Browsing Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions (LEFIC) by Title
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Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Does wrongful conviction lower deterrence and can this explain society’s aversion to sanctioning the innocent? This paper argues that for some of the most important categories of crime such as murder, assault or robbery, the answer to both questions is no. For these categories of crime, a potential offender need not fear wrongful conviction for any particular criminal act he or she chooses not to commit. For example, if a potential offender decides not to murder another person, he or she should not fear being wrongfully convicted of it, since the person will not be dead, and there will therefore be no investigation and no trial. He of she may risk being wrongfully convicted of another crime, but that risk exists independently of his or her own actions. It may be argued that wrongful conviction lowers deterrence in more indirect ways. First, the possibility of being sanctioned for a crime one does not commit may lower the threat of being sanctioned for a crime one commits, if two sanctions are not twice as threatening as one. Second, if wrongful conviction halts further investigations that may lead to the true offender, and third, if a potential offender thinks that if he or she does not take advantage of a crime opportunity, he or she may be wrongly convicted in the event that some other person grasps the same opportunity. However, it will be argued that wrongful conviction may also increase deterrence, and the three indirect effects are in any event unlikely to be quantitatively important in the real world. An implication of the present analysis is that society’s aversion to sanctioning the innocent cannot be rationalized by or reduced to a concern for deterrence. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6803 Files in this item: 1
wplefic092004rev2.pdf (163.7Kb) -
Riis, Thomas (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Evidence from Market and Accounting DataGoldberg, Lawrence G.; Sweeney, Richard J.; Wihlborg, Clas G. (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper discusses results and difficulties of comparing banks' performance based on publicly available data for the case of Nordea, a pan-Nordic bank created through mergers of important national banks. The objective of the performance comparison is to determine whether Nordea's unique strategy of functional intergation across four countries can be advantageous. For stock-market data, however, Nordea does not have stable betas on risk factors, as illustrated by market betas, and thus the comparables method must be used with great care. The Nordea holding company performed about as well as the comparables, both in terms of stock-market and accounting data. Nordea banks in individual countries outperformed comparable holding companies; by arithmetic, Nordea non-bank operations are not as profitable as its bank operations. In event studies, the market views Nordea's acquisitions as adding value. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6812 Files in this item: 1
wplefic052005.pdf (339.2Kb) -
Some Lessons from United States Constitutional HistorySweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: A constitution is more likely to be accepted if it federalizes those issues that are widely seen as needing complete harmonization. A constitution is more likely to endure if the federal government does not have powers that are not vital to it but which may alienate some member states to the point that the federal government loses legitimacy. It appears vital to have trade policy at the European Union level; for euro countries, monetary policy is already federalized. It is not clear that common foreign and defense policies are needed; insisting on common foreign and defense policies may lead to conflicts within and across member states that severely weaken the Union, conceivably contributing to eventual collapse. Insisting on harmonization of commercial codes does not have the destructive potential of attempting completely to harmonize defense and foreign policies; it may, however, lead to needless conflict that helps drain the reservoir of goodwill that the European Union will need for dealing with other conflicts amongst member states. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6787 Files in this item: 1
wplefic092003.pdf (442.7Kb) -
Lessons from the UKMallin, Chris; Mullineux, Andy; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In 1992 the Cadbury Committee report on the financial aspects of corporate governance was published. The Committee had been established following the failures of a number of high profile businesses in the UK which had shaken confidence in the market. Some nine years later, in 2001, the collapse of Enron sent shockwaves through the US market. As a result of the Enron collapse and various other high profile scandals in the years since its occurrence, the US is examining its own corporate governance structures and provisions to determine how these might be improved and help avoid another Enron. The EU similarly is developing principles and legislation to improve corporate governance, and scandals such as Royal Ahold and Parmalat have helped drive further governance reforms. In this paper we detail the development of corporate governance codes in the UK and the adaptation of similar codes in the EU. We discuss the role of the financial sector in corporate governance and how principles for regulation and supervision of the financial sector complement codes of conduct and legislation in the area of corporate governance. JEL Classification numbers: G34, G28, G22, G23 Keywords: corporate governance, financial sector; institutional investors. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6789 Files in this item: 1
wplefic062004.pdf (171.8Kb) -
Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
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Abstract: Artiklen indeholder en diskussion af Værdipapirhandelslovens forbud mod insider handel. Der redegøres for tesen om effektive markeder. Med udgangspunkt i økonomisk teori redegøres for argumenter for et forbud. Der argumenteres for at, at insiderforbudets økonomiske berettigelsen med fordel kan støttes på tesen om effektive markeder. Det er i modsætning hertil blevet gjort gældende i den nyeste børsretlige teori, at den økonomiske teori om effektive markeder ikke er et adækvat grundlag for insider reglerne, og at denne teori bør erstattes af den såkaldte Lemon-teori, formuleret af Akerlof. Artiklen gør gældende, at det ikke er uden problemer at overføre Akerlof’s teori til de finansielle markeder, eftersom der ikke tages hensyn til markedets selvregulerende mekanismer, som mindsker problemet med asymmetrisk information. Artiklen afsluttes med en diskussion af de reguleringsmæssige konsekvenser som følge af valg af det økonomiske grundlag for insiderforbudet. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6793 Files in this item: 1
wplefic152003.pdf (426.7Kb) -
New Challenges and Opportunities for RegulatorsGoldberg, Lawrence G.; Sweeney, Richard J.; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Nordea is the first major international bank planning to operate important host country activities in branches as the Second European banking directive envisions rather than as subsidiaries. Nordea is the result of mergers of roughly equal-size universal banks in four Nordic countries with the intention to reap economies of scale and scope by providing services in an integrated organization. Nordea has so far operated under a legal structure with subsidiaries in the host countries. When the new branch organization is implemented, EU directives specify that the home country is responsible for supervision, regulation as well as deposit insurance. Supervisors in all involved countries are challenged by this prospect and they are negotiating to obtain an acceptable division of responsibilities. We argue that the Nordea case offers an opportunity to implement the EU's vision and to develop institutional foundations for substantial market discipline in banking. In particular, distress resolution and insolvency procedures for banks must be made rule based and credible for host country authorities to accept home country control. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6783 Files in this item: 1
