller incidents like spitting, showing, and yelling
  o Minor acts of vandalism on German signs, cars, and telephone cables
  o Showing support for the allies by wearing red, white and blue insignia
  o Disgracing German graves
  o Debts in Germany

The approximately 240 cases that revolve around race often include examination of relatives as well. This means that each case often contains information on the race of parents, siblings, and grandparents. Cases of examined companies also contain genealogical information on all board members. The number of people examined is thus higher than 240, and closer to 1,000. Hoff’s categories of racial questions (women who were to marry Germans etc. (see above)) seems to have been a routine matter, yet the preserved cases involving race reveal that they revolve around three general groups: 1) Refugees 2) Danes 3) Companies. It appears that race-related questions for these groups were forwarded to the Danish police if the German police was experiencing difficulties in determining if a person was Jewish. Other organizations such as the German Chamber of Commerce, private information bureaus, genealogists and party members had probably already been asked the same questions. The methodologies in order to ascertain if people were Jewish involved both interviews and using local records. As we have
already learned from the case on N.A., relatives or friends were questioned by police to ascertain the race of the person in question. These interviews were carried out by local police precincts on the behalf of the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs. Other public organizations involved were the records of the local municipalities, known as the Folkeregister, as well as local parish records. In some cases, tax records were also used in order to determine if a person paid Kirkeskat, a tax collected and paid to the Lutheran Church (Folkekirke) by the central authorities in Denmark.\textsuperscript{528} This was a tax Jews usually did not pay. Overall, the preserved cases on race show that a considerable work effort was made to answer the German requests.

However, there are several indications that the number of racial investigations was probably higher. Two cases illustrate this. The first one is on professor and medical doctor Paul Møller who in March 1941 was asked if he was Jewish by Danish Police. The request originated from the German legation, because Møller was about to travel to Germany to give a series of lectures. Møller had asked detective constable Olesen about his workload on such questions and Olesen had replied “It is not so bad”, because he only had two more places to visit that day. It seems Olesen was no stranger to performing this kind of work. Compared to other cases, the investigation on Møller was not extensive. He was simply asked if he was Jewish and answered no, while offering to produce his birth certificate to prove it.\textsuperscript{529} This incident corresponds to Hoff’s categories (see above), but shows it had been a routine matter for several years. Persons going to work for German organizations were also examined, such as groups of Danish women going to work for the German Red Cross.\textsuperscript{530} However, this brings into question if the approximately 100,000 Danes who went to work in Germany were most likely questioned or examined regarding their race as well.\textsuperscript{531}

### 5.6 Chapter conclusion

This chapter intended to answer research questions two and three on the theme of identification and registering Jews. It thus focused on stage four in the model Stages of Persecution. In most occupied countries Jews were required to register by law. This chapter has shown that in Denmark it proceeded informally, and this is stage two in the Stages of Persecution

\textsuperscript{528} The Lutheran Church and the State are not separated in Denmark.
\textsuperscript{529} “3242. Forespørgsel på Poul Møller og Svend Petri,” March 1941, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
\textsuperscript{530} “15523. Forespørgsel på fem personer,” July 3, 1943, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
\textsuperscript{531} Christensen et al., Danmark besat: krig og hverdag 1940-45.
model. The basis of all identifications and registrations appear to be based on the German definition of Jews, which is stage three in the model Stages of Persecution. Despite the lack of registration laws in Denmark the Jews were systematically registered by German police. The examination of the German registration efforts has revealed they took on a formalized structure from late 1940 an onwards. However, a preliminary registry probably existed as part of the Aryanization efforts which began in 1937 (see chapter three).

Hans Hermannsen headed the registries of Jews while most day-to-day work was performed by Fritz Renner. Both were members of the Gestapo, but part of the German legation’s staff. They were assisted by Danish anti-Semites Paul Hennig and Lorenz Christensen. Christensen was viewed as an expert on the matter, which gained him the title of Judenreferent in 1944. The German legation had three registries on 1) Danish Jews 2) Jewish Companies 3) Foreign Jews.

This chapter has revealed an extensive cooperation between the German and Danish police on these matters. The Danish-German police cooperation had a prewar context which secured a host of personal ties which remained in place during the occupation. The cooperation was extensive, and the Germans were provided with all the Danish information on foreign Jews. Danish police and the SPSA would answer an unknown number of German requests regarding the race of Danish citizens. According to Troels Hoff, head of the SPSA, this involved the following categories: Women who were to marry Germans, Danish citizens to be employed in German organizations in Denmark or Germany, individuals travelling to Sweden or Germany, and owners of Danish companies who wanted to trade with Germany. But there appears to be several other cases revolving around race in which Danish police supplied information to German police.

The role of the Danish government has not been fully disclosed. The Danish government was only involved as a copy of all the catalogue cards with basic information on Jewish refugees were handed over to the German police in February 1942. Only in the middle of 1943 it seems at least Scavenius was made aware that the SPSA was performing racial investigations on behalf of the German police, but this type of information exchange continued.

In the area of registration, the cooperation seems to have been largely unlimited, and viewing this within the context of bystander analysis this work does have the character of supporting the perpetrator’s registration efforts. Clearly, it was a cooperation which sought to maintain the judicial and executive powers on Danish hands. However, we can hardly ignore the evident
consequences this work had in relation to excluding Jews, while also thinking ahead to October 1943. These registries must have formed the basis for the list of arrests being made in preparation for the action against the Jews in Denmark.

6 Probing the Limits of Cooperation

The dissertation now turns to exploring and analyzing how other areas of Judenpolitik were pursued in Denmark. The chapter revolves around answering research questions two and three. Section 6.1 begins the chapter by briefly tracing how the legation began reporting on the Jewish question in Denmark. It also shows how the racial laws of Germany began influencing parts of the Danish society in 1937-1940 through the usage of proof of race (Ariernachweis). Danish citizens sought to prove their Aryan race in order to qualify for trading with Germany, and Germans with ancestral ties to Denmark had to prove they were Aryan to avoid persecution in Germany. These endeavors involved Danish parishes and archives. Section 6.2 focuses on research question two by following the legation’s attempts to promote Judenpolitik in various forms in Denmark from the beginning of the occupation until January 1942. Several initiatives were set in motion in this period such as an official race office to support the use of National Socialism’s race categories, and initiatives to promote anti-Semitism. At the same time a security area was setup in the northern and western part of Jutland, which disallowed the presence of Jews, German refugees, and Gypsies in this area.

Sections 6.3 and 6.4 are the largest parts of the chapter. They center on both research question two and three during the crisis in the Danish-German relationship surrounding the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in late 1941. This resulted in a combined German pressure on the Danish government to introduce formal laws against the Jews. This part of the chapter will also introduce the previously unknown request from Cecil Renthe-Fink to introduce anti-Jewish laws in December 1941. This pressure led to several discussions within the Danish government and they reveal that a minority would accept formal laws against the Jews.

6.1 Judenfrage Dänemark 1933-1940

One of the reports on Jews written by Bülow-Schwante of the AA’s Abteilung D, the section working on Jews, (see chapter two) reached the German legation in Copenhagen in May 1933. The report was to document and provide political arguments for Germany’s new anti-Semitic
In Denmark it was also distributed to the larger German consulates. The report documents how adamantly and quickly the AA supported and expanded on the dictatorship’s policies against Jews. Since it was written in-house, it is also a testament to the AA’s use of racial arguments to justify Germany’s Judenpolitik. The first line stated that foreign countries had misunderstood Germany’s anti-Jewish policies, and the next twenty pages gave a wide-range of legitimizing arguments for Germany’s policies. The basic argument was that the influence of Jews had become enormous in practically all areas of German society. Sixteen themes were highlighted, including subjects such as Jewish domination in culture and certain business sectors. A host of statistics were used to legitimize the claim of an overwhelmingly high number of Jews in positions such as doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. Culturally, Jews were seen as too dominant compared to their numbers, while they were politically associated with Social Democrats and Communists. From this early stage on, the German diplomats in Denmark were thus charged with supporting and promoting the underlying ideas of German Judenpolitik.

From 1930 to 1936 the German envoy in Denmark was Herbert Freiherr von Richthofen. He was 51 years old in 1930 and had a long diplomatic career behind him, but also ahead of him, as he continued to serve until 1944. On his own accord Gesandter von Richthofen followed and reported on the so-called Jewish question in Denmark right after the National Socialist takeover. One of the first cases reported on was twenty German-Jewish students who had fled Germany and requested enrollment in Danish universities to complete their degree. However, there were several obstacles. First of all, they had to obtain permits of residence, which was a cumbersome process. Secondly, several university regulations made it difficult to follow the needed courses to qualify for graduation. In addition, lectures were in Danish only and many courses were overbooked. As Danes superseded foreigners on the waiting lists the German-Jewish medical students were not able to complete their studies. Likewise, only Danish citizens could serve as civil servants and lawyers. The twenty students were permitted to continue their studies under these normal, but rather harsh terms.

---

532 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 46–47 Several other reports like this were sent to the legations, but this is the only one I have been able to locate in the archives of the German Legation in Copenhagen. However, there are also printed speeches from Goebbels and Hitler which were to be disseminated.

533 These were Aarhus, Aalborg, Randers, Esbjerg, Fredericia, Kolding, Odense and Svendborg.

534 “Ref. D. 913 Judenfrage Deutschland,” April 30, 1933, PA, Kopenhagen 76.


536 “Jüdische Studenten aus Deutschland und die Kopenhagener Universität 153A,” May 29, 1933, PA, Kopenhagen 76.
In late 1933, Richthofen sent a second report to Berlin entitled The Jewish Question in Denmark. The report is a further indication of how the German diplomatic representatives in Denmark followed the issue from very early on. It contained the perception of a public meeting at which Danish and foreign Jews had been discussed. The meeting was held at the society of Socialvirke, a society that discussed current political and social issues. There were three main speakers: the Danish Social Democrat Dr. Albert Olsen, Dr. Davidson, and Arthur Henriques. Dr. Davidson was a communist and had withdrawn his membership of the Jewish congregation, which he accused of consisting of capitalists. Arthur Henriques was a member of the board of the Jewish congregation. The meeting had in general recognized the Jewish contributions to Danish society and was uncontroversial. However, German surveillance of the meeting was used to identify enemies of the National Socialist cause. For example, Albert Olsen was described as a person who in writing and speeches had proved to be “an enemy of the new Germany”. The report also stated that there were around 6,500 Jews in Denmark. This was possibly the first numerical estimate of the number of Jews in Denmark reported from the German legation.537

A few other reports on public meetings were passed on the following year. They showed political support for the Jews in Denmark, while Danish politicians argued that German anti-Semitism was undemocratic and incompatible with Danish ideas.538 Only one reported attempt at boycotting German companies has been located. The Danish company Oskar Wagner had sent out a leaflet arguing for a boycott of German companies. The German Gesandtschaft identified Wagner as a Jewish communist by using local sources and passed on the details to the RfA.539 We do not possess many details on these early registrations. The involvement of the RfA indicates the organization was registering Jews suggesting boycotts. The RfA would later dominate the area of registering foreign Jewish companies (see chapter two).

In early 1936, the German Foreign Ministry sent out a general order to most legations and consulates to report on the development of the Jewish question. Evidently, Richthofen had on his own initiative recognized the importance of Judenpolitik in National Socialism and reported on the issue before it became a formal task.540 The order was tied to the dictatorship's view of the Jews as a worldwide threat. The intention was to gain a complete overview of the Judenfrage

538 "Die Stellung des Judentums in Dänemark nr. 67P," November 24, 1934, PA, R99413.
in the world (Gesamtes Ausland). This type of reports was to include information on the following issues: anti-Jewish laws similar to the ones in Germany, and Jewish attempts to counter Germany. The recipients of these reports were Rudolf Hess, at that point deputy (Stellvertreter) for Hitler, Goebbels’ propaganda ministry, the Gestapo, and Heinrich Himmler.\footnote{Ibid.} This underscores the growing importance placed on Judenpolitik in various areas of German foreign policy.

Judenpolitik as a policy area was expanding and the view of Jews as a political problem was increasing. This was expressed in the continuous sensitivity and added incentive to monitor the issue in Denmark. Positive and negative statements regarding Jews in Denmark as well as the perception of the anti-Semitic policies in Germany were followed closely. In January 1936, Richthofen could report that prominent Danish theologians were very critical of a leaflet entitled: The Christian Church in the Nordic Perception.\footnote{Please see Bak, \textit{Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945}, 333–34 For a complete discussion of these writings in Denmark.} The anti-Semite Aage H. Andersen was the author of the leaflet. Andersen had been expelled from the Danish Nazi party because of his hostile attitude towards Jews (sic).\footnote{Ibid., 51 the reason for A.H. Andersen’s removal from the Danish Nazi Party is disputed as being either being voluntary or involuntary. However, both are explained by Andersen’s highly anti-Semitic opinions.} Andersen had based his work on the well-known anti-Semitic work The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Richthofen noted that most Danish clergy were unsupportive of anti-Semitism. The denouncement made it to NSDAP’s newspaper Völkische Beobachter, which claimed that the Jewish question had been raised in Denmark.\footnote{“Ablehnende Einstellung dänischer Theologen zum Antisemitismus in Dänemark. 37P,” January 13, 1936, PA, R99413.} (See section 6.2.1 for more on A. H. Andersen).

Richthofen would in 1936 argue that the Danish public was becoming more sympathetic towards Germany’s anti-Jewish measures. According to Richthofen, the slight change of heart lay in Danish exposure to Jewish refugees who were described as “importunate and obtrusive”. Richthofen employed an underlying assumption in anti-Semitism in which meeting Jews would reveal their (assumed) basic negative characteristics. In turn, this would generate sympathy for Germany’s domestic policies, he argued. To substantiate his claim, he cited the regional newspaper of Frederiksborg Amtstidende. The paper’s small article focused on the 50-60 Jewish refugees living in the larger city of Hillerød who had neglected to report e.g. address changes causing extra bureaucratic work.\footnote{Ibid.} Clearly, it is an exaggeration to interrelate the article to a
general change in the Danish attitude towards Jews. Nonetheless, Richthofen used it to present himself as an effective promoter of _Judenpolitik_ in Denmark.

In 1936, Cecil von Renthe-Fink replaced Richthofen as envoy which followed regular diplomatic protocol. It appears we are missing similar reports on the Jewish question from Renthe-Fink, but it seems unlikely he could have avoided reporting on the subject. As noted earlier, such reports were specifically requested and expected by the AA as well as being forwarded to high-ranking men and organizations. In addition, we should recall Renthe-Fink’s work in Aryanization, which showed his involvement in _Judenpolitik_. Our knowledge of the contents of these reports is thus highly fragmented. Yet, they show Denmark was part of the surveillance of Jewish refugees initiated by both the Gestapo (see chapter five) and the AA. We will now turn to how proof of race was used in Denmark in the prewar years.

### 6.1.1 Hjalmar Schacht’s Aryan Certificate

In the spring of 1937, the President of the German Reichsbank and Minister of Economics Hjalmar Schacht contacted the small, Danish parish of Tinglev. Schacht had been born in the parish by his Danish mother, and the priest was requested to issue proof that the prominent German minister was Aryan. According to the priest, he _daily_ issued this type of documents to Germans with Danish family ties.\(^{546}\) Proof of being Aryan had become vital for Germans to avoid being targeted by the anti-Jewish laws and/or to become party members. According to the German consulate in the Danish town of Skive, with 10,000 inhabitants, the consulate had assisted in 1,000 cases by the autumn of 1937. This process had involved both Danish priests and archives in the northern part of Denmark.\(^{547}\) However, this was not a new task for Danish archives and parishes. As early as 1934, a newspaper article had shown how Danish archives were involved in providing certified proof of German citizen’s Danish ancestry.\(^{548}\)

The German race laws also influenced the marriage laws in Denmark. In October 1937, the Danish Ministry of Justice practically enforced the Nuremburg race laws in Denmark. The ministry issued a circular which made it illegal for foreigners and non-resident couples to get married in Denmark. If a marriage was illegal in another country it should be considered illegal in Denmark. The Ministry of Justice attempted to spin the public reception of the law by

---

\(^{546}\) “Dr. Schacht har fået Arierattest fra Tinglev,” _Nationaltidende_, May 9, 1937, Mediastream.

\(^{547}\) “1000 Arier-Attester gennem det tyske konsulat i Skive,” _Skive Folkeblad_, September 7, 1937, Mediastream.

\(^{548}\) “Danske Arkiver får daglig tyske anmodninger om at oplyse slægtskabsforhold,” _Politiken_, September 11, 1934, Politikens Online Arkiv.
providing two examples from British marriage laws. The British law stated that brother “A” could not marry brother “B”’s wife before brother “A” was deceased. Evidently, the circular did not aim at stopping a swarm of British siblings trying to marry their brothers’ wives, but instead to prohibit marriages between German Jews and non-Jews in Denmark. The circular even outlined the German racial laws and explained how to determine who was Jewish (!). This was done in order to instruct the Danish organizations who had legal power to wed couples.549 Probably, this would mostly have affected German citizens, but in this manner, Denmark maintained the Nuremburg race laws on marriages regarding foreigners and travelers.

In 1938 Aryan proof also became an increasing issue for Danes. Thomas Hauch-Fausbøll was one of the Danish pioneers of genealogical research, and the Director of the Danish Genealogical Institute. In an interview in late 1938, he revealed that he spent most of his time at the archives “finding material for Aryan proofs for persons who want to be married or make business connections in Germany. The number of orders is enormous...”550

These kinds of questions were also posed to the Danish Foreign Ministry. The Danish-Jewish company Arthur Wittrock contacted the ministry to obtain an Aryan proof, but over the phone the ministry denied issuing such documents. Wittrock claimed he was not Jewish and believed he could solve the problem himself.551 The brief letter exchange shows that the Danish Foreign Ministry drew a line at issuing official statements of race. However, in the spring of 1939, the question of Aryan certificates surfaced again. Danes who lived in countries with anti-Jewish laws such as Germany, Italy, and Hungary faced increasing demands to prove they were Aryan. The ministry denied it could issue such certificates but unofficially it referred to private genealogical companies.552 Thus, providing legal advice on how to adhere to the racial laws, which seems to have been most helpful for those who were considered Aryan.

The various newspaper articles show that the German race laws had a border-crossing effect. It involved Danish authorities and archives, as well as being a smaller public issue. It increasingly became apparent that proof of being Aryan was a requirement in order to trade with Germany, and ads for genealogical research appeared in some newspapers.553 Parts of the Danish

550 “Slægternes flittige forsker fylder 60,” Berlingske Aftenavis, December 29, 1938, Mediastream”...at finde stof til arierattester for personer, som vil giftes eller knytte forretningsforbindelser i Tyskland. Bestillingernes antal er enormt...”
551 “Arthur Wittrock til Udenrigsministeriet.”
553 See e.g. “Reklame,” Nationaltidende, April 21, 1939, Mediastream; “Reklame,” Fædrelandet, February 7, 1940, Mediastream.
administration became involved in supplying the needed documents to Germans who needed proof of their family lines. Combined with the arrival of refugees, the use of official Danish documents for proof of race is an example of how the exclusive policies of National Socialist Germany affected Denmark.

Despite the lack of sources from the German legation on the issue of Jews in the prewar years, it seems safe to conclude that the issue was far from absent on the agenda. Taken together with the prewar Aryanization policies and registration of refugees we can conclude that Judenpolitik was a policy area which from 1933 became part of the legation’s work. We now turn to the occupation period to further examine the promotion of race and anti-Semitism.

6.2 Promoting Anti-Semitism and Race

This section deals with two areas of German Judenpolitik in Denmark: the attempts at promoting the anti-Semitic cause and to establish an official race office issuing proofs of race. The majority of the following sub-sections deal with anti-Semitic propaganda. Aage H. Andersen is central to these efforts which is why he will be our first center of attention.

6.2.1 Anti-Semitic Propaganda

Aage H. Andersen (1892-1968) has been called the most anti-Semitic person in Denmark, so much so that it cost him his first marriage.\textsuperscript{554} He was also excluded from the Danish Nazi Party (DNSAP) in 1935 due to his anti-Semitism. Instead, he formed his own Nazi party: National Socialistisk Arbejderparti (National Socialist Worker’s Party (NSAP)). Yet, in December 1941 the two parties merged. The 500-1,000 party members of NSAP were militarized, ritualized, and formed a small unit for active anti-Semitic raids called Storm Garden (the Storm Guard). The Party members and their spouses had to prove their Aryan descent. In 1935, The NSAP began publishing the anti-Semitic “classics”: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Henry Ford’s The International Jew, and the protestant reformer Martin Luther’s anti-Semitic book On the Jews and Their Lies from 1543.\textsuperscript{555}

Aage H. Andersen is known for issuing the anti-Semitic publication Kamptegnet, which was created in 1939, and formatted along the lines of the German Der Stürmer. Andersen was also


\textsuperscript{555} Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 60–63.
behind creating and chairing Dansk Anti-Jødisk Liga (Danish Anti-Jewish League) in 1941. The league was a sub-division of Anti-Jewish World league (Antijüdische Weltliga). Both of these were tied to the work of NSAP, and later DNSAP.\(^{556}\) Both Kamptegnet and Anti-Jewish league will be dealt with more extensively below, but first we should note that Andersen’s work in these organizations secured him a powerful ally in Paul Wurm.

In 1940 Paul Wurm was head of the Anti-Jewish World League, and the international department of Der Stürmer. He ensured that foreign news stories that depicted Jews negatively were published in the paper. Because of this position, he became head of an international network of anti-Semites, who held annual meetings during the 1930s. Wurm’s *Antijüdische Weltliga* had 25 translators who monitored foreign news on Jews, and media companies perceived as being controlled by Jews. Wurm was considered part of the “old” generation of anti-Semites within the National Socialist movement, and he had powerful friends. He held meetings and exchanged letters with Franz Rademacher, and Wurm’s information resources on international Jewry connected him to Adolf Eichmann as well as the SD.\(^{557}\)

Aage H. Andersen’s Anti-Jewish League was to assist in promoting National Socialism’s racial ideas in Denmark, and it is recognized as an extreme organization. In addition to previous research, I would like to draw attention to surveillance reports from Danish police that have not been previously applied in the research of the league. The league held a series of public meetings during the occupation, and the police reports indicate these meetings drew larger crowds than formerly recognized.\(^{558}\) According to the reports, an average of roughly 270 people attended the eight surveilled meetings. In February 1942, the highest number of attendees was recorded as 600 participated. The lowest number recorded was in January 1943 as only 90 people were present. However, the meeting in January was hampered by an air raid alarm. In comparison the meeting in February 1943 was attended by 150 people. The content of these meetings was highly anti-Semitic and similar to the most extreme propaganda claims known from Germany. This included rhetoric of being at war with the Jews, who had to be destroyed. Police also recorded the audience yelling “death to the Jews” on several occasions. There would often be praise for

\(^{556}\) Ibid., 50, 84 For a full overview of Aage H. Andersen, Danish Anti-Jewish League and Kamptegnet please consult chapter to 2 in Dansk antisemitisme.


\(^{558}\) Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 60 - She mentions two meetings one of 800 participants - based on a review in Kamptegnet, and 80-90 based on photographs from a meeting in the “Storm Garden.”
the Danish volunteers in the Frikors Danmark – the battalion of Danish volunteers in the Waffen-SS. Some meetings were also attended by Frikors’ members and on occasion members of the German military or the Waffen-SS. The Danish government would be highly criticized, and prominent Danish-Jewish civil servants or business owners were mentioned by name. Aage H. Andersen spoke at all the surveilled meetings.\(^{559}\)

Anti-Semitic propaganda efforts became part of the German Judenpolitik in Denmark in the spring of 1941. Aage H. Andersen was facing charges from the Ministry of Justice in the summer of 1940 for publishing several anti-Semitic books and leaflets. This was the second time he was facing the courts. In 1938 he had been sentenced to 80 days in prison after losing a libel case to the Jewish congregation.\(^{560}\) In 1941 Andersen activated his German connection, Paul Wurm. Wurm involved himself in order to intervene on Aage H. Andersen’s behalf by reaching out to the AA for assistance. The letter reveals that Andersen had received legal assistance from Germany during his trial in 1938. This points to direct German involvement in promoting anti-Semitism and legally assisting anti-Semites in Denmark even before the occupation. Towards the AA, Wurm argued that the German occupation of Denmark should improve the possibilities of providing legal assistance to Aage H. Andersen. Wurm stressed that Danish Jews should not be permitted to legally challenge Andersen’s publications or to frame him negatively.\(^{561}\) Renthe-Fink had to explain that Andersen had violated Danish press law and stood accused of attacking the Danish government in his writings. Despite these concerns Renthe-Fink secured Andersen’s stock of anti-Semitic literature from being confiscated.\(^{562}\) It seems that the German assistance in this matter was limited to ensuring that Andersen would not suffer material losses.

Nine months later, Renthe-Fink suggested subsidizing and promoting Aage H. Andersen’s anti-Semitic paper Kamptegnet. Renthe-Fink estimated that Andersen had made an “outstanding” contribution to the promotion of anti-Semitic literature in Denmark. There were “keine Bedenken” (no concerns) in reinvigorating Kamptegnet by providing it with heavy subsidies. Instead, it was to be welcomed as a way of re-introducing anti-Semitic propaganda in Denmark as the paper had “through its treatment of the Jewish question in Denmark had a good


\(^{561}\) "2. Paul Wurm an Auswärtige Amt," July 19, 1940, DK MAG.

\(^{562}\) "5. Cecil von Renthe Fink an das Auswärtige Amt," August 17, 1940, DK MAG; “6. Franz Rademacher an der Stürmer,” August 26, 1940, DK MAG.
influence".\textsuperscript{563} Andersen and his paper were to be paid 3,000 DKK (67,957 DKK/2017) a month, a considerable sum. Renthe-Fink recommended purchasing all of Andersen’s anti-Semitic literature, which was illegal to distribute, at a price of 15,000 DKK (339,787 DKK/2017). Renthe-Fink viewed the literature as a propaganda source for National Socialism and would make it available to Danes free of charge. Gustav Meissner travelled to Germany to discuss the matter further, and the initiative was approved.\textsuperscript{564}

The case of Andersen highlights the various border-crossing connections between advocates and supporters of \textit{Judenpolitik}. Andersen’s activation of his international anti-Semitic associates thus triggered interference in his court case. The case ran its course, but Andersen’s material losses were minimized, as his illegal literature was not confiscated. Instead, his publications became available for potential illegal distribution. Renthe-Fink evidently went on the offensive with a local initiative to re-open Kamptegnet, support Aage H. Andersen financially, and make Danish anti-Semitic literature available for free. Renthe-Fink thereby initiated propaganda measures which promoted anti-Semitism and were to legitimize \textit{Judenpolitik}. He framed his initiative positively by pointing to the benefits of reintroducing anti-Semitic propaganda in the Danish sphere. The German legation had consciously decided to challenge Danish law by becoming distributors of anti-Semitic publications.

The weekly Kamptegnet has seen its fair share of historiographic attention and recently it was comprehensively researched.\textsuperscript{565} The \textit{Stürmer} like lay-out and content was highly anti-Semitic. The articles were often hateful and vulgar as crimes related to sexual violations or violence were preferred. The articles often relied on informants or readers who sympathized with Nazism or wanted to inflict reputational damage on e.g. family members or business owners. Often the information was validated by the genealogical business Personal Historisk Institut that also issued proof of race. Pictures came from German bureaus, while Aage H. Andersen supplied local pictures of Jewish stores or residences. The anti-Semitic caricatures of the \textit{Stürmer} were reprinted in the paper, in addition to Danish produced ones, and it would seem the connection to Wurm secured German propaganda material.\textsuperscript{566} Kamptegnet was frowned upon. It

\textsuperscript{563} "12. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt," May 3, 1941, DK MAG - "durch Behandlung der Judenfrage in Dänemark einen guten Einfluss ausgeübt hat".
\textsuperscript{564} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{565} Bak, \textit{Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945}, 83–111.
\textsuperscript{566} Ibid., 86–88.
experienced several letters and counter articles against it in other papers and magazines. It remained a minor weekly with estimated sales of 2,000 per issue, but it was probably read by more due to its tabloid character.\footnote{Ibid., 85, 90–91, 93, 97–100, 119. Bak does mention Best wrote sales were as high 14,000 issues and reaching a low of 3,000.}

We know little of the consequences of Kamptegnet’s propaganda, but court-case material from the postwar trial against Paul Hennig do provide new insights. The more than 100 articles authored by Paul Hennig were individually researched by Danish police. The police managed to interview at least 139 people who had their names published in Hennig’s articles. The police aimed at disclosing the possible consequences of these articles. Some of the interviewees claimed to be unaware of the articles, and the police would read it aloud on the phone. In most of these cases, the person stated that the article had not been damaging for them. It is of course unknown if they later remembered incidents during the war. A segment of the interviewees claimed not to be Jewish and felt unharmed by the articles. Others would state the article had not been damaging but were discomforted at being publicized. Nine people were not interested in pressing charges if Hennig had been sentenced for other transgressions during the war. This seems to indicate the articles had been harmful, but in this manner, it was avoided to revisit the issue.\footnote{“Rapport nr. 97, 183, 223 vedr. artikler i Kamptegnet.” 1946, RA, Københavns Amt, Nordre Birs politi. Straffeakter, 1909-1959, Ks. XII.e-508-10.}

One case should suffice to illustrate the difficulty in evaluating whether the interviewees experienced discomfort after being publicly labelled as Jews. A Jewish owner of a small patisserie stated the he was not bothered by the article about him. However, after the publication he had experienced the words “Jew” etc. being painted on the sidewalk of his private villa.\footnote{“Rapport nr. 167. Artikel i Kamptegnet om Familien S. og Skandinavisk Conditorvareforretning.” June 8, 1946, RA, Københavns Amt, Nordre Birs politi. Straffeakter, 1909-1959, Ks. XII.e-508-10.} This suggests that the consequence of the article was that he fell victim to anti-Semitism.

For some, the anti-Semitism sponsored by the German legation had more apparent consequences. Although it remains difficult to directly relate anti-Semitic incidents to the articles in Kamptegnet, 31 persons indicated that this was in fact the case. In an article from December 1941, the Jewish singer Raquel Rastenni had been labelled as Jewish. Questioned after the war, she argued she had lost jobs because of the article, including the cancellation of her usual summer job at Marienlyst with the Kaj Evans’ orchestra. This cancellation was “caused by Marienlyst wanting to avoid trouble as it had been publicized she was Jewish”.\footnote{“Rapport nr. 97, 183, 223 vedr. artikler i Kamptegnet.”} One family in
Copenhagen had, after an article in Kamptegnet in late 1941, experienced posters being put up on their restaurant bearing the word “Jew”. On their private villa’s fence, posters were put up reading “Jew Villa”, and a window had been smashed. A star on the house that looked like the Star of David had been removed by the owners “to not provoke the young Nazis”. The wife, who was not Jewish, was arrested in October 1943, but was able to secure a release after two hours, as she could prove she was not Jewish. Incorrect information could also be damaging. An audit company was wrongfully labelled as Jewish, and despite a complaint to Kamptegnet, who corrected the article, the company lost customers. The article had been anonymously circulated among the company’s clients, and used by agents of other companies to convince them to change their audit company. The company ended up losing many contracts in the fishing industry, which exported heavily to Germany.

During the occupation Kamptegnet caused continuous concerns at the highest levels of the Danish government. The following will show that Kamptegnet’s editors were prosecuted with the acceptance of Berlin, while illustrating the extreme caution the Danish government exercised in this matter. In December 1941 the government had a renewed discussion regarding a possible police action against Kamptegnet. However, the fear of raising “the complete Jewish question…which was to be avoided as long as possible” caused concern. The anti-Semitic campaign distressed the Danish government and while being somewhat passive the preliminary legal proceedings were set in motion in January 1942. Kamptegnet was also discussed in several cabinet meetings in February 1942. The Minister of Justice, Thune Jacobsen, believed it might be possible to use the laws against pornography to incriminate Kamptegnet. However, the government wanted Kanstein to approve this step before pursuing the issue further. It is unclear if Kanstein was consulted, but Weizsäcker was.

Gunnar Larsen visited Berlin in March and he took the issue to Weizsäcker. Larsen discussed both the Jewish question on a general level and Kamptegnet with Weizsäcker. Larsen had gotten the impression that the Jewish question would not be raised in Denmark if the Danes...

573 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:489 “...at hele jødespørgsmålet blev rejst...det skulle afværges længst muligt.”
574 Ibid.; Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 429.
576 Larsen was in Berlin to attend Fritz Todt’s funeral which took place on the 12th of February 1942.
behaved wisely. However, and without providing details, Weizsäcker’s remarks on this area were “not absolutely positive”. The Danes had been warned and provided with a rather negative outlook for the future regarding the Jews. On the specific issue of Kamptegnet, Larsen stressed to Weizsäcker that the Danes acknowledged that the anti-Semitic nature of Kamptegnet was tied to the German policy. However, the government was concerned, as the paper had turned in a pornographic direction. The Danish envoy, Mohr, raised the same concerns two weeks later. Weizsäcker argued that it was up to the Danes to deal with pornography issues. The Danes had thus cautiously secured support for a legal action against Kamptegnet. Evidently, the Danes very hesitantly challenged an obvious and vulgar proponent of anti-Semitism. A concerned Weizsäcker contacted Renthe-Fink, who managed to dampen the paper’s writings somewhat. There seems to have been a slight discrepancy between Berlin and the legation in this matter. The legal action which followed against Kamptegnet is often used to underscore Danish independence in judicial matters. However, it seems the Danish government only pursued the weekly after receiving approval from Berlin.

6.2.2 Jud-Süss

Earlier in 1941, Renthe-Fink had succeeded in getting the well-known anti-Semitic German movie Jud-Süss shown in Danish movie theaters. The movie combines Christian anti-Semitic sentiments and National Socialist race propaganda. At the dramatic peak of the film, the Jewish character Süss rapes a young, obviously Aryan woman who drowns herself in shame, while Süss is expelled from the city. This had caused German audiences to yell out in the theatres, demanding banishment of the Jews. Renthe-Fink had initial difficulties in persuading Danish theater owners to show the film as they feared boycotts. Renthe-Fink reported that negotiations were planned, while mentioning the possibility of the movie opening in early 1941, slightly more than four months after it had launched in Germany. We lack the sources to shed light on how Renthe-Fink convinced Danish theaters to show the film. Yet, they did and their initial fears proved unwarranted. Recent research considers the movie a European success, as it sold 20

577 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:98; A general discussion on the Jewish Question in Denmark is not mentioned in “Weizsäcker - Gunnar Larsen Besuch,” February 13, 1942, PA, R29836.


579 Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 433.


million tickets. In Denmark, it was one of the most successful German movies shown during the occupation, as it played in theaters in the Copenhagen area for several months. According to Danish film historian Lars Martin-Sørensen, the appeal to the Danish audience was not its anti-Semitic content, but rather that the movie contains the usual elements of a blockbuster drama.582 The reviews were mixed. The bourgeois paper Berlingske-Tidende saw the character Süss as a contaminator of society, describing him as a plague, while the Aryans in the movie were labelled as protectors against such dangers. The reviewer, Svend Borberg, clearly accepted the propagandistic intentions in the movie. The leftist paper Social-Demokraten, on the other hand, labelled the movie as very biased.583

We are unable to trace the actual effects of the movie on Danish audiences, but it is still considered a central propaganda piece of National Socialism, just like its much less successful predecessor Der ewige Jude, which was a more blatant piece of anti-Semitic propaganda. Both movies were shown prior to deportation campaigns in the Netherlands and France, but they were also used for morale boosts and shown to SS personnel in concentration camps and at the front lines. In Denmark, Der ewige Jude did not reach theatres, yet it was shown at meetings of the Danish Anti-Jewish League. This was also the case for the movie Jud Süss, which became an integral part of the education at the sergeant level (Unteroffiziere) for the Schalburgkorps.584

The German legation and Renthe-Fink had clearly played a decisive part in promoting anti-Semitism and secured a key propaganda piece was shown in Denmark. The propagandistic movies continued to be used and to be shown in private settings, which only underscores their position as important anti-Semitic propaganda pieces.

6.2.3 Promoting Race

Proof of race was brought on the official agenda in the spring of 1941 by the Danish Nazi party (DNSAP). The party wanted to issue Aryan certificates, which would be legally acknowledged in Germany. The Danish office was to be called Rassepolitischen Zentralbüro. Paul Hennig, genealogist, and party member headed it, in cooperation with Aage H. Andersen. As mentioned

582 Sørensen, Dansk film under nazismen, 318–19, 321 Sørensen omits to discuss the involvement of the German legation.
583 Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 260–61.
584 Ibid.; Jakob Antropoid, "Der ewige Jude," Den store danske (Gyldendal), accessed May 17, 2017, http://denstordanske.dk/index.php?sidid=274116 The corps was named after a commander of the Frikorps Danmark who had died in battle. It was formed in April 1943 to combat the Danish resistance movement.
earlier (see chapter five and above) they were central personalities in race matters in Denmark and tied to several German organizations including the legation.

The leader of DNSAP, Frits Clausen, had successfully convinced Renthe-Fink to secure Berlin’s approval for a Danish office to issue Aryan certificates. Renthe-Fink believed it would be beneficial to achieve a formal approval of the office’s certificates as he labelled other issuers of proof of race as unofficial profiteers. An official office would probably remove the competition in this curious industry, and Renthe-Fink would have secured a monopoly for the DNSAP.585 Less than a month later the initiative was approved and the SS Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (RuSHA) would in the future recognize Aryan certificates issued by the office in Denmark. Paul Hennig was to make an observation tour to Germany to learn the trade. The RuSHA looked forward to Hennig’s visit and would provide further assistance to the office in Copenhagen if needed. It turned out Dr. Charles Hindborg, also a member of DNSAP, headed the Amt für Rassenforschung, which also issued Aryan certificates.586 In the end, the new office was called Head office for Racial Policies and led by Aage H. Andersen.587

The Head office for Racial Policies, operating under the name Arier og Slægtsforskningskontoret (Aryan and Genealogical Research Office), began investigations on its own. A complaint from the company E. Geday to the Danish police revealed that the office had called one of E. Geday’s business connections, Københavns Tæppelager (Copenhagen Carpet Storage) in order to ask if E. Geday had an Aryan certificate. The caller had identified herself as a member of the Danish police, and this was probably to the gravest concern for the police. The police visited the premises of Arier og Slægtsforskningskontoret, which was on the same floor as Kamptegnet and Dansk Antijødisk Liga. This tied all three offices to Aage H. Andersen. The police got the impression that the business provided Aryan certificates and did genealogical research, but also that it apparently used drastic methods to obtain racial information.588 This proves the previous indications that Andersen was systematically collecting information on the Jews and kept registries of his findings.589

587 Lauridsen, Dansk nazisme 1930-1945 - og derefter, 474.
589 Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 110–11.
Renthe-Fink had supported the wishes of the Danish Nazi Party and this had resulted in a Danish office which could issue official Aryan certificates. Berlin had accepted the proposition and made their expertise on the issue available. This is to be considered a vital step in the promotion of race in Denmark as a formal organization could officially determine the race of Danes. Despite its voluntary nature it formally introduced the use of Nazism’s racial definitions in a country without racial laws defining Jews. It remains unknown how many Danes applied for official proof of being Aryan. Most likely, those who needed such proof had already obtained it in some form in the 1930s. It is undisclosed how the Danish government reacted to the creation of this office.

6.2.4 Jews Excluded from Being in Parts of Denmark.

In October 1940, Reinhard Heydrich ordered the security police to register and interrogate German emigrants in occupied countries. The goal was to relocate persons who were wanted by the German police or viewed as enemies of Das Reich. The order included a section on the Jews, who were to be interned in camps near large traffic hubs such as ports or main railway lines. The geographic range of the order was Northern and Western Europe, but Denmark was not included. Kanstein was informed of Heydrich’s order, and at the same time the Oberkommando des Heeres demanded security areas (Sicherungsgebiete). These had to be cleared of Jews, political refugees from Germany, and Gypsies who were all considered enemies of Germany. This order was applicable to Denmark in the area of Northern and Western Jutland. The German military e.g. requested a list of Jews in the town of Varde, but Danish police claimed they were unable to answer.590 In November 1940, the Germans successfully demanded that a group of German Jews were removed from the area of Thy in Northern Jutland.591 The Judenpolitik was thus formally and geographically enforced in Denmark, and there was a specific area of Denmark that Jews could not visit or live in.

6.3 German Pressure for Anti-Jewish Laws and the Signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact

In September 1940 King Christian X would enter into a discussion with Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning on the possible German demand to deport Jews in Denmark. The King would

590 Kirchhoff and Rünitz, Udsendt til Tyskland, 203.
deny any such demands and the Prime Minister expressed the same views. Hjalmar Schacht was paraphrased during the discussion as having stated there was not a Jewish problem in Denmark. It is unclear what sparked this exchange of views. A strong pressure for anti-Jewish laws would soon stress test this position.

A forceful pressure for anti-Jewish laws began in the last two months of 1941 and January 1942. These months would become dramatic, and this was related to the signing of the Anti-Comintern pact in November 1941. There would be high tensions in the Danish-German relationship and a crisis within the Danish Government. In order to examine these events further, a few contextual passages are needed on the signing of the Anti-Comintern pact and the Wannsee Conference. As both events appear to have had an enforcing effect on the development of Judenpolitik in Denmark. I will then move to the German correspondence between Copenhagen and Berlin related to the Judenpolitik in Denmark in early January 1942. This will set the scene for the examination of the German pressure for anti-Jewish laws in Denmark as well as the reactions and discussions within the Danish government. Let us now turn to the contextual part of this section.

Denmark, along with allies and satellites of the Third Reich, signed the renewal of the Anti-Comintern pact on the 25th of November 1941. The pact was originally formed in 1936 between Germany and Japan against Soviet Russia. It was mostly perceived as a show-case to promote the collaboration of the two countries. It was expanded when Italy and Spain became co-signatories in 1938 and 1939 respectively. The renewal of the pact in 1941 was not only used for propaganda purposes, but also to formally tie other nations closer to Germany. Denmark’s government would hesitate in signing the pact, recognizing its legitimizing value for Germany, while also acknowledging that Denmark would be perceived as tightening its association with Germany. Yet, the German demand for a Danish signature proved non-negotiable. Renthe-Fink threatened to terminate the cooperation agreement between Germany and Denmark from 1940. The German pressure was intensified as the German troops in Denmark went into a state of alert. This happened two days before the signing was to take place in Berlin. After a series of discussions in the cabinet the Danish Foreign Minister left for Berlin. In Berlin, demands were sharpened upon his arrival. In the end, Denmark secured a small diplomatic victory. It was

592 Ibid., 440–41.
593 The other new signatories were Finland, Rumania, Slovakia, Croatia, Nanking China.
confirmed that Denmark was not be obliged to initiate new policies after signing the pact. The signing sparked rumors and demonstrations in Copenhagen against the Danish-German cooperation.\textsuperscript{594}

On the 20\textsuperscript{th} of January 1942, the Wannsee Conference took place.\textsuperscript{595} The Wannsee Conference is generally considered as a coordinating meeting between SS officers, state secretaries and senior civil servants who were to organize the further persecution and genocide of the European Jews.\textsuperscript{596} It was supposed to have taken place on the 9\textsuperscript{th} of December, but the Japanese attacked the USA on the 7\textsuperscript{th}, and Germany declared war against the USA on the 11\textsuperscript{th}. Due to these events the conference was rescheduled to the 20\textsuperscript{th} of January 1942.

