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Title:
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Partnering Contracts
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A Solution to the Nash Equilibrium? |
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Author:
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Tvarnø, Christina D. |
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Abstract:
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This paper discusses partnering contracts in Denmark and Great Britain, analyses
the legal content and applies game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma game on
some of the legal clauses and objectives. The paper defines partnering contracts as
alternative social contracts relevant when forming a strategic alliance or another
long-term relationship with a certain degree of specificity and frequency. It is not
the aim of partnering contracts to replace the traditional contracts. The paper
focuses on partnering in the construction industry and compares the clauses in
both Danish and British partnering contracts. Based on the analysis, the paper sets
up a scientific definition regarding the aim of partnering contracts and shows that
economic theory can explain the legal clauses in the partnering contract, and the
partnering contract can solve inefficiency in the Nash Equilibrium in the
prisoner’s dilemma game. The partnering contract makes it possible to obtain the
benefit from joint utility and the paper proposes some legal improvements in this
regard. |
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URI:
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http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8909
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Date:
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2014-04-22 |
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Notes:
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Paper presented at joint conference between CBS & Haifa
Copenhagen, August 2013 |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.
