Equilibrium Selection with Risk Dominance in a Multiple-unit Unit Price Auction

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Equilibrium Selection with Risk Dominance in a Multiple-unit Unit Price Auction

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dc.contributor.author Boom, Anette en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:28:01Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:28:01Z
dc.date.issued 2008-06-25T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7664
dc.description.abstract This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing procedure, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to discriminate between two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of the same type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit price auction where two sellers compete in order to serve a fixed demand. The equilibria where the firm with the larger capacity bids the maximum price, serves the residual demand and is undercut by the low capacity firm that sells its total capacity risk dominate the equilibria where the roles are interchanged. en_US
dc.format.extent 12 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2008-02 en_US
dc.title Equilibrium Selection with Risk Dominance in a Multiple-unit Unit Price Auction en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt08jun25 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656556969 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2008 en_US


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