The subject heading for the postponed meeting was changed to “issues related to the final solution of the Jewish question.”\textsuperscript{597} The participants would discuss how to proceed against the Jews in most European areas. As one of the only regions the Nordic countries were to be exempted from a “tiefgehender Behandlung” (an extensive treatment), probably meaning deportation and murder, as this would cause difficulties. As a consequence, Luther suggested the less than 20,000 Jews in the Nordic countries were to initially be spared. This was accepted due to the low number of Jews in Denmark and Norway.\textsuperscript{598}

If we remain in the period surrounding the Wannsee conference two notes from Rademacher and Luther are revealing of AA’s perception of Denmark in regards to European J\textit{udenpolitik}. Prior to Wannsee’s scheduled meeting on the 9\textsuperscript{th} of December, Rademacher outlined the AA’s “ideas and wishes” on the matter in eight points. They all concerned the development of the Jewish question in various states and as the points progressed, the measures suggested became less radical. The first four points regarded deportation measures especially in the German Reich. Points five to six were focused on introducing anti-Jewish laws in e.g. Rumania and Bulgaria. Denmark was affected by point seven “Influence the remaining governments of Europe to introduce anti-Jewish laws”. Point eight stressed AA’s wish for a continued positive cooperation with the Gestapo.\textsuperscript{599}

\textsuperscript{594} Christensen et al., \textit{Danmark besat: krig og hverdag} 1940-45, 266–68.
\textsuperscript{596} Longerich, \textit{Holocaust}, 304–5.
\textsuperscript{599} #19. Franz Rademacher \textit{Aufzeichnung},” 1941, DK MAG.
Close to New-Year’s Eve 1941, and after the postponement of the Wannsee conference, Luther reflected on the issue. Under the impression of an Entschluss des Führers (a decision by Hitler) that all Jews were to be removed from Europe before the end of the war, he suggested that all signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact, if possible, should be moved to adopt some form of anti-Jewish laws. He presumed difficulties would arise in signatory countries Italy and Spain due to clerical obstruction, but also in Hungary. Interestingly, he included non-signatories Sweden and Switzerland labeling those countries as potentially difficult to move in that direction. He evidently did not expect problems to arise in countries like Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland or Denmark. This suggests that the AA was satisfied with the current progress on the matter in these countries.  

It is important to note that Luther’s ideas and thoughts serve as an important pretext for the discussions on these matters in Denmark. Following the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact rumors of Anti-Jewish laws in Denmark initiated an internal German correspondence between Copenhagen and Berlin. This is enlightening in understanding both German reactions as well as the development of Judenpolitik in Denmark. Ribbentrop wanted to know who had started the discussion of the Jewish question in Denmark. Martin Luther explained how the German legation had not been instructed to initiate the Jewish question in Denmark. However, Rademacher had “orally” instructed Renthe-Fink to raise the question when the opportunity presented itself. Renthe-Fink was to refer to the fact that:

“…according to the words of the Führer the Jewish question in Europe would be finally solved and it would be wise if Denmark duly would adjust itself accordingly.”

Renthe-Fink was also to argue that solving the Jewish question would be “technically easier” if Denmark would introduce German-type laws against the Jews. In addition, Werner von Grundherr had also instructed Renthe-Fink to do so. Ribbentrop’s order was to “Nicht insisteren”

---

600 “20. Martin Luther Aufzeichnung,” December 30, 1941, DK MAG.
601 “24. Franz von Sonnenleithner an Martin Luther,” January 10, 1942, DK MAG.
602 “25. Martin Luther Vortragsnotitz,” January 15, 1942, DK MAG”…dass nach den Worten des Führers die Judenfrage in Europa endgültig gelöst würde, und es daher klug wäre, wann Dänemark sich von sich auf rechtzeitig daraus einstelle”.

183
- do not insist, since it might work to opposite effect in the Danish government. In this manner it seems to be Ribbentrop who had lightened the pressure for anti-Jewish laws in Denmark.

It would seem that the German Judenpolitik in Denmark between the period from November 1941 and January 1942 was to apply a diplomatic and political pressure in order to achieve the adoption of some form of anti-Jewish laws in Denmark. If Denmark did not comply, the consequences seem to be minimal as Ribbentrop had ordered his diplomats not to insist on such laws. In this light, any gains made in regards to Judenpolitik in Denmark would probably be regarded as a success.

### 6.3.1 The Policy of Exclusion

Letters from Renthe-Fink in early January 1942 shows he had attempted to follow the orders from the leading cadres of the AA. They also shed light on the progress of general anti-Jewish policies being applied in Denmark. The German Reichsbevollmächtigten had continuously and forcefully stressed this stance in earlier meetings with Scavenius. Unfortunately, we lack the minutes of these talks, but according to Renthe-Fink he had pointed out that:

“It would be wise if Denmark in due time would attune itself to the fact that a European-wide regulation of the Jewish question would be introduced at the latest by the end of the war.”

At the same time Renthe-Fink confirmed the official, yet subversive, racially motivated anti-Jewish policy in Denmark:

“...we will continue our former policy. Our previous practice, whenever an opportunity presents itself to push back the influence of the Jews, or rather to completely eliminate the Jewish influence, will be continued. Also, we shall continue to work towards a greater understanding of the Jewish question here.”

---

603 Ibid.
605 “dass es klug wäre wenn Dänemark sich rechtzeitig darauf einstellt, dass spätens am Kriegsende eine europäische Regelung der Judenfrage erfolgt.”
This is the clearest expression of the presence of an active German *Judenpolitik* in Denmark. To some extent it builds on the reasons behind the Aryanization policies. These served a twofold purpose of 1) carrying out the *Entjudung* of the German foreign trade, and 2) were an important component of the overall *Judenpolitik* in Denmark. At the same time the statement underscores the fact that subsidizing *Kamptegnet* and promoting *Jud-Süss* were both part of a continuous effort to create Anti-Semitic awareness. In a sense the statement also concluded that the pressure on the Danish Government to adopt anti-Jewish laws had been unsuccessful, but that other informal gains had been made. As we step back into events in November and December 1941 it will become evident that the Danish rejection was by no means an outcome set in stone. On the contrary, the Danish government’s rejections of formal laws opened up for informal discrimination.

### 6.3.2 Renthe-Fink Proposes Anti-Jewish Laws

At several meetings in December 1941 and January 1942, Renthe-Fink strove to influence specific members of the Danish government and its administration to adopt anti-Jewish laws. The discussions underscore that Renthe-Fink followed his instructions from Berlin, and despite being unsuccessful in his endeavor to persuade the Danish government to adopt formal anti-Jewish laws, he made other gains in this area. The Danish reactions to the German pressure are also reflected in these discussions. I will first account for the content of the meetings and then analyze them.

Franz Rademacher visited Denmark on the 11th of December, just a few days after the original date for the Wannsee Conference. Rademacher’s visit to Denmark was thus completed under the impression that most Jews in Europe faced deportation and death in some horrible form. Rademacher stayed in Copenhagen for six days, and it is highly likely that he held meetings with Renthe-Fink, but we do not know for certain. Yet, Rademacher was a high-ranking official in the AA and had continuously corresponded with Renthe-Fink on the issue. Following Luther’s ideas for the Wannsee Conference, Denmark was to be pushed to adopt laws against the Jews. Only the day after Rademacher’s departure, Renthe-Fink began following through on these new orders.

Renthe-Fink applied pressure on Knud Sthyr, a senior civil servant in the Foreign Ministry, at an informal meeting. The minutes is an unused source in Danish history. They reveal how
Renthe-Fink was aligned with the wishes of the AA and did not have second thoughts in attempting to raise the Jewish question in Denmark. According to the minutes, he demanded that laws against the Jews were to be introduced in Denmark by stating:

“It was even more necessary now, as Göring had said plain and clear to Scavenius that Denmark also had to assist in solving this National Socialist ideological question”.

Renthe-Fink went on to declare that Denmark needed some form of laws against the Jews. The Danes disagreed. The issue could not be compared to Germany, they said, stating that: “There is not a Jewish question in Denmark”. They also warned Renthe-Fink that the Danish government would resign if Jewish liberties were diminished. While this was a noble argument, it stood in contrast to the arrests of the communists by Danish police in the summer of 1941 and the Aryanization attempts. Moreover, the Danes argued that “The influence of the Jews in this country has been strongly diminished, and at the moment they were remaining very quiet.” Renthe-Fink accepted these arguments. However, he countered them by suggesting the following administrative actions:

A. The government should not hire or promote Jews in the civil service, and it should influence larger Danish companies to avoid promoting Jews to the leadership
B. The government should prevent Jews from appearing on Danish Radio
C. The government should make sure that all Jewish elements were removed from the Danish press.

In combination with the Aryanization policies these three suggestions were Renthe-Fink’s goals in the area of *Judenpolitik*, and he would work to achieve them for the duration of his period in Denmark.

---

607 “Referat af møde mellem Cecil von Renthe-Fink, H.H. (Hugo Hergel?) og Knud Sthyn.,” December 18, 1941, RA, UM 120.d28a “Det var så meget mere nødvendigt, som Göring jo klart og tydeligt til Scavenius havde sagt, at dette nationalsocialistiske ideologiske spørgsmål måtte Danmark også være med til at løse.” Göring had stated this to Scavenius during a meeting in Berlin, which was held during the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941. I will account for this meeting in the sections below.
609 “Referat af møde mellem Cecil von Renthe-Fink, H.H. (Hugo Hergel?) og Knud Sthyn.” “Jødernes indflydelse her i landet var gået stærkt tilbage, i øjeblikket holder de sig så stærkt i ro.”
610 Ibid.
Renthe-Fink’s suggestions to not promote Jews and remove them from the radio seemed practically feasible to Sthyr who would take the matter to the government. However, it was impossible to accept an official agreement, because “the Danish government would rightly fear that an agreement between Denmark and Germany of some side-branch of the Jewish question, would sooner or later give rise to Germany demanding further questions solved.”

Renthe-Fink had mentioned that the newspapers *Politiken* and *Berlingske Tidende* were considered controlled or influenced by Jews. *Politiken* had Jewish stock-owners and *Berlingske* had C.B. Henriques as a board-member. The Danes stressed that they could not remove stock ownership and argued that Henriques’ presence was not a valid argument for categorizing *Berlingske Tidende* as influenced by Jews. Instead, they focused on the (racial) fact that it was primarily owned by an Aryan family. Moreover, they argued it would be very difficult for the Danish government to remove Henriques.

Renthe-Fink was questioned on his motives. Had he been instructed to promote questions on the Jews in Denmark? He denied this despite his instructions from Rademacher and Werner von Grundherr. Therefore, his suggestions below have to be viewed as very tactical as he on the one hand promoted anti-Jewish initiatives while on the other hand used his superiors in Berlin as a threat towards the Danish government. His denial of his instructions shows a Renthe-Fink who wanted to present himself as ready to promote strong anti-Jewish measures in Denmark. Postwar Renthe-Fink would argue that he wanted to lie low in this policy area and not promote Jewish laws in Denmark.

“He denied it but declared that after the statements that periodically had been made in Germany, and after the Jewish question’s development in the occupied countries, he had to assume that he sooner or later would be instructed [to act].”

---

611 Ibid. “...den danske regering med rette ville være bange for, at en aftale om en eller anden sidegren af jødespørgsmålet mellem Danmark og Tyskland ville føre til, at man fra tysk side fær eller senere forlangte yderligere spørgsmål løst.”

612 Ibid.

613 See e.g. Yahil, *Et Demokrati på prøve*, 76.

The Danish tactic was to underline that anti-Jewish initiatives would be contrary to the wishes of the German government who valued quiet and order in Denmark. Renthe-Fink would breach the overall German policy by moving against the Jews, the Danes argued.615

The discussion seemingly continued in early January 1942 in a second meeting between Renthe-Fink and Sthyr. Renthe-Fink found it difficult to accept the rejection of an official agreement to prevent the promotion of Jewish civil servants. The Danish answer remained the same. The Danish government feared it would be met with new demands once it had accepted the first ones. However, the government would possibly be able to “de facto” stop promoting Jews.616

In the period between the two meetings with Sthyr, Renthe-Fink had also attempted to raise the issue with Gunnar Larsen on the 23rd of December 1941. According to Larsen, Renthe-Fink came across as cautious, but he basically proposed the same initiatives to be taken against the Jews as he did in his meetings with Sthyr. Renthe-Fink probed Gunnar Larsen’s attitude towards introducing Jewish laws, but Larsen agreed with his colleagues: demands for anti-Jewish laws would cause the resignation of the Danish government. Renthe-Fink replied with the view that “one could never know when the case would be raised by Berlin”. Larsen suggested that one should make sure Berlin would not raise the issue. Renthe-Fink tactically proceeded by stating that he would have to prevent the issue from being raised in Berlin, but the Danish government had to play a part in securing this outcome. Renthe-Fink repeated the government had to discontinue hiring or promoting Jews in the civil service and prevent Jews from appearing on Danish Radio. This was identical to Renthe-Fink’s suggestions to Sthyr.617

Renthe-Fink then used Berlin and the Danish anti-Semites to pressure Gunnar Larsen. Renthe-Fink claimed Berlin was well-informed on these issues from the legation and the anti-Semite Aage H. Andersen. The proponents of anti-Semitism would inform party organizations, which in turn would ask the AA for reports on the subject. Renthe-Fink emphasized that a substantial case on the Jewish question in Denmark was being assembled in Berlin.

Renthe-Fink went on to suggest that the Danish Jews would welcome a formal understanding on the matter. In Larsen’s words it went as follows:

615 Ibid.
616 Ibid.
“…the Danish Jews, whom he [Renthe-Fink] recognized were not aggressive or excessively represented, except in university circles, themselves should have an interest in a Danish-formulated simple understanding of the matter; hereafter one could argue to Berlin that the case had now been brought to order and thus avoid Berlin demanding the case being raised, which would have more dangerous consequences for the Jews at a later point in time.”

Gunnar Larsen dismissed Renthe-Fink’s arguments, because the suggestion of a formal resolution was considered political and would probably cause the present government to step down.

In conclusion, Renthe-Fink argued that the Danish government could avoid provoking the question by not promoting Jews in the civil service and to prevent them from speaking on the radio. Gunnar Larsen agreed to work for avoiding “provocations”. At the following cabinet meeting, Larsen said he had rejected Renthe-Fink’s proposal. Scavenius revealed that Renthe-Fink had approached him on the same issue as well, but he too had rejected Renthe-Fink’s demands. Renthe-Fink had clearly pressured several persons of the Danish government and administration in an attempt to make them accept anti-Jewish measures.

Cecil von Renthe-Fink had thus followed orders and attempted to expand the Judenpolitik in Denmark by applying a political pressure on members of the Danish government. The Danish rejection was followed up by Renthe-Fink in a well-structured counterproposal to institute informal measures against the Danish Jews (the proposals labelled A, B and C above). Renthe-Fink might have suspected a Danish refusal of a formal agreement, as he seems to have a specific “Plan B” drawn up. The Danish members of the administration and government negated formal laws but accepted Germany’s wish to see progress in the area of Judenpolitik. The refusal to acknowledge that a Jewish problem existed in Denmark was an attempt to undermine the premise of Judenpolitik. If a problem does not exist, it cannot be addressed. Semantically, this is a very creative challenge to the fundamental and negative views of Jews. However, the Danes

---

618 “Referat af møde mellem Gunnar Larsen og Cecil von Renthe-Fink”

somewhat undermined this position by arguing that Jewish influence in Denmark had diminished. This was obviously an attempt to tone down the importance of Danish Jews in order to avoid discriminatory measures. The Danish acceptance of the de facto implementation of at least suggestion A + B shows that the Danish government representatives were ready to accept informal initiatives against specific groups of Jews. It remains unclear if Renthe-Fink succeeded in removing Jewish stock owners from *Politiken*. However, C.B. Henriques was removed from *Berlingske Tidende*, but the exact date is unknown.⁶²⁰

Renthe-Fink deployed different legitimization strategies in his meetings with Sthyr and Gunnar Larsen. In the first discussion, he used Göring’s words to substantiate his claim, while also stressing an expectation that the Jewish question would be raised in Denmark. Interestingly, the Danes used Berlin as a counter argument, claiming that Renthe-Fink was going directly against the dictatorship’s policy of political stability in Denmark. The Danes expected that a formal German demand for anti-Jewish legislation would result in the withdrawal of the Danish government, and several of Renthe-Fink’s suggestions for formal laws were taken off the table. However, this seems to be a tactical move by Renthe-Fink who instead proposed informal demands in order to gain advancements on the issue.

In the meeting with Gunnar Larsen, Renthe-Fink seems more careful. Renthe-Fink legitimized his arguments by using Berlin as a threat, and he continuously stressed that Berlin was following events in Denmark through various channels. He specifically mentioned Aage H. Andersen as one of these informants. As we know, Renthe-Fink was behind assisting Andersen in gaining the position as the primary anti-Semitic agitator in Denmark. Due to this support, Renthe-Fink could hardly view him as a threat. Andersen was rather a key individual in Renthe-Fink’s attempt to raise anti-Semitic awareness in Denmark. Renthe-Fink also use the Jews as an argument by claiming that a formal agreement would calm them. Incidentally, his characterization of the Danish Jewish influence reveals that Renthe-Fink possessed information on the composition and positions of Danish Jews.

⁶²⁰ T. Vogel-Jørgensen, *Berlingske Tidende gennem to hundrede år 1749-1949*, vol. 2. Under Grundloven 1849-1949 (Berlingskes Forlag, 1949), 531 “Han holdt ud på sine poster i Berlingske Tidende så længe, han mente at det ikke kunne skade bladet, at han sad der. Først da han blev klar over, at hans person kunne være uheldig for bladet i dets forhold over for tyskerne, meddelte han, at han ville trække sig tilbage. Højesteretssagføreren bevarede dog både i egenskab af juridisk rådgiver og på anden måde nær tilknytning til det Berlingske hus” // “He kept his positions in Berlingske Tidende as long as he felt it would not damage the paper if he stayed on. Not until he realized his character could be unfortunate for the paper’s relationship to the Germans, he announced his withdrawal. The supreme court justice did keep his role as legal advisor and in others ways his association with the company”.
Overall, we must acknowledge the clear Danish refusal of introducing formal laws against the Jews, while not ignoring the evident approval of informal initiatives towards the Jews. It seems evident that developments in the overall German Judenpolitik also had an enforcing effect on promoting the Jewish question in Denmark. Unfortunately, we do not have Renthe-Fink’s reports on these meetings, and we are left with a very one-sided and Danish perspective.

6.4 The Danish Government’s Discussions on Measures Against the Jews

We now turn to the discussions within the Danish government related to the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact and Renthe-Fink’s pressure for Jewish laws. These will show that although the cabinet ministers ended up rejecting Renthe-Fink, a minority in the Danish government seriously considered accommodating the Germans in some way.

In late November 1941, Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius would travel to Berlin to sign the pact, and during his stay he had conversations with Adolf Hitler, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Hermann Göring. Hitler had impressed Scavenius on the 27th of November, and Scavenius is to have stated “Besides what is in the minutes from Scavenius it should be noted that he had the very best impression of Hitler as a dynamic character who completely controlled everything and everyone”.621 This is also reflected in the minutes from the Nine-Man Committee, where Scavenius’ characterized Hitler as: “He was a force. There was a colossal confidence in victory”.622 Otto Carl Mohr, Danish envoy of the Danish legation in Berlin, felt Hitler gave a less impressive performance compared to his meeting with him in September. Mohr even detected a marked difference in Hitler’s mood. Hitler did not mention the Jewish question, but stressed Germany’s role as Europe’s defender against Bolshevism.623 After Meeting Hitler, Scavenius met with Ribbentrop, who would not mention Judenpolitik, but he did comment on the demonstrations in Copenhagen against the signing of the pact.624

The day before, the 26th, Göring had extended an invitation for tea to the Danes and other diplomats. Göring had been in Denmark several times, including as a show pilot after the First World War. He shared anecdotes from that time and described it as one of the best periods of

---

623 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:471 Mohr’s minutes are reprinted in the diary and must have been circulated. The meeting took place on the 27-11-1941.
624 Ibid., 1:469 The minutes were written by Frantz Hvass from the Danish Foreign Ministry. They are printed and must have been circulated. The meeting took place on the 27-11-1941.
his life. He spoke of National Socialism, which he regarded as unsuitable for export, and he then turned to the Jews, reckoning: “there was no way around a European solution to the Jewish question considering – in his opinion – their close connection to Bolshevism.”

Scavenius returned home by car on the 29th of November to a group of eagerly awaiting colleagues, whom he quickly calmed. He stated that Hitler and Ribbentrop had not raised the Jewish question, the question of Southern Denmark or the use of the Danish military. The cabinet had expected these three issues would have been raised. Scavenius did refer to his conversation with Göring and stated:

“Hermann Göring had during a conversation touched upon the Jewish question especially concerning the full-Jews...The individual states could solve their affairs as they wanted. But international Jewry also had to be combatted, because otherwise the struggle against Bolshevism could not be accomplished. There was no rush, but at some point, the issue had to be solved.”

Scavenius also gave an oral report of this visit to the Nine-Man Committee. Alsing Andersen specifically asked if the issue of the Jews had been raised. Here Scavenius omits any mention of Göring, but states that “other people” had commented on the Jewish question calling for a common Judenpolitik. The need was legitimized in the belief that Jews were behind communism and the enemies of Europe.

This fact sparked a government debate on the issue. On behalf of the Social-Democratic group in parliament Andersen continued to argue they could not accept moves against the Jews. The conservative Ole Bjørn Kraft seconded this. Scavenius calmed his colleagues by replying he had told his German counterparts there was no a ‘Jewish Question’ in Denmark and Scavenius gave the same answer to the Swedes. Yet, this important denial is not cited in the Danish minutes of the meeting in Berlin.

---

625 Ibid., 1:470 The meeting took place on the 26-11-1941 and the minutes are written by Hvass. They are reprinted in the diary which means it must have been circulated, thus a number of people must have been aware of Göring's statement.
626 “Halfdan Hendriksen spredte erindringer 1939-1944. Manuskript B,” December 1944, RA. Halfdan Hendriksen 1939-1944 The minutes from the meetings were read out during the meeting, but there is not recorded any remarkable reactions by the King to these; “Statsrådsprotokol,” December 1, 1941, RA, Statsrådet.
628 Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 111 Kirchhoff uses Swedish diplomatic reports as his source.
Scavenius also gave other details. The Germans had been surprised by certain appointments and while details were not provided they seem to concern the appointment of Jews within the civil service. Scavenius then turned to Göring’s words: the German method was not necessarily the path to be taken everywhere. This could indicate that he at least thought of a Danish way to deal with this question and at the same time appease the Germans.

The Danish government could no longer doubt the long-term goals of Judenpolitik in Denmark: the issue had to be handled. The Danes were probably unaware of Göring’s role in anti-Jewish policy, but recent research suggests Göring’s role was substantial. Previous research has rightly emphasized Göring’s letter to Heydrich in the summer of 1941, in which Heydrich was placed in charge of planning the final solution of the Jewish question (Endlösung der Judenfrage). However, the relationship between Göring and Heydrich was not a novelty. The attempt to seize Jewish assets began as Göring was placed in charge of the four-year plan in 1936 and became Commissioner for Raw Materials and Currency. Göring placed Heydrich as head of the Currency Investigation Office, in charge of monitoring the regulations against Jewish wealth, with the instruction to report to Göring personally. On Göring’s orders Heydrich also became head of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration in January 1939. Göring was at an early stage involved in anti-Jewish policy making and the Göring/Heydrich connection went back to 1936. Göring’s statement to Scavenius was thus made by one of the central personalities in this policy area.

As we shall see in the following, Scavenius had been affected by Göring’s words. The tough discussions among the ministers on whether to sign the Anti-Comintern pact or not had dissatisfied Scavenius. Upon his return, he argued this could not happen again, as “…it was necessary the government realized it could be required, if developments led to it, that Denmark would have to join the Axis Alliance…” This statement was made during a discussion of the possible amalgamation of the Axis alliance and the Anti-Comintern pact, which could occur if Spain joined the war on the Axis side. This formed the basis of a longer discussion among the

---

632 Longerich, Holocaust, 62-64.
ministers on what the Danish position should be if such a demand was raised. The possibility of joining the Axis became a splitting issue in the government.

6.4.1 The Limits of Cooperation

The other ministers felt they had to make a stand against Scavenius on this issue. In late 1944 the trade minister described these discussions, using them as an example of Scavenius’ refusal to follow the cabinet’s instructions. Scavenius’ statement caused much dispute among the government and the political ministers who requested that Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning personally raised the issue with Scavenius. The attempt was unsuccessful. Scavenius instead suggested changes to the government, as he thought certain ministers had not comprehended the position of the country. This resulted in three rounds of meetings between Stauning and the political ministers on how to proceed. Scavenius, Thune Jacobsen and Gunnar Larsen were not invited, as none of them belonged to a political party.

The idea of joining the Axis was decisively turned down by the political ministers in a meeting on December 22nd.

“The Prime Minister accounted for the negotiations that had taken place because of the Foreign Minister statements at the cabinet meeting on the 29th of November, and after a meeting with the 8 political ministers the Prime Minister announced there would for example be opposition against introducing Jewish laws, against joining the three-power pact [the Axis], and against allowing for the disposal of the military outside of Denmark’s borders”.

Scavenius’ statements on the 29th of November were evidently more comprehensive than the minutes of the ministers’ meetings reveal. It seems clear that joining the Axis meant the possible introduction of anti-Jewish laws in Denmark, as well as deploying the Danish military outside of

---

635 “Ministermøde,” December 22, 1941, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943 “Statsministeren redegjorde for de forhandlinger der var ført i anledning af Udenrigsministerens udtalelser på ministermødet den 29. November, og efter konference med de 8 politiske minister meddelte statsministern at der eksempelvis ville være modstand imod at gennemføre en jødelogvægning, at tiltræde tremagtspagten samt at stille militær til rådighed udenfor Danmarks grænser.”; The statement is not mentioned in Larsen's diary, which seems quite remarkable, it is mentioned in; “Halfdan Hendriksen spredte erindringer 1939-1944. Manuskript B” Almost the exact same words are applied. Hendriksen also refers to a cabinet meeting on the 6th of December 1941. However, the information seems to contain the minutes of several meetings. E.g. he writes on the discussions of the weekly anti-Semitic Kampagne, which the government wants to dampen the effects of. However according to Gunnar Larsen’s diary and the protocols from the cabinet meetings these do not take place until 2. of Feb. 1942. See e.g. Larsen Vol 2. p. 74. Hendriksen writes at the end of this amalgamation of meetings that Scavenius said that we have to say no to all demands regarding Jewish laws. However, I would argue the minutes from the protocols of the Meeting of the Ministers on the 22nd of December 1941 were written the same day and only record decisions and rarely discussions. Therefore they seem more trustworthy.
Denmark. Scavenius was voted down, but his readiness and willingness to accommodate German demands in order for Denmark to maintain some independence appear extensive. The other ministers kept him at bay; however, as I will show below, Scavenius was not alone, as Knud Kristensen supported him. Given the fact that Thune Jacobsen and Gunnar Larsen often supported Scavenius, these non-affiliated ministers might have agreed as well, but they were not part of these discussions. In addition, Renthe-Fink had begun pushing for anti-Jewish laws the day before the political ministers’ conversation with Scavenius. (See above).

The three meetings among the political ministers took place from the 29th of November to the 22nd of December and ended in the formal statement to Scavenius mentioned above. The political ministers refer to the affair as a conflict, and the meetings reveal a crisis between the political ministers and Scavenius. The meetings also reflect the political ministers’ skepticism towards Scavenius, but also towards Gunnar Larsen. The first meeting illustrates a group of political ministers who largely opposed Scavenius’ wishes and his work methods. The harshest comment came from the Minister of the Interior, Knud Kristensen, who said “…the policy of the Foreign Minister was, in the end, to make us bow to all German demands…” 636 Yet, he, as the only minister, also argued “the Jewish question is not nearly as dangerous for us if it is solved in a reasonable way”. 637 At least one of the political ministers would thus accept some form of measures against the Jews in Denmark, but we do not know what reasonable means. In the end the Prime Minister went to Scavenius to inform him that:

“…the ministers already now wanted to specify that they would not accept a host of the demands, one could expect the German side to make over time; such as Jewish laws, joining the Axis pact or sending troops to foreign countries.” 638

The statement shows that the ministers expected the Germans to raise the Jewish question at some point. The government should not, they agreed, accept any measures against the Danish Jews and they apparently expected Scavenius would give in to such demands. The majority of the political ministers were not satisfied. They wanted a more formal statement to be presented

636 “Halfdan Hendriksen spredte erindringer 1939-1944. Manuskript B,” 142–43 “udenrigsministerens politik gik ud på, at vi til syvende og sidst skulle bøje os for alle tyske krav”.
637 Ibid. “Jødespørgsmålet er ikke nær så farligt for os, hvis det løses på en skikkelig måde…”.
638 Ministrene ønskede at præcisere allerede nu, at de ikke ville gå med til en række af de krav, man kunne påregne, efterhånden ville fremkomme fra tysk side, såsom jødespørgsmålet, tilslutning til Aksepagten eller udsendelse af tropper til udlandet.” Ibid., 144 paraphrased by Hendriksen on the meeting on the 15th.
to Scavenius at a cabinet meeting. After another meeting between the political ministers on the 19th of December, it was decided to formally make the above-cited statement to Scavenius on the 22nd. Scavenius’ thoughts on the government’s stance remain undisclosed. Yet, he explained to the Swedish diplomatic envoy, Gustav von Dardel, in January 1942 that a move against the Jews would be misunderstood by the Danish population. This might indicate that the demonstrations and other public support for the Jews had influenced the government’s stance on the issue. (See section 6.4.2)

During the discussions among the political ministers Gunnar Larsen and Scavenius showed a willingness to accommodate German demands by suggesting that the Danish Jews should request laws against themselves. This is revealed in a meeting on the 13th of December 1941 between Larsen and his brother-in-law Niels Peter Arnstedt, who was also employed as envoy in the Foreign Ministry. Larsen expected the government to resign in a couple of months due to expected German demands for laws against the Jews. Arnstedt thought this would be a disaster and argued that the Jewish question should somehow be solved by the Danes. However, he perceived this to be an impossibility as the public was certain to oppose it - just as Scavenius would later tell the Swedes. Instead, Arnstedt suggested that the Jews should propose that laws were made against themselves and Larsen, having thought of the same idea, believed it would show both initiative and protract time.

This highly controversial suggestion was viewed as a method to secure the continued existence of the government. A Jewish acceptance of laws against them would ensure that the public would refrain from demonstrations, and the Germans would have to recognize that the Danish Government had taken initiative in the matter. Larsen was concerned that it could create a foundation for harsher demands, and he decided to bring the proposal to Scavenius. Scavenius accepted the suggestion without sharing Larsen’s concerns. However, Scavenius could not accept Arnstedt as a messenger to the Jewish congregation, because he was part of Scavenius’ staff in the ministry. According to Gunnar Larsen’s minutes, Scavenius argued it might be enough if the Jews accepted to refrain from being employed in public positions. This was similar to the German concerns which had been voiced to him in Berlin in November 1941.

---

639 Ibid., 144–45.
640 Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 111.
642 Ibid.
Scavenius expected the Jews to reject this proposition, but he believed the Germans would view it as a sign of Danish goodwill if it was accepted. It is unknown if the proposal was brought to the Jewish leadership.

The suggestion is an evident example of the cooperation which intended to gain political goodwill by, in some form, accepting German demands. It also contained the usual motive of keeping the government in power. It is a suggestion which has not been described in the historiography of the period. Clearly, there was a wish to accommodate the German Judenpolitik in some manner. At the same time, we must recognize that the suggestion included a possible Jewish response. This is quite important as the proposal seems not to have been made in spite of the Jewish community. Rather, it was intended to be made in cooperation with the Jewish leadership. In addition, the statement made by the political ministers on the 22nd of December might have ended the possibility of advancing the proposal. On the other hand, both the proposal and the discussions among the cabinet ministers do show a previously unrecognized willingness by at least three ministers in the Danish government to accept more formal anti-Jewish measures in Denmark.

6.4.2 Rumors and Public Refusal of Judenpolitik

The public reacted as well. They were unaware of the Danish exception from the formal obligations of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and well-founded rumors quickly began to flourish. They were sparked by a press release from the AA which stated that all signatories of the Pact had to handle the Jewish problem, and this was repeated in segments of the Danish press. Two of the most persistent rumors were that Danes were to be conscripted into the German army and that anti-Jewish laws would be introduced. The rumors sparked the first demonstrations against the Danish government’s cooperation with Germany. The Swedish diplomatic reports described there were anti-Semitic incidents, such as the arson attempt on the synagogue in Copenhagen, but also counter-demonstrations.

The rumors affected the inner circles of the government. Minister Gunnar Larsen was approached by a family member who requested assistance in obtaining travel permits to Sweden.

643 Ibid.
644 Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 378–84.
645 Claus Bundgård Christensen et al., Danmark besat: krig og hverdag, 1940 - 45 (København: Informations Forlag, 2009), 266–68.
on behalf of a niece who was considered half-Jewish. Larsen committed himself to helping, as he already had experience in such matters. F.L Smidth’s machine factory in Lübeck seems to have been Aryanized in the 1930s, as Larsen had helped Dr. Benda, an employee of the factory, to reach Sweden.647 The example illustrates both that Danish companies were affected by the anti-Jewish measures in Germany and the profound anxiety the rumors caused in Denmark. On this occasion, Larsen also elaborated on his thoughts on the Jews in general. He was seemingly surprised that the Jewish question had not yet been raised by the Germans, but he was sure it would be raised.

The many rumors of anti-Jewish laws being introduced in Denmark led to protest writings from the theological faculty at the University of Copenhagen. The theologians’ statement informed the Danish government that they refused to accept that Jews were not to be regarded as equals. The main argument was the Jews belonged to the Danish people according to the constitution. Furthermore, it would go against Christian values to initiate laws against them. According to the Ministry of Education, all faculty was prepared to accept the ultimate consequences of the statement.648 The rector and his board (Konsistorium) at the university followed up on the letter from the theological faculty. They too regarded discriminatory measures against “their fellow Jewish citizens” as being against justice and the Danish mentality.649 Both letters also mention that they will not accept discriminatory measures against Jews, even informal ones.650 This was a clear public stance from leading members of society against the possible introduction of the formal parts of Judenpolitik. Keeping Scavenius’ message to Dardel in mind it seems these statements might have affected the government.

The German press release, the rumors of anti-Jewish laws, and the open discussions on the Jews in Denmark led to the first contact between unknown Danes and the Swedish legation in order to let the 200 Hechaluz in Denmark immigrate to Sweden. The 200 Hechaluz had been invited to Denmark to learn farming in order to migrate to Palestine, but the war had left them stranded in Denmark. The Swedish Jewish community and social services deemed it advisable to

only receive 20 to 30 people. The initiative was never followed through, but it does reveal very early flight initiatives and underscores the Swedish restrictive refugee policy at this point.\textsuperscript{651}

Renthe-Fink blamed an article in the \textit{Chicago Daily News}, which had stated that the Danish King would abdicate if such laws were introduced, and similar stories were presented in the Swedish press.\textsuperscript{652} In addition, Renthe-Fink wrote a longer report on the press reactions to the rumors. He especially focused on a piece by the prominent theologian Hal Koch. Koch had argued that Denmark could not continue its policy of the 9\textsuperscript{th} of April if Jewish laws were to be introduced. Renthe-Fink argued that Koch’s article had brought about a public discussion of the Jewish question in Denmark which had never been seen before. It had reached wider audiences than e.g. Kamptegnet’s articles, and Renthe-Fink viewed it as a victory for the cause. He decided not to interfere in the Danish discussion.\textsuperscript{653}

6.5 Chapter Conclusion

Section 6.1 of this chapter has shown how German race laws influenced Danish society by prompting citizens to informally secure proof of race if they had official dealings with Germany. We can even trace the formal application of the German race laws in Danish marriage laws, which were made to prevent, or exclude, foreign Jews from marrying non-Jews in Denmark. We can thus identify the following stages of persecution: one, two, three, and five in this section alone. This raises the question of how many “ordinary” Danes secured proof of race, but also to what extent Danish companies began to prove they were Aryan.

In answering research question number two this chapter has shown the German legation was very active in promoting \textit{Judenpolitik} in Denmark in several areas. Anti-Semites and anti-Semitic propaganda was strongly supported by the legation. While this is not part of the Stages of Persecution model, we should recognize the stigmatizing (stage seven) effects of Kamptegnet and the movie Jud Süss. The creation of an office that had the power to issue official Aryan certificates must be recognized as formalized step that officially applied the racial definitions of the dictatorship (stages two and three).

\textsuperscript{651} Kirchhoff, \textit{Holocaust i Danmark}, 111.
\textsuperscript{652} ”Danske kungen säges ha hotat med abdikation,” \textit{Göteborgsposten}, January 7, 1942, RA, UM 120.d.28a 1946-1972; ”Dansk Politik (Drawing),” \textit{Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts Tidning}, January 10, 1942, RA, UM 120.d.28a; Proposed as the possible source to the myth that the Danish King wore the yellow Star of David as a sign of sympathy in Kirchhoff, ”Endlösung over Danmark,” 1993, 59.
\textsuperscript{653} ”23. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt.”
In addition to these measures Renthe-Fink described the informal *Judenpolitik* being pursued in Denmark as a continuous pressure to exclude Jews. The orders from the AA was to pressure the Danish government to adopt anti-Jewish laws, and these were loyally followed by Renthe-Fink. He initiated a steady pressure on several members of the Danish administration and government. While not being successful in this endeavor he secured guarantees from the Danish government that they would agree to informal, but de facto measures against Jews. While still being within the informal stage of the model, the pressure must be characterized as highly organized and intentional. This builds on the chapters of Aryanization and the legation appears very active in other areas of *Judenpolitik* as well.

This brings us to the reaction of the Danish government which partly answers research question number three. The Danish government’s decision to oppose and reject formal laws against the Jews has been a large component of the somewhat positive evaluation of the cooperation policy. However, the discussions surrounding the events of from November 1941 to January 1942 show that a minority in the government would accept some form of laws against the Jews. This gives rise to at least a re-evaluation of the Danish position in this policy area around the turn of 1941. Current historiography gives the impression of a firm government stance towards the Germans on this issue, but we should recognize the fact that the German *Judenpolitik* caused some heated government discussions. These reveal a previously unrecognized political maneuverability in regards to the Jews in Denmark. The government decisions resulted in the acceptance of informal initiatives which were intended to avoid formal ones. This was in spite of the fact that informal measures also contained possible discriminatory measures against the Jews. These discussions also bring to light that the German pressure was having an effect on the following members of the Danish government: Erik Scavenius, Gunnar Larsen and Knud Kristensen. If we look at the Danish government in light of progressive bystander research we can thus detect a movement towards accepting demands originating from the perpetrators within the informal stages of persecution.

In the next chapter we will explore the manner in which Renthe-Fink’s policies were followed through and how the Danish government slowly continued to accept informal policies against the Jews.
7 Enforcing the Policy of Exclusion

This chapter spans over the months from January to September 1942, and ends just before the Telegram Crisis sets in. It mainly focuses on answering research questions two and three. Stages of persecution will be pointed to especially on the area exclusive measures directed at preventing Jews from being promoted, speaking on the radio, as well as removing Jewish individuals in high-level positions in the media. Thematically the chapter begins by exploring and analyzing Cecil von Renthe-Fink’s anti-Semitism as it is presented in his cover letter to Lorenz Christensen’s report on the Danish Jews. This serves to identify Renthe-Fink’s endorsements for National Socialism’s racial ideas, while acknowledging that he was not one of the party’s radical supporters. At the same time the chapter will present the Judenpolitik Renthe-Fink followed in Denmark. It draws on his orders from December 1941 (see chapter six) to pressure the Danish government to exclude Jews. This is shown in section 7.2 which also traces the Danish government’s reactions to these attempts. The highest level of the Danish government is involved in these Entjudung cases. We will trace the rising adherence and acceptance of the informal measures against the Jews in prominent positions in order to prevent formal laws.

Section 7.3 follows the visit from the central personalities from the AA in the summer of 1942 who promotes harsher informal measures against the Danish Jews. This has an enforcing effect on Renthe-Fink who increases the pressure on the Danish government to let go of Jewish civil servants. The chapter ends with a proposition to re-evaluate Renthe-Fink’s role in the Judenpolitik in Denmark viewing him as a promoter of anti-Jewish policy rather than the opposite.

7.1 Renthe-Fink’s anti-Semitism

Until New Year’s 1941 to 1942 Cecil von Renthe-Fink had only mentioned the subject of the Jewish question in Denmark once in his bi-weekly reports. However, in January 1942 he presented an elaborate analysis of the issue in his cover letter to a report on the Jewish influence in Denmark. The contents of the report will be dealt with below. For now, our attention will remain on Renthe-Fink. In the summer of 1940, Franz Rademacher had requested an update on

the numbers and influence of the Danish Jews. The report was part of the AA’s attempt to gain a world-wide overview of the number of Jews as well as their influence in trade, industries, and their share of capital. Rademacher’s current information on Denmark originated from the book Die Verbreitung der Juden in der Welt (The Distribution of Jews in the World) from 1937. The book reported that Denmark’s 6,000 Jews lived mainly in the greater Copenhagen area. The lack of statistics and publications delayed the report, but Renthe-Fink completed Rademacher’s request on the 20th of January 1942 after several reminders. The report was written by Lorenz Christensen and submitted on the same day as the Wannsee Conference.

Renthe-Fink’s lengthy cover letter to the report shows it was an important issue he was describing. He analyzed the role of the Danish Jews as well as the Danes’ perception of Jews. In addition, he ended his letter by pointing to some doubtful passages and conclusions in the report. In order for Renthe-Fink to criticize aspects of the report, he must have been quite knowledgeable on the subject matter in Denmark. Renthe-Fink expected that the Jews in Denmark would be subject to formal persecution in the future as few politicians in Denmark had realized

“...that in the coming new Europe the Jewish question, for all partners and also Denmark, will be solved along certain general uniform rules, which means it will be solved consistently.”

Renthe-Fink began by contextualizing the Jewish question in Denmark, because most Germans would be incomprehensive to the underdeveloped attitude towards the Jews in Danish society. He wrote that even public figures claimed a Jewish question was non-existent in Denmark. According to Renthe-Fink only the Danish Nazi Party and a few politicians had comprehended Judenpolitik’s importance to the German dictatorship.

656 This might not be coincidental as Renthe-Fink could have been informed of the conference during Rademacher’s visit to Copenhagen in December 1941. The report had also been sent to NSDAP-AO Denmark in November 1941 for an evaluation which was completed on the 10th of December. It seems plausible Renthe-Fink held on the report and sent it at an opportune moment. The letter from NSDAP/AO Denmark sent to Berlin is from 10-12-1941 and passed on to AA by Renthe-Fink on 21-01-1942 “29. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt,” January 21, 1942, DK MAG.
657 “28. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt.”
658 Ibid.”daß in dem kommenden neuen Europa die Judenfrage für alle Partner und somit auch für Dänemark nach gewissen allgemeinen Richtlinien, also einheitlich gelöst werden Muß.”
659 Ibid.
Renthe-Fink provided four historical and blatant anti-Semitic reasons for the Danish "ignorance" towards Jews. He applied the underlying argument that hostility towards Jews was tied to the experience of physically meeting Jews. Renthe-Fink would explain that the Danes were only exposed to Jews in the ratio of 1:500, while in Germany it was 1:100. The second reason was the emancipation of the Danish Jews in 1814 which had secured citizens' rights for Jews born in Denmark. The emancipation had allowed intermarriages, and Renthe-Fink explained how Jews through "clever" intermarriage strategies had assimilated into important Danish families. This argument presented Jews as conspiratorial, and Renthe-Fink now described how "more Danes than one would expect have Jewish blood in their ancestry". The third reason was the Danes' liberal and individualistic attitudes, while the fourth was a return to the racial and anti-Semitic arguments: the Danes were without the "bitter experiences with Jews that we have". In contrast to German Jews, Danish Jews had, according to Renthe-Fink, cleverly managed to cloak themselves, yet their influence was not as prominent as in Germany. By describing the Jews in Denmark in this manner, they were presented as if they by some master plan had succeeded in infiltrating Danish society.