wplefic042005.pdf (209.7Kb) -
Fosfuri, Andrea; Røende, Thomas (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract We analyze firms’ incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is shown that firms’ incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following three conditions are met: 1) technological progress is rapid; 2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; 3) the probability of a single firm to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. We show that some trade secret protection is always beneficial for firms’ profits and stimulates clustering. Excessive protection may impede technology spillovers and reduce firms’ incentives to cluster. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L1, O32, O34. Keywords: Cumulative innovation, industrial districts, intellectual property rights, technology spillovers. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6784 Files in this item: 1
wplefic132002.pdf (365.3Kb) -
validating new indicators by understanding patenting strategiesReitzig, Markus (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Davis, Lee (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Franke, Guenter; Peterson, Sandra; Stapleton, Richard C. (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Investors choosing a portfolio strategy, in order to secure a pension at a future date for example, are faced with many uncertainties. One major uncertainty is the amount by which their pension fund will be supplemented by personal savings from a variety of sources such as life insurance contracts, bequests, or property sales. Over long periods of time these uncertainties are likely to be large and difficult to hedge, and hence may have a significant effect on the dynamic portfolio strategy. Drawing on the results of previous literature on the reaction of investors to non-unhedgeable background risk, and on the theory of stochastic dynamic programming, this article derives optimal strategies for investors maximising the expected utility of terminal wealth, where this wealth consists of the value of a pension fund plus accumulated personal savings. Numerical results, assuming that the market portfolio and the expectation of personal savings follow (possibly) correlated geometric Brownian motions, are derived to illustrate the effects of the size and uncertainty of the personal savings, as well as the effect of the resolution of the uncertainty in them over time. The computation uses a new technique for implementing the stochastic dynamic programming. This involves a binomial approximation, in two dimensions, which ensures that the computations are feasible for relatively long-term problems. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6795 Files in this item: 1
wplefic192003.pdf (540.9Kb) -
la Cour, Lisbeth; Møllgaard, Peter (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This article compares a set of often used simple contracts or mechanisms in terms of how well they allocate decision rights between two agents over time. A basic assumption is that agents incur a fixed cost each time they renegotiate. The contracts or mechanisms studied are: individual ownership and authority, the first-come first-serve rule, the alternating rule and the sign-up rule. One trade-off that arises is the following: when usage of the asset is flexible in the sense that it does not matter in which period it occurs, agents may rely on obtaining the asset through arriving first at some point, while when an agent needs to time and plan the use of the asset, he or she may wish to hold stronger rights or to use the sign-up rule as a simple form of contracting. (JEL:D10, D23, L22); Keywords: Incomplete contracts, individual ownership,first-come first-serve rule, costly renegotiation. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6815 Files in this item: 1
wplefic012004.pdf (658.9Kb) -
Lando, Henrik; Rose, Caspar (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract: Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party, and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries) chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions has been abandoned as a legal remedy. At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance as the general remedy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6823 Files in this item: 1
wplefic142003new2.pdf (270.4Kb) -
Eliasson, Gunnar; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The New Economy is closely associated with computing & communications technology, notably the Internet. We discuss property rights to, and trade in, the difficult-to-define intangible assets increasingly dominating the New Economy, and the possibility of under-investment in these assets. For a realistic analysis we introduce a Schumpeterian market environment (the experimentally organized economy). Weak property rights prevail when the rights to access, use, and trade in intangible assets cannot be fully exercised. The trade-off between the benefits of open access on the Internet, and the incentive effects of strengthened property rights, depend both on the particular strategy a firm employs to secure property rights, and the protection offered by law. Economic property rights can be strengthened if the originator can find innovative ways to charge for the intangible assets. The extreme complexity of the New Economy and the large number of possible innovative private contract arrangements make it more important to facilitate the use and enforcement of private individualized contracts to protect intellectual property than to rely only on standard mandatory patent and copyright law. Enabling law is one proposed solution. Current patent legislation in the US has led to costly litigation processes weakening the position of small firms and individuals in patent disputes. The property rights of such firms and individuals could be strengthened with insurance or arbitration procedures. Key words: Competence bloc theory, Enabling law, Experimentally Organized Economy, New Economy, Weak property rights, Tradability, Underinvestment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6811 Files in this item: 1
wplefic052003.pdf (378.8Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
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Davis, Lee (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Lando, Henrik (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The standard of proof in criminal law a®ects retributive justice through the number of wrong convictions and wrong acquittals. It also a®ects the level of crime, since a higher standard of proof implies less deterrence and less incapacitation. This article derives an expression for the optimal standard from a trade-o® between these e®ects, and applies the expression to the crime of sexual violation against women. For this crime, social preferences for justice versus prevention of crime are elicited through a survey and inserted into the expression for the optimal standard. The result indicates that the concern for prevention of crime may have a signi¯cant e®ect on the optimal standard of proof. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6785 Files in this item: 1
wplefic042003.pdf (634.2Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]