Does Tax Evasion Affect Unemployment and Educational Choice ?


Union Jack

Does Tax Evasion Affect Unemployment and Educational Choice ?

Show simple item record Kolm, Ann-Sofie en_US Larsen, Birthe en_US 2009-02-04T10:27:43Z 2009-02-04T10:27:43Z 2003-11-26T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract While examining the macroeconomic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers are assumed to differ in ability, and the choice of education is determined endogenously. Job opportunities in an informal sector are available only to workers who choose not to acquire higher education. We find that increased punishment of informal activities increases the number of educated workers and reduces the number of unemployed workers. Considering welfare, we show it is optimal to choose punishment rates so to more than fully counteract the distortion created by the government’s inability to tax the informal sector. JEL-codes: H26, I21, J64 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, education, matching, unemployment. en_US
dc.format.extent 36 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2003-12 en_US
dc.subject.other skatteomgåelse en_US
dc.subject.other skattesnyd en_US
dc.subject.other skattemoral en_US
dc.subject.other uformel økonomi en_US
dc.subject.other alternativ økonomi en_US
dc.subject.other sort arbejde en_US
dc.subject.other uddannelse en_US
dc.subject.other arbejdsløshed en_US
dc.title Does Tax Evasion Affect Unemployment and Educational Choice ? en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt03nov26 lanomo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Nationaløkonomi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON
dc.idnumber x656312636 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2003 en_US

Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

Files Size Format View
wpec122003.pdf 347.6Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record