He went on to stress that despite their minor influence, the Jews in Denmark were still a matter of concern, since a powerful group of Jews held prominent positions in universities, cultural areas, the press, and the economy. He attributed Jewish influence to the many Mischlinge who dominated intellectual circles, as well as the long liberal and Jewish influence on the Danish spirit (Geist). This could be traced back to the radical and liberal Danish-Jewish thinker Georg Brandes. The Jews, but especially the Mischlinge, were criticized for working against the efforts to draw Denmark closer to Germany, and making it difficult to pursue exclusive processes such as Aryanization.

In the final passages of the letter Renthe-Fink accounts for the current subversive German Judenpolitik being pursued in Denmark:

---

660 Ibid. “Weit mehr Dänen als man ahnt, haben Judenblut in ihren Adern.”
661 Ibid. “...die bitteren Erfahrungen mit den Juden zu machen wie wir.”
662 Ibid.
663 Ibid.; Georg Brandes (1842-1927) was reviewer and literary researcher. Some of his many works were translated and Thomas Mann called his book "Hovedstrømninger" "the young intellectual Europe’s bible." Brandes challenged many of the formal institutions of the time such as the family and promoted women’s rights. Hans Hertel, "Georg Brandes," Den store danske (Gyldendal), accessed March 23, 2017, http://denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sidId=50520.
664 “28. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt.”
“As long as it is for the benefit of our [Germany’s] warfare and our collected political interests to not disturb the quiet development in Denmark it will not be an option to fundamentally pursue the Jewish question in Denmark. Our practice is for the time being mostly limited to prompting the Danish government to eliminate Jewish personalities wherever these can exercise a damaging influence. The Danish government is said to have decided to, in the future, not to place Jews in prominent positions in the civil service.”

According to Renthe-Fink the Danish government had also agreed to stop providing citizenship to Jewish emigrants, while the legation raised the importance of the Jewish question at any given moment towards representatives of the Danish Government. The report was well received by Rademacher who labelled it as ausgezeichnet (excellent). Renthe-Fink knew his anti-Semitism and was applying it to his arguments tying them into the racial ideology of Nazism to the satisfaction of his superiors. His use of terms like ‘elimination’ (Eliminierung) and ‘purification’ (Reinigungsprozeß) to describe the removal of the Jews, as well as his use of racial terms like ‘Jewish blood’ and Mischlinge, substantiate this. It is evident that Renthe-Fink was following the approved instructions of Luther, Grundherr and Ribbentrop (see chapter 6), while stressing the special circumstances he was working under in Denmark. There seems to be little doubt that Renthe-Fink was pursuing an approved German Judenpolitik in Denmark.

Renthe-Fink’s letter and its explicit reservations about an action against the Danish Jews have traditionally been interpreted as proof of an alleged wish to avoid raising the Jewish question to the Danish government. While his arguments could indeed be regarded as a statement defending the cooperation policy, the view of a Reich Plenipotentiary who was reluctant to move against the Danish Jews seems difficult to align with his simultaneous initiatives in Judenpolitik such as promoting anti-Semitic propaganda, racially categorizing companies, and pressing for anti-Jewish legislation.

665 Ibid. “Solange es vom Standpunkt unserer Kriegführung und unserer gesamtpolitischen Interessen vordringlich ist, daß die ruhige Entwicklung in Dänemark nicht gestört wird, wird ein grundsätzliches Aufgreifen der Judenfrage in Dänemark nicht in Betracht kommen. Unsere Praxis beschränkt sich daher zur Zeit im wesentlichen darauf, daß die dänische Regierung zur Eliminierung jüdischer Persönlichkeiten veanläßt wird, wo diese einen schädlichen Einfluß ausüben können. Es heißt, daß die dänische Regierung sich entschlossen habe, künftig keine Juden auf prominente Staatsstellen zu setzen...”

666 Ibid.

667 “35. Franz Rademacher an Cecil von Renthe-Fink,” March 25, 1942, DK MAG.

668 Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve, 66–67.
We now move to the contents of the extensive report on the Danish Jews written by Lorenz Christensen. It had been compiled from his own registry cards (see chapter five) as well as a host of publicly accessible sources among which he surprisingly mentions the membership list of the Jewish congregation. It also includes the censuses (Folketaællinger) on the complete Danish population from 1921 which included a section on people’s religious faith. From these, Christensen had identified 5,924 Jews in the year 1921. An additional source was an article from 1934 in which the author had constructed a complete registry of Jews based on tax lists from the Jewish congregation, Jews who had been financially supported by the congregation, lists of Jewish children in Jewish schools, and Copenhagen public schools. Lastly, the author had had access to the protocol of former members of the congregation and concluded that in 1931 there were 5,635 Jews in the Copenhagen area. Christensen calls it a methodological problem that he is not able to identify “Rassejuden” from the sources at hand, but he will examine these in separate report.

Lorenz Christensen focused on Jews in several sectors of the economy and trade, where 74 companies were identified as Jewish or having Jewish employees. The former being the most prevalent. The companies mentioned are major Danish ones who had probably not been Aryanized by January 1942, while some state organizations were included as well e.g. the University of Copenhagen. Christensen had also focused on identifying Jews in culture and media. A large segment of the report was devoted to identifying prominent members of society who had Jewish mothers, Jewish ancestry, or who were married to Jews. Altogether 200 individuals were racially categorized in the report. In addition, Christensen had registered people who had publicly supported or assisted Jews.

The report was passed on to NSDAP/AO in Denmark before it was sent to the AA, and by March 1942 it had been circulated in Berlin. Head of the NSDAP/AO branch in Denmark, Ernst Schäfer, evaluated the Jewish influence in Denmark similar to Renthe-Fink, but Schäfer applied a harsher anti-Semitic and National Socialist rhetoric. Schäfer pointed to some minor mistakes in the report, but overall, he characterized it as a precise, and important evaluation of the overall

---

669 “28. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt” The report is part of this letter. // It is surprising because most research claims the membership protocols were stolen in September 1943.

670 H. Colding Jørgensen, “Jøderne i Danmark omkring 1931,” Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift 3 række 42 (1934): 330–45. Interestingly, Colding Jørgensen does not write the total number of Jews based on the census from 1921. Lorenz Christensen does and it seems he might have located the 5.924 persons on his own or with the aid of assistants. None the less it must have been a massive undertaking if he did.

671 This report has not been located if written. It could be Christensen’s registry of 2,000 entries was intended to identify the “Rassejuden”.

672 “28. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt” (The report is attached to this letter).
composition of the Danish Jews. He especially emphasized that the report would explain to outsiders why Jews were not so prevalent in Denmark compared to other countries. He stressed that "Danish Jewry, and the Mischlinge, who play a particular role in Denmark, are all opponents of every single German and enemies of the relationship between Germany and Denmark." 673

The Mischlinge were described very negatively and as having a powerful position in Denmark. They were accused of greatly obstructing the process of removing Jews from the businesses and political positions. According to Schäfer, the Mischlinge did so in collaboration with Freemasons, the church, and friends of England.674 Only recently has the NSDAP/AO in Denmark been examined showing their involvement in Judenpolitik.675

The report from Lorenz Christensen was evaluated by the NSDAP affiliated Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des Neuen Deutschlands (The Reich Institute for the History of the New Germany). The institute had since 1935 been charged with historically legitimizing National Socialism, and it focused intensely on the Judenfrage. It had close connections to the AA and examined the Jewish question in other countries e.g. Great Britain and Italy. Genealogical work was also carried out for these countries, as well as cataloging mixed marriages. The institute actively pursued policies in this area as they educated diplomats in the Jewish question from 1938 onwards.676

The AA used the knowledge gathered by Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des Neuen Deutschlands to ask country-specific questions on e.g. Jewish organizations. In turn the AA supplied information on the influence of Jews and anti-Jewish laws from their diplomatic entities. The forwarding of the report on the Danish Jews thus fits into the overall information flow on foreign Jews that occurred on a large geographical scale between National Socialist Organizations.677 The Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des Neuen Deutschlands’ evaluation of the report was very thorough. The institute in Munich had either been charting the Danish Jews themselves, or possibly been forwarded a copy of Hans Hermannsen’s registries. The Reichsinstitut agreed with most of the report’s findings: there was a very high number of

673 ‘29. Cecil von Renthe-Fink and das Auswärtige Amt” Schäfer’s letter is included in Renthe-Fink’s letter. "Das dänische Judentum und die Mischlinge, die in Dänemark eine besondere Rolle spielen sind alle Gegner jedes einzelnen Deutschen und Feinde der Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Dänemark.”

674 Ibid.

675 Jensen, Landesgruppe Dänemark: NSDAPs udlandsorganisation i Danmark ca. 1932-1945.


677 Ibid., 31.
assimilated Jews (Assimilationsjuden) and mixed marriages in the upper class. They corrected some of the report’s historical passages on the immigration of Sephardic Jews in the 17th and 18th centuries and pointed to Ashkenazi Jews as having immigrated as well. This only underscores the institute’s elaborate knowledge of Danish Jews. There seems to be no doubt that besides the RfA, other German organizations had an international approach to the Jewish question and continuously gathered information on Jews.

7.2 Continued Exclusions

7.2.1 Excluding Jews from Being Promoted

We now turn to the Danish government and its discussions on the subject of Jews. The various minutes of the cabinet meetings are an invaluable source for following the continuous presence of the Jewish question in the Danish Government. The minutes mainly portray the group of ministers as being largely opposed Foreign Minister Scavenius’ suggestions on the matter, but as we have already seen, in chapter six, a minority within the cabinet were ready to accept some form of anti-Jewish laws. Yet, the majority prevailed. The position presented to the Germans was that Denmark would not accept formal anti-Jewish laws. However, during the discussions on how to proceed, one can observe an incipient acceptance of informal measures against the Jews. These discussions reveal the subject’s sensitivity as well as its importance to the government. Overall, it seems Scavenius and the Minister of Public Works Gunnar Larsen appear more accepting of informal measures against the Jews compared to their colleagues. Yet, we should acknowledge that, in several instances, the cabinet ended up agreeing on how to proceed. This is also the case in regards to the discussions in the cabinet in the period from September 1942 to August 1943 covered in chapter eight.

Following the events of December 1941 and early January 1942 the issue of not promoting Jews became a point of discussion among the ministers on the 6th of January 1942. According to Larsen’s minutes, they all agreed to “…not provoke by making Jewish appointments that would stand out…” in public organizations.678 The ministers believed this could be achieved without difficulties except at the universities. However, Minister of Education Jørgen Jørgensen felt he

678 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:9”...at man ikke burde provokere ved at foretage jødiske udnævnelser, der kunne komme til at stikke i øjnene...”
could convince the rector of Copenhagen University, Carl Edvard Bloch, to agree with the government. It would seem the Danish government had decided to adopt and enforce an informal rule not to appoint Jews to the civil service. On top of this the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs Vilhelm Fibiger asked the Jewish leadership through the chief rabbi, Max Friediger, to keep calm and “show restraint”. According to Larsen’s minutes, Friediger had agreed, but it is unclear to what extent the leadership of the Jewish congregation had agreed to this suggestion.

Eight days later, Minister of Justice Thune Jacobsen paraphrased a meeting he had had with Renthe-Fink. Surprisingly, Jacobsen had brought up the subject of the Jews and had explained to Renthe-Fink that Jews would not be promoted in the civil service, but the government would resign if formal laws were introduced. This confirms that at least some ministers of the Danish government enforced the decision to unofficially block the promotion of Jews. The government had shown some acceptance in the matter, and we can trace this in Renthe-Fink’s cover letter from January 20th, 1942. “The Danish government is said to have decided to, in the future, not to place Jews in prominent positions in the civil service...” Renthe-Fink actually had several ministers’ words to back up this statement, and he had good reason to believe he had achieved suggestion “A” from the 18th of December 1941 (see chapter six).

In February 1942, the issue of the Jews was discussed at two cabinet meetings. This time it revolved around several themes such as: Jewish doctors, Jews in the press, celebrating prominent Jews and kosher sausages. The Minister of Justice raised his concern that the newspaper Politiken had over-emphasized the birthday of Dr. Erik Warburg, who was considered Jewish. Warburg was apparently “one of those Jews the Germans were keen to get at”, and Larsen criticized Warburg for behaving unwisely.

It was not the first time Warburg had surfaced in the discussions among the ministers. In late December 1941, Professor and Head Surgeon at the Copenhagen County Hospital in Gentofte, Tyge C. Geerts, who happened to be married to Gunnar Larsen’s niece, had passed on several

---

679 Ibid.
680 Lidegaard, Landsmand. De danske jøders flugt i oktober 1943., 49; Lidegaard argues the Jews agreed to not be promoted using Kirchhoff, “Endlösung over Danmark,” 1993 as a source. However, Kirchhoff does not write this in his article.
682 “28. Cecil von Renthe-Fink an das Auswärtige Amt” “Es heißt, daß die dänische Regierung sich entschlossen habe, künftig keine Juden auf prominente Staatsstellen zu setzen...”
negative messages regarding the Jews at the Faculty of Medicine. Allegedly, the students were extremely affected by “the pretty big Jewish element at the faculty”. Dr. Erik Warburg and Dr. S.E. Kjærsgaard had supposedly neglected to read aloud Rector Bloch’s statement. The statement had been issued in an attempt to halt the demonstrations against the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact the previous month. Apparently, a young doctor, a “Russian Jew that had obtained Danish citizenship” had also openly supported sabotage. Larsen regarded these acts as extremely dangerous, and it was discussed within the government four days later. Larsen emphasized that such behavior by Jewish professors could cause the Germans to raise the Jewish question. The Minister of Education agreed and expressed his concern as well. Yet, it remains unknown if these discussions resulted in actual consequences for these individuals.

The discussion on Warburg in early 1942 led to a general debate among the ministers who agreed to show extreme caution regarding issues relating to Jews. This prompted the Minister of Trade to inform the government that he had denied a request from the Danish Jews for the production of kosher sausages as standard sausages had been introduced for everyone. The minister’s decision was supported and legitimized by arguing that kosher sausages would provoke the Germans. The kosher sausage case is a typical example of how introducing informal restrictions against the Jews was legitimized by the fears of formal rules as part of the logic of cooperation. The Minister of Education, Jørgen Jørgensen, also raised an issue. The Germans had complained of a planned radio show on Georg Brandes, marking what would have been his 100th birthday. Gunnar Larsen scolded Jørgensen for being incautious, as Renthe-Fink in December 1941 and January 1942 had mentioned that such radio shows were regarded as provocative. Larsen even argued that the program should never have been produced. This discussion reveals both the German pressure, and the various levels of concern in the Danish government as well as its readiness to impose informal restrictions.

Brandes was also an issue at the next cabinet meeting. The former Communist students’ union, (Studentersamfundet), wanted to celebrate what would have been Georg Brandes’ 100th birthday. This caused grave concern among the ministers, but the meeting was held

---

684 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1941, 1:499 “...det ret store jødiske element i fakultetet.”
685 Ibid. “...en russisk jøde som havde dansk statsborgerskab...”
686 Ibid., 1:504.
687 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:66; “Ministermøde,” February 3, 1942, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943 The official minutes only states “...various questions regarding the Jews were discussed.” // “...forskellige spørgsmål vedrørende jæderne blev drøftet.”
nonetheless. The number of celebration parties for Brandes appears to have been high, as the Germans had negotiated on the matter with the Minister of Justice, Thune Jacobsen. The contents are undisclosed, but it underscores the continued German attempt to control the subject of Jews in the public sphere in any form; even the celebration of famous, but deceased Jews.

7.2.2 Excluding the Jews From Nationaltidende

Two years of consistent and increasing pressure to remove Jews from the press eventually resulted in the successful removal of Jews and those presumed Jewish from the leadership of the Danish newspaper Nationaltidende. In January 1941, Gustav Meissner had labelled the Editor-in-Chief Aage Schoch, CEO Holger Cohen and journalist Bertel Bing as Jewish. The first pressure was applied to remove Schoch, who was not Jewish, and Bertel Bing. The Germans had demanded Schoch’s dismissal for a lengthy period of time due to his negative stance towards Germany, and his critical articles against Germany written before the war. Meissner blamed the paper’s unsympathetic attitude towards Germany on Jewish influence. He demanded that Schoch step down as editor-in-chief while Bing was to be dismissed. Over several months, negotiations took place between Meissner and the Danish government, yet Schoch remained while Bing was excluded from writing radio reviews. This was only the first step as new demands surfaced in December 1941. These may be related to the German pressure applied around the signing of the Anti-Comintern pact.

This time it was Cecil von Renthe-Fink who demanded that Schoch and CEO Holger Cohen be fired after a series of allegedly insulting articles. During a cabinet meeting in late February 1942 it was decided to accept the German demands, and Schoch was removed. Only a week later, Cohen was targeted. The Germans argued that he controlled administrative affairs, interfered in the editorial process, and was the “evil spirit” of the paper. The Danish Foreign Ministry denied that they could interfere in this case, but the Germans repeatedly requested Scavenius to

---

689 “Ministermøde,” September 2, 1942, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943 (Gunnar Larsen did not attend this meeting, because Fritz Todt died. Larsen had to pay his respects at the German legation and attend the official funeral in Berlin.
690 Aage Schoch (1898-1968) was editor of the conservative paper Nationaltidende that was critical of Nazi Germany before and during the occupation. Schoch was pressured to leave the paper in February 1942. He became a member of the resistance council (Frihedsrådet) Peter Birkelund, “Aage Schoch,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 324.
693 Frederiksen, Pressen under besættelsen., 150, 152+ note 15.
remove him. In the summer of 1942 the German patience ended as Nationaltidende refused to run C.F. Schalburg’s obituary. C. F. Schalburg was a Russian-born Dane who reached the rank of major in the Waffen-SS. He had been killed on the Eastern Front while commanding a battalion of Danish SS-volunteers in the Frikorps.694

Cohen was attacked in the National Socialist papers Fædrelandet, Kamptegnet and Nordschleswigsche Zeitung, which all emphasized that Cohen was Jewish. On the 20th of June Director of the Foreign Ministry Nils Svenningsen received a telephone call at his private residence and was requested to meet with Legationsrat Hugo Hensel in an hour. Only four days prior to this Rente-Fink had again requested Scavenius to remove Cohen. Hensel presented the following message: “We have the intention to remove Coh[e]n to Germany and confine him as Hetzer”. The question of Cohen became high-level politics. At 13:30, a meeting was held at the Prime Minister’s Office (Statsministeriet). Several ministers of the government were present including Prime Minister Buhl and Erik Scavenius as well as members of Nationaltidende’s board of directors. Faced with the “choice” of being deported to Germany or stepping down Cohen chose the latter.695

Cohen’s own account of the meeting has never been presented before, and it is revealing in several ways as it highlights the reactions of the Danish government, the German Judenpolitik, and Cohen’s personal perspective. At the meeting Cohen related how he had been very cautious of his actions since the 9th of April 1940. He had avoided interfering in the editorial work of the paper and was cautious on the phone, while also being careful not to draw attention to his person. He seemed largely disappointed in the government’s reaction, but appears to have found support from Vilhelm Buhl and Thune Jacobsen who offered to assist him or answer any questions he might have. Cohen was supported more fiercely by Halfdan Hendriksen and members of the board of directors of Nationaltidende, who were considering closing the paper as a consequence of his removal.696 A few days after the meeting the board of directors sent a letter to the Prime Minister expressing their great surprise in the government’s acceptance of the German demand. They argued to no avail that Cohen should be reinstated.697

695 Frederiksen, Pressen under besættelsen., 306–8; “Notits,” June 20, 1942, RA, UM 120.G.85.
The ministers reacted in various ways to the German demands. Scavenius straight-forwardly said nothing could be done while the Prime-Minister was much more apologetic in his approach, arguing that the German demand was a major breach of law without any evidence. The participants agreed Cohen had been singled out, because he was Jewish. Yet, they refrained from attempting to argue the case further, and denied Cohen any forms of financial compensation. Minister of Justice Thune Jacobsen also revealed the Germans had requested Cohen was put under surveillance, yet the minister seemed satisfied with Cohen’s assurance that he would remain in Denmark. Scavenius could account for the German modus operandi in such cases. They would begin with minor complaints escalating to threats and repeated complaints ending in an ultimatum to remove a person.698

This seems to indicate that an unknown number of similar cases had crossed his desk since the beginning of the occupation. Was this the method Renthe-Fink applied to slowly remove Jews from their positions? In this case Judenpolitik proceeded just as Renthe-Fink had described it: to prompt the Danish government to eliminate Jewish personalities. However, it is surprising to find a direct threat of deporting Cohen to Germany. Clearly, the delicate balance of the cooperation was not considered in jeopardy by demanding Cohen’s removal. Rather, it displayed a German willingness to enforce their demands in spite of the possible effects it might have on the cooperation. The Danish government, on the other hand, decided to give in under duress. By accepting these demands, they expanded the informal measures against Jews. The events of this case open up for a possible renewed focus on the individual circumstances surrounding Jews who left managing positions in the first three and half years of the occupation. They appear far from random, but rather as part of the conscious and continuous Judenpolitik aimed at slowly excluding the Jews.

7.2.3 Excluding Jewish Publishers and Publications

In June 1942 press attaché Gustav Meissner could conclude his analysis on the publishing industry and bookstores in Denmark. In addition, he presented his results in excluding publications deemed hostile to Germany from Danish public libraries. These included communist and pacifist literature, but also works written by immigrants. He had also succeeded in

698 Cohen, “Referat af møde i Statsministerens kontor.”
preventing public libraries from carrying well-known works authored by Jews. Meissner’s analysis of the Danish publishing business and book stores was thorough. His overview contains 477 official book stores and 200 other types of book traders. Meissner characterized the publishing house Gyldendal as the most influential. In addition to book store sales all publishers sold books via agents in schools and offices, but also in local shops. The companies Branner and Haase were categorized as enemies of Germany and Gyldendal deemed unfriendly. The scientific publisher Munksgaard was identified as untrustworthy due to the Jewish influence in its board of directors. Meissner also repeated an earlier warning about David Grünbaum, who controlled the influx of English-language literature into Denmark. According to Meissner, he did so in collaboration with Swedish distributors who were connected to the British embassy in Stockholm. For these reasons Grünbaum, was to be put under surveillance by Kanstein’s office.

The analysis of this industry found only one Jewish company and a Jewish individual who imported English language books, but in order to identify them a complete industry must have been thoroughly examined. The immense amount of resources which must have been used to complete this investigation only underscores the legation had placed a high priority on identifying Jews in order to follow through on their Entjudung policies. In addition, the surveillance measures applied to Grünbaum shows that the German police force was possibly performing active police work. It is unfortunately unknown how many Jews were placed under surveillance by the German authorities, but if it was deemed necessary, it seems manpower was provided.

7.2.4 Excluding Jews From the Radio

The Danish Broadcasting Company, Danmarks Radio, aired a presentation by the Jewish Permanent Secretary in the Statistical Department Georg Cohn in early July 1942. The Danish government had not followed through on their promises to Renthe-Fink to prevent Jews from appearing on the Radio. Renthe-Fink quickly reacted. Gunnar Larsen was the first to be exposed to Renthe-Fink’s complaints. Renthe-Fink stressed he had continuously warned against letting Jews speak on the Radio and promoting them. Renthe-Fink repeated his arguments from his

---

699 See especially note 38 in “37. Gustav Meissner Aufzeichnung,” June 27, 1942, DK MAG.
700 Ibid.
701 This is the contemporary name, it used to be called Statsradiofonien.
meeting with Gunnar Larsen in December 1941, and again used Berlin as a threat, while giving
the impression he was trying to keep the Jewish question out of Denmark. Renthe-Fink moved
on to blame the Jews for not being “as quiet as mice” (musestille) to avoid raising the issue
further, while he expressed astonishment over the fact that the Danish Jews had not
disappeared from the country when they had the chance. It is unclear which chance he is
referring to, but through Larsen he exerted a pressure on the minority to become even less
visible under the threat of further possible measures.

Cohn’s radio appearance was a central discussion point at the cabinet meeting four days later.
Larsen stressed it would be for the benefit of the Danes, and the Jews, to avoid radio
appearances by Jews, while referring to a former agreement to reach this end. This could
indicate the discussions which followed Renthe-Fink’s demands for anti-Jewish laws in
December 1941 and January 1942 had been successful. It is unclear whether this was a fact, but
it was certainly Larsen’s perception that such an agreement existed.

Renthe-Fink had said “henceforth it was to be prevented that the radio be placed at the disposal of Jews.” In mid-July 1942 all ministers agreed, and the Minister of Education was made responsible for ensuring that
this would not happen again. Nevertheless, Cohn was invited to give an interview on the news of the radio at 18:35 on
Friday the 7th of August, 1942. It may thus appear as if the Danes were not adhering to their own
decisions. However, at the time the news on the radio was an independent unit edited by the
newspapers who supplied the contents of the program. Cohn was to be interviewed on the price
index, but at 16:30 Barandon ordered Meissner to demand that Cohn was prevented from being
interviewed. The case went all the way up to Vilhem Buhl. The Prime Minister’s statement on
the issue shows how the Danish government participated in the informal exclusion of Jewish civil servants’ public statements. Vilhelm Buhl explained how the ministers in the government had
decided not to allow Jewish civil servants to appear on the radio, but the independent news desk
had not been instructed on the matter. The Prime Minister seemed to regret he had not taken
the matter up directly with Cohn. Vilhelm Buhl would not prevent him from appearing on the

---

702 “Memorandum Gunnar Larsen og Renthe-Fink,” July 10, 1942, RA, UM 120.d.28a See also; Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand:
Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:289–90.
rådighed for jøder.”
705 “Svenningsens referat om emnet,” August 8, 1942, RA, UM 120.d.28a; “Eskelund's mødereferat fra møde med Meissner,” August 8, 1942,
RA, UM 120.G.79.
radio an hour and half before the news was to air. At the same time, it would have been too obvious that Cohn’s appearance had been cancelled because he was Jewish. According to Buhl, this had the potential to raise debate on the Jewish question. The radio news was informed of the decisions made by the Prime Minister, telling the organizers to omit Cohn’s name. Cohn had “turned pale as a sheet” as he agreed that his name was not mentioned.

As a consequence, Nils Svenningsen was instructed to inform the Germans of the following:

“….The Prime Minister authorized me [Svenningsen]... to declare to the German Gesandtschaft that he was prepared to see to it that in the future Jewish civil servants would not appear on Danish Radio”.708

This decision was passed on and well received by Barandon and Meissner, who refrained from cancelling Cohn’s radio appearance. Instead, they expressed gratitude for the promise of a “radio lock-out for Jewish civil servants”. Meissner continued to argue it was in the Jews’ own interests to limit their appearance on the radio. He legitimized this argument by pointing to the strong anti-Semitic movement, which could use such appearances to argue for official laws against the Jews. Of course Meissner was part of this movement, but applied it as a threat just as Renthe-Fink had done.

The Danish Nazi newspaper Fædrelandet had apparently monitored the radio and had noticed that Cohn had not been mentioned by name. This was celebrated as a victory in a blatantly anti-Semitic article claiming the omission of Cohn’s name was due to “the purer atmosphere which is sweeping over the country at the moment”. This was used to questioning why Jews held such high positions in Denmark, as Danes could easily take over these positions.

If we look more closely at Renthe-Fink’s swift reaction we should recall his letter from the 20th of January 1942, where he informed his superiors in Berlin that he was putting pressure on the Danish government to prevent Jewish influences. Cohn’s radio appearances made it seem as if Renthe-Fink was not delivering on his promises. One of Renthe-Fink’s key threats towards

706 “Svenningsens referat om emnet.”
708 “Svenningsens referat om emnet”...stasministeren bemyndigede mig...til at erklære overfor det tyske gesandtskab, at han var rede til for fremtiden at foranledige, at jødiske embedsmænd ikke kom til at optræde i den danske radio.”
709 ibid.
the Danish government was the issue of the Jews being raised by Berlin. This threat could also
be viewed as an expression of Renthe-Fink’s own concerns. If the issue was raised by Berlin, it
also meant Renthe-Fink had been unsuccessful in reaching the promised goals for the anti-
Jewish policies in Denmark. This may explain why he reacted so strongly in the Cohn case.
Meissner employed the same tactic, playing on the Danish government’s fear of official demands
in this area. Meissner and Renthe-Fink thus reached progress in the informal restrictions against
Jewish civil servants by obtaining an assurance from the Prime Minister that Jewish civil servants
were banned from appearing on the radio.

Prime Minister Buhl’s statement in August added to the informal measures as he announced
that public speeches by Jewish civil servants were to be prevented. Buhl legitimized his and the
government’s actions as a method for preventing formal laws against Jews. In October 1942 this
restriction was enforced on E. Seligmann Director of the Prices Board (Prisdirektoratet), who had
been identified as Jewish and was to hold a lecture, not on the radio, but at the Trade and Offices
Association (Handel og Kontor). The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade Hakon
Jespersen requested Seligmann to document his ancestry. The Foreign Ministry acted as the
genealogical race experts concluding that Seligmann was not Jewish according the Nuremberg
laws.711 In the case of Seligmann, the Danes used the formal racial definitions in order to adhere
to their promises to informally exclude Jewish civil servants from speaking in public. The case
indicates that the exclusive measures had been expanded to encompass all forms of public
speeches.

7.3 Visit to Denmark – Summer 1942

Danish-German relations had reached a critical moment in the summer of 1942. The death of
Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning in May and his successor Vilhelm Buhl had a negative effect
on the Danish-German relationship, but more importantly sabotage was on the rise. In the late
summer of 1942, Werner von Grundherr, Wilhelm Stuckart and Otto Ohlendorf were all in
Copenhagen. Ohlendorf was head of Sicherheitsdienst Inland in the RSHA, which included
Denmark, and he was later to head the committee for foreign trade in the RWM. Two months
before his visit he had commanded the dreaded Einsatzgruppe D, which had killed 90,000 Jews.

The visit to Denmark had several reasons. There was to be an inspection of the German defenses built to prevent a possible Allied invasion in Denmark. On the administrative level the bureaucracy was to be minimized, while it was to be examined if Denmark could be tied closer to Germany in several areas.\footnote{Lund, \textit{Hitlers spisekammer}, 195; Lauridsen and Lund, \textit{Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942}, 2:325–28 - Larsen mostly writes on the pressure applied on him to get Danish companies involved on the conquered areas of Eastern Europe.}

This was a visit by individuals who on a regular basis were involved in making decisions regarding the overall direction of German policy in Denmark. Given their personal involvement in the organizational and practical tasks of both excluding and murdering the Jews, they were also in Denmark to evaluate the status of the \textit{Judenpolitik}. At the same time, the deportations of Jews from all over occupied Europe were in motion and the pressure for increased measures against the Jews in Denmark rose. The visit was used by Frits Clausen and Gustav Meissner to promote \textit{Judenpolitik} further. Clausen wrote directly to Grundherr during his stay in Denmark to raise several issues including further measures against Jews.

Clausen’s overall aim was to gain more political power for his party. He legitimized his suggestions by pointing to several peculiarities of the influence of Jews in Denmark, which from the viewpoint of Nazism seemed remarkable. Clausen’s party was surprised by the fact that the Supply Office, Varedirektoratet, was controlled by “two Jews and one half-Jew”, while the Permanent Secretary for the Statistical Department, Cohn, was also Jewish. German organizations were also trading with Jewish companies. Clausen recognized that action was being taken in the area of trade, but he thought it was progressing too slowly. He argued that the theaters and press were under Jewish influence, while the Jews controlled half the banking industry and dominated the stock-exchange. Clausen’s main argument was to frame these issues as essential problems for the German state, because the Jews were using their power against Germany. Clausen suggested restructuring the Danish government to counter these developments. In the near future Jews who were politically opposed to Germany had to be removed from their positions. However, Clausen did not suggest the introduction of any legal or formal laws against the Jews.\footnote{“40. Frits Clausen an Werner von Grundherr,” August 19, 1942, DK MAG.} He clearly wanted stronger measures than the ones promoted by Renthe-Fink, but still in an informal manner.
Three days later, Meissner wrote a note describing Stuckart’s and Ohlendorf’s impressions of the progress of the *Judenpolitik* in Denmark. Meissner might have over-interpreted the impressions somewhat, as Stuckart’s own thoughts on the visit do not contain passages on the position of the Jews in Denmark. Meissner mostly focused on Ohlendorf’s negative comments on Jewish influence. This could indicate that Ohlendorf was the most critical of the three visitors, which is backed by his promise to Clausen that things would change. Ohlendorf was also to have promised to report to Himmler that the SS should be tied more strongly to the political developments in Denmark. One cannot help thinking of Best’s arrival in the fall, but we lack evidence to tie these events together. It appears to be the first-time representatives from Berlin voiced a dissatisfaction towards the progress of *Judenpolitik* in Denmark, and the visit had a marked effect on Renthe-Fink.

Only a few days after the visit from Berlin, Renthe-Fink again attempted to pressure Scavenius into firing specific Jews in the public administration. Generally, he held that it was unwise to have Jews in prominent positions and pointed to firing Cohn, while also underscoring that it would be prudent to replace the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, Aage Svendsen, who was considered half-Jewish. Scavenius advised against it. It would cause a great disruption in the government and only a direct German order could make this happen. Renthe-Fink’s suggestions were thus rejected by Scavenius who did mention what was needed for this to succeed. Renthe-Fink backed down, and instead stressed that it would be wise if the Danes on their own would absorb the well-known German stance against the Jews. We should of course take note of Scavenius’ principal stance, which probably reflected the position of the majority of the ministers. In the summer of 1942 this was where the government drew a line in the sand, but as we shall see in the following chapter this was a line Scavenius would be ready to cross only weeks later.

The visit also had further consequences as Anton Fest, maybe on Kanstein’s orders, would instruct Lorenz Christensen to compile a list of the most important Jewish persons in Denmark. On the 24th of August 1942, the list of fifteen people was sent to Fest. First on the list was the head of the Jewish congregation, C.B. Henriques. Christensen characterized him as “without a

---

714 Introduction to “41. Gustav Meissner: Notiz für Herrn Minister,” August 22, 1942, DK MAG.
715 Ibid.
716 #42. Cecil von Renthe-Fink Aufzeichnung,” August 24, 1942, DK MAG.
doubt the leading person in Danish-Jewish orthodox circles.” Henriques was also a lawyer at the Supreme Court, on the board of directors of the paper Berlingske Tidende, and a representative of several other companies. The two rabbis Max Friediger and Marcus Melchior were also on the list, as well as two persons who were also characterized as communists.717

After arriving in Berlin, von Grundherr visited Rademacher. Grundherr brought Clausen’s letter, but also gave the impression that his visit had had a Schockwirkung (a shock effect). Rademacher agreed, because Kanstein, during a recent visit to Berlin, had felt the need to justify his policies in Denmark. According to Rademacher, Kanstein did not agree with Grundherr’s apparently negative report on matters in Denmark. Grundherr had expressed his views to Scavenius in Copenhagen while Renthe-Fink had been given a pep talk. We know this from Rademacher’s suggestion to Luther to change the policy against the Jews in Denmark. It would seem that Grundherr, like Ohlendorf, had been critical of the way the Jewish question was addressed in Denmark. Rademacher suggested to Luther that stronger measures were to be introduced in Denmark. He copied many arguments from earlier reports to prove the continued influence of the Jews. Rademacher argued that the previous policy of ungestörten Entwicklung (undisturbed development) had now reached its limits.718

Rademacher’s suggestions for developing the Judenpolitik further were not radical. He proposed to enact measures against the Jews, which were to avoid the introduction of harsher measures in the future. He believed that a constant pressure should be applied on the Danish government to secure some progress. In order to launch the process, the Danish government was to be forced to introduce some unspecified measures right away. It would seem that the removal of Jewish civil servants could be one such step, but formal laws were not suggested. Von Grundherr believed the time was not ripe for pressuring the Danish government in that direction, and Ribbentrop never became involved.719 Here we could point to a slightly more aggressive stance by Rademacher and Luther in regards to Judenpolitik in Denmark, and while these suggestions were not applied, they would become part of the pressure on the Danish government during the Telegram Crisis (see chapter eight). Yet, it is worth noting that these were still informal.

718 “43. Franz Rademacher an Walter Gödde und Martin Luther,” September 2, 1942, DK MAG.
719 “45. Franz Rademacher an Martin Luther,” September 17, 1942, DK MAG; “43. Franz Rademacher an Walter Gödde und Martin Luther.”
Scavenius presented the German dissatisfaction with matters in Denmark at a cabinet meeting. Scavenius had been informed during the visit, possibly from Grundherr, that the attitude against Germany was too strong, and the demand for the introduction of the death penalty for acts of sabotage had been raised. Scavenius had apparently fended off these demands, but he now called for enforced restriction against the “officers, priests and teachers” who were stirring anti-German sentiment. Halfdan Hendriksen’s impression was that this was a German suggestion, and not one to be followed by the government. The fact that these significant social groups were to be restrained might indicate that the government was losing support for its cooperation among the upper levels of society. The issue of Jewish civil servants was also raised by the Germans who had specifically requested the dismissal of Einar Cohn, Seligmann and Lindgren (who was married to a Jewish woman). It would seem that as most Jews by this point had been removed from Danish companies, the next step was to move against the civil servants.

Despite the slow progress compared to the rest of Europe, where much harsher measures had been introduced at much earlier stages, the pattern of exclusion came in a different order compared to the Judenpolitik in Germany. In Denmark Jewish company owners were excluded before the civil servants. Still, the attempt to exclude these groups in an informal way carries recognizable traits of the formal exclusions in Germany in the 1930’s.

7.4 A Re-Evaluation of Cecil von Renthe-Fink

This chapter is the last to explore and analyze Cecil von Renthe-Fink’s role in the German Judenpolitik in Denmark, as he was recalled in September 1942 due to the Telegram Crisis that will be dealt with in chapter eight. His wife remained in Copenhagen until the 1st of November. Mrs. Renthe-Fink was sent off at a small fare-well dinner with the participation of prominent members of government, and high-level civil servants. Most notably was the presence of Minister Gunnar Larsen and head of the Department of the Foreign Ministry Nils Svenningsen. Mrs. Renthe-Fink was described as bitter, and blamed the politicians for being unwilling to make the necessary changes, which had caused Renthe-Fink to be recalled to Berlin, despite his good intentions. She specifically mentioned the issue of Jews on the radio as one of the areas in which

the politicians should have been more responsive. Renthe-Fink had not been degraded. Instead, he became a special envoy, (diplomatischen Sonderbeauftragten), in Vichy France in December 1943. A Jewish family was removed from an apartment in Berlin to make room for the Renthe-Finks, and as so many others, they personally benefited from being servants of the dictatorship.\footnote{Ibid.; Franz, “Cecil von Renthe-Fink.”} Upon arriving in Berlin Renthe-Fink reported the Italian envoy was not a close associate to Germany, because the envoy’s wife was of Jewish Descent.\footnote{“59. Cecil von Renthe-Fink: Aufzeichnung,” October 9, 1942, WBK Vol. 1.} Lastly, Ribbentrop requested Renthe-Fink and Werner von Grundherr to write a recommendation on how to proceed in Denmark, and it was suggested that the new Danish government should approach the German \textit{Judenpolitik} further.\footnote{“53. Cecil von Renthe-Fink / Werner von Grundherr Notiz,” October 25, 1942, DK MAG.} Renthe-Fink’s continued use and promotion of the regime’s racial ideas serves as a further reason to re-evaluate our perception of his role in Denmark in regards to \textit{Judenpolitik}.

Taken together the chapters three to seven reveal Renthe-Fink as a continuous supporter, promoter, and developer of \textit{Judenpolitik} in Denmark in accordance with orders from Berlin. Let us briefly recapture the many ways, he had enforced \textit{Judenpolitik}. Renthe-Fink was personally involved in registering Jews as part of the prewar Aryanization measures in Denmark. During the occupation he and his staff would continuously work in collaboration with the RfA to Aryanize the Danish-German trade relationship. In January 1942, Renthe-Fink reported that he had succeeded in removing all Jewish representatives for German firms in Denmark, and in September all Danish-Jewish importers had also been excluded. Renthe-Fink suggested further measures against Danish-Jewish companies who received German goods from Danish importers, and through a legal technicality he suggested the application of the Nuremberg Laws to define Jewish companies in Denmark. Likewise, he was a continuous promoter of anti-Semitism in Denmark through the support of Kamptegnet, and the success of getting Jud Süss on Danish billboards. He hired Lorenz Christensen to perform registration tasks for the legation in cooperation with Hans Hermannsen and his staff. It has not previously been recognized that Renthe-Fink suggested formal laws against the Jews in December 1941. The suggestion was quickly turned into a continued pressure on the Danish government to exclude Jews from prominent positions.
This was closely tied to orders from Berlin to pressure the Danish government on the issue while not damaging the overall cooperation.

Cecil von Renthe-Fink has been high-lighted as a career diplomat who succeeded in keeping the Jewish Question at bay in Denmark. However, his direct involvement in Aryanization and many other exclusive measures against Jews shows that he was rather another example of a higher-level member of the AA who worked to achieve the dictatorship’s ideological goals. Without being a radical or fanatic follower of National Socialism, he acted as most German diplomats did in this period. He did not prevent Judenpolitik in Denmark, rather he was one of its promoters. Given the continued importance in keeping Denmark as a cooperative partner to Germany he acted within the informal realm and in accordance with the wishes of Berlin. From this perspective Renthe-Fink succeeded in several areas. Besides Aryanization he was successful in reaching Danish assurances of excluding the Jews from the radio, while he in an unknown number of cases saw to it that Jews were removed from their position, just as Cohen was removed from Nationaltidende and C.B. Henriques from Berlingske Tidende.

7.5 Chapter conclusion

Chapter seven has shown the German legation continued to assist in the Entjudung measures against Danish Jews in the media as well as continuously pressuring the Danish government to prevent Jewish civil servants from speaking on the radio. During the summer of 1942 we detect dissatisfaction with the progress of Judenpolitik in Denmark from Rademacher and Luther. However, the suggestions for enforced measures were still to be achieved by pressuring the Danish government, and without introducing formal laws. After being visited from Berlin Renthe-Fink exerted an even stronger pressure on the Danish government to dismiss specific Danish Jewish civil servants. The legation can thus be characterized as fully assisting in both formulating and executing Judenpolitik in Denmark.

The response of the Danish government to the exclusive elements of the German Judenpolitik in this period varied. It reluctantly accepted the removal of Jews from some newspapers, and while failing to completely ensure that Jews were not to appear on the radio in one instance, the government ended by promising to exclude the Jews from appearing on the radio from August 1942. This seems to be the reason behind examining the race of one civil servant to make

---

725 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 13, 15–16.
sure he was not Jewish. Scavenius denied the government could dismiss Jewish civil servants without a direct German order. This appear as the limit to what the government would accept by the summer of 1942. We can thus detect a bystander government that progressively accepted more German demands, but also had a limit. At the same time, we should recall from chapter four that is also seems the government gave-up its minimal resistance to Aryanization measures close to this point in time as the main file ended in May 1942.

We detect several stages of persecution. Stages two and five are the most notable: the informal exclusion of Jews in prominent positions, from appearing on the radio, and being part of the leadership of some Danish newspapers. The use of the definition of Jews (stage three) functions as a stepping stones for the identification (stage four) of who to exclude. In addition, we can identify that the Danish administration applied the definition of Jews in order to ascertain if a member of the administration is Jewish. This was done to approve his public lecture in the Trade and Offices Association.

