Agency Theory

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Agency Theory

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dc.contributor.author Linder, Stefan
dc.contributor.author Foss, Nicolai J.
dc.date.accessioned 2013-05-07
dc.date.accessioned 2013-05-07T09:16:46Z
dc.date.available 2013-05-07T09:16:46Z
dc.date.issued 2013-05-07
dc.identifier.isbn 9788791815898
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8693
dc.description.abstract Agency theory studies the problems and solutions linked to delegation of tasks from principals to agents in the context of conflicting interests between the parties. Beginning from clear assumptions about rationality, contracting and informational conditions, the theory addresses problems of ex ante (“hidden characteristics”) as well as ex post information asymmetry (“hidden action”), and examines conditions under which various kinds of incentive instruments and monitoring arrangements can be deployed to minimize the welfare loss. Its clear predictions and broad applicability have allowed agency theory to enjoy considerable scientific impact on social science; however, it has also attracted considerable criticism. [99 words] en_US
dc.format.extent 35 en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries SMG Working Paper;7/2013
dc.subject.other Adverse selection en_US
dc.subject.other Agency costs en_US
dc.subject.other Compensation en_US
dc.subject.other Conflict of interest en_US
dc.subject.other Contracting en_US
dc.subject.other Corporate governance en_US
dc.subject.other Delegation en_US
dc.subject.other Hidden action en_US
dc.subject.other Hidden characteristics en_US
dc.subject.other Incentive intensity en_US
dc.subject.other Information asymmetry en_US
dc.subject.other Informativeness en_US
dc.subject.other Monitoring en_US
dc.subject.other Moral hazard en_US
dc.subject.other Motivation en_US
dc.subject.other Nexus of contracts en_US
dc.subject.other Pay-for-performance en_US
dc.subject.other Principal-agent relationship en_US
dc.subject.other Second-best solution en_US
dc.title Agency Theory en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt13maj07 lbjl en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Strategi og Globalisering en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort SMG en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Institut for Strategic Management and Globalization en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort SMG en_US
dc.publisher.city Frederiksberg en_US
dc.publisher.year 2013 en_US


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