The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence


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The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence

Show simple item record Lando, Henrik en_US 2009-02-04T10:24:55Z 2009-02-04T10:24:55Z 2004-08-09T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract The paper argues that society should vary the sanction applied to a criminal defendant with the weight of the evidence against him or her. This is optimal when it is costly for society to apply sanctions, since it can yield the same degree of deterrence while requiring fewer resources to be spent on sanctioning. Furthermore, when the unfairness of convicting an innocent defendant increases with the size of the sanction, this provides a further rationale for graduating sanctions with the probability of guilt. Some objections are briefly discussed, mainly that it is inherently unfair to apply different sanctions on people, who have committed the same offense, and that the legal system will lose legitimacy if it allows sanctions to vary in the way suggested. en_US
dc.format.extent 15 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2004-008 en_US
dc.subject.other kep en_US
dc.title The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04aug09 miel en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort IVS en_US
dc.idnumber x656444001 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2004 en_US

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