The chapter’s last section was a reevaluation of Renthe-Fink’s role in the Judenpolitik in Denmark. I argued Renthe-Fink was a continuous supporter, promoter, and developer of Judenpolitik without being a radical follower of National Socialism. This fits with the perception of most higher-level members of the AA in this period. However, the chapter has also pointed to other proponents of Judenpolitik employed at the legation. It has e.g. identified Gustav Meissner. This does give rise to question how other members of the legation’s staff assisted in achieving progress in Judenpolitik. We have already located the German police’s registration efforts, but they probably supported in other ways as well, which the surveillance of Grünbaum shows. This chapter highlights that Judenpolitik was actively pursued by the leadership at the legation. If we relate this to the AA’s overall role in Judenpolitik this is not surprising. However, it has not previous been clearly identified in the Danish context.

8 The Telegram Crisis and Administrative Discrimination

Chapter eight shows the continued efforts of the legation to promote Judenpolitik from September 1942 through to August 1943. Section 8.1 briefly describes the Telegram Crisis. In section 8.2 the chapter returns to the period just before the Telegram Crisis as Himmler approved to deport the Danish Jews. However, we will follow how this grave proposal was left
in order to continue an informal *Judenpolitik* in Denmark. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 is devoted to the interim period from the 29th of September to November 4th, 1942. This is the period from Cecil von Renthe-Fink’s dismissal to the arrival of Werner Best. In this period the German policies against Denmark are explored following the discussions on these in Berlin. At the same time Barandon and Kanstein from the German legation would take over Renthe-Fink’s role, and begin to exert an enormous pressure on the Danish government to, among other things, adopt formal laws against the Jews. Section 8.4 focuses on the Danish government’s reactions in this period, and it shows that a minority within the government would accept formal anti-Jewish laws.

In section 8.5 we take a step back from high-level politics in order follow the Danish volunteers from the Frikorps who were on leave in Denmark. This provides an important victim perspective, despite it being recorded in Danish Police reports, it reveals several anti-Semitic events took place in Copenhagen in the fall of 1942.

Sections 8.6 and 8.7 zooms in on Werner Best’s two reports on the *Judenpolitik* from January and April 1943. These reports are often viewed as a defense for the cooperation policy. However, by examining the reports’ measures set-in motion to prepare for Best’s stated goal of the complete removal of the Danish Jews, we arrive at a more nuanced perspective on these reports. Section 8.8 follows the Danish government’s reactions to Werner Best’s arrival. It will show how the government began to administratively discriminate against the Danish Jews in order to make sure they were not hired in mostly higher-level positions in the civil service. Let us first take a closer look at the Telegram Crisis.

The Telegram Crisis was sparked by Hitler’s anger towards King Christian X who in late September 1942 had only briefly thanked Hitler for his greetings on the King’s birthday. As a result, Renthe-Fink was recalled on the 29th of September, and Werner Best arrived on the 4th of November. In the interim Paul Barandon would act as a temporary plenipotentiary.\(^\text{726}\) The Danish government had to endure a waiting game for almost a month, and discussed several scenarios on how to proceed. At the same time, the government experienced a strong pressure from German officials in Denmark to initiate steps which would show political goodwill towards Germany. The introduction of formal laws against the Jews was pointed to as one such step, and this is reflected in the government’s discussions in October.

---

\(^\text{726}\) “52. Paul Kanstein an Gottlob Berger [DK MAG],” October 16, 1942, DK MAG - Barandon is described as “stellvertretenden Bevollmächtigten”.
During this dire crisis, the Danish King had a serious horseback riding accident on the 19th of October 1942, and there was widespread fear he would not survive his injuries. The Crown Prince, the later Frederik IX, even took over the regency until Christian X was reinstated in May 1943.727 The fall led to several discussions on how the government would proceed in case of the King’s death. The acting German Reich Plenipotentiary, Paul Barandon, knew about the King’s illness in surprising detail, and he could report on the King’s pulse, fever and general condition. The next three days Barandon reported on how the King slept as well as his statement that if he died, the problem of the Telegram Crisis would no longer exist. The fear of the King dying abated as he slowly began to recover in late September.728

8.1 Himmler’s Approval to Arrest The Danish Jews

On the 24th of September, shortly before the Telegram Crisis took off, Ribbentrop had called Luther to suggest the deportation of Jews from Denmark, Bulgaria, and Hungary.729 While it is well-established that nothing came of this, it is worthwhile examining the circumstances more closely than previous research has done. These events are telling of Berlin’s ideas on Judenpolitik, and provide an indication of Denmark’s position within a German dominated Europe. The idea to deport Jews from the three countries was most likely inspired by a meeting in the German leadership earlier that day. During the meeting Jews were in general held responsible for sabotage against Germany. In addition, deportations were discussed. They were considered to be progressing in all occupied areas, as well as in Croatia, Slovakia, and Romania. Ribbentrop’s proposal was to supplement these deportations by reaching out to the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Danish governments in order to have them deport Jews residing in these countries. The Italians would receive the same invitation, but this would originate directly from Ribbentrop or the Führer.730 Italy could thus be viewed as part of this suggestion.

Bulgaria and Hungary were part of the axis alliance, while Denmark was not. However, all three countries communicated through diplomatic channels. In this context Ribbentrop’s suggestion seems as an attempt to bolster the AA’s role in the overall process of Judenpolitik.731

727 Jespersen, Rytterkongen, 473, 477–78, 481.
729 “46. Martin Luther Notiz,” September 24, 1942, DK MAG.
730 Ibid.
731 Bo Lidegaard explains Ribbentrop’s move as a consequence of events i Denmark, which does not fit the chronology as the suggestion is presented before the Telegram Crisis begins. See Lidegaard, Landsmand. De danske jøders flugt i oktober 1943, 41; John T. Lauridsen has
As we know Ribbentrop’s suggestion never materialized. This shows that despite the power relationship being in German favor, these countries still enjoyed a high degree of independence. So much so that a consultation was warranted before deportations could proceed. It is worth noting that deportations from these countries did not ensue until local governments were replaced by more German friendly ones or had seen a complete German takeover. The exception being Bulgaria which did not deport Jews from the country or were invaded by Germany.

Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo in the RSHA, had attended the same meeting as Ribbentrop. Müller had similar suggestions. On the very same day he advanced the idea to introduce registration measures against the Danish Jews in order to arrest them. It is undisclosed if these efforts were coordinated or not, but Müller’s proposals were harsher than Ribbentrop’s, as Himmler answered:

“I agree with the arrest of the religious Jews (Glaubensjuden) as well as the Communist and Marxist functionaries. These measures are to be coordinated with the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry must be informed that I find the implementation of these measures necessary.”

This acceptance meant the creation of a Festnahmekartei (a registry for arrests), and the suggested move against the communist leaders was performed only weeks later. This underscores that Müller’s suggestions and Himmler’s approval were consequential. The proposal of these drastic measures seems to be the first time, the RSHA and Himmler took a direct initiative to arrest the Jews in Denmark. It underscores that the deportation of the Jews in Denmark was thought of by the main architects of the Holocaust even before Best arrived. 

already pointed to the fact that Ribbentrop’s suggestion not necessarily should be seen as a consequence of events in Denmark, but rather as part of the overall Judenpolitik. See introduction to source “46. Martin Luther Notiz.”

Hungary and Bulgaria had introduced a host of formal laws against the Jews. For an overview of these please see Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 2003, 2:793–807, 853–919.

“47. Heinrich Müller an Heinrich Himmler,” September 24, 1942, DK MAG Müller’s letter is unknown, but is registered as an independent source.


Herbert, Best: biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft: 1903-1989, 385 This could give some credit to Best’s postwar explanation for initiating the action against the Jews in September 1943 because it had already been on Himmler’s drawing board in the fall of 1942. Yet, it is unknown if Best was aware of this. On the other hand, Best and Himmler still kept in touch.
It is unclear why the Jews in Denmark were not arrested at this point. Müller’s suggestions also needed approval from the AA, and it seems plausible that the AA convinced Himmler to postpone the arrests. It has been convincingly argued that the appointment of Werner Best as Reich Plenipotentiary halted the initiative. Werner Best, needed to deal with a friendly, rather than a hostile Danish government or no Danish government at all. If the Jews were arrested the projected reshuffling of the Danish government might also become an impossibility.737 (See section 8.2). It seems plausible that the consideration for Best’s future political maneuverability played a major role as he still enjoyed Himmler’s support.

On the 8th of October, it seems an analysis of the Jewish influence on Communism in Denmark was ordered, thus tying the ideological and racial enemies of Nazism together in the Danish context.738 On November 4th the report on Jewish influence in the Danish Communist Party was forwarded to the AA. It was composed by Heinrich Müller in collaboration with Gustav Meissner, and the fairly speedy reply points to the possibility that most of the case material was readily available due to earlier registration efforts. The report is not convincing in tying the two groups together, and the authors forced its conclusions to fit the racial ideas of amalgamating Jews and communists. Several of the Danish communists, mentioned in the report are only connected to Jews by marriage. The report in many cases linked communist thoughts to the Danish Social Democrats, who were labelled as potential enemies although they were neither communist nor Jewish.739

8.2 German Ideas for Denmark During the Telegram Crisis.

In the middle of October, Barandon would describe the Danish government as nervous and awaiting German demands for a restructuring of the cabinet. Barandon opposed the idea of adopting Danish Nazis into the government. Instead, he viewed the crisis as an opportune moment for Germany to achieve a more accommodating Danish government. One that would initiate measures against the press, the Danish resistance, and the Jews.740 Paul Kanstein agreed with Barandon. They both regarded the coming government as the last before a German takeover of power, and this prognostication later proved to be precise. Kanstein passed his views on

737 As suggested by John T. Lauridsen in his introduction to “49. Heinrich Himmler an Heinrich Müller.”
738 “50. Martin Luther an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft Kopenhagen.”
740 “48. Paul Barandon an das Auswärtige Amt [DK MAG],” October 5, 1942, DK MAG.
to Gottlob Berger, head of the SS-Hauptamt, while also supporting Werner Best as the most suited candidate for the position as Reich Plenipotentiary. Best was also Himmler’s favorite candidate, and it fell on fertile soil when Kanstein argued the SS would gain a stronghold in Denmark by appointing Best.741

This development was further supported by two notes from Renthe-Fink to Ribbentrop on Danish matters. Renthe-Fink’s first note was a status on the situation in Denmark, and the second was an elaborate proposal on how to proceed. The second one was written in collaboration with von Grundherr (AA). Renthe-Fink’s first report did not mention the subject of the Jews. Generally, the Danish government was commended for adhering to German demands, but it was also criticized for not wholeheartedly supporting National Socialist Germany. On the other hand, the Danish people were generally described as negative towards Germany. Renthe-Fink’s last words were “The weakening of the democracy’s powerful position has therefore been my most purposeful goal”.742 This was Renthe-Fink’s self-perception of his period in Denmark, and this goal was carried into the second note, which contained an elaborate suggestion on how to proceed in Denmark.

Renthe-Fink and Grundherr’s ideas were more developed compared to Barandon’s and Kanstein’s suggestions. Renthe-Fink and Grundherr proposed to untie the Danish government from parliamentary bindings, and orienting the media towards Germany. At the same time an active campaign against the resistance movement was to be initiated and the leading Danish politicians were to be directed towards initiating German-style laws against the Jews. As a way of separating the Danish government and the monarchy, the new plenipotentiary was to ignore the King and only cooperate with the government. The authors expected that the future Danish government would probably oppose these demands, but this was to be used as an advantage to continuously restructure the government in a more National Socialist direction. Scavenius, Gunnar Larsen and Johannes Kjærbøl were regarded as examples of ministers who could remain in the coming government.743 There were thus clear intentions to destroy the remnants of Danish democracy by purposely provoking government reshufflings to accommodate German demands, and within this strategy a pressure for laws against the Jews was to be applied.

741 “52. Paul Kanstein an Gottlob Berger [DK MAG].”
In late October, Hitler, Ribbentrop, Best, and Walter Hewel, Ribbentrop’s permanent officer at Hitler’s chancellery, held a preparatory meeting stipulating the tasks for the newly appointed Reich Plenipotentiary. Many of Renthe-Fink’s and Grundherr’s suggestions were discussed at this meeting. Hitler’s main concern was keeping Denmark as a militarily strategic bridge in order to maintain military control over Norway. The new Reich Plenipotentiary was to break the interior power of the country with the aid of the Danish Nazis, but as warned by Barandon and Kanstein, they were not necessarily to be part of the government. The importance was placed on forming a legal government with German-friendly personalities or people who would conform to German demands. As suggested, Best was only to work with the Danish government in order to secure a coordinating role in the formation of Danish laws and the administration of the country. The government was to have little political support in the population in order to make it feel completely dependent on “die deutsche Macht” (the German power). There were no demands for actions or policies against the Jews as far as we know. There were only two important and limiting elements to these ideas: they could not damage Germany’s overall foreign policy or Germany’s war economy. In November, Scavenius was invited to Berlin, and demands were made directly to him.\footnote{109. Cecil von Renthe Fink: Niederschrift,” October 27, 1942, WBK Vol. 1 The introduction to source 109 contains a discussion on the possible author of the minutes. ; “110. Cecil von Renthe-Fink/Werner Best Niederschrift,” October 27, 1942, WBK Vol. 1.}

8.3 The Danish Government Before Best’s Arrival

The Germans had made their final decisions in late October, but the preceding weeks had been used to continuously pressure the Danish government to make the wanted changes: reshuffle the government, introduce anti-Jewish laws and enact the death penalty for acts of sabotage. This pressure had been applied on Scavenius and Nils Svenningsen by several German representatives, but the only ones identified by name are Barandon and Kanstein. They all suggested to Scavenius that he could gain good-will by accommodating the Germans, but Scavenius acted as a coolheaded tactician and rejected them. His rejection was not founded on the contents of the German proposals. Rather, he required assurances of political stability in the Danish-German relationship in order to consent to them.\footnote{Lauridsen and Lund, \textit{Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:403, 408, 390 It concerns the dates of 12-10-1942, 24-10-1942, and 27-10-1942.}

impressions from these conversations were positive. They considered it likely a new government would accept these German demands.\textsuperscript{746}

According to a secret report from the German Military Secret Service, the \textit{Abwehr}, the King had been asked about his position on the hypothetical question of German demands for laws against the Jews and the introduction of the death penalty. The King is cited as saying, "I would rather abdicate than voluntarily agree to, what I believe, would befoul the name of Denmark".\textsuperscript{747} While we lack Danish sources on this meeting it appears that representatives of the Danish government were probing the possibilities for accepting German demands. At this point it would seem as if Scavenius and others were contemplating accepting German demands for formal laws against the Jews in order to gain stability within the Danish-German relationship.

Ribbentrop invited Scavenius to Berlin at the beginning of November to discuss German demands. The invitation resulted in a brief period of intense meetings between the ministers and the so-called Nine-Man Committee, as well as with Crown Prince Frederik who had taken over due to his father’s accident.\textsuperscript{748} The discussions during these meetings reveal the boundaries and limits on the introduction of formal measures against the Jews. Scavenius kicked off discussions at a Statsråd\textsuperscript{749} by pointing to seven issues on which Scavenius expected the Germans would make new demands.

1. The difficulties of the cooperation between a democracy and a totalitarian state


\textsuperscript{747} Abwehr, "Bericht vom 5.10.1942," October 5, 1942, PA, R261128 Politische Lage Dänemark"...ich abdiziere eher, als dass ich freiwillig in ein Abkommen einwillige, von dem ich der Meinung bin, dass es den Namen Dänemark beschmutzt." It is uncertain who wrote the report for Abwehr, but it is highly detailed and corresponds to the known reactions of the Danish government during the Telegram Crisis. See eg. ; Lauridsen and Lund, \textit{Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942}, 2:377 The report is possibly on the discussion between the King, the Crown Prince, Prime Minister Buhl and Scavenius, which took place on the 29th. of September, but Danish minutes of the meeting do not seem to exist. The Abwehr report seems credible as similar reports are rich in detail and some parts are certifiable through other sources. The Abwehr’s report from the 2.11.1942 contains extreme details on how power was transferred from the King due to the Crown Prince due the King’s horse-back riding accident on the 19.10.1942. Even that the queen had given Prime Minister Buhl comforting words if the King was to die. It also contains many details on the following cabinet meeting and there is a clear consistency between Gunnar Larsen’s minutes of the meeting on the 27.10.1942 on the government’s discussion on how to proceed in case of the King’s death. A further argument for the credibility of these reports is the status on the King’s illness, which on the 2.11.1942 is described as having taken the decisive turn for the better. Vilhelm Buhl and Alsing Andersen are mentioned as sources. It could be Georg F. Duckwitz who is the “ich” in the reports as he had an elaborate network among the Danish Social Democrats. Though his ties to Abwehr are blurred and they have not been decisively refuted ; Kirchhoff, \textit{Den gode tysker: Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz: de danske jøders redningsmand}, 52–53, 107–10.

\textsuperscript{748} It should be recalled the King had a horseback riding accident on the 19.10.1942 and the Crown prince took over regency until 15.5.1943 Jespersen, \textit{Rytterkongen}, 473, 477–78, 481.

\textsuperscript{749} Meeting between the Regent and the cabinet on government issues

\textsuperscript{750} "Statsrådsprotokol," October 31, 1942, RA, Statsrådet The official minutes to do not reflect this discussion. Apparently, the protocols in which the minutes are normally recorded had not reached the meeting. The meeting’s minutes were instead based on notes from the Minister of Justice. He had only registered one point of seven - the possible demand for a change in the government. The following is based on Larsen’s minutes see below.
2. The Jewish question
3. The Communists
4. Instigators (Kaj Munk, Arne Sørensen, Hal Koch, and Vilhelm La Cour)
5. Sabotage
6. The attitude of the press
7. Demands that Denmark send more workers to Germany

The list is prioritized, and the two first bullet-points were considered the most important and politically difficult. The first point regarded the possible demands for a restructuring of the government in a direction which made it more independent from the political parties, and:

“No. 2. was the Jewish question. The Foreign Minister paraphrased Göring’s statement to him in Berlin approximately a year ago, when Göring had stated that the question of National Socialism played a minor role; if there was just some form of cooperation between the countries it would not be of decisive importance if the system of government was based on National Socialist guidelines or not, even though the prerequisite, of course, had to be the achievement of good and confidential cooperation. On the contrary, one could not avoid the Jewish question, as it sooner or later would become a matter for all of Europe, but on the other hand the question did not have to be solved in the same way everywhere, as the Jewish question expressed itself in highly different ways in various countries. The Foreign Minister expected that it would be possible to get by with a very mild form of Jewish laws, namely the dismissals of Jewish civil servants in higher positions or something similar. The Foreign Minister was aware of the extreme difficulty of this question, and it could cause great difficulties even if it was toned down to something less.”

Based on his meeting with Göring the Foreign Minister evidently expected that the Germans would demand anti-Jewish laws, while Kanstein’s and Barandon’s recent pressure only added to

---

751 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:422–33 ”No. 2. Var jødespørgsmålet. Udenrigsministeren refererede Görings udtalelse til ham i Berlin for ca. 1 år siden, idet Göring her havde udtalt, at spørgsmålet om nationalsocialismen spillede en underordnet rolle; når blot man kunne få et samarbejde i stand mellem landene, ville det ikke være af afgørende betydning, om regeringsystemet var efter nationalsocialistiske retningslinjer eller ej, selvom om forudsætningen selvfølgelig måtte være, at man kunne opnå et godt og fortroligt samarbejde. Derimod kunne man ikke komme uden om jødespørgsmålet, da det dog før eller senere blev en europæisk sag, men på den anden side behøvede spørgsmålet ikke løses ensartet hele vejen, da jødespørgsmålet jo gav sig højst forskelligt udtryk i de forskellige lande. Udenrigsministeren kunne derfor tænke sig, at man måtte kunne komme igennem med en meget mild form for jødelovgivning, nemlig afskedigelse af jødiske embedsmænd i højere stillinger eller lignende. Udenrigsministeren var dog klar over, det var et yderst vanskeligt spørgsmål, og at det kunne volde store vanskeligheder, selvom det blev dæmpet ned til noget underordinet.”.
this expectation. Scavenius was thus ready to accept formal laws against Jewish civil servants to accommodate German demands and secure the cooperation.

During the meeting, Prime Minister Buhl denied that the government could be changed, anti-Jewish laws introduced, and the death penalty reinstated. The remaining questions were up for negotiation. Most other ministers agreed, but two ministers were ready to accept some form of discriminatory measures against the Jews. Minister for the interior Knud Kristensen was flexible on the Jewish question. The most important issue for him was the form and extent of the laws. Minister for Education Jørgen Jørgensen could not support formal laws, but he was ready to accept minor informal measures against the Jews. The Jews were to be removed from prominent positions, “which they themselves should be strongly interested in” he argued, while the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs Vilhelm Fibiger opposed any form of anti-Jewish laws. We do not know the positions of the remaining ministers Alsing Andersen, Gunnar Larsen, Kristen Bording, Halfdan Hendriksen and Johannes Kjærboel. We should expect that Scavenius’ usual allies, Larsen and Jacobsen, were probably ready to accept formal anti-Jewish laws, but this cannot be substantiated by the sources at hand. Yet, we can conclude that at least three of the government’s ministers agreed to some form of discriminatory measures against the Jews, while two spoke against it. Clearly, the position of some of the cabinet members had changed significantly since December 1941, making this a telling example of how the logic of cooperation functioned to continuously, but piecemeal to give in to German demands. At the same time the bystander role had progressed towards accommodating German demands. In the summer of 1942 Scavenius had demanded a direct German order to dismiss Jewish civil servants, but this stance seems to have evaporated.

As Scavenius went to Berlin, Ribbentrop would not demand laws against the Jews, instead there was a strong German pressure to make Scavenius Prime Minister. National Socialist ministers were also demanded, but Scavenius wanted the demand in writing, cleverly calling...
Ribbentrop’s bluff. As Scavenius left Berlin, he was approached by Renthe-Fink who hoped Scavenius would continue to have confidential talks with Best as he had had with Renthe-Fink. During the conversation, Scavenius said, “It would be difficult to get the parliamentary ministers to commit hara-kiri”. The reference to collective suicide probably meant that many ministers were not only to be replaced, but also that the government was to sever its ties to parliament. The latter, at least did not transpire.

In Denmark, the result of negotiations with Best and tough discussions among the Danish ministers saw Scavenius becoming Prime Minister, while maintaining his position as Foreign Minister. The price for ensuring the Danish Nazis were not adopted into the government was the inclusion of additional ministers without party affiliation. The last government of the cooperation ended up having six non-affiliated ministers and seven ministers representing political parties. This was a significant change compared to the first coalition government in April 1940 that only consisted of political ministers, while the second from July 1940 had had three non-affiliated ministers. The continued pressure to reshuffle the government had over time proven successful in some respects. At the same time, these concessions secured that the Danish National Socialists never became part of the government.

Discussions on the restructuring of the government were also held in the Nine-Man Committee. Peter Munch feared the consequence of a possible break-down of the cooperation would result in the persecution of Jews and further arrests. Scavenius’ arguments for a change in government illustrated his firm belief in the cooperation. Using himself as an example, he stressed that the persons trusted by the Germans had better options during negotiations. He then used Slovakia as an example of what could be achieved if a nation adhered to German demands. His final argument came from biology; Denmark had to act as a chameleon and change its colors according to its situation. Scavenius’ position can be described in many ways, from unscrupulous to a political realist. However, his willingness to accept new and further German demands seemed to have had few limits.

758 Christensen et al., Danmark besat: krig og hverdag 1940-45, 342–44.
760 Ibid., IV Regering og Rigsdag under besættelsen. Aksstykker. Stenografiske referater:731; See Tönsmeyer, “Kollaboration als handlungsleitendes Motiv? Die slowakische Elite und das NS-Regime” She shows how Slovakia accepted its role as “Schutzstaat”, and maintained maneuverability to pursue political elements that in the opinion of the one party state benefitted the nation.
Just around suppertime on November 7th 1942, in the final hours before the political parties and ministers decided to let Scavenius function as both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Jews again became a discussion point among the ministers. Despite the fact that formal demands regarding the Jews had not been made, Scavenius was asked to state his position on joining the Axis powers, legislating against the Jews and possibly bringing German-friendly persons into the government. The politicians wanted Scavenius to state his position on these points to avoid future conflicts on the issues. Scavenius replied that he felt he was an object of suspicion and would be unable to work under such inflexible conditions. He thought it was dangerous to take non-negotiable stands. Regarding the question of joining the Axis, he would not accept such demands, but he noted that the issue was no longer relevant. His recent visit to Berlin had revealed that the Germans did not want troops from Denmark. It would seem that Scavenius’ position had changed since December 1941. This was not due to a newly principled stance, but rather a German statement that buried the issue. Scavenius’ stance on the Jews remained flexible and again reveals his willingness to adopt parts of the German Judenpolitik should the need arise to maintain the cooperation:

“Likewise, as he had repeatedly stated, he agreed in principle with the other members of the government, that one could not or should not be all for Jewish laws on the basis of the Nuremberg laws; while on the other hand everything had to be seen in relation to the actual circumstances and demands that were being raised. He thought he would accept a German demand to remove the Jewish civil servants or something similar; this could even be in the interest of the Jews in order to avoid something worse, but as he had stated previously, he could not and would not give any actual statement on these issues.”

In essence, Scavenius and some of the other ministers were ready to accept further formal measures against the Jews. The only concrete step mentioned was removing the Jewish civil servants. However, Scavenius’ statement allowed for further acceptances if such demands were made. This does open for a discussion on the cooperation functioning as a shield for the Jews.

---

763 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:464–65 “Ligeledes var han jo, som han gang på gang havde udtalt, principielt enig med de andre regeringsmedlemmer i, at man ikke kunne eller burde gå ind for jødelove efter Nürnberglovenes still, medens man på den anden side måtte se alt i relation til de faktiske forhold og de krav, der blev stillet. Således kunne han godt tænke sig at gå ind på et tysk krav om at fjerne jødiske embedsmænd eller lignende, dette kunne måske endda være i jøderenes interesse for at undgå noget værre, men som sagt, han kunne ikke og ville ikke give nogen egentlig erklæring vedrørende disse emner.”.
A continuous German pressure had slowly shifted the attitude of a minority of ministers to be willing to accept formal anti-Jewish laws against Jewish civil servants. Contrary to the position that the Danish government would always reject proposed laws against the Jews, the discussions among politicians and ministers reveal that the issue was up for negotiation during crises in the Danish-German relationship. To a minority within the government, formal anti-Jewish laws, in some toned-down version, was considered a possible solution to remedy the Danish-German relationship, while maintaining some political power. As we shall see in section 8.8 the matter of Jews in prominent positions became a continuous concern and a subject of discussion during the period of Werner Best’s administration.

8.4 A Visit from the Front Lines

During this crucial crisis in the Danish-German relationship, 850 Danes who had volunteered for the Waffen-SS as members of the Frikorps Danmark were on leave in Copenhagen in September and October 1942. The Frikorps was part of Himmler’s idea to create national SS-legions outside of Germany who were to be engaged in the war against the Soviet Union. Three days after the invasion of Russia, the go-ahead to form the Frikorps was given. It is well established that the Frikorps was to blame for numerous incidents of violence and clashes between the volunteers and the Danish population.764 The visit at large was the cause of many discussions within the government.765 Yet, the incidents directed against Jews were not part of these. The episodes targeting Jews are included here as they provide an important victim perspective.

The Frikorps volunteers were ideologically convinced, and instigated several anti-Semitic incidents, which have not been explored in detail.766 Most cases are described in several Danish police reports, as well as in a larger report summarizing these incidents.767 The large report reflects several cases of rumors, harassment and threats, but only a few incidents of physical abuse. The individual reports provide examples of Danish Jews being discriminated against on a more direct level. The police placed observers in several entertainment establishments in the

765 See Gunnar Larsen’s diary entries for September and partly October Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942.
766 Christensen, Poulsen, and Smith, Under Hagekors og Dannebrog. Danskere i Waffen SS 1940-1945, 358 The authors have a paragraph on these incidents, based on the overall report in the source collection printed immediately after the war.
767 "90 Rapport om Frikorpsens besøg." November 1942, RA, Statsadvokaten for særlige anliggender - diverse sager.
city based on risk evaluations and rumors. Their task was to observe and if need be closedown incidents involving the Frikorps. The majority of the cases are presented below, however it should be noted that these only reflect incidents which were reported and recorded by the police.

Some Jewish artists experienced threats and verbal abuse. Max Skalka was the conductor of the orchestra at Restaurant Czardas. He contacted the police as he feared that members of the Frikorps were about to arrive at his residence. He stated nine uniformed men had approached him at the restaurant and threatened to appear at his home. Only a few days later, two members of the Frikorps demanded to be informed if Skalka was Jewish. Though Skalka denied it, the Frikorps member said, “You have to understand, Mr. Skalka, there is a movement in motion against Semites... This question has to be solved, and it has to be removed by the root without mercy and pardon.” Skalka had the impression the situation could have escalated, had it been confirmed he was Jewish.768

The Jewish singer Rachel Rastenni experienced more direct anti-Semitism during her concerts at the National Scala in Copenhagen.769 On the 15th of October 1942, Danish police witnessed two members of the Frikorps began yelling at her: “There is the Jew swine.” Shortly after this, they chanted “Down with Jews” and “Death to the Jews.” They promised to show up the next day with more men if she was not removed. The next few days, the police were present at Rastenni’s concerts and witnessed the same behavior. The Danish police had learned that the Frikorps wanted to see off the “Jewess” in a violent manner on the 20th, but nothing came of it.770 Additional incidents of anti-Semitism occurred at the National Scala. A waiter was called a “Jew-swine” and a Jewish looking guest was insulted a few weeks later. Anti-Semitic propaganda was handed out and posters were hung on the toilet walls.771

A similar incident happened at the restaurant Mythen772, where members of the Frikorps and the German Navy loudly cheered “Death to the Jews”.773 At the Lulu Ziegler Cabaret two

769 In Bent Blüdnikow, Min fars flugt: jødiske skæbner i oktober 1943, 1. udgave (København: Berlingske, 2013), 72–74 Blüdnikow also points to these by using a postwar interview from Rastenni as well as in the diary of Journalist Vilhelm Bergstrøm. Unfortunately, only the diary is mentioned by name, and it reveals very little. The interview which is extensively quoted is unfortunately used without citation.
770 “11430. (no title),” October 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
771 “90 Rapport om Frikorpsets besøg,” 21, 31, 45.
772 This is the correct spelling
members of the Frikorps loudly called the place a “Jew joint” and threatened to bring scissors on their next visit as “...someone needed to get their hair cut...”.

This possibly referred to the public humiliation of Jews in Eastern Europe, which involved cutting the beard and hair off orthodox Jews. In the restaurant La Bohemé, the piano player was threatened with beatings and called a “Jew-swine”. The piano player was forcibly removed from the premises and handed over to the Danish police for insulting the Danish volunteers.

The Danish police recorded several other incidents of public anti-Semitic utterances. A member of the Danish police could report he had witnessed 7-8 members of the Frikorps yelling to a Jewish person, “Ew, it smells like garlic here”. This gathered a crowd, which the police officer had to disperse, but the soldiers kept following the person. The police officer kept alert, but nothing further happened.

There are several other minor incidents recorded e.g. the yelling of “Jew swine” to a merchant by a member of the SS. A non-Jewish man would explain his “Jewish looks” were presently against him as they apparently fit the stereotypes of anti-Semitic propaganda. He had been subject to several episodes of racial slur being yelled at him.

There are additional examples of threats and one example of violence. An intoxicated Danish Frikorps soldier had drawn his gun in an ice cream parlor in Copenhagen, threatening to kill the Jewish waiter if he did not remove himself from the premises, which he did. Two other customers were held at gun-point as the Dane and his partner, a German regular soldier, bragged about shooting 7,000 Jews and Bolsheviks. They claimed that the Danish Jews would be removed in two weeks. They were gone as police arrived.

Late in the evening of October 9th an incident of violence occurred in the city center of Copenhagen. A member of the Frikorps had yelled “Down with the Jews” several times. This had caused a civilian to slap the Frikorps member in the face, and as it was presumed the civilian was Jewish, the retaliation was swift: two blows with the butt end of the bayonet while being called a “Jew-swine”. Even though it later turned out the person was not Jewish, the Frikorps member was not aware of this during the fight.

---

774 “11006. (no title),” September 17, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
775 “90 Rapport om Frikorpsets besøg,” 44.
776 “11108. (No title),” September 24, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
780 “90 Rapport om Frikorpsets besøg,” 51.
The synagogue attracted repeated attention during the Frikorps’ leave. There were rumors that the synagogue and Freemasons’ hall would be bombed after a large recruitment meeting at the arena K.B. Hallen, as the soldiers apparently had smuggled explosives with them from the front. This caused the police to place guards at the premises.\textsuperscript{781} Nine days later, it was reported that a mixture of German soldiers and members of the Frikorps were seen on the premises of the synagogue looking for a Mr. Nathan.\textsuperscript{782} This happened again a week later, but this time the members of the Frikorps had urinated on the building.\textsuperscript{783} The Jewish community was concerned, and as the important Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur fell in September, the congregation requested additional security measures from Danish police. Five police officers would guard the synagogue during the daytime and four during the evening. In addition, a civilian police patrol of two men would be observing the area.\textsuperscript{784}

While the incidents might be regarded as mild compared to those elsewhere in Europe, they underscore that the Jews in Copenhagen were subject to public harassments such as yelling and threats by the Frikorps, and sometimes regular German soldiers. It is surprising to see that Frikorps members were joined by regular German soldiers as they have largely been regarded as two distinct groups. It raises the question if other irregular anti-Semitic incidents against Jews took place during the occupation. The role of the Danish police seems to have been quite important as they interfered if things appeared to escalate to violence but would otherwise not intervene. We now leave the streets of Copenhagen to return to political level and the arrival of Werner Best.

8.5 Werner Best

Werner Best came to Denmark by plane, landing at 12:30 on the 4\textsuperscript{th} of November 1942. He was greeted at Copenhagen Airport by his SS colleague Kanstein and Nils Svenningsen.\textsuperscript{785} On the same day, Best had received his formal appointment from the Führer as Bevollmächtigten des Reiches in Dänemark and was appointed head of the German legation by Ribbentrop.\textsuperscript{786} Best

\textsuperscript{781} “10962. Ang. formentlig planlagt forsøg på attentat mod synagogen og frimurerlogen.,” September 9, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
\textsuperscript{782} “11007. (No title),” September 18, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
\textsuperscript{783} “11107. (No title - Note),” September 24, 1942, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
\textsuperscript{784} “123 Anmodning om mere bevogtning,” September 17, 1942, RA, Statsadvokaten for særlige anliggender - diverse sager.
was promoted to SS-Gruppenführer by Hitler in November 1942, the 4th highest rank in the corps, despite being in the service of the Foreign Ministry.\footnote{183. Rudolf Querner an Werner Best," November 25, 1942, WBK Vol. 1.}

Shortly after Best’s arrival, Franz Rademacher visited him to discuss further measures against the Jews in Denmark. It was agreed that these measures were to progress slowly, and Best was to report on his plans.\footnote{48. Karl Otto Klingenfuss: Notiz [WBK Vol. 2.]," December 23, 1942, WBK Vol. 2.} In January 1943, Best had been in Berlin meeting with representatives from both the RSHA and the AA. The content of these meetings remains largely unknown, but shortly afterwards Best sent off the first of two larger reports on the Jews in Denmark. In the introduction to his first report in January, he specifically referred to his conversations in Berlin with Luther and Rademacher. This shows that the \textit{Judenpolitik} in Denmark was a coordinated matter, and the content of the report hardly surprised the AA.\footnote{76. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt," January 13, 1943, WBK Vol. 2.}

The report is divided into two main parts. The first one describes the current state of affairs and explains why formal Jewish laws cannot be introduced. The second part contains a host of suggestions on how to proceed against the Jews in an informal manner. Let us initially focus on the first part. Best wrote that anti-Jewish laws similar to the ones in Germany would be met with resistance and result in the collapse of the cooperation. Scavenius had said his government would step down if they were introduced, because the political parties as well as the King would not participate in such policies. Combined with Abwehr’s report on the King’s opposition to laws against the Jews as well as our knowledge on the discussions within the government, these bystander groups had set the limits for how far the German demands would be accommodated. Best guessed, that a removal of the government would result in his appointment as \textit{Reichskommissar}.\footnote{Ibid.}

Best’s arguments for not introducing Jewish laws come off as strategic, but also seem to reflect a fear of Danish public reactions rather than the government’s. He argued that Jewish laws would remove the last restraints the Danish population had at the moment, and direct them into active resistance. Even the Danish Nazi leader Frits Clausen had warned Best that the Danish population would react in favor of the Jews. Added resistance would lead to a need for more German police and military in Denmark. Best instead argued that it would be much easier to tie Denmark closer to Germany by keeping the Danish government in a state of hope and fear:

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item 76. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt," January 13, 1943, WBK Vol. 2.
  \item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
the hope was tied to the continuation of the parliamentary system, while the fear of losing it would keep them in a deadlock position deeply dependent on Germany.\footnote{Ibid.} Essentially, this was very similar to Renthe-Fink and Grundherr’s suggestions. (See section 8.2). At the same time, it seems Best had the Danes exactly where he wanted them – in a deadlock built on fear of losing power. Previous research argues that the first part of Best’s report is to be regarded as a way of postponing the formal laws against the Jews in Denmark, and also point to a surprising continuity in Renthe-Fink’s and Best’s \textit{Judenpolitik}.\footnote{see e.g. Bak, “Jødepolitik i Danmark: Deportation eller uddrivelse? Den tyske faktor i redningen af jøderne i oktober 1943,” 16.} Given the findings in this and previous chapters I would argue that this part of the report reflects a continuation of a well-established German \textit{Judenpolitik} which was highly influenced and approved by the main actors in Berlin. This means that Best’s arguments can hardly be attributed to a personal strategy of preventing formal laws against the Jews Denmark.

The second part of Best’s report did not contain arguments against introducing anti-Jewish laws in Denmark. Instead, it gave concrete suggestions on how to proceed against the Jews on the informal level in Denmark. Best’s vision for the Jews in Denmark was, in his own evident words, the “total solution of the Jewish question in Denmark”,\footnote{“76. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt” “....totale Lösung der Judenfrage in Dänemark...”} which he mentioned twice. We should not doubt Best’s intentions: the Jewish question would also be solved in Denmark, and this is not surprising. As Ulrich Herbert has pointed out it was a prevalent feature of Best’s career and world view to seek this goal.

“But for Best, as for most other SS leaders, the removal of the Jews from the German sphere of influence was a political goal sui generis;....since the days of the völkisch student movement the goal of pushing the Jews out of the German sphere of influence had been at the center of his thinking – and in this sense Best had acted since the mid-1930s, first in Berlin, then in Paris, from a central and authoritative position in each case.”\footnote{Herbert, \textit{Best: biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft: 1903-1989}, 387”Für Best aber, wie für die meisten anderen SS-Führer, war die Entfernung der Juden aus dem deutschen Machtbereich ein politisches Ziel sui generis;....stand die Zielsetzung, die Juden dem deutschen Einflussbereich herauszudrängen, für Best seit den Tagen der völkischen Studentenbewegung im Mittelpunkt seines Denkens – und im diesem Sinne hatte Best seit Mitte der dreißige Jahre, zunächst in Berlin, dann in Paris, an jeweils zentraler und verantwortlicher Stelle auch gehandelt.”}
However, for the time being Best would have to limit his policies to prevent the Danish
government from stepping down. The following suggestions were within these limits and
intended as the first steps in reaching the long-term goal of a total solution.

1. There was to be a systematic removal of Danish Jews from public life, especially
   a. in the Civil Service
   b. in public institutions
   c. in the press.
2. Jews were to be removed from the German-Danish economy through the introduction
   of the informal rule that Jews could not be employed by Danish firms. This would be
   achieved by introducing a clause in future contracts between Danish and German
   firms stipulating that Danish companies could not employ Jews.
3. There were to be some arrests of Jews on charges of political or criminal offences in
   order to threaten the Jewish minority.
4. Best had begun building a registry of the Danish Jews, which were estimated at 6,000
   and concentrated in the capital. Essentially, this would “ease the later solution”, Best
   argued.795

His suggestions for further measures against the Jews were slightly harsher than those set in
motion by Renthe-Fink in September, but fit the overall and long-term Judenpolitik of gradually
excluding the Jews from more and more areas.

Luther’s reply was one of approval:

“The proposed measures from the Reich Plenipotentiary are to be considered a first
step in the solution of the Jewish question in Denmark. It must be attempted, step
by step, to clear-up the Jewish question in Denmark.”796

795 “76. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt”...wird die späteren Lösungen erleichtern.”
vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen bedeuten einen ersten Schritt zur Lösung der Judenfrage in Dänemark. Es muss versucht werden, schrittweise
auch die Judenfrage in Dänemark zu bereinigen.”.
Ribbentrop also accepted Best’s suggestions. The *Judenpolitik* in Denmark, which was essentially a policy of exclusion, had now been expanded by Best and approved by Berlin.\(^{797}\)

Clearly, in order to certify Best’s intentions, it is also of great importance to examine if his suggestions were actually carried out. Previous research seems to have largely neglected to follow up on this. Suggestions two and three are the hardest to evaluate. It remains unclear if Best began ordering the arrests of Jews in order to threaten them. This would probably have to be done through the SPSA if it were to follow normal procedures, but the examined cases do not reveal such arrests. There is of course the possibility of having representatives of the legation question Jews under arrest, but this type of sources was probably destroyed shortly before the war ended.\(^{798}\)

The suggestion to remove Jewish employees from Danish companies who were trading with Germany went further than the previous Aryanization measures in Denmark, because it went beyond excluding importers, owners, board members or directors. It seems foggy, but plausible, that the initiative was carried out in a consistent manner. We know that the members of the GCC from 1939 were asked to remove Jewish employees, and that companies with Jewish employees were present in Christensen’s large report on the Jews (see chapter seven). There is a Danish police report from May 1943 on the steel importer STAMEKO, that traded with Germany, which specifically stresses that the company does not employ Jews or have Jews in their leadership.\(^{799}\) These are indications of such steps being initiated, and if we view them in conjunction with Best’s other Aryanization initiatives (see chapter four) they also appear likely. However, an irrefutable answer can only be provided after a closer examination of contracts made between Danish and German companies in the period from February-August 1943.

The evidence regarding the other initiatives is more convincing. Removing Jews from the civil service and public organizations, suggestions 1a and 1b, were discussed several times at the highest levels of the Danish government. Below, I will analyze these and show how the government reacted to these demands. Here, it will suffice to highlight the fact that Best monitored all reassignments and promotions of civil servants to secure Jews were not

---


\(^{799}\) “14527. Forespørgsel på 2 firmaer,” May 12, 1943, RA, AS-Sager Kbh.
In addition, Lorenz Christensen was ordered to compose a list of all Jews who held a law degree, and Best received it on in April 1943. The list contained the names of 65 Jews, including all details of kinship and their addresses. Christensen knew 21 of them were members of the Jewish congregation, and some also belonged to B’nai B’rith. The sources are silent on why this list was made, but it was designated as being addressed to German Legation and it fits into Best’s initiative 1b. It is possible that Best in due time would apply pressure on the Danish government to begin removing Jewish lawyers, as he had already secured the Danish government’s support to refrain from promoting or hire Jewish civil servants (see below). The list cannot be directly linked to these initiatives, but it seems unlikely it was made without a purpose.

Suggestion 1c, the removal of Jews from the press is reflected in a request from Best for an updated overview of Jews in Danish media. This report was also written by Lorenz Christensen and as Best after the war would testify to meeting Christensen multiple times it seems that Christensen functioned as Best’s primary expert on Jewish matters. This brings us to an evaluation of suggestion 1c.

It remains unknown when Best ordered the report on the Danish press. It was finished after August 29th 1943 and presented before October 1943. Jürgen Schröder was head of the office for press affairs at this point as he had taken over from Meissner, who left in April 1943. After the war Schröder argued that the report had been ordered to appease fanatic National Socialists in Berlin and to prove Jews were not influential in the Danish press. If we examine the report more closely, the content is contrary to Schröder’s arguments. The report went to great lengths to prove a Jewish presence in the press. It seems more likely that Best ordered the report in order to fulfill the promise he had made to Berlin in January and to target specific individuals.

