Secession and Expulsion


Union Jack

Secession and Expulsion

Show simple item record Sweeney, Richard J. en_US 2009-02-04T10:24:50Z 2009-02-04T10:24:50Z 2003-11-21T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract If secession or expulsion ends in a "velvet divorce," as with Czechoslovakia, costs are minimal and the split is relatively unimportant. High costs arise if a federation splits into mutually hostile, comparably sized regions. Perhaps the majority of splits lead to dangerous hostility. A well-designed constitution minimizes the likelihood of hostile splits by limiting the issues that are dealt with at the federal level, by providing checks and balances, and by establishing due process under the rule of law. Preventing the conditions under which a hostile split may arise is more costeffective than trying to optimize the terms of a split or to find last-minute compromises to forestall the split. en_US
dc.format.extent 42 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC working paper;2003-12 en_US
dc.subject.other eu en_US
dc.subject.other usa en_US
dc.subject.other føderalisme en_US
dc.subject.other økonomisk historie en_US
dc.subject.other forfatninger en_US
dc.subject.other international politik en_US
dc.subject.other statsteori en_US
dc.subject.other nationalstat en_US
dc.title Secession and Expulsion en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt03nov21 inrumo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Finansiering en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Finance en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort DF en_US
dc.idnumber x656312679 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2003 en_US
dc.title.subtitle Lessons for the EU from United States History, 1789 - 1861 en_US

Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

Files Size Format View
wplefic122003.pdf 387.3Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record