Browsing Research documents by Author "Kanniainen, Vesa"
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Glazer, Amihai; Kanniainen, Vesa; Poutvaara, Panu (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only about the products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of being ethical consumers. Consequently, to affect a firm’s ethical behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy from an unethical firm. Consumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the boycott to (falsely) signal that they do care. In the firm’s choice between ethical and unethical behavior, the optimality of mixed and pure strategies depends on the cost of behaving ethically. In particular, when the cost is (relatively) low, ethical behavior arises from a prisoners’ dilemma as the firm’s optimal strategy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7706 Files in this item: 1
dp 2008-08.pdf (225.8Kb) -
Kanniainen, Vesa; Poutvaara, Panu (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper identifies several distortions which create barriers to entrepreneurship. First, in addition to the innate entry cost, there are entry costs caused by regulation. Second, union wage policies raise the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship. Third, inefficiencies in the transmission of tacit knowledge between generations of entrepreneurs can arise: with access to within-family ownership transfer, the outside market for entrepreneurship operates as a lemon’s market. This problem becomes relevant when the economic life of a business idea exceeds the active life of an entrepreneur. barriers to entrepreneurship, tacit knowledge, occupational choice URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7711 Files in this item: 1
artikel 18.pdf (210.7Kb) -
Glazer, Amihai; Kanniainen, Vesa; Poutvaara, Panu (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We consider the effects of income redistribution when people can migrate from one country to another, and when land within each country is heterogeneous. Taxes related to income can then affect property values, and can induce migration, which further affects property values. We show that under these conditions a utilitarian government should never equalize after-tax incomes. If migration is impossible, it may even transfer income from the poor to the rich, reducing the rents earned by absentee landlords. The redistributive tax on the rich may be higher or lower when the rich can migrate than when they cannot. A Rawlsian government in the absence of mobility will equalize after-tax incomes. Under mobility, Rawlsian governments cut their taxes if and only if the relative pre-tax income of the poor is sufficiently low. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7689 Files in this item: 1
dp 2008-05.pdf (163.9Kb)
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