Lorenz Christensen’s report on the press was highly anti-Semitic incriminating anyone with the slightest ties to Jews. “Jewish blood” was certified by stretching family relations far, and mentioned all kinds of historical ties to Jewish companies or banks. He went through all the

---

802 An international Jewish organization and lodge founded in 1843
major newspapers in this manner, and one example should suffice to show his method. The paper *Berlingske Tidende* no longer employed the Jewish board member, C.B. Henriques, who had first been pointed to as representing a problem for the Germans by Renthe-Fink in December 1941. The main editor Svend Aage Lund was characterized as having a Jewish mother, and several other board members were said to be connected to Jewish finance. Christensen argued that these networks had obstructed any critique of Jews in the paper. The editor of the law section was categorized as half-Jewish and the editor of the social pages was categorized as one-eighth Jewish. Among the staff, there was one full-Jew, two half-Jews and two one-eighth Jews. All were mentioned by name and detailed information on their heritage was provided. One other person was mentioned for his two marriages. First to a half-Jewish woman and then a quarter Jewish woman. This type of detailed analysis continued over 20 pages, addressing the papers of B.T., Nationaltidende, Aftenposten Politiken, Børsen, Kristeligt Dagblad, Aarhus Stiftstidende, Jyske Tidende, Aalborg Amtstidende and Vestkysten. It is worth noting that Christensen included a report he had written on the Union of Journalists’ financial ties to Jews in late 1941.805

In a way these reports tie into suggestion four, the registration of Danish Jews. We know from chapter five that the registration process had been taking place for a long period of time, but as we have also learned Troels Hoff stated in April 1943 that questions on race posed to Danish police were on the rise. This could be attributed to Best’s initiatives from January.

### 8.6 Best’s Second Report

In April 1943, Best wrote his second report by request from Ribbentrop. It was an overview of the progression of the *Judenpolitik* in Denmark. Ribbentrop especially wanted to know how many Jews were in prominent public positions or had a great influence in Denmark. In addition, the report was to include a section on the influence of the Jews in German-Danish trade. Lastly, Ribbentrop wanted Best to evaluate the possibility of the Danish government taking steps against the Jews. Ribbentrop’s proposal was limited as Scavenius and his government could not experience difficulties (Schwierigkeiten) if these steps were initiated.806

---

Best could thus easily reject Ribbentrop’s suggestion as it would raise problems for Scavenius. Best stated the introduction of formal Jewish laws in Denmark would result in the Danish government stepping down. Most interpretations of this report view it as if Best is arguing against Jewish laws to protect the cooperation. However, Best’s rejection was in line with Ribbentrop’s limited proposal, and it seems that Berlin and Copenhagen agreed on how to proceed once again. Best argued that the role of the Jews was very minor and summarized their influence based on Lorenz Christensen’s reports. In the public administration, libraries, schools and universities, there were only 31 Jews, and in the press fourteen were identified, but none of them served as main editors. In the arts, only 21 Jews were known. The number of lawyers was set to 35, which is not consistent with Christensen’s most recent report, which mentioned 65 Jews with a law degree. However, the number of 35 lawyers is much closer to the 41 mentioned in Christensen’s report from January 1942. That list had only included barristers who could represent clients in Supreme Court or both the High Courts and the District Courts. It could be that Best only counted this type of lawyers or he purposely lowered the number. Taken together, and compared to the number of Jews in such positions in other countries, Best could easily and convincingly conclude that the “Jewish question in Denmark plays such a slight role qualitatively and factually that for the time being there is no practical necessity for specific measures to be taken.” He then moved on to describe the Jewish influence in trade and concluded that the Jewish influence in all important areas was so small that it would be harmful to German interests to move against them. He both reasoned and expected a coming comprehensive solution (Regelung) would be simple to complete due to the geographic concentration of the Jews and the registration work being done by his own men.

In the conclusion of the report, Best provided an opening for moving against the 1,351 stateless Jews from Germany. His scheme was to let them regain their German citizenship and then deport them. Best reasoned this move would not judicially violate the sovereignty of Denmark and would not be “psychologically” damaging to Danish-German relations.
suggestion was unsuccessful, and I will evaluate it more closely below. But before doing that, we should note that previous research has estimated the suggestion as a way of satisfying the hardliners in Berlin, while one author has pointed to the potential loss of life. Behind these positions lie the uncertainty of whether the proposition should be regarded as sincere or not.

In evaluating Best’s proposal, we must at least recognize the possibility that it might have been accepted. For several reasons I will argue that we should regard it as sincere. Previous research has established Best was an educated and radical supporter of the National Socialist cause. His suggestion specifically targeted Jews from Germany. This minority had been the enemy of the party as well as the police organization Best had served almost his entire career. At the same time, he felt the move would not jeopardize the Danish-German relationship, which was the main concern for him and his superiors. A further substantiation of his sincerity lies in the way he ended his letter. Instead of asking for instructions, he moved on to writing how he would provide the plans for when and how the following measures were to be initiated. If we compare the proposal from April to the one sent in September 1943, where he proposes to arrest the Danish Jews, there is a notable difference in the way he finishes them. In September he would ask for further instructions on how to proceed, but this was not the case in April. Further, the April letter does not warn his recipients of practical difficulties that might arise either from returning citizenship or the potential risk of the reaction of the Danish public. These concerns were part of his suggestion in September. We should also take the deportation pattern in most other Western European countries into account. This largely followed a design which first deported foreign Jews and then moved on to attempt to deport Jewish nationals of the host country. In this manner Best’s suggestion follows a recognizable deportation pattern from Western Europe. In addition, Best had experience from France where he was behind organizing the first deportation of Jews from France. If Best’s proposal was accepted, he could secure a form of progress in the Judenpolitik in Denmark that was comparable to Western Europe while maintaining the cooperation of the Danish government. The combined arguments of this paragraph strongly suggest that Best’s proposal was sincere.

817 See e.g. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 2003, 2:642–45, 696–99 for the example of Belgium and France. 2/3 of the deportees from France were not French citizens.
Eberhard von Thadden had the suggestion to return citizenship to German Jews in Denmark evaluated in the offices of the AA. They reasoned that it was hardly feasible for two reasons. It would be necessary to partly rework the 11th revision of the Nuremberg laws in order to follow Best’s plan, and it did not address the Jewish question in the desired consistent manner. The arguments behind the rejections are telling. The application of a judicial hinderance is in stark contrast to the murderous campaign against the Jews that had already peaked. Yet, at the same time it underscores Holocaust’s haphazard and often contradictory path. The rejection based on the plan’s lack of consistency points to a wish to maintain this in the Judenpolitik. Yet, it remains unclear if it is to be understood as a reference to Denmark or Judenpolitik in general. Thadden’s evaluation was sent to Ribbentrop who decided to revisit the matter in June. We do not know the reason for Ribbentrop’s delay. It could be that Best’s suggestion was being evaluated further, or it could be that Ribbentrop was too busy to make a decision.

On May 18th Himmler requested a meeting with Best through Ribbentrop. Best was to travel to Berlin in July to, among other issues, discuss the progress on the Judenpolitik in Denmark with Himmler. Shortly before Best’s arrival in late June 1943, Himmler decided that measures against the Jews in Denmark were to be postponed until he decided otherwise, and Ribbentrop agreed. Himmler’s decision was sent to Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who had replaced Reinhard Heydrich as head of the RSHA.

Were there serious plans to initiate steps against the Danish Jews since Himmler decided to postpone such measures? The fact that Kaltenbrunner needed to be informed points to a confirmation of this. Best met with both Himmler and Kaltenbrunner in early July, and it seems likely that Best was informed of the decision to not move against the Jews in Denmark at this point, but his minutes of the meeting with Himmler do not disclose details on this issue. This might be because the minutes were intended for Ribbentrop.

819 The death camps of Belzec, Treblinka and Sobibor, where approximately 1.7 million Jews were killed, were all closed by the fall of 1943. By the end of 1942 1.5 million Polish Jews had been murdered. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 2003, 3:1043; Longerich, Holocaust, 340.
820 For one example of Longerich’s point that the practice of genocide fostered contradictory intentions and orders which delayed the process. Longerich, Holocaust, 417–18.
Leni Yahil has two contradictory interpretations of these events as she first claims that Himmler’s decision cannot be explained, and then later attributes Best’s positive reports on the general conditions in Denmark as the reason for Himmler’s decision.\textsuperscript{825} Danish historiography has taken over the latter interpretation and it fits the explanation that Best sought to keep the Jewish question out Denmark by e.g. writing “…he travelled to Berlin where he convinced both von Ribbentrop and Himmler to once again postpone the solution of the Jewish question in Denmark...”.\textsuperscript{826} This explanation runs contrary to the chronology of events, while interrogations at the Nuremberg trials placed the responsibility for Himmler’s change of heart with Horst Wagner and Adolf von Steengracht, who were coordinating Best’s visit.\textsuperscript{827} Both were in the AA, where Wagner had replaced Luther’s while Steengracht had taken over from Weizsäcker.\textsuperscript{828}

8.7 Best and Propaganda

Werner Best is often credited with closing Kamptegnet\textsuperscript{829}, but as Bak has showed, the weekly continued as part of the DNSAP’s paper. The leading editors of Kamptegnet, Aage H. Andersen and Olga Eggers, were sentenced to prison, but by German intervention they never served their sentences and were relocated to Germany. If we examine events more closely it seems that the Danish government was pressured to let the two anti-Semites go.

The anti-Semitic weekly Kamptegnet had largely outplayed its role as an independent paper as Aage H. Andersen and Olga Eggers were facing prison sentences in the spring of 1943.\textsuperscript{830} Andersen had apparently tried to activate his connections within the Antijüdische Weltliga (see chapter six) to avoid prison, and he requested to become a member of the Waffen-SS. The AA wanted Best’s opinion, but Best blamed Andersen for his own predicaments as Kamptegnet had been reduced to a gossip magazine. He recommended that German financial support be discontinued. He also reasoned that this type of propaganda was not beneficial for expanding the understanding of anti-Semitism among the Danish public. Following Best’s postwar testimony, the organizations Der Stürmerverlag and Institut für Judenforschung had requested

\textsuperscript{825} Yahil, Et Demokrati på prøve, 83–84, 115.
\textsuperscript{827} Please see the introduction to “143. Horst Wagner an Ernst Kaltenbrunner.”
\textsuperscript{828} Ernst Klee, “Horst Wagner,” Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945 (Nikol Verlag, 2016), 650; Ernst Klee, “Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland,” Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945 (Nikol Verlag, 2016), 598.
\textsuperscript{830} Bak, Dansk antisemitisme 1930-1945, 446.
the weekly continued.\textsuperscript{831} Closing the weekly proved costly, as its debt was 10,500 RM, but the AA decided to pay the dues for several political reasons. It was considered very shameful to let a weekly fold as it had for years been supported by the AA in the “anti-Jewish struggle”. The closure would be the laughing stock of world Jewry, and it would damage the relationship with foreign anti-Semites that the AA had been building up since 1933.\textsuperscript{832}

Best seems to have been involved in moving the subject matter of Kamptegnet into a page in the Danish Nazi party’s newspaper Nationalsocialisten. In this manner, Stürmer-type propaganda was reduced, but not cancelled.\textsuperscript{833} It could be viewed as a setback for the promotion of anti-Semitism, but as it was continued in a newspaper with more readers, one could in fact argue that it was enhanced. The result also seems to counter Best’s own opinion of the weekly as inappropriate propaganda for the anti-Semitic cause.

The service of Andersen and Eggers was not forgotten as the legation paid the costs of the court cases, which amounted to 10,000 DKR (2017//217,264 DKR). Best was prepared to intervene and prevent Andersen and Eggers from serving their prison sentences. However, he would not accept Andersen becoming a member of the SS, as earlier cases had caused “unwanted political consequences”.\textsuperscript{834} On the 4\textsuperscript{th} of May Best rejected a request from Berlin to let a representative from the Anti-Comintern visit Aage H. Andersen.\textsuperscript{835}

On the 14\textsuperscript{th}, Eggers visited Friedrich Stalmann as she faced prison, because the Danish courts had rejected her pardon plea. Stalmann succeeded in postponing the imprisonment for ten days. Towards Danish police representatives he called it “very unfortunate” that Eggers had not been pardoned. Stalmann then moved on to threatening the Danish police, since refusing to pardon Eggers had the potential to raise the Jewish question in Denmark.\textsuperscript{836} Considering that Olga Eggers was despised by the Danish authorities and that the Germans had great interest in maintaining a functioning and cooperative government, the risks associated with this threat were high. However, it stresses the extent to which Eggers enjoyed the protection of German diplomacy. The case now went to a higher political level, as Ludwig Chantré from the German diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{831} “Rapport vedr. Dr. Lorenz Christensens forbindelse med afdøde forfatterinde Olga Eggers.”
\textsuperscript{833} “359. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt,” April 15, 1943, WBK Vol. 2.
\textsuperscript{834} Ibid.
legation negotiated with the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, Eivind Larsen. As we know, both Andersen and Eggers were instead relocated to Germany.

Olga Eggers was moved to a position at the Heinkel Factories in Warnemünde. She was very dissatisfied with this. She successfully convinced her friend Lorenz Christensen to argue for her return to Denmark. At the German legation, it seems very likely that it was Chantré who successfully secured Eggers’ return.837 Best agreed to let Andersen work for the Anti-Comintern in Berlin as long as Andersen would not interfere in Danish politics again.838 Yet, as we know, Andersen would later return to Denmark. Though Best’s role remains undisclosed, it seems unlikely that he was not involved in bypassing the Danish justice system. The cases proceeded as intended through the Danish courts, but the court’s rulings were undermined by letting Andersen and Eggers move to employment in Germany, and they returned to Denmark after August 1943. These cases thus come off as less impressive examples of Danish judicial independence.

8.8 Administrative Discrimination

Let us return to the Danish government’s discussions, that we left in November 1942. Until the summer of 1943 the continuous discussions reveal two important things: 1) certain aspects of Werner Best’s Judenpolitik, which are not found in the known German sources. 2) The fact that the Danish government enforced an informal and administrative discrimination towards Jews.

In late November 1942, as we have seen, Werner Best wished to be informed of all reassignments and promotions of civil servants in Denmark. Consequently, Scavenius informed the department heads of all Danish ministries in order to deter the hiring process at an early stage. This piece of information became a central discussion point at the following cabinet meeting, as the ministers felt that the issue should have been brought directly to their attention. Scavenius explained that the German demand had probably been issued to avoid the promotion of Jews or persons hostile towards Germany. Given Scavenius’ previous willingness to accommodate German demands in this area, and fully aware that most of his colleagues

837 “Rapport vedr. Dr. Lorenz Christensens forbindelse med afdøde forfatterinde Olga Eggers.”; “Justitsministeriet om løsladelse af Olga Eggers,” January 24, 1948, RA, Københavns byret. Retsopgøret: Straffeakter. 23-1947-86-I, pk. 441-442 Postwar Danish police wrote she did return and Best was also questioned on the matter. He remembered the case, but had conveniently forgotten his role in it. This appears unlikely as Eggers was an unusual case which had required negotiations at the highest level.
disagreed, he had most likely wanted to circumvent the other ministers by keeping it at an administrative level.\textsuperscript{839}

The main concern for some of the ministers was that this would enable the Germans to overrule the government on employment issues. Gunnar Larsen agreed, but felt that the government was to blame as it had not been sensitive to Renthe-Fink’s many warnings. Larsen used the breach of the government’s promise to keep the Jews off the radio as an example (see chapter seven). Larsen argued that the lack of focus on these incidents had the potential to raise the Jewish question at large. Larsen believed this could “open all of hell’s torments against these people”.\textsuperscript{840}

The Minister of Finance Kristian H. Kofoed now revealed that he and Scavenius had decided not to follow protocol and reappoint Head of Department for Statistical Affairs Cohn as the head of The Royal Danish Mortgage Bank (Kongeriget Danmarks Hypotekbank) as his six-year term had run out. Normally he would have been automatically reappointed. As we recall Cohn had previously been singled out as one of the civil servants Renthe-Fink and others wanted removed. However, Minister of Trade Halfdan Hendriksen had just reappointed the members of the Board of the Price Control Committee (Priskontrolrådets Forretningsudvalg) and this included Cohn. Hendriksen believed this issue did not belong at this political level. The ensuing discussions ended in Cohn staying in both positions.\textsuperscript{841}

The diary from the new Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Valdemar Holbøll, supply us with a few more important details from this meeting. In the following positions Jews were not to be hired: “Permanent Secretaries, Head of Departments, all police positions, Rectors etc.”\textsuperscript{842} This meant that Jews were to be completely excluded from serving in the police. Holbøll also recorded Scavenius as stating “…that it might be necessary to sacrifice some, approximately 3 or 4 cases have Jews in prominent positions, just as it had been necessary to sacrifice several politicians.”\textsuperscript{843} Erik Scavenius willingness to let go of the Jewish civil servants was also known by

\textsuperscript{840} Ibid., 2:507 “…åbne op for alle helvedes kvaler for disse mennesker…”
\textsuperscript{841} Ibid., 2:508.
\textsuperscript{842} Non paginated diary the date is the 3rd. of December 1942 Valdemar Kragh Holbøll, “Dagbog fra 30.10.1942 til 30.08.1943,” 1943 1942, Det Kongelige Bibliotek “…departementschefer og afdelingschefer, alle politistillinger, rektorer osv.”
\textsuperscript{843} Non paginated diary the date is the 3rd. of December 1942 ibid “…at man måske kunne komme ud for at måtte ofre enkelte, ca. 3-4 stykker sager har jøder i større stillinger, ligesom man tidligere havde måttet ofre flere politikere.”
the Swedish envoy Gustav Dardel who reported on it in December 1942. There seems to be little doubt that Scavenius was ready to go through with this if necessary.

Larsen suggested to make the:

“...definitive agreement that in the future reappointments and appointments of Jews would not be done without previous submission at a cabinet meeting, and in addition I advised the outmost caution, especially in the area of education, as this area had proven particularly sensitive.”

According to Larsen, there was a consensus among the ministers to adopt his suggestion. The discussion is only summed up in one sentence in the official minutes:

“...it was agreed to inform the Germans that the appointment of higher civil servants would be treated by the government as a whole, and that it would be attentive to not placing enemies of Germany in such positions.”

The editors of Larsen’s diary argue that Larsen’s suggestion crossed a moral line, as such a policy adhered to Nazi racism and anti-Semitism. However, he was far from alone, as it was a united government who committed to discriminate and prevent Jews from holding positions in the civil service. This largely corresponds to one of Best’s goals from his report in January 1943 and it had been his predecessor’s as well. Now, it seems the logic of cooperation had secured that this goal had finally been reached.

On the other hand, Scavenius had in his first discussion with Best informed him that the Jewish issue could not be raised. This had caused Best to react quite fiercely. However, Best seemed to have accepted the Danish method, which was to “administratively” keep it at bay.

---

844 Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 112.
845 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejds mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:508 “...den definitive aftale, at man for fremtiden ikke foretog genudnævnelser eller udnævnelser af jøder uden forelæggelse på et ministermøde, og jeg henstillede ligeledes, at man yderst varsom med udnævnelser ikke mindst indenfor undervisningsministeriets område, da dette jo havde vist sig særdeles omtåeligt.”.
846 Ibid.
848 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejds mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:508 see note 22.
849 Ibid.
In this way Scavenius avoided the formal, and forced retirements. In addition, he succeeded in securing the cabinet’s participation to informally administer that Jews were not promoted or hired in public positions.

The issue of Jewish civil servants continued to resurface in the Danish government to various degrees and did so only a week later during the discussion of the financing of new state loans. The Jewish firm Carl Otto Henriques was among the group of companies to fund the loan. Because Carl Otto Henriques was traditionally part of the funding and had participated in the preparatory work, the Minister of Finance, Kristian H. Kofoed, felt obliged to continue this principle. However, Scavenius and Kofoed had discussed the issue before the meeting. The Director of the Danish National Bank, Carl V. Bramsø, had assured them, that the loan arrangements could be constructed without Henriques. The firm was then excluded from the deal.850

Larsen, as usual, supported Scavenius by arguing that the Jewish question had to be kept at bay to secure the political cooperation, as well as for the sake of the Jews themselves. He then explained how administrative discrimination functioned and why it should be applied:

“...it was of the greatest importance, that we kept our part of the silent agreement, according to which we [the government] ourselves had to do everything in our administrative power to prevent the Jewish question from being raised in public or otherwise provoking it to the surface. I agreed with the Prime Minister that this was a typical example in which an administrative act could prevent the participation of the Henriques company.”851

This expanded the administrative measures the Danish government was ready to perform in order to, on principle, exclude Jews from official dealings and positions. Larsen legitimized the action by calling it a part of a “silent agreement” on the Jewish question between the

850 Ibid., 2:508, 512; “Ministermøde,” December 10, 1942, RA, Ministermøder 29.1.1940 - 28.8.1943”Lånet blev tiltrådt på de af Finansministerens opgivne betingelser men under forudsætning af firmaet C.O. Henriques udtrådte af lånekonsortiet. // The loan was granted on the conditions stated by the Minister of Finance, but under the condition the company C.O.Henriques stepped out of the loan consortium.”

851 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942, 2:508”...at det derfor var af den største betydning, at vi overholdt vor del af den stiltiende overenskomst i henhold til hvilken vi selv skulle gøre alt, hvad der stod i vor administrative magt for at forhindre, at spørgsmålet kom frem i offentligheden eller på anden måde blev provokeret frem. Jeg måtte give statsministeren ret i, at her var et typisk tilfælde, hvor man ved en administrativ handling kunne holde firmaet Henriques udenfor.”
government and the Germans. This raises the question whether other Jewish companies were excluded from deals with the Danish government, but never made it to the level of the cabinet.

The case mentioned above seems to be the first known one in which the government began to administratively discriminate against and exclude Jews without a German pressure being applied beforehand. This case was quite far from the issue of promoting Jews to higher positions in the civil service. Yet, the incident has a grim tone of state-sponsored Aryanization attached to it as it removed a Jewish company from the state’s economy. In the government, the exclusion of Carl Otto Henriques was legitimized as a necessary precaution in order to avoid legal measures against Jews and jeopardizing the cooperation. However, it clearly went further than the agreement on Jewish civil servants made in the cabinet a week earlier. This was a form of active cooperation which was intended to maintain political stability, and possibly motivated by the fear of losing power. Essentially, the tactics Best had aimed for were working – the Danes reacted based on a “deadlock of fear” by moving in the German direction.

The “silent agreement” mentioned above was elaborated upon in the spring of 1943. It appears that Scavenius and Best had struck a deal regarding the Jews. This argument can be substantiated if we follow Larsen’s and Scavenius’ repeated references to the Jewish question as one that had been buried. The two most remarkable instances of this were Gunnar Larsen’s description of Scavenius’ policy and Scavenius’ own words at a cabinet meeting in May 1943. Larsen’s praised Scavenius for having

“...understood that we had to give in on quite insignificant areas which presented themselves, namely the avoidance of promoting Jews to public positions, the removal of Jews from the radio etc., and on this issue, I for once have to state that the political members of the government have fully understood this and have without difficulties agreed to it in order to achieve a higher goal; in addition I believe the Jews should be forever grateful to the Danish government for this; while I know they are not and they will probably later claim they had wanted to be turned into martyrs. This will of course also be easy to say afterwards, but it will hardly affect the realities.”

852 Ibid., 2:509.
853 Lauridsen and Lund, *Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1943*, 3:177–78”...idet denne har forstået her at give ind på de ganske uvæsentlige punkter, som her foreligget, nemlig undladelse af at forfremme jøder til offentlige stillinger, fjernelse af jøder fra radio o.lign. og på dette punkt må jeg for en gangs skyld også udtale, at de politiske medlemmer af regeringen fuldt ud har forstået dette og uden vanskeligheder er gået med hertil for at opnå det højere mål, som jeg i øvrigt mener, jøderne burde være den danske regering uendeligt taknemmelig for, hvad jeg imidlertid godt er klar over, at de ikke er, og senere hen vil de formentlig påberåde sig, at de hellere ville være gjort til martyrer. Det vil naturligvis også være let at sige bagefter, men det kan næppe andre realiteterne.”
According to Larsen, a unified government had now given in on several areas regarding the Jews, and it seems very plausible that the government and Best had made an agreement on the issue. The government’s knowledge of what was happening in other countries probably played a significant role in Larsen’s, and possibly, the government’s acceptance of these informal measures.\(^{854}\) However, if we focus on the Danish setting we should acknowledge the continued expansion of measures against the Jews. With our present knowledge it is difficult not to acknowledge Larsen’s foresight. However, the Danes could not know how things would turn out at this point. We should also note the fact that Larsen mentions that he knows the Jews do not appreciate the government’s actions. While we are unaware of the actual relationship of the two groups the statement does indicate that it had become more troublesome.

Scavenius’ statement at the cabinet meeting of May 4\(^{th}\) 1943 further adds to the argument that an informal understanding had been made with Best.

> “…after this, Scavenius accounted for the Jewish question and stated that fortunately, by Best’s mediation, this question had been buried for the time being, but there was a silent precondition in which the Danish side was not to provoke the raising of the question by promoting Jews in the state…”\(^{855}\)

This agreement had been mentioned several other times in the spring of 1943. The first time Larsen mentions it was after discussing the release of the prominent professor and surgeon Ole Chievitz. In late 1942, Chievitz had been arrested by Danish police due to his resistance activities. After five months in prison he was released. The famous physicist Niels Bohr, who was Jewish, celebrated the release. Larsen argued the celebrations was careless as it could cause the Jewish question to be raised again, now that it had finally been buried.\(^{856}\)

### 8.8.1 Cases of Administrative Discrimination

In the following I will trace the known examples of administrative discrimination. It is important to underscore that these examples appear to be the high-profile cases. They confirm

\(^{854}\) Bjerre, Udsigt til forfølgelse. Det danske udenrigsministerium og de europæiske jødeforfølgelser 1938-1945, 224.

\(^{855}\) Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1943, 3:181 “Herefter redegjorde Scavenius for jødespørgsmålet og udtalte, at man jo heldigvis ved Bests mellemkomst nu havde fået dette spørgsmål begraved indtil videre, men det var jo en stillitiende forudsætning, at man fra dansk side ikke provokerede spørgsmålet frem ved forfremmelser indenfor statstjenesten af jøder...”.

\(^{856}\) Ibid., 3:162.
how adamantly the Danish government was enforcing the informal exclusion of Jews from the public sphere. At first glance, it would seem surprising if all such incidents were discussed in cabinet. Were they of such political importance that one needed the government’s stance in every case? Or were smaller cases solved by lower level administrative decisions? In a recruitment case at the School of Dentistry the applicant for a professorship had been administratively turned down by the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Education, Frederik Graae, stating that at the moment Jews could not be promoted to public office.\textsuperscript{857} Apparently, the case only made it to the cabinet because it made it to the bulletins of the resistance movement who wrote: “...but behind the back of the population the government has administratively approved and implemented rules of conduct which carry the character of Jewish laws...” The Jewish applicant had been informed that “...the government has decided not to hire Jewish civil servants to avoid insulting the German Nazis!”\textsuperscript{858} Scavenius called the affair “very unfortunate” and blamed the Minister of Education, Jørgen Jørgensen, who later denied the existence of such a letter.\textsuperscript{859} It is unknown if the letter was a hoax or if the Minister of Education simply attempted to conceal it. However, Scavenius’ and Larsen’s reactions clearly show that the government was now enforcing the informal prohibition against promoting and hiring Jews as part of the German \textit{Judenpolitik} in Denmark.

Larsen had learned of Graae’s letter during a discussion with Professor Dr. Henning Lassen who was dissatisfied with the government’s position against the Jews. As a consequence of Graae’s rejection Lassen brought the up-coming competition for the professorship in pediatrics at the University of Copenhagen into the discussion as it involved a Jewish candidate, Dr. Rothe-Meyer. Lassen wanted to cancel the competition as the applicants would be competing on unfair terms. That same evening, the hospital director in charge of the competition, K.M. Nielsen, entered into a discussion with Larsen concerning the Jews. Nielsen agreed with the government’s policy, but he felt that society would owe the Jews favors in the future as a consequence of this discrimination. Larsen took the opposite stand, arguing that the Jews should give the government credit for creating a “free state” for the Jews, unlike the rest of Europe. He

\textsuperscript{857} Ibid., 3:165–66, 172, 181.
\textsuperscript{858} “Vort demokratî og jæderne! Bag professorkonkurrencens kulisser,” \textit{Frit Danmark}, June 1943, 2. yr. no 3 edition, 1, www.illegalpresse.dk”...men bag befolkningens ryg har regeringen administrative vedtaget og gennemført forholdsregler af en jødelovs karakter...” // “regeringen havde vedtaget ikke at ansætte jødiske embedsmand før ikke at støde de tyske nazister!”.
also remarked that the Jews did not agree with him.\textsuperscript{860} Again, the relationship between the government and the Danish Jews appear to be out of tune. The exchange of viewpoints illustrates the fact that outside the government there was knowledge of the discrimination going on, but also that there was criticism of the government’s policy. Even though K.M. Nielsen accepted the government’s position, he still felt it was necessary to point to a postwar re-justification of this discrimination. Larsen’s reaction shows that he felt justified in his actions, and at the same time had little care for individual consequences.

The competition for the professorship in pediatrics set off a round of discussions among the ministers who were all troubled at the possibility of the Jewish Dr. Rothe-Meyer winning the competition. Scavenius even felt the university was conducting independent politics, which could potentially bring down the government. The Minister of Education, Jørgen Jørgensen agreed: Dr. Rothe-Meyer could not be allowed to win the competition. Jørgensen feared some of the judges might vote for the Jewish candidate for political reasons in order to oppose the government. The competition could not be stopped, but it might be possible to sabotage it by preventing the Swedish member of the assessment committee, who was likely to vote for Dr. Rothe-Meyer, from entering Denmark. Jørgensen even considered requesting the Minister of Justice to obstruct the issuing of the travel permit. In the end, the cabinet decided not to interfere, but rather to rely on a minority decision, which placed the final decision in the hands of Jørgensen. This option was preferred as it had already been done once before, but it is unknown if this had involved a Jewish applicant.\textsuperscript{861}

The two candidates for the professorship in pediatrics and director of the polio clinic, Dr. Rothe-Meyer and Dr. Plum were evaluated on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of January 1943. They both had their advantages, yet Dr. Rothe-Meyer had more practical experience at children’s clinics, having been employed at four different ones, including one in Baltimore, USA. Dr. Rothe-Meyer was særdeles velkvalificeret – extremely well qualified, while Dr. Plum was udmærket kvalificeret – excellently qualified. This made Dr. Rothe-Meyer’s rating the highest of the two.\textsuperscript{862} All the members of the assessment committee voted for Dr. Plum who remained in this position until 1976. Rothe-

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{860} Ibid., 3:166.
\textsuperscript{861} Lauridsen and Lund, \textit{Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1942}, 2:181–82 It is unknown if the previous case had involved a Jewish applicant.
\textsuperscript{862} This is concluded on the advice from the Danish Medical Museum (Museion) in the spring of 2017. It should be noted the illegal paper argued Plum was selected, because of his qualifications. “Vort demokrati - og Jøderne! Bag professorkonkurrencens kulisser,” 1.
\end{flushright}
Meyer fled to Sweden in 1943. He worked as a doctor in both Sweden and Great Britain during the war, and afterwards became head physician at several Danish hospitals, but he never became a professor. There is reason to believe the government had played a decisive role in this decision, as it was discussed on such a high level. The illegal press seems well informed on the competition and saw the government’s meddling as an expression of its attempt to carry a mask of democracy while administrating as the German’s wanted them to. It was concluded that: “The decisive element is not the degree these provisions reach, but their character of unambiguous breaches of democracy’s leading principles.”

In the spring, the Minister of Education intervened in the election for the position of rector at the University of Aarhus. The Jewish candidate Dr. Fritz Blatt was about to be elected, but the minister had made sure the other professors would refrain from voting for him. After this, Blatt withdrew his candidacy and the theologian Johannes Munck became rector. Blatt fled to Sweden in October 1943 but became rector in 1949-1951. It seems evident that the Danish government was enforcing the informal agreement made with Best. Some might even argue that the government became a vital and enforcing factor in the German Judenpolitik in Denmark.

8.9 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the Judenpolitik pursued in Denmark from September 1942 to August 1943 to answer research questions two and three. It has shown that a German pressure was asserted on members of the Danish government in October 1942 to adopt anti-Jewish laws. The German perception of this pressure was positive. The discussion within the Danish government reveal that a minority was ready to accept such laws. However, a German demand was not made and it seems the Danish King would not agree to these.

Werner Best’s Judenpolitik was formulated in close coordination with his superiors in Berlin. Best applied a Judenpolitik that continuously sought to exclude Jewish companies and to prevent Jews from being hired in prominent positions in the civil service. Best secured this would happen by ordering the Danish government to report on reassignments and promotions of civil servants


864 “Vort demokrati - og jøderne! Bag professorkonkurrencens kuliss,” 1-2”Det afgørende er ikke den grad, disse foranstaltninger når, men deres karakter af uvetdylige krenkelser af demokratiets bærende principper.”

865 Lauridsen and Lund, Samarbejdets mand: Minister Gunnar Larsen: dagbog 1941-1943, Dagbog 1943, 3:182 including note 17 on that page.
in Denmark. It seems registration measures were further enforced, and Best requested specific reports on Jewish lawyers and Jews in the press. Possibly, to begin excluding Jews completely from these areas as well. These were part of Best’s long-term goal: the “total solution of the Jewish question in Denmark”.

The Danish government came to play an important role in these measures as it agreed to administratively secure that Danish Jews were not hired in higher-ranking civil service positions as well as in the police. Scavenius and Knud Kristensen were willing to accept formal laws against the Jews, but the only identifiable law to be accepted was the removal of Danish-Jewish civil servants.

Several stages of persecution are identifiable in this chapter. As in all previous chapters the Judenpolitik took on a well-organized informal form (stage one). Exclusive measures are also detectable within the civil service. The informal rule to prevent Jews from being hired in higher ranking civil service positions was enforced by the Danish government. It also appears that Jews were prevented from joining the police force and excluded from other areas as well. The case of the company Henriques opens up for questioning which other areas Jews might have been excluded from in this period by the Danish government.

Taken together, the discussions on issues relating to Jews reveal the Danish government slowly solidified in an administrative discrimination in order to avoid formal laws against the Jews. However, there was a readiness among a minority of the ministers to initiate formal laws. Even after agreeing with Best to administratively exclude the Jews from public positions the Danish government discussed and discriminated Jews in other areas. This points to a government that had a more fluid and flexible stance in relation to the German Judenpolitik in Denmark than previously recognized.

9 Epilogue: After October 1943

On the 5th of October 1943, Werner Best declared “Dänemark ist entjudet, da sich hier kein Jude...mehr legal aufhalten und betätigen kann.” Before Best could send this report to the AA, some of the most dramatic, and defining events of the occupation had occurred. In late July through August 1943 strikes and sabotages in major Danish provincial cities resulted in a German

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{(242. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt," October 5, 1943, WBK Vol. 4)\"Denmark is entjudet, as no Jew can...legally reside or be active here."}}\]
ultimatum. On August 28th the ultimatum demanding six measures, including the death penalty and prohibition of strikes, was presented to the Danish Government. The ultimatum was rejected, and the government stopped functioning, but was not formally dissolved. It is worth noting that attempts to form a new government were carried on into late September, but on the 29th of August, a state of emergency was announced. The German army arrested the Danish military during several skirmishes.

On the 8th of September 1943, during the state of emergency, Werner Best sent his famous telegram no. 1032 suggesting to arrest the Danish Jews and the freemasons. The theories on Best’s motives are many. Most Danish researchers rely on Hans Kirchhoff’s suggestion that Best wanted to prove himself towards Hitler. However, by disclosing the date of the action, he attempted to remain on good footing with the Danish civil servants who agreed to take over the administration of the Danish state. This idea builds on Best’s later attempts to circumvent his suggestion to deport the Jews arguing it would cause too many problems for a continued cooperation. On the 17th of September this strategy failed as Hitler decided to deport the Jews in Denmark. Best decided to let the date for the event slip to his close associate Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz. Through Duckwitz’s network the information was passed on to Danish Social Democrats, and the warning found its way to most Jews, who went into hiding.

Most international researchers explain Best’s motives as being mainly ideological. Ulrich Herbert e.g. proposes Best realized the action had been compromised from early September, and the attempt to arrest the Jews would fail. Therefore, he passed on the information to Duckwitz for two reasons 1) to speed up the flight of the Jews and 2) in order to reach the ideological goal Best had been part of since 1935: removing the Jews. At the same time this might allow for an easier cooperation with the Danish civil servants.

Best’s motives will probably remain a recurring theme in future research discussions. The attempt to arrest the Jews during the night of 1st and 2nd of October 1943 was carried out through a restrained German effort. Because of the warning that had been communicated to

---

867 Christensen et al., Danmark besat: krig og hverdag 1940-45, 413–24.
869 “33. Werner Best an das Auswärtige Amt.”
870 Kirchhoff, Holocaust i Danmark, 31–33.
871 For a full overview consult ibid., 39–62 A later addition is ; Keren-Carmel, “Another Piece in the Puzzle: Denmark, Nazi Germany, and the Rescue of Danish Jewry.”
the Jewish congregation most Danish Jews avoided arrest.  
Approximately 480 Jews were deported to Theresienstadt where they remained for most of the war. 52 of them would perish in the camp. The so-called White Busses were allowed to travel from Denmark and Sweden to German concentration camps to extradite Scandinavian prisoners. The earliest extraditions took place in December 1944 but only in April 1945 were the Jewish survivors, who had been deported from Denmark, rescued from Theresienstadt and transported to Sweden. The Jews that were not apprehended in October 1943 fled the country with the assistance of many ordinary Danes. Most of the refugees paid local fishers to be smuggled across the narrow sound from occupied Denmark to Sweden. In spite of these events, the German *Judenpolitik* continued in Denmark.

In the office at Dagmarhus containing the registry of Jews two German police officers put the catalogue cards back in their place. The cards had been used in the attempt to arrest the Danish Jews. During the following months one of the police officers would continue working in Renner’s official Gestapo office IV-4b in order to write new registry cards and note on existing cards if the individual had fled to Sweden or been deported. Despite the very low number of Jews in Denmark, the registration work continued after October 1943 as Lorenz Christensen continued to add cards to the registry.  

As a consequence of the flight of the Jews Head of Rüstungsstab Dänemark, Walter Forstmann, reported there were no-longer Jewish companies in Denmark, and the ban on the six Jewish companies that had been removed as producers for the German war effort could be lifted. This message proved insufficient. The Aryanization measures set in motion by the RfA continued to influence the Danish-German trade relations even though Best attempted to end them in January 1944, stating that: “After the ‘Aktion’ against the Jews in Denmark the Jewish influence in the Danish business life has ceased to exist.” Although he focused on the events of October 1943, the purpose of his letter was to simplify trade relations. However, Aryanization procedures were still enforced, possibly by the RfA, as the GCC still supplied lists of

---

876 “Geschäftverkehr mit Dänemark,” January 21, 1944, BA, R9I, 630”Nach der Durchführung der Aktion gegen die Juden in Dänemark hat der jüdische Einfluss im dänischen Wirtschaftsleben aufgehört.”
Danish importers to the RfA as late as December 1944.\textsuperscript{878} Krüger would also continue to correspond with the RfA until May 1944.

The following case shows how being registered as a Jewish company continued to have lasting effects even after October 1943. The case also reveals how H. J. Simonsen & Co., a Danish-Jewish shipping company, was basically dismantled due to Aryanization measures. As a consequence of being a Jewish company, H.J. Simonsen & Co. had their shipping contracts cancelled by the Swiss-Italian company Jacky, Maeder & Co. Slowly, H.J. Simonsen & Co. was excluded from the only international market available to them, and as a consequence had to lay-off most of their employees. A former employee created the company B. C. Lundberg in 1942, and took over the Danish representation for Jacky, Maeder & Co as well as recruiting laid off employees from H. J. Simonsen & Co. In essence, this was a case of Aryanization in which the Jewish company was stripped of its business opportunities only to see them taken over by another company. However, in the summer of 1943 B.C. Lundberg was under suspicion of being Jewish, and it seems the company had inherited the racial stigma as well as the consequences from H. J. Simonsen & Co. B.C. Lundberg had been removed from RWM’s lists of approved shipping companies in Denmark. As a result, a shipment of goods from Switzerland was impounded in Lübeck, Germany. The race issue for B.C. Lundberg was only resolved in mid-1944. It did not matter that Jews were no longer present in Denmark, and the Danish Shipping Association (Dansk Speditørforening) the Danish Foreign Ministry, the Danish embassy in Berlin, and the RWM were all involved in removing the ban on the company.\textsuperscript{879}

After October 1943, Lorenz Christensen maintained an important role in Werner Best’s continued \textit{Judenpolitik} in Denmark. Only a week after the attempt to round up the Jews in October 1943, Werner Best requested a radio broadcast on why the Jews had left Denmark.\textsuperscript{880} The draft was written by the Danish lawyer and National Socialist Knud Nordentoft.\textsuperscript{881} Lorenz Christensen was contacted to comment on the manuscript, but he rejected its contents. Instead, Christensen was paid for writing three pieces on historical anti-Semitism and these were

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{878} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{879} “Sagsnr. 83.dan.68.12.,” 1943 1944, RA, UM 83.dan.68-12 B.C. Lundberg.
\textsuperscript{880} “Rapport. Dr. Lorenz Christensens foredragsvirksomhed i den danske radio om Jødespørgsmål,” December 12, 1945, RA, Københavns Byret, Retsopgøret Straffeaakter - 21-1947-86-I pk. 441-442.
\textsuperscript{881} Arne Hardis, “Manden og dagbogen - forfatteren Knud Nordentoft,” in \textit{Over stregen under besættelsen} (Gyldendal, 2007), 612–14 For a full biography see ; Arne Hardis, \textit{Forræderens dagbog: en dansk nazist 1941-45} (København: Lindhardt og Ringhof, 2005).
\end{flushleft}
broadcast in March 1944. They were used to historically justify the perception of the Jews as having been a consistent foreign entity in Danish and Christian society. Christensen used the few public clashes between Christians and Jews in Danish history in order to argue that the Jews had a record as troublemakers. Postwar testimony reveals that these pieces were also ordered by Best. In this manner, Best pursued the legitimation of Judenpolitik and anti-Semitism in an intellectually sounding propaganda after most Jews fled the country.

In April 1944, Best sent Lorenz Christensen to a meeting of Judenreferenten (Jewish specialists) in Krummhübel (Karpacz) in Poland. Best had selected Christensen due to his in-depth knowledge of the Jewish question, and Christensen served as the legation’s official representative. The meeting was part of an initiative made by a new department in the AA called the Information Office XIV – Anti-Jewish Action for Foreign Countries (Informationsstelle XIV – Anti-jüdische Auslandsaktion). Plans for this department had been initiated in the summer of 1943. It was created with the collaboration of Alfred Rosenberg, as he was planning a conference of all anti-Jewish bureaucrats in Europe.

On January 5th, 1944 the new department was official, and Rudolf Schleier from the AA was its manager. Many other ministries as well as the RSHA were represented in the department, which served as a multi-organizational entity joining forces to promote anti-Jewish propaganda in other countries. Another goal of the new department was to create a massive archive documenting Jews and anti-Jewish personalities. This included a collection of pictures and files documenting all the procedures undertaken regarding the Jewish question. This would have been a complete documentation of both Jews and their destruction. This stands in stark contrast to the attempt to destroy almost anything related to Jews as well as the attempts to conceal the genocide.

The workflow on the anti-Semitic propaganda was to collect newspaper articles locally, and send them to the AA for translation. These articles were daily distributed among all units of the AA, the Ministry of Propaganda, Rosenberg’s offices, the Security Service (SD) and the Institut

882 This is confirmed by a focused search in the database of radioprograms “Programoversigt..,” Larm, 1944, http://www.larm.fm/Search?query=%22Lorenz+Christensen%22&from=1943-08-31T23%3A00%3A00Z&to=1945-11-10T23%3A00%3A00Z&facets=%7BDocument%7D.TypeId%3A86.
883 “Rapport. Dr. Lorenz Christensens foredragssværkshed i den danske radio om Jødespørgsmål.”
885 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 195, 197.
886 Ibid., 197.
887 As early as June 1942 the attempt to conceal the murders began in Aktion 1005 Longerich, Holocaust, 410-11.
zur Erforschung der Judenfrage (Institute for Researching the Jewish Question.) In many ways Informationsstelle XIV resembles the goals of Wurm’s Antijüdische Weltliga, but the Informationsstelle XIV published news in a circular reference system. Newspaper articles from Germany were published abroad without revealing the source, and the articles were then quoted in German papers as popular opinion in other countries. In order to push the argument that the Jews were a world-wide threat a diplomatic yearbook on the Jewish question was on the drawing board. Anti-Semitic radio programs aimed at regional audiences were also among the concrete initiatives. It might be in this context we find the reason behind Lorenz Christensen’s three radio programs from March 1944.

On the basis of Hitler’s wishes, Horst Wagner took the initiative to the meeting in Krummhübel to broaden anti-Jewish propaganda initiatives into worldwide distribution. It was to consist of Judenreferenten and Arisierungsberater (Jewish experts and Aryanization advisors) from the SS. Himmler made sure the meeting was not held in Berlin, as he feared losing “all specialists in one area at once” due to the bombing raids on Berlin.

The Aryanization specialists had to cancel due to their engagement in Aryanizations in Hungary, which had been invaded by Germany three days prior to the meeting on the 3rd and 4th of April 1944. The RSHA was represented by Karl Hoffman, the Police Attaché in Sofia. The AA was well represented, and the highest-profile member at the meeting was von Thadden. The minutes of the AA were intentionally minimal, but after the war von Thadden revealed that details on the extermination of the Jews in Eastern Europe as well as statistical information on the issue had been provided. The statistics came from Adolf Eichmann, and von Thadden had promised they would remain secret.

Lorenz Christensen participated in this meeting. He was placed among Judenreferenten from the German legations in Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, France, Italy, Sweden, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia and Turkey. It is worth noting that there were five such emissaries serving in neutral countries, while the representatives from Belgium and the Netherlands were missing. Christensen wrote his own minutes of the meeting intended for Best, but in accordance with

---

888 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 196–97.
889 Such as Theodor Dannecker, Dieter Wisliceny and Alois Brunner
890 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 197.
891 Ibid., 198–99.
892 Kurt Asche in Belgium and Wilhelm Zoepf in the Netherlands.
von Thadden’s wishes they are not very revealing. His minutes mostly focus on who participated in the conference, as well as on Christensen’s own contribution to the anti-Jewish question. He voiced specific ideas on promoting the anti-Jewish cause by adapting initiatives to regional peculiarities.893 Christensen claims he was asked not to participate in von Thadden’s meeting concerning the “executive measures” against the Jews. His minutes only reveal a precise knowledge of the title, and it remains unknown if Christensen actually participated or not.894

On the 23rd of May 1944, Best promoted Lorenz Christensen to Judenreferent in Denmark, the first official bearer of that title. In a letter thanking Best for this promotion Christensen wrote:

“In the meantime, I have learned, that I on the basis of your order of May 23rd 1944, I have been appointed as Judenreferenten at the local German mission. I hereby inform you that I accept the position and I cordially thank you for the trust you have shown me by this appointment”.895

The promotion seems closely tied to Christensen’s participation in the meeting in Krummhübel. Despite Lorenz Christensen’s postwar claims of having reservations on how the Jewish question was solved in Denmark. He became the official expert on Jews in Denmark, and as such, he was probably informed that the Jews were murdered. This makes it increasingly likely he attended von Thadden’s speech. The creation of an official position of Judenreferent also shows that Best continued to work against Judaism. He was promoting anti-Semitism in a country without Jews.

Several other developments underscore this, the most important being the visit from Friedrich Wilhelm Osiander in June 1944. He was head of family pedigrees, Ahnentafel, in the RuSHA, with the rank of SS-Sturmbahnführer. He had two items on his agenda in Copenhagen: 1) a meeting with Günther Pancke in order to establish a race office at the Schalburg Corps; 2) a meeting with Lorenz Christensen and Charles Hindborg. Osiander’s overall impression was the
need to construct a central racial office in Denmark to bridge the offices of the DNSAP, SS and the Schalburg Corps. Osiander wanted Pancke to monitor the race office at the Schalburg Corps and if necessary appoint its leadership. Hindborg was no longer head of the race office for the DNSAP, but was nevertheless interviewed by Osiander, who wrote positively of his merits. Osiander’s talks with Christensen had centered on the registries of Jews and “Judenmischlinge”. Christensen revealed that he had been dealing mainly with such questions for the last two years, and Osiander was promised the most important works on Danish genealogy. Osiander was shown the main sources of Christensen’s work: the Danish Royal Library, the Danish National Archives, and the Regional Archive of Copenhagen.896 Christensen would supply Osiander’s offices with relevant books and answered questions from RuSHA.897

Judenpolitik in Denmark after October 1943 also targeted the published memory of the most important Jews in Denmark. The Danish Who is Who, Blå Bog (literally Blue Book) contains short biographies of important Danes in the civil service, business, and culture. In the summer of 1943, the last edition of Blå Bog during the occupation was published. The editors had received information from the Danish Foreign Ministry that German authorities wanted to scrutinize the new edition before publication in 1944. The editors assumed this was in order to remove all Jewish biographies from the publication and to increase the number of German-friendly ones. The editors decided to stop production due to “technical difficulties”, specifically a lack of paper. After the war, the director indicated that the editors had been threatened to republish the book and promised all the paper they needed, but they still refused.898 This attempt underscores Judenpolitik’s ultimate intention of not only eradicating the Jews physically, but also the memory of their lives and roles in Danish society. This type of cultural and memorial elimination was seen in many countries in Europe. It was only a brief attempt but it is a testament to how important the issue of Jews continued to be for the German occupiers.

Judenpolitik after October 1943 has not been researched closely but it would seem that it continued in Denmark in several areas. Companies were still examined for their racial composition, anti-Semitic propaganda was continued, a Judenreferent was appointed,

896 The former Landsarkiv for Sjælland, Lolland-Falster, and Bornholm
registration measures proceeded, and the publication containing the biographies of prominent Jews was to be rewritten along racial criteria.

10 Conclusion and Perspectives

In the 1990s and early 2000s, twenty-three individual nations re-examined their wartime relationships with Germany in commissions or by establishing permanent research organizations. One crucial part of their research would often address aspects of the persecution of the Jews. In Denmark, such encompassing initiatives were not pursued and thus the country stands out as a European exception. Instead, research has focused strongly on the dramatic events surrounding the flight of the Jews from Denmark in October 1943. These two observations highlight a gap in the status quo of Danish historiography, which so far has only selectively addressed the persecution of Jews before and during Denmark’s wartime relationship with Germany. One research desideratum is thus a more systematic analysis of the social, civil, and financial exclusion of Jews in Denmark before the well-described escape in October 1943.

This dissertation responds to this call by exploring and analyzing the German Judenpolitik in Denmark. Within the context of Judenpolitik it focuses on the Aryanization of Danish-German trade relations and anti-Jewish policies in Denmark from 1937 until August 1943. As a second research goal, it examines the reactions of the Danish government to the German Judenpolitik. The dissertation thus responds to these goals by posing the following research questions:

1. How was Germany’s ambition to Aryanize its foreign trade developed into concrete policies, and how were these policies implemented into Danish-German trade relations as part of the German Judenpolitik in Denmark?
2. How did the German legation assist in formulating and executing the German Judenpolitik in Denmark?
3. How did the Danish government respond to the German Judenpolitik?
4. Based on the model Stages of Persecution, which stages and forms of Judenpolitik can be identified in Denmark during 1937-August 1943?

These questions have been answered through the use of qualitative historical sources by applying a historical method developed by Matthias Kipping, R. Daniel Wadhwani, and Marcelo
Bucheli consisting of 1) source criticism 2) triangulation, and 3) hermeneutics. The analytical approach consists of four tiers. The overarching one is Peter Longerich’s definition of Judenpolitik which is understood as a tool to describe and analyze the complex processes of German anti-Jewish policy and politics. This is applied to the Danish-German relationship in the period from 1937 to August 1943, which is defined as either collaboration or cooperation. Collaboration is defined as the support of the occupying forces for reasons of personal self-interest or ideological conviction. Cooperation is understood as: the conscious acceptance of most political and socioeconomic elites to cooperate with representatives of Nazi Germany in a passive or activist manner. This was done in order to preserve political power from challengers on both sides of the political spectrum, while attempting to save Denmark’s political structures as well as maintaining material levels. These motives justified accepting increasing German demands in a self-enforcing logic of cooperation, which created unforeseen results.

The third analytical approach is the perspectives of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders as introduced by Raul Hilberg. The main perspective is that of the perpetrators understood as the main organizations and relevant actors in the German Foreign Ministry but especially the German legation in Copenhagen and its leadership Cecil von Renthe-Fink and Werner Best. Included in this category is also the RfA, and to a much lesser degree the RWM as well as the NSDAP/AO. A secondary perspective is the bystander perspective which is mainly understood as the Danish government. This dissertation applies a processual bystander view to accommodate for changes in this position over time.

The fourth analytical practice is the application of a ten-stage model: Stages of Persecution. This has been developed by building on previous research in order to identify the persecution stages of Judenpolitik present in Denmark. It consists of the following stages: 1) informal persecution 2) formal persecution 3) definition 4) identification and registration 5) exclusion 6) confiscation and robbery 7) public stigmatization 8) forced relocation 9) deportation 10) murder.

10.1.1 Judenpolitik in Denmark

Overall, this dissertation has shown that Denmark was subject to an intentional and racially motivated Judenpolitik between 1937 and August 1943. This mainly aimed at steadily excluding the Jews in Denmark from several areas of society. It was a patient and informal policy due to the nature of the cooperation between Denmark and Germany. In spite of this, a continuous
progress in the exclusive *Judenpolitik* is traceable. We can identify the following typical stages of the persecution process in Denmark: informal persecution (stage one), and to a much lesser degree formal persecution (stage two). The definition of Jews (stage three), and identification and registration of Jews (stage four). The exclusion of Jews, especially through Aryanization measures (stage five). As a bystander the Danish government reacted to the German Judenpolitik by increasingly accepting more and more German demands as the war progressed. These overall results will be elaborated upon below.

**10.1.2 Aryanizing the German Foreign Trade and its Implementation in Denmark**

This dissertation has shown that the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel (RfA) became the main organization responsible for pursuing a global policy aiming at Aryanizing the German foreign trade. The organization was firmly tied to the dictatorship’s racist ideology and the overall Aryanization policies in Germany, but the RfA focused on Aryanizing international trade relations. In the prewar period, this policy mainly targeted Jewish representatives of German companies abroad. Jewish companies and representatives in many countries were registered by the RfA with the intention to exclude them from German foreign trade. In the summer of 1940, these Aryanization measures were expanded to exclude all Jewish import and export companies in countries outside Germany.

The prewar Aryanization attempts of the RfA have been largely overlooked in previous research, with the notable exception of research on Sweden. By analyzing these events in Denmark, it has been shown that the German Foreign Ministry and its diplomatic representation in Denmark were extensively involved in locally pursuing RfA’s Aryanization policies. The German legation in Copenhagen was the organizational entity responsible for gathering intelligence on Jews in Denmark. Historian Ole Brandenborg Jensen has previously suggested that Aryanization should be regarded as ad-hoc initiatives set in motion by the German Chamber of Commerce (GCC) or others. By contrast, this dissertation has shown that while the GCC was an integral part of this area of *Judenpolitik*, the legation carried the main responsibility for pursuing this policy in Denmark.

Denmark was subjected to an intentional and deliberate German Aryanization process from 1937 to 1943, which lasted well into 1944. The Aryanization measures are to be regarded as the most successful element of the *Judenpolitik* pursued in Denmark. We can conclude that all
Danish Jewish agents and representatives had been removed by September 1942. In addition, most Jewish importers had been excluded from the German foreign trade by this date. This is concluded based on the German envoy Cecil von Renthe-Fink’s status reports. Moreover, the Danish Foreign Ministry’s main file on Aryanization dries out in May 1942, which seems to indicate the government no longer was involved in these cases.

In January 1943, Werner Best introduced the Nuremberg race laws in order to define the Jewish companies in Denmark as proposed by Cecil von Renthe-Fink in September 1942. They were never publicized but seems to have been put into practice among German organizations. These laws served as the foundation for further Aryanization initiatives. The Nuremberg definitions of Jews and Jewish companies had informally served as the foundation for charting, registering, and excluding Danish-Jewish businesses trading with Germany since 1937. Though we lack a complete numerical overview and an exhaustive list of the names of the registered companies the communication between the RfA and the German legation indicates that all Danish companies trading with Germany were charted according to the Nuremberg laws.

10.1.3 The German Legation’s Role in the Judenpolitik in Denmark

As indicated above, the German legation was deeply involved in fulfilling the goals of the RfA by providing continuous local intelligence on Jewish companies. The Aryanization policies were but one part of an intentional German policy directed against the Jews in Denmark. During the occupation of Denmark, these policies were continuously extended and expanded. Anti-Semitic propaganda was endorsed by the German legation. It was assisted by the most ideologically committed and anti-Semitic Danish citizens known in the period. They became hired hands in supporting the Judenpolitik in Denmark. It has been ascertained that some of the anti-Semitic articles they authored in the anti-Semitic weekly Kamptegnet had a direct effect on the Danish Jewish minority’s ability to do business, as well as giving rise to more personal anti-Semitic incidents among the minority.

From as early as 1933 the legation registered Jewish refugees. The Aryanization measures started by the RfA in 1937 possibly initiated a regular registration of Jewish companies, and their leadership, ensuring that at least 3,600 Danish businesses had been categorized by race before the occupation. During the occupation, registration measures became more effective as members of the Gestapo were relocated to the German legation in Copenhagen. They were
aided by Lorenz Christensen in registering communists and Jews. Three registries of Jews were kept at Dagmarhus containing the names of Danish Jews, Jewish companies, and foreign Jews. The registration effort was continuous, and it appears the more difficult cases were unraveled with the assistance of the Danish police who would perform racial investigations on behalf of the German police.

The two main crises in the Danish-German relationship in 1941-1942, the Danish signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact in late 1941 and the so-called Telegram Crisis in the fall of 1942, are crucial in understanding the German anti-Jewish policies and their development. The pressure on the Danish politicians to introduce anti-Jewish laws in Denmark rose continuously, but especially during these crises. A previously unrecognized push in that direction was Renthe-Fink’s suggestion to introduce such laws in December 1941. Although the government rejected these demands, Renthe-Fink immediately suggested informal discriminatory measures. These were: 1) Jews could not be recruited to or promoted in the civil service, 2) Jews could not be part of the management in large Danish companies, and 3) Jews were to be excluded from the Danish media. As part of the Aryanization measures, Renthe-Fink most likely succeeded in removing Jews from large Danish companies that exported to or directly imported from Germany. In August 1942 he also succeeded in excluding Jews from appearing on the radio. Even though these were informal measures, their success shows that Judenpolitik’s exclusive character was continuously expanded upon. At the same time, it seems as if most Jews were removed from Danish newspapers. We are able to conclude that they were at least purged from Berlingske Tidende and Nationaltidende. Renthe-Fink’s agenda was taken over by his successor Werner Best. In January 1943, Werner Best succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Danish government to not promote or hire Jews in the civil service. We can thus conclude that most of the suggestions for informal discrimination made by Renthe-Fink two years earlier had been achieved by January 1943.

In light of the above, the relationship between Berlin and Copenhagen largely appears as a well-coordinated effort to informally and continuously exclude Jews from the civil service, companies, and the media. We should thus consider the relationship between the German actors, individual as well as organizational, in Denmark and Berlin, as generally being in accordance with one another. The perception of a radical Berlin compared to a more defensive stance on behalf of Renthe-Fink and Werner Best does not seem to hold. Most measures were
approved or initiated by the AA in Berlin, and actively pursued by Renthe-Fink or Werner Best. The examined documents only reveal a slight disharmony on the Jewish question in Denmark during the summer of 1942. This prompted Renthe-Fink to suggest further measures against the Jews in Denmark to accommodate for Berlin’s critique. The perception that there were general disagreements between the AA and its representatives in Denmark possibly has its roots in postwar testimonies by the former German representatives in Denmark who applied the well-known tactic of postwar trials to push responsibility upwards in the hierarchy.

The dominant perception of Renthe-Fink as an apolitical career diplomat, who kept the Jewish question at bay, is difficult to maintain. This dissertation has shown that Renthe-Fink followed instructions from Berlin with few delays or concerns. Additionally, he initiated policies against the Jews in Denmark of his own accord. In January 1942, he described the goal of Judenpolitik in Denmark as: to remove the Jewish influence in Denmark at any given opportunity. In addition, he described his overall policy in Denmark as one which aimed at destroying the remnants of Danish democracy. He continuously pressured Danish politicians in order to achieve his objectives. His anti-Semitic views were most apparent in the report on Danish Jews sent to the AA in January 1942.

Werner Best is often described in the same way: as someone who kept the Jewish question at bay in Denmark. Best’s two reports on Jewish matters in Denmark from January and April 1943 contain sections which have been largely ignored or regarded as unimportant in previous research. A closer examination has shown that they were calculated and strategic. Best wanted to keep the Danish government deadlocked, making it highly dependent on his actions. He also stated that his goal was the totale Lösung der Judenfrage in Dänemark (the total solution of the Jewish question) in Denmark. Best enforced registration measures further and initiated specific research in order to e.g. locate Jewish lawyers. In addition, well-known Danish anti-Semites were employed by the German legation during most of the occupation, most notably Lorenz Christensen, who was appointed Judenreferent, Expert in Jewish Affairs, by Best in 1944.

10.1.4 The Danish Government’s Response to Judenpolitik

The responses of the Danish government to the German Judenpolitik varied. The Danish government did not assist the Danish Jewish business minority before or during the occupation. The Danish Jewish business minority was mainly left to fight its own battles. Upon German
request, the Danish police supplied the German legation with information on which companies were regarded as Jewish. This included supplying information on individuals who were part of these companies and who were regarded as either Jews or non-Jews. This information was most likely used to further Aryanize Danish-Jewish businesses.

The examination of the Danish government’s reactions to the German Aryanization and anti-Jewish policies has revealed a previously unrecognized flexibility as well as continued discussions on how to react in this policy area. This questions the dominant perception of the Danish government as repeatedly denying the existence of a Jewish problem. If we briefly recapture the instances where the government or a minority within the government showed flexibility in this area, they proceed as follows: In December 1941, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erik Scavenius, revealed that he would accept demands for legal measures against the Jews should it become a political necessity. He was supported by the Minister of the Interior, Knud Kristensen. Gunnar Larsen suggested to Scavenius that one should advice the Danish Jews to ask for discriminatory laws against themselves. We can conclude that at least three ministers in the government would accept formal anti-Jewish laws. These discussions also reveal a crisis in the cabinet, mostly between the political and non-affiliated ministers. After several meetings in December 1941, Scavenius accepted the position of the majority to stall for anti-Jewish measures.

In January 1942, part of the government agreed to prevent Jews from being promoted or hired in the civil service. The government had thus begun to enforce informal restrictions against the Jews in order to avoid formal laws. Combined with a mounting pressure on the Danish government, smaller and larger issues relating to the Jews in Denmark were brought to the highest levels of government. The informality of these policies resulted in a government that developed a hyper-sensitivity on issues concerning Jews. In this sense, the German pressure on the Danish government had proven successful, as the AA accepted these measures as progress.

In the autumn of 1942, the Telegram Crisis also revealed that a minority of the ministers within the Danish government was willing to accept formal laws against the Jews. As the Danes awaited the appointment of Renthe-Fink’s successor, they were being pressured to accept both the death penalty for acts of sabotage and anti-Jewish laws. The German demands were rejected by Scavenius. However, to his colleagues he revealed he was not principally against accepting anti-Jewish laws, if this could secure other political assurances in the Danish-German relationship.
In the autumn of 1942, the cabinet discussions centered on locating the government’s position on a variety of issues that might be raised by the Germans. On the question of Jews these debates reveal that Erik Scavenius and Knud Kristensen would accept formal laws against the Jews, while the Minister of Education Jørgen Jørgensen was prepared to accept further informal measures. The positions of the other ministers remain uncertain, but in January 1943 the government as a whole accepted and enforced the informal procedure of not promoting or hiring Jews in the Danish civil service or the police. The known cases of this administrative discrimination reveal that this policy was not limited to the civil service but was expanded to other areas as well. The Danish government thus informally administrated elements of the German *Judenpolitik*.

In summary, the Danish government and the Danish-German cooperation as such were much more flexible regarding anti-Jewish measures than previously discussed. Danish-Jewish businesses were not protected from Aryanization measures, while Danish police actively participated in disclosing and registering who was Jewish, both in selected companies and in the population at large. This information was used for further discrimination. The internal discussions of the Danish government show that from December 1941 onwards, a minority was willing to accept laws against the Jews and from January 1943 an informal policy of discrimination was administered by the Danish government.

The Danish government’s bystander role can be characterized as extremely cautious in the prewar period. In the occupation period, the bystander role progressed towards accepting an increasing number of German demands in order to maintain the cooperation with Germany. A number of ministers also argued that accepting these informal demands safeguarded the Jews against formal demands. As already mentioned the Danish Government largely decided to remain passive regarding Danish-Jewish businesses. A minority in the government would accept unspecified anti-Jewish laws in December 1941 and in the fall of 1942, this was specified as removing the Jewish civil servants. The majority prevailed in these instances and formal laws were not adopted. However, German pressure did secure the removal of Jews from prominent positions. In the summer of 1942 the stance presented to the Germans was that Jewish civil servants could only be removed by German demand. In the winter of 1942 and early 1943 the Danish government’s bystander role progressed further as it accepted to administratively secure that Jews were not hired in public positions.
10.1.5 Stages of Persecution in Denmark

In this dissertation the Judenpolitik in Denmark has been categorized by using the ten-stage model: Stages of Persecution. Here, we should recall that Raul Hilberg’s description of the persecution and destruction of the Jews as “not so much a product of laws and commands as it was a matter of spirit, of shared comprehension, of consonance and synchronization.” In this sense, Stage one, informal persecution, the most prevalent characteristic of the German policies against the Jews in Denmark, still targeted a well-defined minority within the idea of removing or destroying the Jews. The informal Judenpolitik in Denmark was mainly pursued by the German legation in cooperation with the Auswärtiges Amt, and only in the summer of 1942 can we detect differences between the two, which were smoothed out as Werner Best arrived in November 1942. After his arrival the informal Judenpolitik was also enforced by the Danish government which actively prevented Jews from being hired in prominent public positions. Formal persecution, stage two, is seen in a few instances. The marriage laws of 1938 which prohibited German Jews to marry Aryans in Denmark, might be regarded as such, and while not targeting Danish Jews, it targeted Jewish travelers to Denmark. The creation of a security area in Northern and Western Denmark in November 1940 officially restricted Jews from entering and living in a specific area of Denmark. This is also the only known example of forced relocations, stage eight, before October 1943, as Jewish refugees were removed from that area.

The definition of Jews is stage three, and is closely tied to stage four: identification and registration of Jews. The Nuremberg definition of Jews was informally applied in numerous ways in Denmark. We can locate its use in the prewar years as a rising number of parishes were involved in supplying genealogical information to those seeking to prove their Aryan decent based on the National Socialist laws. Likewise, Danish company owners bought the assistance of private genealogical researchers to prove their Aryan descent. At the same time, the German legation, the Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel, and the German Chamber of Commerce were applying these laws to determine if Jews were present in the leadership of Danish companies. The registration of Danish Jews thus began in the prewar period, and formed the foundation for a continued Aryanization process targeting Danish-Jewish representatives, company owners, and managers.

This informal use of the definition of Jews became even closer tied to the registration procedures during the occupation. An official race office was formed in conjunction with the Danish Nazi party, the German legation, and the German SS (RuSHA). In addition, the members of the German police at the legation continued to register Jews, and after a continuous pressure received a copy of the Danish catalogue cards of Jewish refugees in February 1942. The German legation hired Danish anti-Semites to perform further genealogical investigations and registrations. The Danish State Prosecutor for Special Affairs (SPSA) also performed racial investigations upon request of the German legation, and used e.g. birth certificates, tax registries, and interviews to disclose if an individual was to be considered Jewish. This information was passed on to German police. The introduction of the definition of the Nuremberg Laws regarding Jewish companies was suggested in September 1942, and officially applied by the German legation in early 1943, but laws or decrees to certify this were not issued.

We can detect several measures of exclusion, stage five, of Jews in prominent positions within the media, and through the prevention of Jews being hired to higher public positions. From a German perspective the most successful area was Aryanization, where Jewish directors and board members were removed if the company in question traded with Germany.

Stage six: confiscation and robbery, does not appear to have taken place within the period examined in this dissertation. Stage seven: Public stigmatization understood as wearing a symbol of the Star of David in a specific design cannot be detected in Denmark, while the public identification of Jews in papers like Kamptegnet and Fædrelandet should not go without mention. Stage nine is deportations, and these occurred after the period examined in this dissertation. Stage ten, the murder of Jews, did not take place in Denmark. It should be noted that the Jews who were deported from Denmark to the concentration camp Theresienstadt were not sent to extermination camps.

10.1.6 Perspectives

While answering important questions regarding our understanding of the German Judenpolitik in Denmark and the Danish government’s position on the Jewish question, the results of this dissertation create the foundation for further research in a variety of areas.

This dissertation has elaborated on existing research and more thoroughly examined the policies of the RfA. In order to fully evaluate the international Aryanization attempts of the RfA,
additional cases need examination to allow for cross case and international comparisons. This would warrant both business historians and Holocaust historians to gain further knowledge on the border-crossing anti-Jewish policies of the RfA and the AA. Yet, by introducing this international Aryanization aspect into the economics of the Holocaust, we have gained a deeper insight into how race policies, economy and foreign trade were intertwined into a formalized policy that raised racial trade barriers from 1937 onwards.

Based on the results of the analysis of the policies of the RfA and the case of Denmark, I would argue we need to rethink our understanding of Aryanization especially in the prewar setting. Aryanization was not exclusive to Germany in those years, but a policy with international and border-crossing elements with the potential to affect Jewish companies and Jews outside of Germany. This realization raises a host of additional questions to the overall research theme of Aryanization. For example, how did the United States react to German Aryanization policies being pursued in the country? How did smaller European countries react? What was the role of German companies in these prewar, but international Aryanization measures? How did foreign companies from smaller European nations located in Germany react towards the hostility against Jews, and Aryanization demands? It could be interesting to follow the reaction of companies of smaller nations who became bystanders to the events in Germany in order to trace their reactions and motives.

This dissertation has explored the field of Aryanization in Denmark. We now possess an overview of the process and how it functioned. This has the potential to secure that further research will be able to gain a full overview of the companies and individuals targeted. If this was successful, it would provide us with the data needed to analyze both companies and specific business areas, as well as closely following the consequences for individuals who had to leave their businesses. The cases used in this dissertation certainly uncover examples of the personal and economic consequences of Aryanization. However, more comprehensive information would allow for an analysis of how Danish-Jewish businesses coped with the risk of hostile take-overs. In addition, detailed information would make it possible to trace transfers of ownership from Jews to non-Jews. In the James Polack case we saw how he was paid far less than the value of his stock. Transfers like this indicate a loss of valuables within the Jewish minority, but was this just one case out of many or few? Were those who had to leave the boards of businesses compensated in some way, and how did they cope? Who took over these positions, and did they
benefit from it? The issue of reentering the Danish business environment after the war also seems relevant to examine in order to disclose how this process unfolded. How many could reenter their positions as e.g. CEO after returning to Denmark? We should also recognize the use of proof of race in the period from 1933-1945. It remains a relevant and unexamined question how deeply it penetrated into Danish society: e.g. how many non-Jewish businesses adapted to German demands either by proving their race or removing Jewish employees if requested?

10.1.7 Cooperation Revisited

The results also ask for a reexamination of the Danish police in the first years of the collaboration. How many questions on both race and other personal information were investigated and passed on to both the German police as well as the German military intelligence? A further investigation into the consequences of this information exchange would provide us with answers on other policies the Germans successfully pursued in Denmark.

The successful flight and survival of 98% of the Jews in Denmark remains a remarkable occurrence. It stands out as one of the few positive events in an otherwise dark chapter of recent European history. However, it is worth discussing if this success has shaped our perception of the previous years? Is this why previous interpretations have largely seen the discrimination against Jews as unimportant compared to the fact that most Jews survived? And how did Denmark manage to remain largely untouched by the wave of research initiatives on the European continent after the 1990s, which examined the persecution of the Jews? Danish newspapers from the 1990s reported on this type of research in other countries, but they are silent on the Danish case. How far have these trends been guided by the narrative that “it did not happen here”?

The fact that formal laws against the Jews were discussed within the Danish government and that a minority was willing to accept such laws, give rise to a discussion of the purpose of the cooperation. Was it to maintain any shred of sovereignty within the logic of cooperation as suggested by Hans Kirchhoff, and if so where does this place the flexibility on issues relating to Jews in Denmark? Especially, if we consider the government’s willingness to arrest and intern the Danish communists and offhand multiple categories of German refugees, such as communists, Social Democrats, and Jews, as well as the proposition of interning the Danish Jews
in a camp in Denmark in late September 1943? If we categorize these groups as enemies of Germany, the Danish government actually went quite far in order to maintain the cooperation with Germany.

Given the interest in the period it is interesting to find that many of the cabinet ministers have not been subjected to contemporary research, which might provide further insights into the discussions on the Jews in Denmark, as well as many other areas. These could help us determine where other ministers drew the line in important negotiations during the cooperation. Lastly, we should examine what consequences the discrimination administered by the Danish government had. Did it e.g. have life-long consequences as in the case of Dr. Rothe-Meyer who never became a professor due to racial discrimination? And how many were actually administratively prevented from entering into the civil service? How many other examples of discrimination exist?

All things considered, we still lack thorough research in many areas regarding the first years of the cooperation, especially compared to the rest of Europe. It is telling that important source collections and diaries have only recently become publicly available. Compared to research on the Jewish experience in the rest of Europe, Denmark remains an unexplained dark spot on issues such as the possible existence of looted art, Jewish bank accounts and the reentry of the Danish-Jewish business minority in Denmark. This dissertation has only examined selected aspects of the social, civil and financial exclusion of Jews before October 1943, but points to the existence of further unanswered historical questions.

Appendix 1: Danish Governments and Parties 1937-1943

Socialdemokratiet – The Social Democrats (S)
Venstre – The Liberal Party (V)
Det Radikale Venstre – The Social Liberal Party (R)
Kommunisterne – The Communists (K)
Det Konservative Folkeparti – The Conservative Party (C)

**Government from 4-11-1935 to 15-9-1939. The Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party**
Prime Minister: Thorvald Stauning (S)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Peter Munch (R)
Minister of Finance: Hans Peter Hansen (S), (1935 to 20.7.1937)
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S), (20.7.1937 to 15.9.1939)
Minister of Defence: Alsing Andersen (S)
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Johannes Hansen (S)
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)
Minister of Justice: Karl Kristian Steincke (S)
Minister of the Interior: Bertel Dahlgaard (R)
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Niels Peter Fisker (S)
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S)
Minister of Industry, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Johannes Kjærboel (S)
Minister of Social Affairs: Ludvig Christensen (S)

**Government 19-9-1939 to 10-4-1940 The Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party**
Prime Minister: Thorvald Stauning (S)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Peter Munch (R)
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S)
Minister of Defence: Alsing Andersen (S)
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Johannes Hansen (S)
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)
Minister of Justice: Sven Unmack Larsen (S)
Minister of the Interior: Bertel Dahlgaard (R)
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Axel Sørensen (S)
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S)
Minister of Industri, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Johanne Kjærbøl (S)
Minister of Social Affairs: Ludvig Christensen (S)

1st Coalition Government 10-4-1940 to 8-7-1940 The Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, The Conservative People’s Party and The Liberal Party
Prime Minister: Thorvald Stauning (S)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Peter Munch (R)
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S)
Minister of Defence: Alsing Andersen (S)
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Johannes Hansen (S)
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)
Minister of Justice: Sven Unmack Larsen (S)
Minister of the Interior: Bertel Dahlgaard (R)
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Axel Sørensen (S)
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S)
Minister of Industri, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Johanne Kjærbøl (S)
Minister of Social Affairs: Ludvig Christensen (S)
Ministers without portfolios: Søren Brorson (V), Oluf Krag (V), Henning Hasle (C), John Christmas Møller (C), Vilhelm Fibiger (C)

2nd Coalition Government 8-7-1940 – 4-5-1942 The Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, The Conservative People’s Party and The Liberal Party
Prime Minister: Thorvald Stauning (S) († 3.5.1942)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Erik Scavenius (unaffiliated)
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S)
Minister of Defence: Søren Brorson (V)
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Vilhelm Fibiger (C)
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)
Minister of Justice: Harald Petersen (unaffiliated) until 9.7.1941
Minister of Justice: Eigil Thune Jacobsen (unaffiliated) from 9.7.1941
Minister of the Interior: Knud Kristensen (V)
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Gunnar Larsen (unaffiliated)
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S)
Minister of Industry, Trade and Maritime Affairs: John Christmas Møller (C) until 3.10.1940
Minister of Industry, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Halfdan Hendriksen (C) from 3.10.1940
Minister for Employment and Social Affairs: Johannes Kjærbøl (S)

3rd Coalition Government 4-5-1942-9.11.1942 The Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, The Conservative People’s Party and The Liberal Party
Prime Minister: Vilhelm Buhl
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Erik Scavenius (unaffiliated)
Minister of Finance: Vilhelm Buhl (S) until 16.7.1942
Minister of Finance: Alsing Andersen (S) from 16.7.1942
Minister of Defence: Søren Brorson (V)
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Vilhelm Fibiger (C)
Minister of Education: Jørgen Jørgensen (R)
Minister of Justice: Eigil Thune Jacobsen (unaffiliated)
Minister of the Interior: Knud Kristensen (V)
Minister of Public Works (Traffic): Gunnar Larsen (unaffiliated)
Minister of Agriculture and Fishery: Kristen Bording (S)
Minister of Industry, Trade and Maritime Affairs: Halfdan Hendriksen (C)
Minister For Employment and Social Affairs: Johannes Kjærbøl (S)

Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs: Erik Scavenius (unaffiliated)
Minister of Finance: K. H. Kofoed (unaffiliated)
Minister of Defence: Søren Brorson (V)
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs: Valdemar Holbøll (unaffiliated)
Minister of Education: A.C. Højberg-Christensen (unaffiliated)
Appendix 2: Selected Biographies

B

Barandon, Paul (1881-1971). Barandon was the Gesandter, envoy, and deputy manager of the German legation from January 1942. He headed the legation in the period between Cecil von Renthe-Fink and Werner Best. He had been in the AA since the beginning of his career.\textsuperscript{900} Member of the party in 1937, and recalled to Berlin in January 1945. According to postwar interrogations Joachim von Ribbentrop moved Barandon to a position as AA’s representative at the German Military high-command (OKH) until March 1945. According to Barandon, Ribbentrop wanted to be informed of the work of the OKH.\textsuperscript{901} In 1934 Paul Barandon was temporary leader of the Justice department of the AA. In this capacity he led a thorough investigation into his colleague Georg von Broich-Oppert’s ancestry in an attempt to disclose if he was Jewish. In the five months the investigation lasted Barandon ordered personnel files and adoption files on Broich-Oppert’s relatives. He also questioned his relatives and friends while obtaining references from colleagues and school mates. While receiving extremely good recommendations from his colleagues, but also the Nazi Party and SA- leadership in Austria the racial argument was the weightiest. Broich-Oppert was Jewish and while it could not be ascertained if he had lied when asked about his ancestry he was pensioned in April 1935.\textsuperscript{902}

\textsuperscript{900} Kirchhoff, ”Paul Barandon.”
\textsuperscript{901} ”Zeugenschriftum, Barandon, Paul.”
\textsuperscript{902} Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 53–55.
Baumgartner, Eugen (1884-?). Came from an unknown career in a company to the RWM in 1934. He took over the leadership of the RfA in 1937.  

Best, Werner (1903-1989). Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark from 1942 to 1945. Doctor of Law and member of the party in 1930, and the SS a year later. He had a successful career in the dictatorship’s secret police until he was outmaneuvered by his competitor Reinhard Heydrich. Before coming to Denmark, he had been involved in making the first Einsatzgruppen in Poland and deporting Jews from France. He was flexible in his policy making in Denmark, and he adapted well to the situation. His long term goal was that Denmark should lose more and more of its independence.  

Bloch, Carl Edvard, Dr. med. (1872-1956). Head (Rektor) of the University of Copenhagen from 1931 to 1932 and from 1936 to 1942. He functioned as professor (professor ordinaries) from 1916. Specialized in the pediatric area. He was head of the clinic for children’s diseases in 1910-1943.  

Buhl, Vilhelm (1881-1954). Member of Parliament for the Social Democrats from 1932 to 1953. Prime Minister from 3.5.1942 until November. He was Thorvald Stauning’s successor. He was also the first Prime Minister after the war in 1945 for five months. He was educated as a lawyer, and Minister of Finance from 1937 to 1942. Buhl remained a leading personality in the Government despite not having the title of minister after November 1942. He maintained a position as the de facto leader of the government after it had withdrawn in August 1943. He cooperated with the leadership of the resistance movement in order to secure Denmark was recognized as an allied nation, as well as issuing army directives. He was crucial in the negotiations with the resistance movement in creating the first Danish government after the war.

903 “Personalakten Eugen Baumgartner” His file appears incomplete. He is not mentioned in the usual handbooks on staff of the government.  
904 Kirchhoff, “Dr. Best i medvind og modvind,” 250–215; Klee, Das Personen Lexikon Zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945, 45.  
Bunke, Erich (1907- ). Head of the Gestapo’s counter sabotage efforts in Copenhagen from 1943 to 1945. He worked in customs in 1934. Two years later he worked for Reinhard Heydrich’s office to prevent Jews from leaving Germany with valuables. In 1936 he became a member of the SS. Bunke arrived in Denmark in the spring of 1943 and from September he headed several central offices in the Gestapo HQ in Copenhagen. He was deeply involved in combating the Danish resistance in the last years of the occupation. Remarkably, he escaped to Germany, and the Danish authorities were unable to find him, though he lived undisguised in Frankfurt am Main. He never faced any trials for his deeds in Denmark.907

Bülow-Schwante, Vicco von (1891-1970). Leader of dept. Deutschland in the AA from 1933. He had initially pursued a military career that ended due to a horseback riding accident. He was an anti-republican who was politically engaged, and from 1928 he was a member of the German National People’s Party, Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP). As head of dept. Deutschland, he was responsible for justifying the National Socialists’ racial policies by providing statistical material intended to substantiate the perceived negative Jewish influences.908

C

Chantré, Ludwig (????-19??). SS-Sturmbannführer, Regierungsrat at the German legation in Denmark. Leader of department B – Inner Affairs under Stalmann’s leadership of Dept. II. Verwaltung und Innenpolitik.909

Clausen, Frits (1893-1947). Head of the Danish National Socialist Worker’s Party (DNSAP). Educated as a Doctor. Brought up in a Danish-minded home in the north of Germany. Conscripted to fight on the German side during the First World War. His negative views of the Bolshevik revolution and Jewish Marxists were shaped during his three-year stay in Russian prison camps as a prisoner of war. During the referendum in 1920 he agitated for the Danish side. He joined the Danish Nazi party in 1931 due to dissatisfaction in not achieving a higher position in the Conservative party. He became Führer of DNSAP in July 1933. Despite his

908 Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 43–47.
adoration for National Socialist Germany, he was largely ignored by NSDAP until April 1940. However, he proved unsuccessful in his many attempts to become part of the Danish government or take over power. He maintained leadership of DNSAP until the party lost its three seats in the Danish Parliament in the elections in March 1943. He temporarily stepped down and joined the SS as a doctor. He never saw front service, but provided medical assistance during bombing raids in Germany. Upon his return to Denmark he was ousted of the party in February 1944, and in November he was excluded from the party. He was arrested immediately at the end of the war in Denmark, but he died in 1947 before appearing in court.910

D

Darré, Richard Walther (1895-1953). Minister of Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft. The author of the influential Blut und Boden texts, and a great supporter of Nazism’s racial ideas.911

F

Fest, Anton (1908- ?). Fest was educated in law in 1930 and joined the NSDAP in 1933. He became part of the SS in 1934, and a year later he joined the Gestapo. He was located in Berlin in 1935 and recruited for the RSHA. In April 1940 he was attached to the German Legation in Copenhagen as Police Attaché. He was basically the Gestapo leader in Denmark, disguised with a diplomatic title.912 He left Denmark with a recent promotion to the rank of Obersturmbannführer in September 1943.913

Fibiger, Vilhelm (1886-1978). Head of the Conservative party from 1939. Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs from July 8th 1940 to November 1942. The first Minister of Trade after the war. Member of parliament from 1920 to 1957.914

G

911 “Wareneinfuhr”; “Richard Walther Darré (1895-1953).”
912 Lundtofte, Gestapo!, 23.
913 Lundtofte, “Anton Fest.”
Grundherr, Werner von (1888-1968). Head of the AA’s department for Scandinavia. Educated in political science and history. Entered the AA in 1918. German envoy to Finland from 1925 to 1934. From 1934 to 1945 he was head of the department for Scandinavian and the Baltic countries. Imprisoned by the Americans from 1945 to 1947. He reentered the civil service in 1950, but after preliminary investigations he was retired in 1952.915

Göring, Hermann (1893-1946). Carried a multitude of leaderships during the National Socialist period and had joined the party in 1922. Minister of Aviation in 1933 and Supreme Commander of the Airforce in 1936. Leader of the Four Year Plan in 1936. He ordered Heydrich to plan the murder of the Jews in the summer of 1941. Sentenced to death at the Nuremberg trials, but committed suicide before being executed.916

Heydrich, Reinhard, (1904-1942). Began a military career, but was discharged for not honoring a marriage agreement in 1931. Member of the NSDAP and SS in 1931. Closely associated with Himmler and held several high-ranking positions in the party’s police organization during the 1930s. Head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) in 1939 which controlled the security police and SD. The RSHA was a leading organization in implementing the murder of the Jews, and Heydrich is considered a key architect behind these policies. He also chaired the Wannsee Conference in January 1942. Deadly wounded by Czech resistance in 1942.917

Henriques, Carl Bertel (1870-1957). Supreme Court Justice (1906). Part of the Jewish congregation’s leadership from 1905 and its manager from 1930. After successfully fleeing to Sweden in October 1943, he returned home in 1945 and stepped down.918

Hewel, Walt(h)er (1904-1945). Carried the flag at Hitler’s failed attempt to take-over power in Germany in 1923. In 1938 Legationsrat I kl. In the German Foreign Ministry. In 1942 he was SS-Brigadeführer. Hewel was Ribbentrop’s permanent officer at Hitler’s chancellery. Hitler had

sympathies for Hewel who managed to gain a certain degree of independence from Ribbentrop.919

**Himmler, Heinrich** (1900-1945). Reichführer-SS and head of the German police. Responsible for the murder of leading members of the SA in 1934. He built the SS to become a powerful and ideologically convinced entity. He organized the structure of the concentration camps in Germany. He was responsible for planning and monitoring the Holocaust.920

**J**

**Jacobsen, Thune** (1880 – 1949). Educated as a lawyer in 1905 and began a career in the police. He is also labeled as the creator of the modern Danish police. Minister of Justice from 1941 to 1943 without any party affiliation. A full supporter of the cooperation and behind the law against the Danish communists from August 1941. Fiercely attacked in the papers of the resistance and after the war a hated personality.921

**Jørgensen, Jørgensen** (1888-1974). Educated as a farmer and member of parliament for the Social Liberals (R) 1929-1964. Minister of Education from 1935. After the reshuffling of the government in November 1942 Jørgensen was appointed Minister of the Interior. He supported the cooperation but not as actively as Erik Scavenius. Jørgensen was very skeptical of the Resistance movement. In August 1943 he joined the expanded Nine-Man Committee, the Thirteen-Man Committee, as one of four former ministers. Head of the Social Liberal group in parliament from 1945 to 1947. Minister of Education from 1957 to 1961. He was behind two major reforms of the public school system in 1937 and 1958.922

**K**

---

919 Conze et al., *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik*, 155–56 Spelled with an H in the first name, but not in ; Klee, *Das Personen Lexikon Zum Dritten Reich. Wer war war vor und nach 1945*, 252 Here it is spelled without and “h”. However, dates and data are the same.


Kanstein, Paul (1899-1980). Kanstein was SS-Brigadeführer from 1942. He had made a career in the German police. From 1937 he was the leader of the Stapoleitstelle Berlin and in 1939 Vice President for the police in Berlin. He was stationed in Denmark from April 1940, and his main responsibility was the security of the German troops and the police department at the German legation. He was on good terms with the Danish Minister of Justice, Thune Jacobsen. He viewed the collapse of the cooperation as a personal defeat and left Denmark in October 1943.923

Kofoed, Kristian Hansen (1879-1951). Member of Parliament for The Social Liberal Party (R) from 1913-1920. In 1924 he became Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. He was Minister of Finance from November 1942.924

Krüger, Ernst (1877- ????). He was German Consul General and Trade Attaché at the German legation. He came to Denmark in 1915. In 1919 he received the title of consul. He worked as a trade attaché from 1919. In 1937 he was promoted to Consul General. He was highly esteemed after the war described as being against Nazism.925 He handled all correspondence on behalf of the German legation to the RfA, and was directly involved in the Aryanization processes in Denmark.

L

Larsen, Gunnar (1905-1973). Educated as a chemical engineer in the USA in 1926. Took over as CEO and head of the board of directors in F.L. Smidth & Co. in 1935. A company which had been co-founded by his father and largely produced cement but also developed new kinds of cement. He was held in high regard in Danish business life as the occupation began, and became an unpolitical Minister of Public works in July 1940. He initiated many public building projects, which helped decrease employment numbers. As these projects often involved the use of cement he was criticized for catering to F.L. Smidth’s interests. He had left the company upon becoming minister but maintained the majority of the stocks, and still had a decisive role. He was a strong proponent of the cooperation and supporter of Erik Scavenius. As the only minister

923 Stevensborg, “Der Beauftragte Paul Kanstein.”
925 “Ernst Krüger.”
he was after the war he was sentenced for værnemageri (economic cooperation with the German occupier), but he was acquitted by the Supreme Court in 1948. He then left Denmark and settled in Ireland.926

**Luther, Martin** (1895-1945). Unterstaatssekretär. From 1938 part of the AA, and from 1940 Head of Abteilung Deutschland, which handled Jewish questions and matters of race. The department also coordinated these efforts with the RSHA as well as office D III – which handled the Jewish and Race polices and information on these issues from the German legations. He worked closely with Adolf Eichmann’s department to diplomatically prepare and secure the deportations of Jews. He was in 1941 promoted to Unterstaatssekretär. Part of the Wannsee conference in 1942. After unsuccessfully attempting to remove Ribbentrop, he was a privileged prisoner in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen from February 1943. He died a month after the Russians liberated the camp in 1945.927

**M**

**Meissner, Gustav** (1910-1995). Gustav Meissner, Presse Attaché of the German legation in Copenhagen 1940-1943. He grew up in the northern part of Germany and attended school in Flensburg. He was fluent in German and Danish. He became a reporter at Flensburger Nachrichten. He was an early member of the Nazi party, and was employed at Dienststelle Ribbentrop in 1937 with Nordschleswig as his area of expertise. He was associated with Martin Luther, in the 1930’ies Meissner benefitted from this connection during his years in Denmark. As the Second World War broke out he became part of the German legation. He was the liaison between the German legation and the Danish Nazis, and he promoted their claim for political power. Best did not side with Meissner’s ambitions and as Meissner’s protégé Luther was removed in February 1943, Meissner joined the soldiers at the front. He survived the war, and was never put on trial. His involvement in censoring Danish papers, the pressure to remove Jews from the press or his support for Danish Nazis thus remained untried. To his death he maintained and defended the mind-set from the National Socialist period.928

---

927 Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz, “Martin Luther.”
928 Kreth, “Gustav Meissner.”
Munch, Peter RocheGune (1870-1953). Member of Parliament for The Social Liberal Party, Det Radikale Venstre, 1909-1945. Part of founding the party in 1905, and leader of the Party from 1927. Minister of Defence from 1913-1920. Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1929-1940. He was an educated and practicing historian, while also being a pacifist supporter of international justice. Part of the group of politicians attempting to keep Denmark out of the Second World War. He argued for a minimal defense in order to not attract military attention. He believed smaller states would survive by international rules of justice, while preserving their cultural traits through a national community with a broad redistribution of wealth. In July 1940 he left the government, but remained a vital member of the Nine-Man Committee during the occupation. He was criticized for his views and politics during and after the war. 929

O

Odmart Jens Peter (1896-1978). Hired by Danish police in 1918. Head of police personnel in the special police department attached to the offices of the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs. During the occupation he accumulated more and more power. He headed the arrests and searches against the Communists in Copenhagen in June 1941. In January 1942 he took over leadership of section D. He was central to handing over 155 immigrants to the German police. He was tough on the resistance movement, which he primarily considered a communist affair. In the fall of 1943 he was responsible for sending a delegation of Danish policemen to Sweden to point out Danish resistance fighters amongst the Danish refugees in Sweden. However, he was on good terms with the non-communist parts of the Danish resistance movement, and the Danish military intelligence. After the war he continued to serve in the Danish police. 930

R

Rademacher, Franz (1906-1973). Educated as a lawyer and entered the party in 1933. Reached the rank of SS-Obersturmführer. From 1940, head of office D III, the main office for Jewish Matters in Dept. Deutschland. Office D III was headed by Franz Rademacher in 1940, but he was

removed when Luther was imprisoned in February 1943. Rademacher was the second Judenreferent and worked closely with Luther. Rademacher was deeply involved in writing several of the key documents of the so-called Madagascar plan. The plan envisioned the deportation of the German Jews to the, at the time, French Island, and this is regarded as the first territorial final solution. Rademacher was generally involved in arranging deportations from all over Europe. After Luther’s removal Rademacher served in the navy for the duration of the war. He served two postwar prison sentences, became advisor to the Syrian government and spied for West Germany. Sentenced to prison in 1968, but released due to illness.\textsuperscript{931}

**Renthe-Fink, Cecil Karl-August Timon Ernst Anton von** (1885-1964). Since 1936, the German diplomatic envoy in Denmark. As Denmark was occupied he was promoted to Reichsbevollmächtigter. He is usually characterized as a career diplomat. He was a Doctor of Law and had participated in the First World War from 1914-1916, and had been decorated with the Iron Cross II and I degrees. A year before the outbreak of the First World War his diplomatic career began. A peak in his early career was the position as deputy head of section II in the AA in 1933. He became a National Socialist party member in 1938. In Denmark he attempted to increase the cooperation between Denmark and Germany. After being summoned to Berlin and replaced by Werner Best, he was a special envoy, diplomatischen Sonderbeauftragten, in Vichy France.\textsuperscript{932}

**Ribbentrop, Joachim von** (1893-1946). Imported and exported liqueur in Berlin in the 1920s, and received nobility by adoption. Joined the party in 1932, and Hitler’s foreign policy advisor before becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1938. Reached the rank of SS-Obergruppenführer.\textsuperscript{933}


\textsuperscript{933} Ernst Klee, “Joachim von Ribbentrop,” *Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945* (Nikol Verlag, 2016), 494.
Scavenius, Erik (1877-1962). Educated in political science he began a career in the Foreign Ministry and became its minister several times (1910-1922, 1913-1920 and June 1940-1943). He held this position while also being Prime Minister from November 1942. He basic perception of Denmark’s geo political position was that it depended on Germany. He was a cool headed diplomat, but often cynical and unsentimental in evaluating the political power positions. He rarely waivered from his analysis of events and is often characterized as stubborn. He also had a temper and quite a few enemies. He pursued an active cooperation line to gain goodwill in Berlin. To oust the Danish Nazis from becoming part of the government meant joining the European new order according to Scavenius. Fierce discussions between Scavenius and the political ministers were the norm on several issues during the cooperation. However, none were willing to replace him though he threatened leaving the government several times. He developed an extraordinary relationship with Werner Best. They exchanged letters and kept in touch after the war until Scavenius died. Scavenius was after the war one of the few who kept defending the reasons for the cooperation, while many of his political colleagues would not. Scavenius remains a contested figure in Danish history.934

Schacht, Hjalmar (1877-1970). Born in Tinglev, a Danish town since 1920. Co-founder of the German Democratic Party in 1920. Top negotiator in both the Dawes- and Young plans. Part of a party coalition against the Weimar Republic in 1931. President of the Reichsbank and a year later Minister for economic affairs, but released from this post in 1939. Arrested in 1944 due to contacts among the persons who attempted to murder Hitler. Acquitted at the Nuremberg trials, but sentenced as a main culprit in the denazification process, and sentenced to eight years in a labor camp. He was released after only serving one year. Financial advisor for Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Syria from 1950 to 1953 where he created his own Bank. He retired 10 years later.935

Schumburg, Emil (1898- ? ). The first Judenreferent of the AA from 1936-1940. He became part of the AA in 1926. He was briefly leader of dept. Deutschland in the AA in 1939, which he had

been working for since 1933. Decorated in the First World War the Iron Cross second and first class. Received his doctoral degree in law in 1922. He expressed firm beliefs in the German people and National Socialist ideology, but did not join the party until 1936. He was behind drafting some of the reports Vicco von Bülow-Schwante would send to the legations. In 1936, he was adopted into the SS by Himmler.\footnote{Browning, Die “Endlösung” und das Auswärtige Amt: Das Referat D III der Abteilung Deutschland 1940-1943., 27-28/pos. 507 in Kindle; Döscher, Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich: Diplomatie im Schatten der “Endlösung,” 119–29; Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, 45.}

**Stalmann, Friedrich,** (1902-?). Stalmann was Dr. Jur. and had the title of Regierungsdirektor at the German legation. He came to Denmark in 1940. His previous career he had been in the Gestapo from 1934-1939. He was the right hand of Kanstein.\footnote{Hans Kirchhoff, “Friedrich Stalmann,” Hvem var hvem 1940-1945 (København: Gad, 2005), 339–40.}

**Stauning, Thorvald August Marinus,** (1873-3.5.1942). The first Danish Social Democratic Prime Minister from 1924-26. He regained office in 1929, and maintained it until his death in 1942. He came from a working class background in Copenhagen, but received formal education. He became a cigar sorter while attending evening classes. From 1899 he was the treasurer of the Social Democratic Party. He was a member of Parliament from 1906-1942. During the turbulent 1930’ies he was a defender of Democracy and respected by his regular adversaries, while fencing off extreme currents from the left and right side of the political spectrum. He headed the coalition government during the occupation until his death.\footnote{Niels Finn Christiansen, “Th. Stauning,” Den Store Danske (Gyldendal), accessed June 16, 2017, http://denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sid=164401.}

**Steincke, Karl Kristian,** (1880-1963). Doctor of Law in 1906 and Social Democrat. Member of parliament from 1918 and Minister of Justice from 1924-1926, and 1935-1939. He briefly had a third term as Minister of Justice in 1950. He was Minister of Social Affairs from 1929-1935. He left Parliament in 1952. He is known for introducing Europe’s first eugenic laws allowing for sterilization in 1929. These laws were expanded in 1934 and 1938. Steincke had in 1920 legitimized eugenics as part of social reform in order to save money on health care.\footnote{Jacob Christensen, “K. K. Steincke,” Den Store Danske (Gyldendal), accessed June 10, 2017, http://denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sid=164591.}
Svenningsen, Nils (1894-1985). Svenningsen was a prominent civil servant in the Danish Foreign Ministry becoming Permanent Secretary in the fall of 1941. He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for his entire career beginning in 1920. He was stationed six years at the Danish legation in Berlin from 1924-1930. In the late 1930'ies he headed negotiations in the Danish-German Trade Committee. After becoming Permanent Secretary, he supported minister Erik Scavenius, and drafted many of the ministry’s statements and announcements during the war. After the Danish government discontinued in August 1943, Svenningsen took over as head of the Civil Servants in what has become known as the Departementschefstyret – or The Permanent Secretaries’ Management. He sought to keep as much control in Danish hands as possible just like his political predecessors. He negotiated directly with Werner Best and other leading Germans in Denmark in order to steer the country through the war. After the war he was labelled as a collaborator, and became Denmark’s ambassador to Sweden until 1951. The next ten years he served as Permanent Secretary. His last important post was as Denmark’s ambassador in London from 1961-1964.940

W

Walter, Alex (1888-1949). German civil servant and Doctor of Law. Head of the German-Danish trade committee on behalf of Germany. His superior was Staatsekretär, Permanent Secretary, Herbert Backe who in May 1942 became the Minister of Food and agriculture. Walter was well connected in Berlin, and he negotiated on behalf of Germany during the war. He is described as a good negotiator. His articles from 1941-1943 reveal him as a supporter of the National Socialist cause. He was a party member and SS-Sturmbahnführer.941


the Vatican State from 1943. Captured in Rome by allied troops in 1944. Sentenced to prison for seven years in 1949, but released in 1950.\footnote{“Ernst Freiherr von Weizäcker.”}

\textbf{Wingen, Oskar} (1889-1945). Wingen had a doctoral degree in Political Science with a career start in maritime transport and world economy from 1915. He came to the AA in 1919 and worked as a scientific aid. Head of the archives before becoming part of department P – press matters in 1921. In the 1930s he had a briefer, but important position at the Propaganda Ministry from 1933 to 1934, and was Saarbevollmächtigen des Reichskanzlers 1934-1935. He reentered the AA in 1935 and headed department X from October 1938. He retired in November 1944. He died in a Russian prison camp in Germany 1945.\footnote{Isphording, Keiper, and Kröger, “Oskar Wingen.”}


\section*{Appendix 3: The Office Names of the RfA.}

\textbf{Leadership}

\textbf{Dept I. General Affairs}

- Off. I/1A. Administration
  - Off. I/1B. Military matters & Communication
    - Off. I/1C. Library
  - Off. I/2A. General and Organisation matters f. Außenhandelsstellen
    - Off. I/2B. Management of the German "Wirtschaftsdienstes"
  - Off. I/3. Special tasks of disseminating trade news

- Dept II. News service and Library (Shrifttum)
  - Off. II/1a Official Foreign News Material
    - Off. II/1b. Information Service f. German Trade
      - Off. II/1c. Trade News
        - Off. II/1d. Handbook f. Foreign Trade
  - Off. II/2a. World Trade/ Trade Policy
• Off. II/2b. Ordinary Trade Services
  • Off. II/2c. Industrial News
    • Off. II/2d. Transport
      • Off. II/2e. Duty and import/export rules
        • Off. II/2f. Conferences and Archive

Dept III. International Trade
• Off. III/1a. Regulations from RWM/Prohibitions on Imports and Exports
  • Off. III/1b. Trade Political Reports/Co-operation w. Offices of Commerce.
    • Off. III/1c. Collecting and analysis of reports f. German Offices of Commerce
      • Off. III/1d. Questions of Representatives and Sales
        • Off. III/1e. Archive of Industries
          • Off. III/1f. Representative's search
  • Off. III/2a. Trade: Legal Issues
    • Off. III/2b. Transport Regulation
  • Off. III/3 British World incl. USA
    • Off. III/3a. Brit. India, AUS, NZ, USA.
      • Off. III/3b. Specialty areas: E.g. Optics
        • Off. III/3c. Special Assignment: Monitoring enemy trade
  • Off. III/4 Pacific Area
    • Off. III/4a. JP, CH, MN, TH, PH, IN, AUS, NZ
      • Off. III/4b. Specialty areas e.g. Transport
        • Off. III/4c. General Colonial Questions
  • Off. III/5 Mediterranean
    • Off. III/5a. PT, ESP, SCH
      • Off. III/5b. ITA (ALB, LY, ET)
        • Off. III/5c. Specialty areas e.g. Glass
  • Off. III/6 Western Europe
    • Off. III/6a. NL, BEL, FRA + Colonies
• Off. III/6b. Specialty Areas e.g. Machinery
• Off. III/7 North and Eastern Europe
  • Off. III/7a. DK, SWE, NOR, FI, USSR
  • Off. III/7b. Specialty areas e.g. Means of transportation
• Off. III/8a Middle - and South America
  • Off. III/8b. Special areas e.g. Metals
• Off. III/9 The Orient
  • III/9a. Egt, Arabia, CY, IRK, IRN, PAL, Trans Jordania, SUD, TYR, YE,
  • III/9b. Specialty Areas e.g. Paper/wool goods
• Off. III/10 The Balkans
  • Off. III/10a Phasing out Bohemia, Yugoslavia, RUM, SLO, HUN
  • Off. III/10b BUL, GRE
  • Off. III/10c. Specialty areas e.g. Leather, textiles

Dept. IV. Company and Credit information service
• Off. IV/1. Documentation for German Goods and Suppliers.
• Off. IV/2. Information on Companies
• Off. IV/3. Determining Race in foreign countries and "Entjudung" of Representatives abroad.

Dept. V. Duty Service
No individual offices.

Appendix 4: Ministers’ of Justice and State Prosecutors’ for Special Affairs in Denmark 1940-1943

Ministers of Justice
• Svend Unmack Larsen (April 1940- June 1940)
• Harald Petersen (June 1940 – July 1941)
• Thune Jacobsen (July 1941 – August 1943)

State Prosecutors for Special Affairs in Denmark
• Harald Petersen (April 1940 – June 1940)
• Eivind Larsen (July 1940 – June 1941)
• Poul Kjalke (June 1941 – February 1942)
• Troels Hoff (February 1942 – August 1943)

Head of the Police Section of the State Prosecutor for Special Affairs
• Jens Peter Odmar (1940-1943)

Appendix 5: Visits to the German Gesandtschaft

Werner von Grundherr in Copenhagen
16th to 20th October, 1940
15th to 18th September, 1941
1st to 3rd of December, 1941
29th to 30th of August, 1942

Rademacher in Copenhagen
5th to 9th of April, 1941
10th to 14th of June, 1941
11th to 17th of December, 1941
24th of March, 1942
16th to 21st of June, 1942
8th to 16th of December, 1942

Cecil von Renthe-Fink in Berlin
1940
15th to 18th of May
16th to 18th of July
12th to 15th of November
15th to 18th of December

1941

944 Based on “Auswärtiges Amt an Leni Yahil,” September 10, 1962, NL756 Nachlass Renthe-Fink Leni Yahil requested an overview these trips, and the list was compiled by the AA.
3rd to 6th of January
8th to 19th of July
24th to 28th of November

1942
10th to 16th of April
29th of July to 7th of August
23rd to 27th of September

Officially withdrawn to Berlin on the 28th of December 1942 according to the AA.

References

Archival sources

Bundesarchiv, BA
R3131 (RWM): 3041, 9040
R901 (German Embassy in Denmark Handel): 67777

Poltisches Archiv (PA)
Kopenhagen 54, 76
R99413 ( bd. 1.), R27275, R29836, R80815, R93094, R104608, R261128
Nachlass Cecil von Renthe-Fink NZ 756

Rigsarkivet, RA – Danish National Archives.
Statsrådsprotokoller
Ministermøder fra 29-4-1929 til 27-1-1940 og fra 29-1-1940 til 28-8-1943
Statsadvokaten for Særlige Anliggender – diverse sager pk 5, 6
Statsadvokaten for Særlige Anliggender AS-sager København pk. 2, 3, 6, 14, 38, 39, 40, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55,
Militärarchiv Freiburg, Danica, Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Dänemark. Pk 70, Læg
RA, Udenrigsministeriet (UM)
83.dan.68-12
120.d.28a 1946-1972.
120.d.28.g. 1909-1945.
120.G.79, 85, 87.
140.N.33b.
140.N.33b1.

RA, Det tyske Handelskammer
Sagsakter 1936-1945, Ks 8
Sagsakter ks. 73-76

RA, Københavns byret
RA, Københavns Byret, Retsopegøret Straffeakter - 21-1947-86-I pk. 441-442.
RA, Københavns Byret, Retsopegøret Straffeakter - 21-1947-135, 123

RA, Privatarkiver
RA, Gustav E. Hartz.
RA, Jørgen Jørgensen.
RA, Halfdan Hendriksen.

Det Kongelige Bibliotek, the Royal Library,

Published Source Collections

———. “Tyske akter vedrørende ‘Jødespørgsmålet’ i Danmark april 1940 - august 1943.”
Secondary Sources

Newspaper articles found in archive collections as cut-outs are not noted individually, as they are deemed part of the archival collection. Online newspaper articles and online archival material (digitalized sources) are registered with dates. This means an accessed date is not provided, as the article or source is dated.

“It is claimed that 1000 Arier-Attester gennem det tyske konsulat i Skive.” *Skive Folkeblad*, September 7, 1937. Mediastream.


“Den nye ledelse i aktieselskabet Sophus Berendsen.” Politiken, September 17, 1941.


Döscher, Hans-Jürgen. Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich: Diplomatie im Schatten der

“Dr. Schacht har fået Arierattest fra Tinglev.” Nationaltidende. May 9, 1937. Mediastream.


tjenestemænd samt censorer. Schults Forlag, 1951.


Mau, Mark. “Business as Usual?: De dansk-tyske handelsrelationer under besættelsen. En analyse af Udenrigsministeriets embedsmænds politik i regeringsudvalget.” Københavns


kilder/vis/materiale/forhandlings-og-samarbejdspolitikken-under-besaettelsen-1940-1945/.
“Programoversigt.” Larm, 1944.
http://www.larm.fm/Search?query=%22Lorenz+Christensen%22&from=1943-08-31T23%3A00%3A00Z&to=1945-11-10T23%3A00%3A00Z&facets=%7BDocument%7D.TypeId%3A86.


“Slægternes flittige forsker fylder 60.” Berlingske Aftenavis, December 29, 1938.

Mediastream.


“Sofhus Berendsens øverste ledelse.” Berlingske, November 6, 1945.


54.

Stræde, Therkel, and Dennis Larsen. En skole i vold. Bobruisk 1941-1944. Frikorps Danmark

Sverige, Kommissionen om judiska tillgångar i Sverige vid tiden för andra världskriget.

http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c4/18/18/950400da.pdf.


Thad Allen, Michael. “A Bureaucratic Holocaust: Toward a New Consensus.” In Networks of
2017.


Tingbog, Hovedstaden, Frederiksberg 2. Frederiksberg 10051 70, 1927.


Tönsmeyer, Tatjana. “Kollaboration als handlungsleitendes Motiv? Die slowakische Elite und
das NS-Regime.” In Kooperation und Verbrechen. Formen der Kollaboration in Südost- und
Osteuropa 1939-1945, edited by Cristoph Dieckmann, Babette Quinkert, Tatjana Tönsmeyer,
Christian Gerlach, Wolf Gruner, Anne Klein, Beate Meyer, Armin Nolzen, and Thomas
Wallstein Verlag, 2005.

Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy.


Ændringer i ledelsen af akts. Sophus Berendsen.” Politiken, September 16, 1941.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces and Supply Chain Management</td>
<td>Martin Grieger</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1. Martin Grieger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIKENESS A Philosophical Investigation</td>
<td>Thomas Basbøll</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2. Thomas Basbøll LIKENESS A Philosophical Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing Consumer Innovation A product development strategy that</td>
<td>Lars Bo Jeppesen</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4. Lars Bo Jeppesen Organizing Consumer Innovation A product development strategy that is based on online communities and allows some firms to benefit from a distributed process of innovation by consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION AND TRANSLATION MEMORY SYSTEMS An</td>
<td>Barbara Dragsted</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5. Barbara Dragsted SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION AND TRANSLATION MEMORY SYSTEMS An empirical investigation of cognitive segmentation and effects of integrating a TM system into the translation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategisk Økonomistyring</td>
<td>Carsten Mejer Plath</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8. Carsten Mejer Plath Strategisk Økonomistyring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Management as Internal Corporate Venturing</td>
<td>Annemette Kjærgaard</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9. Annemette Kjærgaard Knowledge Management as Internal Corporate Venturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De profesjonelle i endring</td>
<td>Knut Arne Hovdal</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10. Knut Arne Hovdal De profesjonelle i endring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industriel forskningsledelse – på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde i</td>
<td>Lars Frode Frederiksen</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>12. Lars Frode Frederiksen Industriel forskningsledelse – på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde i danske forskningsintensive virksomheder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV Advertising A study of the first</td>
<td>Lars Pynt Andersen</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>14. Lars Pynt Andersen The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV Advertising A study of the first fifteen years with special emphasis on genre and irony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Formalised Horizontal Networks</td>
<td>Lene Nielsen</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>16. Lene Nielsen Engaging Personas and Narrative Scenarios – a study on how a user-centered approach influenced the perception of the design process in the e-business group at AstraZeneca</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen  
*Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk in Energy Markets*

20. Sabine Madsen  
*Emerging Methods – An Interpretive Study of ISD Methods in Practice*

21. Evis Sinani  
*The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Efficiency, Productivity Growth and Trade: An Empirical Investigation*

22. Bent Meier Sørensen  
*Making Events Work Or, How to Multiply Your Crisis*

23. Pernille Schnoor  
*Brand Ethos*  
Om troværdige brand- og virksomhedsidentiteter i et retorisk og diskurstheoretisk perspektiv

24. Sidsel Fabech  
*Von welchem Österreich ist hier die Rede?*  
Diskursive forhandlinger og magtkampe mellem rivaliserende nationale identitetskonstruktioner i østrigske pressdiskurer

25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen  
*Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i flersprogede forbundsstater*  
Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og Canada

26. Dana B. Minbaeva  
*Human Resource Practices and Knowledge Transfer in Multinational Corporations*

27. Holger Højlund  
*Markedets politiske fornuft*  
Et studie af velfærdens organisering i perioden 1990-2003

28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen  
*A.s erfaring*  
Om mellemværendets praktik i en transformation af mennesket og subjektiviteten

29. Sine Nørholm Just  
*The Constitution of Meaning*  
– A Meaningful Constitution?  
Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion in the debate on the future of Europe

2005

1. Claus J. Varnes  
*Managing product innovation through rules – The role of formal and structured methods in product development*

2. Helle Hedegaard Hein  
*Mellem konflikt og konsensus*  
– Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker

3. Axel Rosenø  
*Customer Value Driven Product Innovation – A Study of Market Learning in New Product Development*

4. Søren Buhl Pedersen  
*Making space*  
An outline of place branding

5. Camilla Funck Ellehave  
*Differences that Matter*  
An analysis of practices of gender and organizing in contemporary workplaces

6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond  
*Styring af kommunale forvaltninger*

7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen  
*Supply Chain versus Supply Chain Benchmarking as a Means to Managing Supply Chains*

8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan  
*From an idea to a standard*  
The UN and the global governance of accountants’ competence


10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni  
*An Experimental Field Study on the
Effectiveness of Grocer Media Advertising
Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition, Purchase Intentions and Short-Term Sales

11. Allan Mortensen
Essays on the Pricing of Corporate Bonds and Credit Derivatives

12. Remo Stefano Chiari
Figure che fanno conoscere Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo e espressivo della metafora e di altri tropi da Aristotele e da Vico fino al cognitivismo contemporaneo

13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
Strategic Planning and Corporate Performance
An integrative research review and a meta-analysis of the strategic planning and corporate performance literature from 1956 to 2003

14. Jens Geersbro
The TDF – PMI Case
Making Sense of the Dynamics of Business Relationships and Networks

15. Mette Andersen
Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Supply Chains
Understanding the uniqueness of firm behaviour

16. Eva Boxenbaum
Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic Foundations of Institutional Change

17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
Capacity Development, Environmental Justice NGOs, and Governance: The Case of South Africa

18. Signe Jarlov
Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse

19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening Comprehension in English as a Foreign Language

20. Christian Nielsen
Essays on Business Reporting
Production and consumption of strategic information in the market for information

21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
Egos and Ethics of Management Consultants

22. Annie Bekke Kjær
Performance management i Procesinnovation – belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk perspektiv

23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
Om organisering af den kreative gøren i den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis

24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
Revenue Management
Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige & organisatoriske konsekvenser

25. Thomas Riise Johansen
Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
The Danish Case of Accounting and Accountability to Employees

26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’ Adoption Decisions

27. Birgitte Rasmussen
Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes fornyende rolle

28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
Remerger – skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og opkøb

29. Carmine Gioia
A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
*Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot, pædagog eller politiker?*
Et studie i arbejdskreders meningstil-skriverier i forbindelse med vellykket gennemførelse af ledelsesinitierede forandringsprojekter

31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
*Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynamiske læringsnettverk i toppidretten Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem Samfunds litteratur*

32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
*Linking Healthcare An inquiry into the changing performances of web-based technology for asthma monitoring*

33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
*Virtual Uddannelsespraksis Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie i hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering kan forbedre praksis i virtuelle læraf-miljøer*

34. Anika Liversage
*Finding a Path Labour Market Life Stories of Immigrant Professionals*

35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
*Studies i samspillet mellem stat og erhvervsliv i Danmark under 1. verdenskrig*

36. Finn Janning
*A DIFFERENT STORY Seduction, Conquest and Discovery*

37. Patricia Ann Plackett
*Strategic Management of the Radical Innovation Process Leveraging Social Capital for Market Uncertainty Management*

2006

1. Christian Vintergaard
*Early Phases of Corporate Venturing*

2. Niels Rom-Poulsen
*Essays in Computational Finance*

3. Tina Brandt Husman
*Organisational Capabilities, Competitive Advantage & Project-Based Organisations The Case of Advertising and Creative Good Production*

4. Mette Rosenkrands Johansen
*Practice at the top – how top managers mobilise and use non-financial performance measures*

5. Eva Parum
*Corporate governance som strategisk kommunikations- og ledelsesværktøj*

6. Susan Aagaard Petersen
*Culture’s Influence on Performance Management: The Case of a Danish Company in China*

7. Thomas Nicolai Pedersen
*The Discursive Constitution of Organizational Governance – Between unity and differentiation The Case of the governance of environmental risks by World Bank environmental staff*

8. Cynthia Selin
*Volatile Visions: Transactions in Anticipatory Knowledge*

9. Jesper Banghøj
*Financial Accounting Information and Compensation in Danish Companies*

10. Mikkel Lucas Overby
*Strategic Alliances in Emerging High-Tech Markets: What’s the Difference and does it Matter?*

11. Tine Aage
*External Information Acquisition of Industrial Districts and the Impact of Different Knowledge Creation Dimensions*
A case study of the Fashion and Design Branch of the Industrial District of Montebelluna, NE Italy

12. Mikkel Flyverbom
Making the Global Information Society Governable
On the Governmentality of Multi-Stakeholder Networks

13. Anette Grønning
Personen bag Tilstedevær i e-mail som interaktionsteam mellem kunde og medarbejder i dansk forsikringskontekst

14. Jørn Helder
One Company – One Language? The NN-case

15. Lars Bjerregaard Mikkelsen
Differing perceptions of customer value
Development and application of a tool for mapping perceptions of customer value at both ends of customer-supplier dyads in industrial markets

16. Lise Granerud
Exploring Learning
Technological learning within small manufacturers in South Africa

17. Esben Rahbek Pedersen
Between Hopes and Realities: Reflections on the Promises and Practices of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

18. Ramona Samson
The Cultural Integration Model and European Transformation. The Case of Romania

2007
1. Jakob Vestergaard
Discipline in The Global Economy Panopticism and the Post-Washington Consensus

2. Heidi Lund Hansen
Spaces for learning and working
A qualitative study of change of work, management, vehicles of power and social practices in open offices

3. Sudhanshu Rai
Exploring the internal dynamics of software development teams during user analysis
A tension enabled Institutionalization Model: “Where process becomes the objective”

Ej til salg gennem Samfundslitteratur

5. Serden Ozcan
EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES
A Behavioural Perspective

6. Kim Sundtoft Hald
Inter-organizational Performance Measurement and Management in Action
– An Ethnography on the Construction of Management, Identity and Relationships

7. Tobias Lindeberg
Evaluative Technologies
Quality and the Multiplicity of Performance

8. Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg
Den globale soldat
Identitetsdannelse og identitetsledelse i multinationale militære organisationer

9. Lars Frederiksen
Open Innovation Business Models
Innovation in firm-hosted online user communities and inter-firm project ventures in the music industry
– A collection of essays

10. Jonas Gabrielsen
Retorisk toposlære – fra statisk ’sted’ til persuasiv aktivitet
11. Christian Moldt-Jørgensen
Fra meningsløs til meningsfuld evaluering.
Anvendelsen af studentertilfredshedsmålinger på de korte og mellemlange videregående uddannelser set fra et psykodynamisk systemperspektiv

12. Ping Gao
Extending the application of actor-network theory
Cases of innovation in the telecommunications industry

13. Peter Mejlby
Frihed og fængsel, en del af den samme drøm?
Et phronetisk baseret casestudie af frigørelsens og kontrollens sam eksistens i værdibaseret ledelse!

14. Kristina Birch
Statistical Modelling in Marketing

15. Signe Poulsen
Sense and sensibility: The language of emotional appeals in insurance marketing

16. Anders Bjerre Trolle
Essays on derivatives pricing and dynamic asset allocation

17. Peter Feldhütter
Empirical Studies of Bond and Credit Markets

18. Jens Henrik Eggert Christensen
Default and Recovery Risk Modeling and Estimation

19. Maria Theresa Larsen
Academic Enterprise: A New Mission for Universities or a Contradiction in Terms?
Four papers on the long-term implications of increasing industry involvement and commercialization in academia

20. Morten Wellendorf
Postimplementering af teknologi i den offentlige forvaltning
Analysen af en organisations kontinuerlige arbejde med informations teknologi

21. Ekaterina Mhaanna
Concept Relations for Terminological Process Analysis

22. Stefan Ring Thorbjørnsen
Forsvaret i forandring
Et studie i officerers kapabiliteter under påvirkning af omverdenens forandringspres mod øget styring og læring

23. Christa Breum Amhøj
Det selvskabte medlemskab om managementstaten, dens styringstekno logier og indbyggere

24. Karoline Bromose
Between Technological Turbulence and Operational Stability
– An empirical case study of corporate venturing in TDC

25. Susanne Justesen
Navigating the Paradoxes of Diversity in Innovation Practice
– A Longitudinal study of six very different innovation processes – in practice

26. Luise Noring Henler
Conceptualising successful supply chain partnerships
– Viewing supply chain partnerships from an organisational culture perspective

27. Mark Mau
Kampen om telefonen
Det danske telefonvæsen under den tyske besættelse 1940-45

28. Jakob Halskov
The semiautomatic expansion of existing terminological ontologies using knowledge patterns discovered
on the WWW – an implementation and evaluation

29. Gergana Koleva
   *European Policy Instruments Beyond Networks and Structure: The Innovative Medicines Initiative*

30. Christian Geisler Asmussen
   *Global Strategy and International Diversity: A Double-Edged Sword?*

31. Christina Holm-Petersen
   *Stolthed og fordom. Kultur- og identitetsarbejde ved skabelsen af en ny sengeafdeling gennem fusion*

32. Hans Peter Olsen
   *Hybrid Governance of Standardized States. Causes and Contours of the Global Regulation of Government Auditing*

33. Lars Bøge Sørensen
   *Risk Management in the Supply Chain*

34. Peter Aagaard
   *Det unikkes dynamikker. De institutionelle mulighedsbetingelser bag den individuelle udforskning i professionelt og frivilligt arbejde*

35. Yun Mi Antorini
   *Brand Community Innovation. An Intrinsic Case Study of the Adult Fans of LEGO Community*

36. Joachim Lynggaard Boll
   *Labor Related Corporate Social Performance in Denmark. Organizational and Institutional Perspectives*

2008

1. Frederik Christian Vinten
   *Essays on Private Equity*

2. Jesper Clement
   *Visual Influence of Packaging Design on In-Store Buying Decisions*

3. Marius Brostrøm Kousgaard
   *Tid til kvalitetsmåling? – Studier af indrulleringsprocesser i forbindelse med introduktionen af kliniske kvalitetsdatabaser i specialægepraksissektoren*

4. Irene Skovgaard Smith
   *Management Consulting in Action. Value creation and ambiguity in client-consultant relations*

5. Anders Rom
   *Management accounting and integrated information systems. How to exploit the potential for management accounting of information technology*

6. Marina Candi
   *Aesthetic Design as an Element of Service Innovation in New Technology-based Firms*

7. Morten Schnack
   *Teknologi og tværfaglighed – en analyse af diskussionen omkring indførelse af EPJ på en hospitalsafdeling*

8. Helene Balslev Clausen
   *Juntos pero no revueltos – un estudio sobre emigrantes norteamericanos en un pueblo mexicano*

9. Lise Justesen
   *Kunsten at skrive revisionsrapporter. En beretning om forvaltningsrevisionsberetning*

10. Michael E. Hansen
    *The politics of corporate responsibility: CSR and the governance of child labor and core labor rights in the 1990s*

11. Anne Roepstorff
    *Holdning for handling – en etnologisk undersøgelse af Virksomheders Sociale Ansvar/CSR*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Essays on Credit Risk and Credit Derivatives</td>
<td>Claus Bajlum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>The Performative Power of Competence – an Inquiry into Subjectivity and Social Technologies at Work</td>
<td>Anders Bojesen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Green and Fragile</td>
<td>Satu Reijonen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Corporate Governance in Banking A European Study</td>
<td>Ilduara Busta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>De uvidende og de udviklingsparate Identitet som mulighed og restriktion blandt fabriksarbejdere på det aftayloriserede fabriksgulv</td>
<td>Trine Paludan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Foreign market entry in transition economies: Entry timing and mode choice</td>
<td>Kristian Jakobsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Syntactic reordering in statistical machine translation</td>
<td>Jakob Elming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Regional Computable General Equilibrium Models for Denmark Three papers laying the foundation for regional CGE models with agglomeration characteristics</td>
<td>Lars Brømsøe Termansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>The Motivational Foundations of Knowledge Sharing</td>
<td>Mia Reinholt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>The Co-Evolution of Institutions and Technology A Neo-Institutional Understanding of Change Processes within the Business Press – the Case Study of Financial Times</td>
<td>Frederikke Krogh-Meibom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>OFFSHORING OF ADVANCED AND HIGH-VALUE TECHNICAL SERVICES: ANTECEDENTS, PROCESS DYNAMICS AND FIRMLEVEL IMPACTS</td>
<td>Peter D. Ørberg Jensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Functional Upgrading, Relational Capability and Export Performance of Vietnamese Wood Furniture Producers</td>
<td>Pham Thi Song Hanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Why wait? An Exploration of first-mover advantages among Danish e-grocers through a resource perspective</td>
<td>Mads Vangkilde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Rethinking the History of European Level Merger Control A Critical Political Economy Perspective</td>
<td>Hubert Buch-Hansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>From Independent Ratings to Communal Ratings: A Study of CWA Raters’ Decision-Making Behaviours</td>
<td>Vivian Lindhardsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnerships: Meaning and Practice</td>
<td>Guðrið Weihe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Enabling Supply Networks with Collaborative Information Infrastructures An Empirical Investigation of Business Model Innovation in Supplier Relationship Management</td>
<td>Chris Nøkkentved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Christine Sestoft
Forbrugeradfærd i et Stats- og Livsformsteoretisk perspektiv

6. Michael Pedersen
Tune in, Breakdown, and Reboot: On the production of the stress-fit self-managing employee

7. Salla Lutz
Position and Reposition in Networks – Exemplified by the Transformation of the Danish Pine Furniture Manufacturers

8. Jens Forssbæk
Essays on market discipline in commercial and central banking

9. Tine Murphy
Sense from Silence – A Basis for Organised Action
How do Sensemaking Processes with Minimal Sharing Relate to the Reproduction of Organised Action?

10. Sara Malou Strandvad
Inspirations for a new sociology of art: A sociomaterial study of development processes in the Danish film industry

11. Nicolaas Mouton
On the evolution of social scientific metaphors: A cognitive-historical enquiry into the divergent trajectories of the idea that collective entities – states and societies, cities and corporations – are biological organisms.

12. Lars Andreas Knutsen
Mobile Data Services: Shaping of user engagements

13. Nikolaos Theodoros Korfiatis
Information Exchange and Behavior: A Multi-method Inquiry on Online Communities

14. Jens Albæk
Forestillinger om kvalitet og tvaerfaglighed på sygehuse – skabelse af forestillinger i læge- og plejegrupperne angående relevans af nye idéer om kvalitetsudvikling gennem tolkningsprocesser

15. Maja Lotz
The Business of Co-Creation – and the Co-Creation of Business

16. Gitte P. Jakobsen
Narrative Construction of Leader Identity in a Leader Development Program Context

17. Dorte Hermansen
“Living the brand” som en brandorienteret dialogisk praksis: Om udvikling af medarbejdernes brandorienterede dømmekraft

18. Aseem Kinra
Supply Chain (logistics) Environmental Complexity

19. Michael Nørager
How to manage SMEs through the transformation from non innovative to innovative?

20. Kristin Wallevik
Corporate Governance in Family Firms: The Norwegian Maritime Sector

21. Bo Hansen Hansen
Beyond the Process: Enriching Software Process Improvement with Knowledge Management

22. Annemette Skot-Hansen
Franske adjektivisk afledte adverbier, der tager præpositionssyntagmer indledt med præpositionen á som argumenter: En valensgrammatisk undersøgelse

23. Line Gry Knudsen
Collaborative R&D Capabilities: In Search of Micro-Foundations
24. Christian Scheuer  
*Employers meet employees*  
*Essays on sorting and globalization*

25. Rasmus Johnsen  
*The Great Health of Melancholy*  
*A Study of the Pathologies of Performativity*

26. Ha Thi Van Pham  
*Internationalization, Competitiveness Enhancement and Export Performance of Emerging Market Firms: Evidence from Vietnam*

27. Henriette Balieu  
*Kontrolbegrebet betydning for kausaltivalternationen i spansk*  
*En kognitiv-typologisk analyse*

2010  
1. Yen Tran  
*Organizing Innovation in Turbulent Fashion Market*  
*Four papers on how fashion firms create and appropriate innovation value*

2. Anders Raastrup Kristensen  
*Metaphysical Labour*  
*Flexibility, Performance and Commitment in Work-Life Management*

3. Margrét Sigrún Sigurdardottir  
*Dependently independent*  
*Co-existence of institutional logics in the recorded music industry*

4. Ásta Dis Óladóttir  
*Internationalization from a small domestic base: An empirical analysis of Economics and Management*

5. Christine Secher  
*E-deltagelse i praksis – politikernes og forvaltnингens medkonstruktion og konsekvenserne heraf*

6. Marianne Stang Våland  
*What we talk about when we talk about space:*

7. Rex Degnegaaard  
*Strategic Change Management*  
*Change Management Challenges in the Danish Police Reform*

8. Ulrik Schultz Brix  
*Værdi i rekruttering – den sikre beslutning*  
*En pragmatisk analyse af perception og synliggørelse af værdi i rekrutterings- og udvælgelsesarbejdet*

9. Jan Ole Similä  
*Kontraktsledelse*  
*Relasjonen mellom virksomhetsledelse og kontraktshåndtering, belyst via fire norske virksomheter*

10. Susanne Boch Waldorff  
*Emerging Organizations: In between local translation, institutional logics and discourse*

11. Brian Kane  
*Performance Talk*  
*Next Generation Management of Organizational Performance*

12. Lars Ohnemus  
*Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and Shareholder Value*  
*An Empirical Reconciliation of two Critical Concepts*

13. Jesper Schlamovitz  
*Håndtering af usikkerhed i film- og byggeprojekter*

14. Tommy Moesby-Jensen  
*Det faktiske livs forbindlighed*  
*Førsokratisk informeret, ny-aristotelisk τήθος-tænkning hos Martin Heidegger*

15. Christian Fich  
*Two Nations Divided by Common Values*  
*French National Habitus and the Rejection of American Power*
16. Peter Beyer  
Processer, sammenhængskraft og fleksibilitet  
Et empirisk casestudie af omstillingsforløb i fire virksomheder

17. Adam Buchhorn  
Markets of Good Intentions  
Constructing and Organizing  
Biogas Markets Amid Fragility and Controversy

18. Cecilie K. Moesby-Jensen  
Social læring og fælles praksis  
Et mixed method studie, der belyser læringseksevanser af et lederkursus for et praksisfællesskab af offentlige mellemledere

19. Heidi Boye  
Fødevarer og sundhed i senmodernismen – En indsigt i hyggefænomenet og de relaterede fødevarerpraksisser

20. Kristine Munkgård Pedersen  
Flygtige forbindelser og midlertidige mobiliseringer  
Om kulturel produktion på Roskilde Festival

21. Oliver Jacob Weber  
Causes of Intercompany Harmony in Business Markets – An Empirical Investigation from a Dyad Perspective

22. Susanne Ekman  
Authority and Autonomy  
Paradoxes of Modern Knowledge Work

23. Anette Frey Larsen  
Kvalitetsledelse på danske hospitaler – Ledelsernes indflydelse på introduktion og vedligeholdelse af kvalitetsstrategier i det danske sundhedsvæsen

24. Toyoko Sato  
Performativity and Discourse: Japanese Advertisements on the Aesthetic Education of Desire

25. Kenneth Brinch Jensen  
Identifying the Last Planner System  
Lean management in the construction industry

26. Javier Busquets  
Orchestrating Network Behavior for Innovation

27. Luke Patey  
The Power of Resistance: India’s National Oil Company and International Activism in Sudan

28. Mette Vedel  
Value Creation in Triadic Business Relationships. Interaction, Interconnection and Position

29. Kristian Tørning  
Knowledge Management Systems in Practice – A Work Place Study

30. Qingxin Shi  
An Empirical Study of Thinking Aloud Usability Testing from a Cultural Perspective

31. Tanja Juul Christiansen  
Corporate blogging: Medarbejderes kommunikative handlekraft

32. Malgorzata Ciesielska  
Hybrid Organisations. A study of the Open Source – business setting

33. Jens Dick-Nielsen  
Three Essays on Corporate Bond Market Liquidity

34. Sabrina Speiermann  
Modstandens Politik  
Kampagnestyring i Velfærdsstaten. En diskussion af trafikkampagners styringspotentiale

35. Julie Uldam  
Fickle Commitment. Fostering political engagement in ‘the flighty world of online activism’
36. Annegrete Juul Nielsen  
*Traveling technologies and transformations in health care*

37. Athur Mühlen-Schulte  
*Organising Development Power and Organisational Reform in the United Nations Development Programme*

38. Louise Rygaard Jonas  
*Branding på butiksgulvet Et case-studie af kultur- og identitetsarbejdet i Kvickly*

2011  
1. Stefan Fraenkel  
*Key Success Factors for Sales Force Readiness during New Product Launch A Study of Product Launches in the Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry*

2. Christian Plesner Rossing  
*International Transfer Pricing in Theory and Practice*

3. Tobias Dam Hede  
*Samtalekunst og ledelsesdisciplin – en analyse af coachingsdiskursens genealogi og governmentality*

4. Kim Pettersson  
*Essays on Audit Quality, Auditor Choice, and Equity Valuation*

5. Henrik Merkelsen  
*The expert-lay controversy in risk research and management. Effects of institutional distances. Studies of risk definitions, perceptions, management and communication*

6. Simon S. Torp  
*Employee Stock Ownership: Effect on Strategic Management and Performance*

7. Mie Harder  
*Internal Antecedents of Management Innovation*

8. Ole Helby Petersen  
*Public-Private Partnerships: Policy and Regulation – With Comparative and Multi-level Case Studies from Denmark and Ireland*

9. Morten Krogh Petersen  
*‘Good’ Outcomes. Handling Multiplicity in Government Communication*

10. Kristian Tangsgaard Hvelplund  
*Allocation of cognitive resources in translation - an eye-tracking and keylogging study*

11. Moshe Yonatany  
*The Internationalization Process of Digital Service Providers*

12. Anne Vestergaard  
*Distance and Suffering Humanitarian Discourse in the age of Mediatization*

13. Thorsten Mikkelsen  
*Personligheds indflydelse på forretningsrelationer*

14. Jane Thostrup Jagd  
*Hvorfor fortsætter fusionsbolgen udover “the tipping point”? – en empirisk analyse af information og kognitioner om fusioner*

15. Gregory Gimpel  
*Value-driven Adoption and Consumption of Technology: Understanding Technology Decision Making*

16. Thomas Stengade Sønderskov  
*Den nye mulighed Social innovation i en forretningsmæssig kontekst*

17. Jeppe Christoffersen  
*Donor supported strategic alliances in developing countries*

18. Vibeke Vad Baunsgaard  
*Dominant Ideological Modes of Rationality: Cross functional*
19. Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson
Governance Failure and Iceland's Financial Collapse

20. Allan Sall Tang Andersen
Essays on the modeling of risks in interest-rate and inflation markets

21. Heidi Tscherning
Mobile Devices in Social Contexts

22. Birgitte Gorm Hansen
Adapting in the Knowledge Economy: Lateral Strategies for Scientists and Those Who Study Them

23. Kristina Vaarst Andersen
Optimal Levels of Embeddedness: The Contingent Value of Networked Collaboration

24. Justine Grønbæk Pors
Noisy Management: A History of Danish School Governing from 1970-2010

25. Stefan Linder
Micro-foundations of Strategic Entrepreneurship: Essays on Autonomous Strategic Action

26. Xin Li
Toward an Integrative Framework of National Competitiveness: An application to China

27. Rune Thorbjørn Clausen
Værdifuld arkitektur: Et eksplorativt studie af bygningers rolle i virksomheders værdiskabelse

28. Monica Viken
Markedsundersøkelser som bevis i varemerke- og markedsføringsrett

29. Christian Wymann
Tattooing: The Economic and Artistic Constitution of a Social Phenomenon

30. Sanne Frandsen
Productive Incoherence: A Case Study of Branding and Identity Struggles in a Low-Prestige Organization

31. Mads Stenbo Nielsen
Essays on Correlation Modelling

32. Ivan Häuser
Følelse og sprog: Etablering af en ekspressiv kategori, eksemplificeret på russisk

33. Sebastian Schwenen
Security of Supply in Electricity Markets

2012
1. Peter Holm Andreasen
The Dynamics of Procurement Management: A Complexity Approach

2. Martin Haulrich
Data-Driven Bitext Dependency Parsing and Alignment

3. Line Kirkegaard
Konsulenten i den anden nat: En undersøgelse af det intense arbejdsliv

4. Tonny Stenheim
Decision usefulness of goodwill under IFRS

5. Morten Lind Larsen
Produktivitet, vækst og velfærd: Industrirådet og efterkrigstidens Danmark 1945 - 1958

6. Petter Berg
Cartel Damages and Cost Asymmetries

7. Lynn Kahle
Experiential Discourse in Marketing: A methodical inquiry into practice and theory

8. Anne Roelsgaard Obling
Management of Emotions in Accelerated Medical Relationships
9. Thomas Frandsen  
*Managing Modularity of Service Processes Architecture*

10. Carina Christine Skovmøller  
*CSR som noget særligt*  
*Et casestudie om styring og meningsskabelse i relation til CSR ud fra en intern optik*

11. Michael Tell  
*Fradragsbeskæring af selskabers finansieringsudgifter*  
*En skatteretlig analyse af SEL §§ 11, 11B og 11C*

12. Morten Holm  
*Customer Profitability Measurement Models*  
*Their Merits and Sophistication across Contexts*

13. Katja Joo Dyppel  
*Beskatning af derivater*  
*En analyse af dansk skatteret*

14. Esben Anton Schultz  
*Essays in Labor Economics*  
*Evidence from Danish Micro Data*

15. Carina Risvig Hansen  
*“Contracts not covered, or not fully covered, by the Public Sector Directive”*

16. Anja Svejgaard Pors  
*Iværksættelse af kommunikation - patientfigurer i hospitalets strategiske kommunikation*

17. Frans Bévort  
*Making sense of management with logics*  
*An ethnographic study of accountants who become managers*

18. René Kallestrup  
*The Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk*

19. Brett Crawford  
*Revisiting the Phenomenon of Interests in Organizational Institutionalism*  
*The Case of U.S. Chambers of Commerce*

20. Mario Daniele Amore  
*Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance*

21. Arne Stjernholm Madsen  
*The evolution of innovation strategy*  
*Studied in the context of medical device activities at the pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk A/S in the period 1980-2008*

22. Jacob Holm Hansen  
*Is Social Integration Necessary for Corporate Branding?*  
*A study of corporate branding strategies at Novo Nordisk*

23. Stuart Webber  
*Corporate Profit Shifting and the Multinational Enterprise*

24. Helene Ratner  
*Promises of Reflexivity*  
*Managing and Researching Inclusive Schools*

25. Therese Strand  
*The Owners and the Power: Insights from Annual General Meetings*

26. Robert Gavin Strand  
*In Praise of Corporate Social Responsibility Bureaucracy*

27. Nina Sormunen  
*Auditor’s going-concern reporting*  
*Reporting decision and content of the report*

28. John Bang Mathiasen  
*Learning within a product development working practice: - an understanding anchored in pragmatism*

29. Philip Holst Riis  
*Understanding Role-Oriented Enterprise Systems: From Vendors to Customers*

30. Marie Lisa Dacanay  
*Social Enterprises and the Poor*  
*Enhancing Social Entrepreneurship and Stakeholder Theory*
31. Fumiko Kano Glückstad  
*Bridging Remote Cultures: Cross-lingual concept mapping based on the information receiver’s prior-knowledge*

32. Henrik Barslund Fosse  
*Empirical Essays in International Trade*

33. Peter Alexander Albrecht  
*Foundational hybridity and its reproduction  
Security sector reform in Sierra Leone*

34. Maja Rosenstock  
*CSR - hvor svært kan det være?  
Kulturanalytisk casestudie om udfordringer og dilemmaer med at forankre Coops CSR-strategi*

35. Jeanette Rasmussen  
*Tweens, medier og forbrug  
Et studie af 10-12 årige danske børns brug af internettet, opfattelse og forståelse af markedsføring og forbrug*

36. Ib Tunby Gulbrandsen  
*‘This page is not intended for a US Audience’  
A five-act spectacle on online communication, collaboration & organization.*

37. Kasper Aalling Teilmann  
*Interactive Approaches to Rural Development*

38. Mette Mogensen  
*The Organization(s) of Well-being and Productivity  
(Re)assembling work in the Danish Post*

39. Søren Friis Møller  
*From Disinterestedness to Engagement Towards Relational Leadership In the Cultural Sector*

40. Nico Peter Berhausen  
*Management Control, Innovation and Strategic Objectives – Interactions and Convergence in Product Development Networks*

41. Balder Onarheim  
*Creativity under Constraints  
Creativity as Balancing ‘Constrainedness’*

42. Haoyong Zhou  
*Essays on Family Firms*

43. Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen  
*Making sense of organisational conflict  
An empirical study of enacted sense-making in everyday conflict at work*

2013

1. Jacob Lyngsie  
*Entrepreneurship in an Organizational Context*

2. Signe Groth-Brodersen  
*Fra ledelse til selv  
En socialpsykologisk analyse af forholdet imellem selvledelse, ledelse og stress i det moderne arbejdsliv*

3. Nis Høyrup Christensen  
*Shaping Markets: A Neoinstitutional Analysis of the Emerging Organizational Field of Renewable Energy in China*

*As a matter of size  
THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL MASS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS*

5. Christine D. Isakson  
*Coworker Influence and Labor Mobility Essays on Turnover, Entrepreneurship and Location Choice in the Danish Maritime Industry*

6. Niels Joseph Jerne Lennon  
*Accounting Qualities in Practice  
Rhizomatic stories of representational faithfulness, decision making and control*

7. Shannon O’Donnell  
*Making Ensemble Possible  
How special groups organize for collaborative creativity in conditions of spatial variability and distance*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Access Decisions in a Partly-Digital World Comparing Digital Piracy and Legal Modes for Film and Music</td>
<td>Robert W. D. Veitch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Making Strategy Work An Organizational Ethnography</td>
<td>Marie Mathiesen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The role of business intelligence in organizational decision-making</td>
<td>Arisa Shollo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The construction of social and environmental reporting</td>
<td>Mia Kaspersen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The organizational design of offshoring</td>
<td>Marcus Møller Larsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>EU Law on Food Naming The prohibition against misleading names in an internal market context</td>
<td>Mette Ohm Rørdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>GIV EN GED! Kan giver-idealtyper forklare støtte til velgørenhed og understøtte relationsopbygning?</td>
<td>Hans Peter Rasmussen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Fonetisk reduktion i dansk</td>
<td>Ruben Schachtenhaufen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dansk CFC-beskatning I et internationalt og komparativt perspektiv</td>
<td>Peter Koerver Schmidt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Strategi i den offentlige sektor En kortlægning af styringsmæssig kontekst, strategisk tilgang, samt anvendte redskaber og teknologier for udvalgte danske statslige styrelser</td>
<td>Morten Froholdt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Cognitive effort in metaphor translation An eye-tracking and key/logging study</td>
<td>Annette Camilla Sjørup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>The Internationalization of Emerging Market Firms: A Context-Specific Study</td>
<td>Tamara Stucchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>“Let’s Go Outside”: The Value of Co-Creation</td>
<td>Thomas Lopdrup-Hjorth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Genre and Autonomy in Cultural Production The case of travel guidebook production</td>
<td>Ana Alačovska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Stemningssindssygdommenes historie i det 19. århundrede Omtydningen af melankolien og manien som bipolære stemningslidelser i dansk sammenhæng under hensyn til dannelsen af det moderne følelseslivs relative autonomi. En problematiserings- og erfarings-analytisk undersøgelse</td>
<td>Marius Gudmand-Høyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Fabricating an S&amp;OP Process Circulating References and Matters of Concern</td>
<td>Lichen Alex Yu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>The Expression of a Need Understanding search</td>
<td>Esben Alfort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Assembling Markets for Wind Power An Inquiry into the Making of Market Devices</td>
<td>Trine Pallesen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Web-Visions Repurposing digital traces to organize social attention</td>
<td>Anders Koed Madsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>BREWING ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS</td>
<td>Lærke Højgaard Christiansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>EGENTLIG SELVLEDELSE En ledelsesfilosofisk afhandling om selvedelsens paradoksale dynamik og eksistentielle engagement</td>
<td>Tommy Kjær Lassen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Morten Rossing</td>
<td>Local Adaption and Meaning Creation in Performance Appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Søren Obed Madsen</td>
<td>Lederen som oversætter: Et oversættelsersteoretisk perspektiv på strategisk arbejde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Thomas Høgenhaven</td>
<td>Open Government Communities: Does Design Affect Participation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Kirstine Zinck Pedersen</td>
<td>FailSafe Organizing?: A Pragmatic Stance on Patient Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Anne Petersen</td>
<td>Hverdagslogikker i psykiatrisk arbejde: En institutionsetnografsk undersøgelse af hverdagen i psykiatriske organisationer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Didde Maria Humle</td>
<td>Fortællinger om arbejde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Mark Holst-Mikkelsen</td>
<td>Strategiesekvering i praksis – barrierer og muligheder!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Malek Maalouf</td>
<td>Sustaining lean: Strategies for dealing with organizational paradoxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Nicolaj Tofte Brenneche</td>
<td>Systemic Innovation In The Making: The Social Productivity of Cartographic Crisis and Transitions in the Case of SEEIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Morten Gylling</td>
<td>The Structure of Discourse: A Corpus-Based Cross-Linguistic Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Binzhang YANG</td>
<td>Urban Green Spaces for Quality Life - Case Study: the landscape architecture for people in Copenhagen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Michael Friis Pedersen</td>
<td>Finance and Organization: The Implications for Whole Farm Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>Even Fallan</td>
<td>Issues on supply and demand for environmental accounting information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Ather Nawaz</td>
<td>Website user experience: A cross-cultural study of the relation between users’ cognitive style, context of use, and information architecture of local websites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Karin Beukel</td>
<td>The Determinants for Creating Valuable Inventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Arjan Markus</td>
<td>External Knowledge Sourcing and Firm Innovation: Essays on the Micro-Foundations of Firms’ Search for Innovation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2014

| 1. | Solon Moreira | Four Essays on Technology Licensing and Firm Innovation |
| 2. | Karin Strzeletz Ivertsen | Partnership Drift in Innovation Processes: A study of the Think City electric car development |
| 4. | Jane Bjørn Vedel | Managing Strategic Research: An empirical analysis of science-industry collaboration in a pharmaceutical company |
| 5. | Martin Gylling | Processuel strategi i organisationer: Monografi om dobbelttheden i tænkning af strategi, dels som vidensfelt i organisationstheori, dels som kunstnerisk tilgang til at skabe i erhvervsmæssig innovation |
6. Linne Marie Lauesen  
**Corporate Social Responsibility in the Water Sector: How Material Practices and their Symbolic and Physical Meanings Form a Colonising Logic**

7. Maggie Qiuzhu Mei  
**LEARNING TO INNOVATE: The role of ambidexterity, standard, and decision process**

8. Inger Høedt-Rasmussen  
**Developing Identity for Lawyers Towards Sustainable Lawyering**

9. Sebastian Fux  
**Essays on Return Predictability and Term Structure Modelling**

10. Thorbjørn N. M. Lund-Poulsen  
**Essays on Value Based Management**

11. Oana Brindusa Albu  
**Transparency in Organizing: A Performative Approach**

12. Lena Olaison  
**Entrepreneurship at the limits**

13. Hanne Sørum  
**DRESSED FOR WEB SUCCESS? An Empirical Study of Website Quality in the Public Sector**

14. Lasse Folke Henriksen  
**Knowing networks How experts shape transnational governance**

15. Maria Halbinger  
**Entrepreneurial Individuals Empirical Investigations into Entrepreneurial Activities of Hackers and Makers**

16. Robert Spliid  
**Kapitalfondenes metoder og kompetencer**

17. Christiane Stelling  
**Public-private partnerships & the need, development and management of trusting A processual and embedded exploration**

18. Marta Gasparin  
**Management of design as a translation process**

19. Kåre Moberg  
**Assessing the Impact of Entrepreneurship Education From ABC to PhD**

20. Alexander Cole  
**Distant neighbors Collective learning beyond the cluster**

21. Martin Møller Boje Rasmussen  
**Is Competitiveness a Question of Being Alike? How the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark Came to Compete through their Knowledge Regimes from 1993 to 2007**

22. Anders Ravn Sørensen  
**Studies in central bank legitimacy, currency and national identity Four cases from Danish monetary history**

23. Nina Bellak  
**Can Language be Managed in International Business? Insights into Language Choice from a Case Study of Danish and Austrian Multinational Corporations (MNCs)**

24. Rikke Kristine Nielsen  
**Global Mindset as Managerial Meta-competence and Organizational Capability: Boundary-crossing Leadership Cooperation in the MNC The Case of ‘Group Mindset’ in Solar A/S.**

25. Rasmus Koss Hartmann  
**User Innovation inside government Towards a critically performative foundation for inquiry**
26. Kristian Gylling Olesen  
Flertydig og emergerende ledelse i folkeskolen  
Et aktør-netværksteoretisk ledelses-studie af politiske evalueringsreformers betydning for ledelse i den danske folkeskole  
36. Nicky Nedergaard  
Brand-Based Innovation  
Relational Perspectives on Brand Logics and Design Innovation Strategies and Implementation  
37. Mads Gjedsted Nielsen  
Essays in Real Estate Finance  
27. Troels Riis Larsen  
Kampen om Danmarks omdømme 1945-2010  
Omdømmebejde og omdømmeopfattelse  
38. Kristin Martina Brandl  
Process Perspectives on Service Offshoring  
28. Klaus Majgaard  
Jagten på autenticitet i offentlig styring  
39. Mia Rosa Koss Hartmann  
In the gray zone  
With police in making space for creativity  
29. Ming Hua Li  
Institutional Transition and Organizational Diversity: Differentiated internationalization strategies of emerging market state-owned enterprises  
40. Karen Ingerslev  
Healthcare Innovation under The Microscope  
Framing Boundaries of Wicked Problems  
30. Sofie Blinkenberg Federspiel  
IT, organisation og digitalisering: Institutionelt arbejde i den kommunale digitaliseringsproces  
41. Tim Neerup Themsen  
Risk Management in large Danish public capital investment programmes  
31. Elvi Weinreich  
Hvilke offentlige ledere er der brug for når velfærdstænkningen flytter sig – er Diplomuddannelsens lederprofil svaret?  
2015 1. Jakob Ion Wille  
Film som design  
Design af levende billeder i film og tv-serier  
32. Ellen Mølgaard Korsager  
Self-conception and image of context in the growth of the firm – A Penrosian History of Fiberline Composites  
2. Christiane Mossin  
Interzones of Law and Metaphysics Hierarchies, Logics and Foundations of Social Order seen through the Prism of EU Social Rights  
33. Else Skjold  
The Daily Selection  
3. Thomas Tøth  
TRUSTWORTHINESS: ENABLING GLOBAL COLLABORATION An Ethnographic Study of Trust, Distance, Control, Culture and Boundary Spanning within Offshore Outsourcing of IT Services  
34. Marie Louise Conradsen  
The Cancer Centre That Never Was The Organisation of Danish Cancer Research 1949-1992  
4. Steven Højlund  
Evaluation Use in Evaluation Systems – The Case of the European Commission  
35. Virgilio Failla  
Three Essays on the Dynamics of Entrepreneurs in the Labor Market
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AMBIGUOUS WINDS OF CHANGE – OR FIGHTING AGAINST WINDMILLS IN CHINESE WIND POWER</td>
<td>Julia Kirch Kirkegaard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A MULTI-CASE ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING SYSTEMS (ERP) BUSINESS PRACTICES</td>
<td>Michelle Carol Antero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sustainability-Focused Identity: Identity work performed to manage, negotiate and resolve barriers and tensions that arise in the process of constructing or organizational identity in a sustainability context</td>
<td>Mathew Abraham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Organizing Science in Society – the conduct and justification of responsible research</td>
<td>Cecilie Glerup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Implementering af ITIL® IT-governance - når best practice konflikter med kulturen Losning af implementerings-problemer gennem anvendelse af kendte CSF i et aktionsforskningsforløb.</td>
<td>Allan Salling Pedersen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>A REAL OPTIONS APPROACH TO DETERMINING POWER PRICES</td>
<td>Nihat Misir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>MEASURING AND PRICING THE RISK OF CORPORATE FAILURES</td>
<td>Mamdouh Medhat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Toward a Digital Strategy for Omnichannel Retailing</td>
<td>Rina Hansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>In the rhythm of welfare creation</td>
<td>Eva Pallesen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>In Search of Opportunities: Three Essays on Global Linkages for Innovation</td>
<td>Gouya Harirchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Embedded Diversity: A critical ethnographic study of the structural tensions of organizing diversity</td>
<td>Lotte Holck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Learning through Scenario Planning</td>
<td>Jose Daniel Balarezo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Knowledge dissemination based on terminological ontologies. Using eye tracking to further user interface design.</td>
<td>Louise Pram Nielsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY TRANSFORMATION</td>
<td>Sofie Dam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>An embedded, comparative case study of municipal waste management in England and Denmark</td>
<td>Ulrik Hartmyer Christiansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>FOLLOWING THE CONTENT OF REPORTED RISK ACROSS THE ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>Guro Refsum Sanden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Language strategies in multinational corporations. A cross-sector study of financial service companies and manufacturing companies.</td>
<td>Louise Pram Nielsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Designing performance management for operational level - A closer look on the role of design choices in framing coordination and motivation</td>
<td>Linn Gevoll</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23. Frederik Larsen  
*Objects and Social Actions – on Second-hand Valuation Practices*

24. Thorhildur Hansdottir Jetzek  
*The Sustainable Value of Open Government Data Uncovering the Generative Mechanisms of Open Data through a Mixed Methods Approach*

25. Gustav Toppenberg  
*Innovation-based M&A – Technological-Integration Challenges – The Case of Digital-Technology Companies*

26. Mie Plotnikof  
*Challenges of Collaborative Governance An Organizational Discourse Study of Public Managers’ Struggles with Collaboration across the Daycare Area*

27. Christian Garmann Johnsen  
*Who Are the Post-Bureaucrats? A Philosophical Examination of the Creative Manager, the Authentic Leader and the Entrepreneur*

28. Jacob Brogaard-Kay  
*Constituting Performance Management A field study of a pharmaceutical company*

29. Rasmus Ploug Jenle  
*Engineering Markets for Control: Integrating Wind Power into the Danish Electricity System*

30. Morten Lindholst  
*Complex Business Negotiation: Understanding Preparation and Planning*

31. Morten Grynings  
*TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY FROM AN ALIGNMENT PERSPECTIVE*

32. Peter Andreas Norn  
*Byregimer og styringsevne: Politisk lederskab af store byudviklingsprojekter*

33. Milan Miric  
*Essays on Competition, Innovation and Firm Strategy in Digital Markets*

34. Sanne K. Hjordrup  
*The Value of Talent Management Rethinking practice, problems and possibilities*

35. Johanna Sax  
*Strategic Risk Management – Analyzing Antecedents and Contingencies for Value Creation*

36. Pernille Rydén  
*Strategic Cognition of Social Media*

37. Mimmi Sjöklint  
*The Measurable Me - The Influence of Self-tracking on the User Experience*

38. Juan Ignacio Staricco  
*Towards a Fair Global Economic Regime? A critical assessment of Fair Trade through the examination of the Argentinean wine industry*

39. Marie Henriette Madsen  
*Emerging and temporary connections in Quality work*

40. Yangfeng CAO  
*Toward a Process Framework of Business Model Innovation in the Global Context Entrepreneurship-Enabled Dynamic Capability of Medium-Sized Multinational Enterprises*

41. Carsten Scheibye  
*Enactment of the Organizational Cost Structure in Value Chain Configuration A Contribution to Strategic Cost Management*
1. Signe Sofi Dyrby  
*Enterprise Social Media at Work*

2. Dorte Boesby Dahl  
*The making of the public parking attendant: Dirt, aesthetics and inclusion in public service work*

3. Verena Girschik  
*Realizing Corporate Responsibility: Positioning and Framing in Nascent Institutional Change*

4. Anders Ørding Olsen  
*IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS: Inertia, Knowledge Sources and Diversity in Collaborative Problem-solving*

5. Pernille Steen Pedersen  
*Udkast til et nyt copingbegreb: En kvalifikation af ledelsesmuligheder for at forebygge sygefravær ved psykiske problemer.*

6. Kerli Kant Hvass  
*Weaving a Path from Waste to Value: Exploring fashion industry business models and the circular economy*

7. Kasper Lindskow  
*Exploring Digital News Publishing Business Models – a production network approach*

8. Mikkel Mouritz Marfelt  
*The chameleon workforce: Assembling and negotiating the content of a workforce*

9. Marianne Bertelsen  
*Aesthetic encounters: Rethinking autonomy, space & time in today’s world of art*

10. Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen  
*EU PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION*

11. Abid Hussain  
*On the Design, Development and Use of the Social Data Analytics Tool (SODATO): Design Propositions, Patterns, and Principles for Big Social Data Analytics*

12. Mark Bruun  
*Essays on Earnings Predictability*

13. Tor Bøe-Lillegraven  
*BUSINESS PARADOXES, BLACK BOXES, AND BIG DATA: BEYOND ORGANIZATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY*

14. Hadis Khonsary-Atighi  
*ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN AN OIL-BASED ECONOMY: THE CASE OF IRAN (1965-2010)*

15. Maj Lervad Grasten  
*Rule of Law or Rule by Lawyers? On the Politics of Translation in Global Governance*

16. Lene Granzau Juel-Jacobsen  
*SUPERMARKEDETS MODUS OPERANDI – en hverdags sociologisk undersøgelse af forholdet mellem rum og handlen og understøtte relationsopbygning?*

17. Christine Thalsgård Henriques  
*In search of entrepreneurial learning – Towards a relational perspective on incubating practices?*

18. Patrick Bennett  
*Essays in Education, Crime, and Job Displacement*

19. Søren Korsgaard  
*Payments and Central Bank Policy*

20. Marie Kruse Skibsted  
*Empirical Essays in Economics of Education and Labor*

21. Elizabeth Benedict Christensen  
*The Constantly Contingent Sense of Belonging of the 1.5 Generation Undocumented Youth An Everyday Perspective*
22. Lasse J. Jessen
   *Essays on Discounting Behavior and Gambling Behavior*

23. Kalle Johannes Rose
   *Når stifterviljen dør… Et retsøkonomisk bidrag til 200 års juridisk konflikt om ejendomsretten*

24. Andreas Søeborg Kirkedal
   *Danish Stød and Automatic Speech Recognition*

25. Ida Lunde Jørgensen
   *Institutions and Legitimations in Finance for the Arts*

26. Olga Rykov Ibsen
   *An empirical cross-linguistic study of directives: A semiotic approach to the sentence forms chosen by British, Danish and Russian speakers in native and ELF contexts*

27. Desi Volker
   *Understanding Interest Rate Volatility*

28. Angeli Elizabeth Weller
   *Practice at the Boundaries of Business Ethics & Corporate Social Responsibility*

29. Ida Danneskiold-Samsøe
   *Levende læring i kunstneriske organisationer En undersøgelse af læringsprocesser mellem projekt og organisation på Aarhus Teater*

30. Leif Christensen
   *Quality of information – The role of internal controls and materiality*

31. Olga Zarzecka
   *Tie Content in Professional Networks*

32. Henrik Mahncke
   *De store gaver - Filantropiens gensidighedsrelationer i teori og praksis*

33. Carsten Lund Pedersen
   *Using the Collective Wisdom of Frontline Employees in Strategic Issue Management*

34. Yun Liu
   *Essays on Market Design*

35. Denitsa Hazarbassanova Blagoeva
   *The Internationalisation of Service Firms*

36. Manya Jaura Lind
   *Capability development in an off-shoring context: How, why and by whom*

37. Luis R. Boscán F.
   *Essays on the Design of Contracts and Markets for Power System Flexibility*

38. Andreas Philipp Distel
   *Capabilities for Strategic Adaptation: Micro-Foundations, Organizational Conditions, and Performance Implications*

39. Lavinia Bleoca
   *The Usefulness of Innovation and Intellectual Capital in Business Performance: The Financial Effects of Knowledge Management vs. Disclosure*

40. Henrik Jensen
   *Economic Organization and Imperfect Managerial Knowledge: A Study of the Role of Managerial Meta-Knowledge in the Management of Distributed Knowledge*

41. Stine Mosekjær
   *The Understanding of English Emotion Words by Chinese and Japanese Speakers of English as a Lingua Franca An Empirical Study*

42. Hallur Tor Sigurdarson
   *The Ministry of Desire - Anxiety and entrepreneurship in a bureaucracy*

43. Kätlin Pulk
   *Making Time While Being in Time A study of the temporality of organizational processes*

44. Valeria Giacomin
   *Contextualizing the cluster Palm oil in Southeast Asia in global perspective (1880s–1970s)*
45. Jeanette Willert
Managers’ use of multiple Management Control Systems: The role and interplay of management control systems and company performance

46. Mads Vestergaard Jensen
Financial Frictions: Implications for Early Option Exercise and Realized Volatility

47. Mikael Reimer Jensen
Interbank Markets and Frictions

48. Benjamin Faigen
Essays on Employee Ownership

49. Adela Michea

50. Iben Sandal Stjerne
Transcending organization in temporary systems Aesthetics’ organizing work and employment in Creative Industries

51. Simon Krogh
Anticipating Organizational Change

52. Sarah Netter
Exploring the Sharing Economy

53. Lene Tolstrup Christensen

54. Kyoung(Kay) Sun Park
Three Essays on Financial Economics

2017

1. Mari Bjerck
Apparel at work. Work uniforms and women in male-dominated manual occupations.

2. Christoph H. Flöthmann
Who Manages Our Supply Chains? Backgrounds, Competencies and Contributions of Human Resources in Supply Chain Management

3. Aleksandra Anna Rzeźnik
Essays in Empirical Asset Pricing

4. Claes Bäckman
Essays on Housing Markets

5. Kirsti Reitan Andersen
Stabilizing Sustainability in the Textile and Fashion Industry

6. Kira Hoffmann
Cost Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Determinants and Consequences of Asymmetries

7. Tobin Hanspal
Essays in Household Finance

8. Nina Lange
Correlation in Energy Markets

9. Anjum Fayyaz
Donor Interventions and SME Networking in Industrial Clusters in Punjab Province, Pakistan

10. Magnus Paulsen Hansen
Trying the unemployed. Justification and critique, emancipation and coercion towards the ‘active society’. A study of contemporary reforms in France and Denmark

11. Sameer Azizi
Corporate Social Responsibility in Afghanistan – a critical case study of the mobile telecommunications industry
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|12.| Malene Myhre  
The internationalization of small and medium-sized enterprises: A qualitative study|
|13.| Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen  
The Significance of Normativity – Studies in Post-Kantian Philosophy and Social Theory|
|14.| Federico Clementi  
Essays on multinational production and international trade|
|15.| Lara Anne Hale  
Experimental Standards in Sustainability Transitions: Insights from the Building Sector|
|16.| Richard Pucci  
Accounting for Financial Instruments in an Uncertain World  
Controversies in IFRS in the Aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis|
|17.| Sarah Maria Denta  
Kommunale offentlige private partnerskaber  
Regulering I skyggen af Farumsagen|
|18.| Christian Östlund  
Design for e-training|
|19.| Amalie Martinus Hauge  
Organizing Valuations – a pragmatic inquiry|
|20.| Tim Holst Celik  
Tension-filled Governance? Exploring the Emergence, Consolidation and Reconfiguration of Legitimatory and Fiscal State-crafting|
|21.| Christian Bason  
Leading Public Design: How managers engage with design to transform public governance|
|22.| Davide Tomio  
Essays on Arbitrage and Market Liquidity|
|23.| Simone Stæhr  
Financial Analysts’ Forecasts  
Behavioral Aspects and the Impact of Personal Characteristics|
|24.| Mikkel Godt Gregersen  
Management Control, Intrinsic Motivation and Creativity  
– How Can They Coexist|
|25.| Kristian Johannes Suse Jespersen  
Advancing the Payments for Ecosystem Service Discourse Through Institutional Theory|
|26.| Kristian Bondo Hansen  
Crowds and Speculation: A study of crowd phenomena in the U.S. financial markets 1890 to 1940|
|27.| Lars Balslev  
Actors and practices – An institutional study on management accounting change in Air Greenland|
|28.| Sven Klingler  
Essays on Asset Pricing with Financial Frictions|
|29.| Klement Ahrensbach Rasmussen  
Business Model Innovation  
The Role of Organizational Design|
|30.| Giulio Zichella  
Entrepreneurial Cognition. Three essays on entrepreneurial behavior and cognition under risk and uncertainty|
|31.| Richard Ledborg Hansen  
En forkærlighed til det eksisterende – mellemlederens oplevelse af forandringsmodstand i organisatoriske forandringer|
|32.| Vilhelm Stefan Holsting  
Militært chefvirke: Kritik og retfærdiggørelse mellem politik og profession|
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>33. Thomas Jensen</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shipping Information Pipeline:</td>
<td>Vishv Priya Kohli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An information infrastructure to</td>
<td>Combatting Falsification and Counterfeiting of Medicinal Products in the European Union – A Legal Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improve international containerized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shipping</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Helle Haurum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Customer Engagement Behavior in the context of Continuous Service Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Dzmitry Bartalevich</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do economic theories inform policy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the influence of the Chicago School on European Union competition policy</td>
<td>Nis Grünberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Party-state order: Essays on China’s political organization and political economic institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Kristian Roed Nielsen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowdfunding for Sustainability: A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>study on the potential of reward-based crowdfunding in supporting sustainable entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Jesper Christensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Behavioral Theory of Human Capital Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Emil Husted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is always an alternative: A study of control and commitment in political organization</td>
<td>Poula Marie Helth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Learning in practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Anders Ludvig Sevelsted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreting Bonds and Boundaries of Obligation. A genealogy of the emergence and development of Protestant voluntary social work in Denmark as shown through the cases of the Copenhagen Home Mission and the Blue Cross (1850 – 1950)</td>
<td>Rasmus Vendler Toft-Kehler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entrepreneurship as a career? An investigation of the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and entrepreneurial outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Niklas Kohl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essays on Stock Issuance</td>
<td>Szymon Furtak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sensing the Future: Designing sensor-based predictive information systems for forecasting spare part demand for diesel engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Maya Christiane Flensborg Jensen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUNDARIES OF PROFESSIONALIZATION AT WORK</td>
<td>Mette Brehm Johansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An ethnography-inspired study of care workers’ dilemmas at the margin</td>
<td>Organizing patient involvement. An ethnographic study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Andreas Kamstrup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowdsourcing and the Architectural Competition as Organisational Technologies</td>
<td>Iwona Sulinska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complexities of Social Capital in Boards of Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Louise Lyngfeldt Gorm Hansen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triggering Earthquakes in Science, Politics and Chinese Hydropower - A Controversy Study</td>
<td>Cecilie Fanøe Petersen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Award of public contracts as a means to conferring State aid: A legal analysis of the interface between public procurement law and State aid law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Poula Marie Helth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning in practice</td>
<td>Ahmad Ahmad Barirani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three Experimental Studies on Entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. Carsten Allerslev Olsen  
Financial Reporting Enforcement: Impact and Consequences

13. Irene Christensen  
New product fumbles – Organizing for the Ramp-up process

14. Jacob Taarup-Esbensen  
Managing communities – Mining MNEs’ community risk management practices

15. Lester Allan Lasrado  
Set-Theoretic approach to maturity models

16. Mia B. Münster  
Intention vs. Perception of Designed Atmospheres in Fashion Stores

17. Anne Sluhan  
Non-Financial Dimensions of Family Firm Ownership: How Socioemotional Wealth and Familiness Influence Internationalization

18. Henrik Yde Andersen  
Essays on Debt and Pensions

19. Fabian Heinrich Müller  
Valuation Reversed – When Valuators are Valuated. An Analysis of the Perception of and Reaction to Reviewers in Fine-Dining

20. Martin Jarmatz  
Organizing for Pricing

21. Niels Joachim Christfort Gormsen  
Essays on Empirical Asset Pricing

22. Diego Zunino  
Socio-Cognitive Perspectives in Business Venturing

23. Benjamin Asmussen  
Networks and Faces between Copenhagen and Canton, 1730-1840

24. Dalia Bagdziunaite  
Brains at Brand Touchpoints A Consumer Neuroscience Study of Information Processing of Brand Advertisements and the Store Environment in Compulsive Buying

25. Erol Kazan  
Towards a Disruptive Digital Platform Model

26. Andreas Bang Nielsen  
Essays on Foreign Exchange and Credit Risk

27. Anne Krebs  
Accountable, Operable Knowledge Toward Value Representations of Individual Knowledge in Accounting

28. Matilde Fogh Kirkegaard  
A firm- and demand-side perspective on behavioral strategy for value creation: Insights from the hearing aid industry

29. Agnieszka Nowinska  
SHIPS AND RELATION-SHIPS Tie formation in the sector of shipping intermediaries in shipping

30. Stine Evald Bentsen  

31. Stine Louise Daetz  
Essays on Financial Frictions in Lending Markets

32. Christian Skov Jensen  
Essays on Asset Pricing

33. Anders Kryger  
Aligning future employee action and corporate strategy in a resource-scarce environment
34. Maitane Elorriaga-Rubio  
*The behavioral foundations of strategic decision-making: A contextual perspective*

35. Roddy Walker  
*Leadership Development as Organisational Rehabilitation: Shaping Middle-Managers as Double Agents*

36. Jinsun Bae  
*Producing Garments for Global Markets Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Myanmar’s export garment industry 2011–2015*

37. Queralt Prat-i-Pubill  
*Axiological knowledge in a knowledge driven world. Considerations for organizations.*

38. Pia Mølgaard  
*Essays on Corporate Loans and Credit Risk*

39. Marzia Aricò  
*Service Design as a Transformative Force: Introduction and Adoption in an Organizational Context*

40. Christian Dyrlund Wåhlin-Jacobsen  
*Constructing change initiatives in workplace voice activities Studies from a social interaction perspective*

41. Peter Kalum Schou  
*Institutional Logics in Entrepreneurial Ventures: How Competing Logics arise and shape organizational processes and outcomes during scale-up*

42. Per Henriksen  
*Enterprise Risk Management Rationaler og paradokser i en moderne ledelsesteknologi*

43. Maximilian Schellmann  
*The Politics of Organizing Refugee Camps*

44. Jacob Halvas Bjerre  
*Excluding the Jews: The Aryanization of Danish-German Trade and German Anti-Jewish Policy in Denmark 1937-1943*
**TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN**

**1992**
1. Niels Kornum
   *Servicesamkørsel – organisation, økonomi og planlægningsmetode*

**1995**
2. Verner Worm
   *Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
   Kulturspecifikke interaktionsrelationer ved nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i Kina*

**1999**
3. Mogens Bjerre
   *Key Account Management of Complex Strategic Relationships
   An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving Consumer Goods Industry*

**2000**
4. Lotte Darsø
   *Innovation in the Making
   Interaction Research with heterogeneous Groups of Knowledge Workers creating new Knowledge and new Leads*

5. Peter Hobolt Jensen
   *Managing Strategic Design Identities
   The case of the Lego Developer Network*

**2001**
6. Peter Lohmann
   *The Deleuzian Other of Organizational Change – Moving Perspectives of the Human*

7. Anne Marie Jess Hansen
   *To lead from a distance: The dynamic interplay between strategy and strategizing – A case study of the strategic management process*

8. Lotte Henriksen
   *Videndeling – om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæssige udfordringer ved videndeling i praksis*

9. Niels Christian Nickelsen
   *Arrangements of Knowing: Coordinating Procedures Tools and Bodies in Industrial Production – a case study of the collective making of new products*

**2003**
10. Carsten Ørts Hansen
    *Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og effektivitet*

**TITLER I DBA PH.D.-SERIEN**

**2007**
1. Peter Kastrup-Misir
   *Endeavoring to Understand Market Orientation – and the concomitant co-mutation of the researched, the researcher, the research itself and the truth*

**2009**
1. Torkild Leo Thellefsen
   *Fundamental Signs and Significance effects
   A Semeiotic outline of Fundamental Signs, Significance-effects, Knowledge Profiling and their use in Knowledge Organization and Branding*

2. Daniel Ronzani
   *When Bits Learn to Walk Don’t Make Them Trip. Technological Innovation and the Role of Regulation by Law in Information Systems Research: the Case of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)*

**2010**
1. Alexander Carnera
   *Magten over livet og livet som magt
   Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens*